# BELFI v. WAGNER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667275

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667275

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding claims for intentional interference with D. Negligent Misrepresentation Belfi’s negligent misrepresentation claim will also be dismissed. A claim for negligent misrepresentation requires proof of four elements: “(1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2
- finding claim that lawyers inserted “fabricated” information into complaints would be barred by judicial privilege
- holding New Jersey’s litigation privilege “does not absolve a debt collector from liability under the FDCPA” because “the FDCPA does not contain an exemption from liability for common law privileges”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEXANDER BELFI : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. : No. 23-4346
:
THOMAS WAGNER, et al. :

MEMORANDUM
Judge Juan R. Sánchez September 30, 2024

Pro se Plaintiff Alexander Belfi brings this action against the law firm Marshall Dennehey,
PC and five individual attorneys, seeking damages for Defendants’ alleged misconduct in a civil
lawsuit they successfully prosecuted against him in state court between December 2017 and
January 2020. Defendants have moved to dismiss Belfi’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They argue Belfi’s claims, which focus almost entirely on
Defendants’ conduct during the underlying state court action, are barred by the applicable one-
and two-year statutes of limitations or by the judicial privilege doctrine. They also argue the claims
are not Belfi’s to pursue, as they belong to his bankruptcy estate. It is clear from the face of the
Amended Complaint and the other materials properly before the Court that dismissal is appropriate
based on one or more of the grounds advanced by Defendants. The motion will therefore be
granted, and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND1
On December 27, 2017, Attorney Gregory Fox, one of the individual Defendants in this
action,2 filed a complaint against Belfi in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on
behalf of his client, Mary Elizabeth Brophy. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The complaint was filed by Brophy

both in her individual capacity and as managing partner of and trading as “League Street
Partnership.” Id. In the complaint, Brophy asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, a declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment, among others, all based on the theory that
Brophy and Belfi had entered into a written partnership agreement to create an entity called the
League Street Partnership to own and develop real property in Philadelphia. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. According
to Belfi, the filing of the state court action breached the very partnership agreement on which
Brophy’s claims were based, as the agreement contained an arbitration clause. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.3

1 The following facts are drawn from Belfi’s Amended Complaint, the exhibits to the Amended
Complaint, and the state and federal court dockets pertaining to both the underlying state court
action from which Belfi’s claims in this case arise and Belfi’s bankruptcy case. These “[c]ourt
dockets may be considered on a motion to dismiss because they are matters of public record.”
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Nealey, 262 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2017); see also Orabi v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting a court “may take judicial
notice of the contents of another Court’s docket”); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong
Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (“To resolve a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
properly look at public records, including judicial proceedings, in addition to the allegations in the
complaint.”).

2 The individual attorney Defendants are Fox, Thomas Wagner, Melanie Foreman, Meredith
Lussier, and Butler Buchanan, III. Attorney Buchanan is sued in his capacity as Managing
Attorney of Marshall Dennehy’s Philadelphia office based on a theory of vicarious liability. Am.
Compl. 3, ECF No. 7. The remaining individual Defendants, three of whom are or were affiliated
with the Marshall Dennehy firm during the relevant timeframe, are alleged to have personally
participated in the tortious conduct pled. Id. at 2-3.

3 Belfi also alleges the filing of the state court action was improper in other ways, noting various
improprieties in the cover sheet, Defendants’ purposeful failure to include a “jurisdiction and
venue” statement in the complaint, and their failure to satisfy the procedural requirements for filing
a derivative action. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-18, 21.
Although the existence of a written partnership agreement was integral to Brophy’s claims against
Belfi, she and her counsel refused to produce the original agreement. Id. ¶ 24. They instead
produced only a copy of the agreement, which Belfi maintained (and continues to maintain) was
forged.4 See id. ¶¶ 23-24, 27-30.

Defendants successfully litigated the case in state court for two years, obtaining
“substantial monetary pre-trial orders/judgments against Belfi, which froze all of his assets,
requested certain monies be paid into an IOLTA [account] and the current leases, deeds, and titles
for his property at 1502 E. Moyamensing be turned over to the court.” Id. ¶ 7. Belfi alleges that
during the course of the litigation, Defendants failed to respond to discovery requests, withheld
documents fatal to Brophy’s claims, and helped Brophy avoid her deposition on several occasions.
Id. ¶¶ 36, 41. He also asserts they used the court to harass him by filing frivolous motions to
compel and for contempt. Id. ¶ 42. As a result of Defendants’ frivolous filings, Belfi was nearly
held in contempt of a June 6, 2018 court order freezing his funds in his primary account at Radius
Bank at a hearing on June 11, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 44, 50. According to the Amended Complaint, although

the state trial judge told Defendants at the June 11, 2018 hearing that they could not garnish Belfi’s
military disability benefits, Defendants succeeded in freezing Belfi’s account. Id. ¶¶ 45, 50 & Ex.
7 at 53. Defendants also abused their subpoena power by serving a subpoena on Radius Bank on
July 10, 2018, seeking Belfi’s personal and financial information, without first filing the subpoena
with the court to afford Belfi an opportunity to object. Id. ¶¶ 51-53.

