# ADAMS v. DELAWARE COUNTY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667268

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667268

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the 60-day clock begins on the date of the original complaint, not the date of the amended complaint
- holding that prison officials act deliberately indifferent when they “intentionally deny[] or delay[] access to medical care or interfer[e] with the treatment”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT L. ADAMS, : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : NO. 23-1178
:
DELAWARE COUNTY, et al. :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
MURPHY, J. September 30, 2024
According to his pleadings, Mr. Adams was a pre-trial detainee at George W. Hill
Correctional Facility. He arrived after a transfer from another jail expecting to continue
treatment for opioid abuse, including a prescription for Suboxone. But George W. Hill staff
halved his dose, citing policy. Then they cut him off entirely, causing severe symptoms of
forced withdrawal.
Mr. Adams filed this action pro se asserting violations of rights based on events that
allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at George W. Hill. Mr. Adams alleges that
Delaware County, corrections officials, the prison medical contractor, and prison medical staff
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Eighth
Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment by denying him Medications for Opioid Use Disorder
(MOUD) and mental health care. He also asserts state law claims against the prison medical
contractor and medical staff for professional negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
The various defendants filed two motions to dismiss Mr. Adams’s amended complaint for
failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we grant in part and deny in part.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Adams filed an amended complaint consisting of the preprinted Prisoner Complaint
for Violation of Civil Rights, 39 handwritten pages, and attachments and exhibits. DI 56. The
amended complaint is the operative pleading in this case.1 Mr. Adams names six defendants: (1)

Delaware County; (2) The GEO Group, Inc.; (3) Warden Laura Williams; (4) Chief Medical
Officer John Christakis; (5) Nurse Ivy Ford; and (6) Doctor Ronald B. Phillips. Id. at 14-15.2
He sues all defendants in their official and individual capacities. Id. Defendants The GEO
Group and John Christakis have not been served. DI 60, 66, 69. Because we are on motions to
dismiss, we accept Mr. Adams’s allegations as true and summarize them below.
The core of Mr. Adams’s complaint is that while housed as a pre-trial detainee at George
W. Hill, he was forced to undergo opioid withdrawal and denied mental health care, ultimately
resulting in life threatening symptoms. Mr. Adams has struggled with Opioid Use Disorder
(OUD) for most of his life. DI 56 at 16. He also struggles with various mental health disorders,
including “bipolar disorder, manic depression, schizophrenia, oppositional defiant disorder, [and]

PTSD.” Id.
Mr. Adams was detained at Bucks County Correctional Facility on October 1, 2022. Id.
at 18. Before his arrest, he had been in treatment for severe opioid dependence for about six
months and had received Suboxone “continuously” during this time. Id. While detained at

1 See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “an
amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity”
and that “the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading”). Mr.
Adams named George W. Hill Health Services Administrator Kristen Grady as a defendant in his
original complaint, DI 2 at 11, but not in his amended complaint, DI 56 at 12. Accordingly, Ms.
Grady is no longer a defendant in this case.

2 We adopt the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
2
Bucks County Correctional, he received 16 milligrams of Suboxone and mental health
medications — including 100 milligrams of “Seraquil” and 30 milligrams of “Rimron” — daily.3
Id. at 18-19.
Mr. Adams arrived at George W. Hill on December 12, 2022 as a “security transfer” from

Bucks County Correctional. Id. at 16. He then informed staff of his current medications and
requested Suboxone, Seroquel, and Remeron. Id. at 19. He claims that the Bucks County
Correctional medical department verified for George W. Hill the daily dosage amounts for his
medications. Id.
According to Mr. Adams, Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips — both medical providers at
George W. Hill — formulated a “care plan” that consisted of “forced withdrawal from suboxone
and mental health medications that he desperately needed.” Id. at 22. As the Methadone-
Assisted Treatment (MAT) Supervisor, Nurse Ford is allegedly responsible for “distributing
suboxone” to people with OUD and for “overseeing all aspects concerning suboxone” at George
W. Hill. Id. at 15, 39. Mr. Adams asked Nurse Ford for 16 milligrams of Suboxone and his

psychiatric medications. Id. at 19. Nurse Ford responded that “she was only going to give him
8mg of suboxone” and that “she was not the nurse who gave out mental health medications.” Id.
Mr. Adams also requested 16 milligrams of Suboxone and 100 milligrams of Seroquel from Dr.
Phillips, the Medical Director at George W. Hill. Id. at 21. Dr. Phillips informed Mr. Adams
that the prison provides only 8 milligrams of Suboxone regardless of one’s prior prescription. Id.
“Psych meds [were] also denied.” Id.