4 Belfi obtained an expert opinion supporting his contention that his signature on the agreement
was forged in February 2018, three months after the state court action was filed. See Am. Compl.
Ex. 3.
The state court action ultimately went to trial in November 2019.5 See id. ¶¶ 27-28. At
trial, Belfi presented unrefuted expert testimony from a Certified Document/Handwriting
Examiner to support his claim that his signature on the partnership agreement was forged. Id.
¶¶ 23, 27-30. Nevertheless, on December 16, 2019, the trial court found in favor of Brophy,

individually and as managing partner of, and trading as, League Street Partnership, on her claim
for unjust enrichment and awarded $118,276.09 in damages. Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 48-
49 (12/18/19 docket entry). Judgment was entered in favor of Brophy and League Street
Partnership, and against Belfi on January 9, 2020. Id. at 50 (1/9/20 docket entry).
Belfi appealed, but the Superior Court quashed the appeal in May 2020. Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF
No. 17-2 at 49 (12/18/19 docket entry); Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 17-4 at 4-5 (5/19/20 docket entry).
On December 16, 2021, Belfi filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No.
17-9 at 2 (12/16/21 docket entry); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103, 116 (alleging Defendants’ actions
destroyed Belfi financially, culminating in bankruptcy). The bankruptcy case was concluded in
June 2022. Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No. 17-9 at 8.

Beginning in December 2022, nearly three years after judgment was entered against him
in the Court of Common Pleas, Belfi made a series of attempts to obtain relief from that judgment
in both state and federal court. In state court, he first filed an application to reinstate his appeal in
the Superior Court. Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 17-4 at 4 (12/27/22 docket entry). When that
application was denied, he filed two motions in the Court of Common Pleas, one seeking to vacate
the judgment and the other for release of funds. Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 51-52 (1/24/23

5 In April 2019, six months before trial, Belfi attempted to remove the case to federal court, but
the case was remanded. See Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 17-3 at 3-4. (Citations in the form “Defs.’ Ex.
__” are to the dockets attached as exhibits to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Citations to page
numbers within these exhibits use ECF pagination.)
docket entries). At the same time, Belfi also filed a motion for relief from judgment in federal
court, in the 2019 removal action. Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 17-3 at 5 (1/24/23 docket entry). All
three motions were denied. Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 54-56 (3/1/23 docket entry); Defs.’ Ex.
C, ECF No. 17-3 at 5-6 (2/27/23 docket entry). Belfi then appealed the rulings in state and federal

court. Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 54-56 (3/2/23 docket entries); Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 17-3 at
5-6 (3/23/23 docket entry). In April 2023, while those appeals were pending, he again attempted
to remove the state court action to federal court, and the case was again remanded. Defs.’ Ex. H,
ECF No. 17-8 at 2, 4 (4/24/23 and 7/20/23 docket entries). Belfi appealed the remand order to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.6 See id., ECF No. 17-8 at 4 (8/9/23 docket entry).
On August 24, 2023, Attorney Thomas Wagner took what Belfi contends was “the first
affirmative act in attempting to validate the fraudulent League Street Partnership” by filing a
Corporate Disclosure Statement in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 26.1 in one of Belfi’s then-
pending appeals. Am. Compl. ¶ 55 & Ex. 8. The filing identified the party making the disclosures

as “Mary Elizabeth Brophy; Mary Elizabeth Brophy as the Managing Partner of and t/a/ League
Street Partnership.”7 Id. Ex. 8. According to Belfi, this filing prompted him to make inquiry to

6 All of Belfi’s appeals have since been denied. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Belfi’s
motions for relief from judgment in the 2019 removal action in August 2023, and dismissed his
appeal from the 2023 remand order in November 2023. Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 17-7 at 4 (8/14/23
docket entry); Brophy v. Belfi, C.A. No. 23-2452 (3d Cir.) (11/17/23 docket entry). The Superior
Court quashed both of Belfi’s state court appeals in March 2024. See Brophy v. Belfi, 614 EDA
2023 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (3/21/24 docket entry); Brophy v. Belfi, 615 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct.)
(3/20/24 docket entry). These dispositions are reflected on the publicly available dockets in these
cases. Because all but the first of the dispositions occurred after this case was filed, however, they
are not reflected in the dockets attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

7 Belfi responded to the Corporate Disclosure Statement by filing a “Motion for Fraud on the court
seeking an order requiring the defendants to produce a certificate of Authority, the fictitious name
filing, and the state and status of incorporation of the purported general partnership (i.e., the
the Pennsylvania Secretary of State regarding the official status of the League Street Partnership.
See id. ¶ 127. On September 1, 2023, the Secretary of the Commonwealth certified that an
examination of the “indices and [r]ecords” of the Pennsylvania Department of State “fail[ed] to
disclose a presently subsisting either Foreign or Domestic filing Association, Limited Liability

Partnership, or a registration under the provisions of the Fictitious Names Act bearing the title,
League Street Partnership.” Id. ¶ 13 & Ex. 2.
On November 5, 2023, Belfi commenced this new federal court action by filing a
Complaint against Marshall Dennehy and the five individual attorney Defendants. Belfi filed an
Amended Complaint later the same month, asserting claims against all Defendants for (1) abuse
of process, (2) violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the
Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (FCEUA), and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), (3) tortious interference with contractual
relations, (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) aiding and abetting fraud and civil conspiracy, and
(6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-121. As noted, these claims

arise almost entirely from Defendants’ conduct in filing and prosecuting the underlying civil action
against him in the Court of Common Pleas. The Amended Complaint also includes counts
captioned “Tolling,” “Punitive Damages,” and “Vicarious Liability.” Id. ¶¶ 122-35.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety on grounds that
all of Belfi’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, most are barred by the

League Street Partnership).” Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Although the motion was pending when Belfi
filed the Amended Complaint in this case, it was denied in a November 17, 2023 Order that also
dismissed Belfi’s appeal from the remand order for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Order in Brophy
v. Belfi, C.A. No. 23-2452 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023), ECF No. 18-1.
judicial privilege doctrine,8 and Belfi lacks standing to bring the claims, which belong to his
bankruptcy estate.9 Belfi opposes the motion.
DISCUSSION
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
This standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”—i.e., facts that are more than “‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Doe v. Univ.
of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The court may also consider “exhibits attached to the

complaint,” “matters of public record,” and documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the

8 Defendants concede Belfi’s claim for abuse of process is not barred by the judicial privilege
doctrine. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 13 n.8, ECF No. 17. The privilege is also inapplicable
to claims under the FDCPA. See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 369
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding New Jersey’s litigation privilege “does not absolve a debt collector from
liability under the FDCPA” because “the FDCPA does not contain an exemption from liability for
common law privileges”).

9 Defendants also assert—in a footnote—that Belfi cannot prevail on the merits because he has not
alleged sufficient facts to establish any of his claims and because his claims require an assessment
of the applicable standard of care yet his certificate of merit states expert testimony is unnecessary.
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6 n.5, ECF No. 17. Because these arguments are not developed
and lack citations to legal authority, the Court focuses on Defendants’ primary grounds for
dismissal.
complaint” at the motion to dismiss stage, without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must
construe the complaint liberally, holding it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311, 325 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be asserted
in a responsive pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the Third Circuit permits a defendant to raise
a limitations defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “if the time alleged in the statement of a claim
shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.” Schmidt,
770 F.3d at 249 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A court cannot dismiss a case as
time-barred, however, unless the limitations bar is “apparent on the face of the complaint.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Abuse of Process

Belfi’s abuse of process claim will be dismissed because it is based on conduct that either
occurred outside the limitations period or is not actionable as abuse of process. To establish a
claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must show the defendant “(1) used a legal process against
the plaintiff; (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and
(3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.” Langman v. Keystone Nazareth Bank & Tr. Co., 502
F. App’x 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008)). Abuse of process claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 221 (citing
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(1)). The limitations period “begins to run as soon as the right to
institute and maintain a suit arises,” id. at 224 (quoting Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono
Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983))—typically “on the date the alleged abuse occurs,”
P.J.A. v. H.C.N., 156 A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
The Amended Complaint alleges Defendants engaged in abuse of process by (1) unlawfully
garnishing Belfi’s veteran disability funds and restricting him “to use his personal funds for his

daily personal and business expenses” in an attempt to coerce a settlement and damage his
reputation, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60; (2) filing the underlying civil action in court, notwithstanding
the partnership agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause, in an effort to stifle Belfi’s business
dealings and cause him to incur costs, id. ¶¶ 61-62; (3) proposing a release that would have
required Belfi to drop all claims to coerce a settlement and “buy [their] way out [of] liability for
the intentional damages [they] have caused Belfi,” id. ¶¶ 63-64, 68-69; and (4) using the
underlying civil action “to impose a restraint on Belfi’s property at 1502 E. Moyamensing for use
as a bargaining chip,” id. ¶ 67. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Belfi adds that
Defendants’ abuse of process also encompasses (5) using a subpoena never served on Belfi to
obtain his personal bank statements; (6) “filing a fraudulent corporate disclosure”; (7) “not

engaging in discovery”; and (8) “communicating directly with his bank and mortgage company
outside of any order allowing them to do so.”10 Pl.’s Opp’n 8, ECF No. 18.
Except for the filing of the corporate disclosure statement, however, all of this conduct
occurred while the underlying action was being litigated in the Court of Common Pleas between
December 2017 and January 2020, nearly four years before Belfi filed this lawsuit in November
2023. While Belfi does not specify the dates on which his funds were garnished and restricted,
the Amended Complaint makes clear that these actions were taken while the state court litigation

10 Belfi does not explain how Defendants used these any of these additional “processes” to
accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed.
was ongoing. It alleges, for example, that Belfi’s assets were frozen as a result of “pre-trial
orders/judgments,” Am. Compl. ¶ 7 (emphasis added); refers to a “June 6, 2018 freeze order” and
a June 11, 2018 hearing at which Belfi was nearly held in contempt of that order, id. ¶¶ 44, 50; and
notes Belfi testified about the garnishment of his funds at trial on November 25, 2019, id. ¶ 77.

Indeed, these actions could only have occurred while the state court litigation was ongoing—and
with Belfi’s knowledge—since he maintains they were “an attempt to coerce [him] into a
settlement” of that litigation. Id. ¶ 59.
As for the other abuse of process allegations, Belfi claims Defendants filed the complaint
in the underlying state court action on December 27, 2017,11 id. ¶ 1, and proposed the release Belfi
found objectionable on September 19, 2019, id. ¶ 63 & Ex. 9. With regard to the restraint on
Belfi’s property at 1502 E. Moyamensing, the Amended Complaint references a March 12, 2018
court order stating “1502 E Moyamensing may not be sold,” id. ¶ 97, and alleges Defendants
obtained “orders/judgments against Belfi” requiring “the current leases, deeds, and titles for [this
property] be turned over to the court” prior to trial, id. ¶ 7. The subpoena for Belfi’s personal and
financial information is alleged to have been served on his bank on July 10, 2018,12 id. ¶ 51, and

Defendants are alleged to have communicated with Belfi’s bank and mortgage company on June
7, 2018 and March 12, 2019, id. ¶¶ 49, 93 & Ex. 10. Finally, Defendants’ failure to engage
discovery in the underlying state court action necessarily would have occurred while that action

11 While Belfi maintains the partnership agreement containing the arbitration clause was
fraudulent, he was unquestionably aware of the agreement, which he admits “was produced at the
commencement of the civil action.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24.

12 Although Belfi alleges the subpoena was not filed with the trial court, preventing him from
objecting to its form and components, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52-53, the docket in the state court action
reflects that Defendants filed a certificate prerequisite to service of the subpoena pursuant to Rule
4009.22 on July 10, 2018, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 23 (7/10/18 docket entry).
was ongoing. See id. ¶ 40 (noting Defendants’ failure to respond to discovery requests served on
May 29, 2018).
The only alleged abuse of process that occurred within the limitations period was Attorney
Wagner’s filing of a corporate disclosure statement in the Third Circuit on August 23, 2023. This

filing, however, cannot support liability for abuse of process. Even assuming the filing constitutes
use of a legal process against Belfi, he has not alleged—and cannot show—the filing caused him
any harm. The corporate disclosure statement is attached as an exhibit to Belfi’s Amended
Complaint. The instructions on the first page of the form explain its purpose is “to provide the
judges with information about any conflicts of interest which would prevent them from hearing
the case.” Am. Compl. Ex. 8. To that end, the form includes four questions that ask the responding
“nongovernmental corporate party” to identify any parent corporations, publicly held companies
holding 10% or more of the party’s stock, non-party publicly held corporations that have a financial
interest in the outcome of the proceeding, and certain participants in bankruptcy appeals. Id. In
completing the form, Attorney Wagner identified “Mary Elizabeth Brophy; Mary Elizabeth

Brophy as the Managing Partner of and t/a League Street Partnership” as the party making the
disclosure and responded “N/A” (or not applicable) to each of the four inquiries. Id. Belfi alleges
the filing was “an attempt to validate a fraudulent partnership through the courts.” Pl.’s Opp’n 3,
ECF No. 18; Am. Compl. ¶ 55. But the filing merely identified “Mary Elizabeth Brophy as the
Managing Partner of and t/a League Street Partnership” as a plaintiff in the action—just as the
complaint in the underlying civil action had done when it was filed in state court in December
2017.13 Am Compl. ¶ 1. It did not ask the Court of Appeals to take any action to “validate” the

13 Because the federal court case was a removed from state court, the parties were the same as in
the state court action.
partnership. And it plainly had no impact on the Court’s disposition of the appeal, which was
dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the district court’s remand order was not
appealable. Order in Brophy v. Belfi, C.A. No. 23-2452 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023), ECF No. 18-1.14
In responding to Defendants’ argument that his abuse of process claim should be dismissed

as time-barred, Belfi does not dispute that the conduct on which the claim is based—apart from
Attorney Wagner’s filing of a corporate disclosure statement in the Third Circuit—occurred
outside the two-year limitations period. He instead invokes the continuing violation doctrine and
the discovery rule to argue the claim did not accrue until the corporate disclosure statement was
filed on August 23, 2023. The Amended Complaint also anticipatorily invokes the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment, alleging the statute of limitations should be tolled based on Defendants’
misrepresentations and/or concealment regarding the status of the partnership. Id. ¶¶ 122-29. All
of these arguments are unavailing.
Pennsylvania’s discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations “until the injured party
discovers or reasonably should discover that he has been injured and that his injury has been caused

by another party’s conduct.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 859 (Pa. 2005). Belfi asserts, without
elaboration, that he lacked “sufficient information to recognize that the matter warrant[ed] further
pursuit” until Attorney Wagner filed the corporate disclosure statement in the Third Circuit. Pl.’s
Opp’n 3, ECF No. 18; see also Pl.’s Surreply 2, ECF No. 27 (“[O]nly when Mr. Wagner filed the

14 In a different count of his Amended Complaint, Belfi alleges that when he filed a motion to
vacate the court order garnishing his exempt funds in January 2023, Defendants opposed it. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 77-78. Belfi asserts the filing of the opposition “tolled or became new claims against
the defendants for abuse of process and violations of the FDCPA.” Id. ¶ 78. The docket in the
state court action reflects that the opposition was filed at the request of the trial court. See Defs.’
Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2 at 52 (2/21/23 docket entry). Belfi provides no explanation as to how
Defendants’ filing of a court-ordered opposition to a motion to vacate the judgment they obtained
three years earlier constitutes abuse of process.
corporate disclosure was the plaintiff able to maintain his action to a successful conclusion.”).
This filing, however, is irrelevant to Belfi’s claims. Belfi’s own Amended Complaint makes clear
he was aware of the conduct he challenges as an abuse of process and the harm it caused him while
the state court litigation was ongoing. The discovery rule is therefore inapplicable here.

The same is true of the continuing violation doctrine. “Under that doctrine, ‘when a
defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period.’” Montanez v. Sec’y Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286,
292 (3d Cir. 2001)). As explained above, the filing of the corporate disclosure statement cannot
be the basis for an abuse of process claim and therefore cannot be part of a continuing practice of
abuse of process. Even if it could, “the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when the
plaintiff ‘is aware of the injury at the time it occurred.’” Id. (quoting Morganroth & Morganroth
v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003)). Here, as noted,
Belfi was aware of his injuries resulting from Defendants’ alleged abuse of process during the state
court litigation. The continuing violation doctrine thus does not toll statute of limitations here.15

15 Belfi also asserts, again without elaboration, that Defendants’ filing of an opposition to the
motions to vacate and release funds he filed in the Court of Common Pleas in January 2023 is a
“compelling reason[] to toll the statute of limitations on all claims due to the continuous violations
and discovery rule.” Pl.’s Opp’n 3, ECF No. 18 (footnotes omitted). The filing of the opposition
could not have tolled the statute of limitations based on the discovery rule because Belfi has not
stated a claim for abuse of process based on the filing of the opposition. And “a continuing
violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original
violation.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Belfi’s
alleged injuries stem from Defendants’ actions in the underlying state court litigation, which was
concluded by January 2020. The fact that Defendants would not accede to Belfi’s efforts to reopen
the state court judgment years later does not amount to a continuing violation.
Finally, there is no basis to apply the doctrine of fraudulent concealment here. Under the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a defendant “may not invoke the statute of limitations, if
through fraud or concealment, he causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right
of inquiry into the facts.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 860. “The doctrine does not require fraud in the

strictest sense encompassing an intent to deceive, but rather, fraud in the broadest sense, which
includes an unintentional deception.” Id. Where the doctrine applies, it tolls the statute of
limitations until “the injured party knows or reasonably should know of his injury and its cause.”
Id. at 861. Belfi appears to invoke the doctrine based on Defendants’ misrepresentations and
concealment regarding the status and validity of the partnership. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122-29. As
Defendants note, however, it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Belfi knew the partnership
was invalid during the state court litigation. He obtained an expert report on February 21, 2018,
concluding his signature on the partnership agreement was traced from another document and the
agreement was therefore not authentic. Id. Ex. 3 at 3, ECF No. 7. He also presented expert
testimony regarding the forged signature at trial on November 27, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 27-30. Having

defended the state court action based in part on the partnership agreement’s invalidity, Belfi cannot
now maintain he was somehow deceived into believing the partnership was valid.16

16 That Belfi did not learn until September 2023 of the lack of any filings with the Pennsylvania
Department of State under the name “League Street Partnership” does not change the analysis.
The lack of this information did not prevent Belfi from believing the partnership was invalid and
seeking proof of that fact via an expert opinion and testimony. Moreover, Belfi himself
acknowledges that information regarding the partnership’s lack of filings was readily available via
a public records search on the Department of State website. Am. Compl. ¶ 31 (noting the website
can be publicly searched and asking the court to take judicial notice of the lack of any “League
Street Partnership” filings).
Because it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Belfi’s abuse of process claim is
either time-barred or based on conduct that is not actionable, the claim will be dismissed with
prejudice.
B. FDCPA/FCEUA/UTPCPL
Although Belfi brings identical claims under the FDCPA, the FCEUA, and the UTPCPL,17

the claims are subject to different statutes of limitations. An action under the FDCPA must be
brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); see
also Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 10 (2019) (holding the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period
“begins to run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date on which
the violation is discovered”). An action under the FCEUA must be brought “within two years
from the date on which the violation occurs.” 73 Pa. Stat. § 2270.5(b). Defendants assert that
because Belfi’s UTPCPL claim is based solely on a violation of the FCEUA, the claim is subject
to the FCEUA’s two-year statute of limitations rather than the six-year statute of limitations
otherwise applicable to UTPCPL claims.18 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 9, ECF No. 17.

Defendants cite no law for this proposition, and the case law identified by the Court suggests
otherwise. See Almashhadani v. Norris McLaughlin, P.A., Civ. No. 20-04681, 2021 WL 2454456,
at *6 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2021) (rejecting argument that FCEUA’s two-year limitations period

17 A violation of the FDCPA also constitutes “an unfair or deceptive debt collection act or practice”
under the FCEUA. 73 Pa. Stat. § 2270.4(a). Similarly, if a debt collector engages in “an unfair or
deceptive debt collection act or practice” under the FCEUA, it is also a violation of the UTPCPL.
Id. § 2270.5(a).

18 See Rodgers v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 845 F. App’x 145, 147 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A six-year
statute of limitations applies to a UTPCPL claim.” (citing Morse v. Fisher Asset Mgmt., LLC, 206
A.3d 521, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)).
governed a UTPCPL claim based on a FCEUA violation). The Court will therefore apply a six-
year statute of limitations to Belfi’s UTPCPL claim.
While Belfi’s FDCPA/FCEUA/UTPCPL claims are difficult to decipher, they appear to be
based primarily on Defendants’ filing of “a false, misleading, and blatantly deceptive complaint”

in the underlying state court action in an attempt to collect a debt, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72, 76, and
garnishment of Belfi’s bank account, despite knowing the funds in the account were exempt (or
without verifying Belfi’s statements to that effect), id. ¶¶ 77, 84. As noted above, these actions
are alleged to have been taken while the state court action was pending between December 2017
and January 2020. Belfi did not file this action until November 2023, well past two years later.
As a result, his FDCPA and FCEUA claims are barred by the applicable one- and two-year statutes
of limitations.
Belfi alleges Defendants’ filing of an opposition to his post-judgment motion to vacate in
2023 constitutes a “new” FDCPA claim, id. ¶ 78, but this claim is nevertheless untimely. Where
an FDCPA claim is based on “allegations of improper pursuit of debt collection litigation,” the

statute of limitations begins to run either upon the filing of the underlying collection action or
when the purported debtor was served. See Schaffhauser v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 340 F. App’x
128, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing circuit split on this issued). The continuing violation
doctrine does not apply in the FDCPA context. Brown v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 73 F.4th 1030,
1044 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Schaffhauser, 340 F. App’x at 131 (declining to extend the
continuing violation doctrine to an FDCPA claim based on defendants’ participation in ongoing
debt collection litigation). So post-filing litigation acts do not trigger a new limitations period
unless they constitute standalone violations of the FDCPA. See Brown, 73 F.4th at 1042. Post-
filing conduct must be “independent of [the] initial filing of the lawsuit—not a continuing effect
of it” to qualify as a standalone FDCPA violation. Bouye v. Bruce, 61 F.4th 485, 493 (6th Cir.
2023). “[S]tandard litigation events that reasonably follow the commencement of a lawsuit . . .
are not independent FDCPA violations.” Brown, 73 F.4th at 1044. Belfi’s motion to vacate and
Defendants’ opposition to the motion were filed in the underlying state court action—the same

action in which Belfi alleges Defendants improperly garnished his exempt funds. Belfi does not
allege Defendants took a new or different position in their 2023 opposition. Rather, by opposing
Belfi’s “Motion to Vacate the court order garnishing his exempt funds,” Am. Compl. ¶ 77,
Defendants “simply ‘reaffirmed’ the legitimacy of [their earlier position].” Bouye, 61 F.4th at 493.
The filing of the opposition thus does not qualify as an independent FDCPA violation with a new
limitations period.
While Belfi’s UTPCPL claim is not time-barred, the claim belongs to Belfi’s bankruptcy
estate. Because the estate never abandoned the claim, Belfi lacks authority to pursue it.
Upon the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition, most of the debtor’s property becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate. In re Wilton Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2020).

The estate “includes all kinds of property, including . . . causes of action.” In re O’Dowd, 233
F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “A cause of action [becomes] property of the
estate if the claim existed at the commencement of the [bankruptcy] filing and the debtor could
have asserted the claim on his own behalf under state law.” Wilton Armetale, 968 F.3d at 280
(alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown,
Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002)). Under the Bankruptcy Code, once a cause of action
becomes the estate’s property, only the trustee has authority to pursue it. Id. The trustee also has
authority to abandon a cause of action belonging to the estate, but “must do so ‘overt[ly].’” Id. at
284 (citation omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (“After notice and a hearing, the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate.”). Unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise, property of the
estate that is neither abandoned nor administered in the bankruptcy case “remains property of the
estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). Thus, “[a] cause of action[] which a debtor fails to schedule[] remains

property of the estate because it was not abandoned and not administered.” Allston-Wilson v.
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., Civ. No. 05-4056, 2006 WL 1050281, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2006).
Here, as noted, Belfi’s UTPCPL claim accrued while the underlying action was being
litigated in state court, between December 2017 and January 2020, and thus became property of
Belfi’s bankruptcy estate upon the filing of his bankruptcy petition in December 2021. Belfi did
not include the UTPCPL claim in the schedule of assets he filed in the bankruptcy case.19 See
Defs.’ Ex. J, ECF No. 17-10. Rather, in response to the inquiry regarding “Claims against third
parties, whether or not you have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment,” Belfi listed only
a lawsuit he filed against USAA Federal Savings and MERSCORPO Holding Inc. Id. at 6. Belfi
notes “the Chapter 7 Trustee had no interest in the claims and closed his file.” Pl.’s Opp’n 11,

ECF No. 18. But the docket entry Belfi cites gives no indication the Trustee abandoned any claims,
and the Trustee could not have abandoned Belfi’s UTPCPL claim in any event, as the claim was
not scheduled. As a result, the claim remains property of the estate, and Belfi lack statutory
authority to assert it.20

19 The Court may consider this bankruptcy filing in deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss
because it is a matter of public record. See S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc., 181 F.3d at 426.

20 This conclusion applies equally to all of Belfi’s time-barred claims.
Belfi notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 would permit the Court to join or
substitute the Trustee as the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (“The court may
not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an
objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be

substituted into the action.”). Belfi has made no effort to join or substitute the Trustee in this
action after being alerted to this defect in December 2023. Accordingly, the UTPCPL claim will
be dismissed without prejudice.
C. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
Belfi’s claim for tortious interference with contract is also time-barred. The elements of a
tortious interference claim are:
(1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the complainant and a third
party; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering
with that contractual relationship; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the
part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of
defendant’s conduct.

Hyldahl v. Denlinger, 661 F. App’x 167, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Walnut St. Assocs., Inc.
v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 982 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)). The statute of limitations for
such a claim is two years. Id. at 170 (citing CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs.
Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2004)).
For his tortious interference claim, Belfi alleges Defendants “interfered with his mortgage
contract with USAA by sending threatening notices on, but not limited to March 12, 2019,
‘cautioning’ USAA Federal Savings Bank not to disburse any funds from the potential foreclosure
sale of his primary residence located at 1502 E. Moyamensing Ave.” Am. Compl. ¶ 93. He also
alleges Defendants “interfered with his contract with his personal financial institution”—
Aspiration Financial, LLC/Radius Bank—“by garnishing his account and restricting his use of
personal funds.” Id. ¶ 101.
The conduct on which this claim is based occurred while the state court litigation was
ongoing. Belfi himself alleges Defendants’ interference with his mortgage lender occurred on

March 12, 2019, when they sent a letter to USAA. Id. ¶ 93. The letter in question is attached as
an exhibit to Belfi’s Amended Complaint. Id. Ex. 10. As Defendants note, the letter was copied
to Belfi’s counsel in the underlying state court action, id., so Belfi either was or reasonably should
have been aware of the alleged interference around the time the letter was sent, more than four
years before this lawsuit was filed. Although the Amended Complaint alleges Defendants’
threatening notices were not limited to the one sent on March 12, 2019, it identifies no later
communications.
As for the interference with Belfi’s financial institution, while the Amended Complaint
does not specify a date or dates on which Belfi’s funds were garnished and restricted, it is clear
these actions occurred while the underlying state court action was ongoing, as discussed in detail
above.21 Belfi’s tortious interference claim is therefore time-barred.

21 Defendants suggest that based on Belfi’s allegations regarding a June 11, 2018 hearing at which
he was nearly held in contempt of a court order freezing his funds in his primary account at Radius
Bank, the interference must have predated the hearing. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10 n.6,
ECF No. 17. Belfi disputes this, arguing the communications post-dated the June 11, 2018 hearing
and adding that Defendants “also communicated with Aspiration to verify his bank statements for
trial on November 26, 2019.” Pl.’s Opp’n 5, ECF No. 18. This dispute is immaterial because it is
clear from the Amended Complaint that the garnishment and restriction of Belfi’s funds occurred
during the course of the state court action for reasons discussed above.
Belfi also notes that in February 2023, Attorney Wagner opposed his motion to vacate and
release funds in the Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 5. He provides no explanation as to how this
court filing constitutes interference with his contract with his bank. In any event, the opposition
brief, a filing in the underlying state court action made at the request of the state court, is protected
by the judicial privilege doctrine, discussed in greater detail below. See Schwartz v. OneWest
Bank, FSB, 614 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding claims for intentional interference with
D. Negligent Misrepresentation
Belfi’s negligent misrepresentation claim will also be dismissed. A claim for negligent
misrepresentation requires proof of four elements: “(1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2)
made under circumstances in which the misrepresenter ought to have known its falsity; (3) with

an intent to induce another to act on it; and[] (4) which results in injury to a party acting in
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.” Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 561 (Pa. 1999). The
statute of limitations for a negligent misrepresentation claim is two years. Rodgers, 845 F. App’x
at 147 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7)).
Belfi alleges Defendants misrepresented the material facts that (1) “the ‘League Street
Partnership’ was a valid Pennsylvania general partnership” and (2) “Ms. Brophy was the managing
partner of” the partnership. Am. Compl. ¶ 106. According to the Amended Complaint,
Defendants made this misrepresentation in the complaint they filed against Belfi in state court in
December 2017 and in subsequent iterations of that state court complaint. Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 9. Belfi also
alleges Defendants have “continuously misrepresented the same to this day.” Id. ¶ 99.

To the extent the claim is based on misrepresentations made during the course of the
underlying state court litigation, it is clearly time-barred. Belfi claims to have relied on
Defendants’ misrepresentations. Id. ¶ 107. But the Amended Complaint also alleges the
partnership agreement was forged and Belfi knew of the forgery within months after the state court
action was filed through the expert report he obtained in February 2018. See id. Ex. 3. Indeed,
Belfi defended the state court action at least in part on this basis, presenting expert testimony at
trial that his signature on the agreement was forged. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27-30. It is thus clear from the

existing and prospective contractual relations based on the filing of a foreclosure action and
communications in connection with that action were barred by the judicial privilege).
Amended Complaint that Belfi either knew or reasonably should have known the partnership was
invalid as early as February 2018 and no later than November 2019, when the state court case went
to trial.22 This knowledge also forecloses Belfi’s negligent misrepresentation claim to the extent
it relies on misrepresentations after the state court litigation was concluded, as Belfi cannot have

relied on misrepresentations he knew were false.
Moreover, the claim must be dismissed because it is barred by Pennsylvania’s judicial
privilege. The judicial privilege provides “absolute immunity for ‘communications which are
issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the
redress or relief sought.’” Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Post v. Mendel,
507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986)). The privilege “sweeps broadly to protect ‘[a]ll communications
pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding.’” Schwartz, 614 F. App’x at 82 (alteration in
original) (quoting Binder v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971). It “covers
statements by a party, a witness, an attorney, or a judge,” and “is absolute, meaning that, where it
attaches, the declarant’s intent is immaterial even if the statement is false and made with malice.”

Schanne v. Addis, 121 A.3d 942, 947 (Pa. 2015).
Belfi’s negligent misrepresentation claim is based entirely on statements made by opposing
counsel in pleadings (and perhaps other filings) made in the state court litigation. As such, the
claim is barred by the judicial privilege. See Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alliance Adjustment Grp.,
708 F. App’x 64, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims based
on misrepresentations in pleadings submitted on behalf of an opposing party were “made during

22 For the same reason, it clear from the Amended Complaint that Belfi cannot show reliance, as
required for a negligent misrepresentation claim. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6 n.5, ECF
No. 17.
the course of litigation and thus shielded by judicial privilege”); see also id. at 71 (finding claim
that lawyers inserted “fabricated” information into complaints would be barred by judicial
privilege).
E. Aiding and Abetting Fraud and Civil Conspiracy

In Count V of the Amended Complaint, captioned “Aiding and Abetting Fraud and Civil
Conspiracy,” Belfi alleges a conspiracy
to defraud [him] of the money due to him from the rental income he received from
his property at 1502 E Moyamensing Ave., Phila, PA, the proceeds from the sale
of his property at 2251 League St., Philadelphia Pa and the ultimate beneficial use
of his personal property and land, along with his exempt funds.

Am. Compl. ¶ 112. Defendants are alleged to have participated in the conspiracy by taking “the
specific actions outlined in this complaint with the intent to injure [Belfi] based on their fraud and
perjury,” including by “assert[ing] that the League Street Partnership is a valid Pennsylvania entity
and Ms. Brophy is the managing partner of such entity” in an effort to “justify and validate” their
claims. Id. ¶¶ 113-14.
The statute of limitations for these fraud-based claims is two years. See Kliesh v. Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 527 F. App’x 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (statute of limitations for fraud and
civil conspiracy is two years (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7))). As set forth above, apart from
the filing of the corporate disclosure statement, the conduct alleged in Amended Complaint
occurred while the state court action was being litigated between December 2017 and January
2020. The corporate disclosure statement is no more actionable as fraud than as abuse of process,
for the reasons explained above. These claims are therefore time-barred.
F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, Belfi asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). An
IIED claim “requires four elements: (1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the
conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress
must be severe.” Robinson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 821 F. App’x 97, 102 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). The statute of limitation for an IIED claim is two years. Ormsby v. Luzerne
Cnty. Dep’t of Public Welfare Office of Human Servs., 149 F. App’x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2005). Rather

than plead conduct satisfying the foregoing elements, Belfi alleges only that (1) the averments
elsewhere in the Amended Complaint are “incorporate[d] by reference,” and (2) “[m]edical
testimony is not required to show emotional distress damages in an abuse of process claim.” Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 120-21 (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that even reading the Amended Complaint as a whole, “there are no
factual allegations of conduct by the Defendants occurring within two (2) years of the date on
which this lawsuit was filed which could give rise to this claim.” Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
11, ECF No. 17. The Court agrees. To the extent the IIED claim is based on conduct by
Defendants while the underlying state court action was being litigated between December 2017
and January 2020, the claim is time-barred. As noted, the only conduct alleged within two years

of the filing of this action in November 2023 is Defendants’ filing of an opposition to Belfi’s
untimely motion to vacate in state court and filing of a corporate disclosure statement in the Third
Circuit. These actions cannot give rise to an IIED claim as a matter of law. See Robinson, 821 F.
App’x at 102 (an IIED claim requires conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society” (citation omitted)). In any event, this conduct is clearly protected
by the judicial privilege. This claim will also be dismissed.
G. Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability
The Amended Complaint also includes counts captioned “Punitive Damages” and
“Vicarious Liability.” Because all of Belfi’s underlying claims will be dismissed, there is no basis
for Belfi to recover under either theory. These counts will therefore be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
As set forth above Belfi’s claims for abuse of process, violations of the FDCPA and the
FCEUA, tortious interference with contractual relations, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and
abetting fraud and civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred in
their entirety or in substantial part by the applicable statute of limitations and/or the judicial
privilege doctrine. Belfi’s efforts to state a claim under some of these theories based on conduct
within the limitations period—Defendants’ filing of a corporate disclosure statement in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals and the filing of a court-ordered response to the motions to vacate
judgment and release funds—are unavailing, and further amendment would be futile. These claims
will therefore be dismissed with prejudice. While Belfi’s UTPCPL claim is not time-barred, the

claim belongs to Belfi’s bankruptcy estate, so Belfi lacks authority to pursue it. The UTPCPL
claim will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez .
Juan R. Sánchez, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667275. Public record. Not legal advice.