3 Mr. Adams refers to the psychiatric medications he was taking as “Seraquil,” “Rimron,”
and “Doxepin.” DI 56 at 15-16, 36. Construing the complaint liberally, we assume he is
referring to Seroquel, Remeron, and Doxepin.
3
On December 27, 2022, Nurse Ford provided Mr. Adams with 8 milligrams of Suboxone.
Id. at 19-20. He “took [the] medication into his mouth, under his tongue.” Id. at 20. Nurse Ford
then went back to “playing” with an officer, who “began to have words with Mr. Adams.” Id.
Mr. Adams was accused of “cheeking” medication (i.e., concealing medication between one’s

teeth and cheek to avoid swallowing it). Id. An officer searched him and his cell for the
medication but found nothing. Id. The next day, he received 8 milligrams of Suboxone. Id. On
December 29, 2022, when Mr. Adams asked for his Suboxone, Nurse Ford said “no.” Id. Mr.
Adams told Nurse Ford that “she was causing him physical harm and could not just abruptly stop
his medication.” Id. She replied, “I just did.” DI 56 at 20.
Mr. Adams claims defendants’ failure to provide MOUD caused him to suffer forced
withdrawal from Suboxone. Id. at 27. He experienced symptoms of “bone and joint pain, aches,
vomiting, diarrhea, nausea, anxiety, depression, difficulty concentrating, insomnia, body
numbness, and uncontrollable cravings for opioids.” Id. at 22. The forced withdrawal prevented
him from exercising and made it difficult to read or eat. Id. at 23. As his symptoms worsened,

Mr. Adams complained about pain and cold sweats to medical staff, wrote sick call requests
explaining his pain and suffering, and requested Suboxone every day he saw medical staff. Id. at
22-23. According to Mr. Adams, other prison staff emailed the mental health unit on his behalf.
Id. at 22. In early January 2023, his “Legal Assistant” reportedly contacted the maximum-
security unit counselor to request medication for Mr. Adams. Id. at 24. Mr. Adams filed three
grievances with the prison, which he attached as exhibits to the amended complaint. Id. at 53,
55, 63. Mr. Adams claims that despite these efforts, he was denied Suboxone, psychiatric
mediation, and any medical help with withdrawal. Id. at 23.

4
On January 6, 2023, Mr. Adams lost consciousness and hit his head on a concrete floor.
Id. at 24. He was rushed to the hospital with “paralysis to the left side of his body, swelling to
the left side of his head, a concussion, a chemical imbalance, dehydration and a systematic shut
down.” Id. Doctors prescribed him 100 milligrams of Doxepin and 12 milligrams, twice daily,

of Suboxone. Id. at 25. When he returned to George W. Hill with a doctor’s order for his
medication, the facility refused to give him MOUD and mental health medications. Id. On
January 10, he was transferred back to Bucks County Correctional. Id.
Mr. Adams alleges that George W. Hill has policies or customs of denying prescribed
dosages of Suboxone that exceed 8 milligrams and denying prescribed mental health medications
Seroquel and Doxepin. Id. at 39. As historical context, he alleges that between January 2018 and
March 2021, approximately 10,400 detainees at George W. Hill were forced to withdraw from
opioids without access to MOUD. Id. at 27. He claims that Delaware County passed a
resolution in 2021 to expand treatment, including medication options, for incarcerated people
with OUD. Id. at 40.

Based on this series of events, Mr. Adams advances claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 42-45. He also asserts professional negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 45-46. He seeks monetary relief. Id. at 47.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Delaware County and Warden Williams (the county defendants) move to dismiss Mr.
Adams’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
county defendants assert that Mr. Adams’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be
dismissed because Mr. Adams does not allege that he was precluded from participating in any
5
programs, services, or activities and that any preclusion occurred because of his alleged
disability. DI 61 at 5-6. The county defendants move to dismiss Mr. Adams’s Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims on the basis that Mr. Adams fails to plead sufficient facts to
support a deliberate indifference claim against Warden Williams or a Monell claim against

Delaware County. Id. at 9-12.
In his opposition brief to the county defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Adams claims
that Warden Williams interfered with his medical treatment. DI 64 at 3. He also asserts facts
that were not included in his amended complaint. He alleges that Warden Williams signed an
agreement to accept Mr. Adams into George W. Hill from Bucks County Correctional. Id. at 1-
2. He claims that Warden Williams knew of his prescribed medications and medical needs
because this information is listed on an Exchange of Inmate Information form. Id. at 2. Mr.
Adams further states that Warden Williams knew of his pain and suffering because other prison
staff raised his need for Suboxone and mental health care during weekly staff meetings. Id. at 3.
Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips (the medical defendants) also move to dismiss Mr. Adams’s

amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The medical defendants argue that Mr. Adams’s
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be dismissed because the medical defendants are not
public entities; providing inadequate medical care is not actionable discrimination under either
statute; and Mr. Adams fails to provide evidence that any discrimination was because of his
disability. DI 58 at 12-13. The medical defendants further argue that Mr. Adams has not plead
sufficient facts to show deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 13-16.
Finally, the medical defendants move to dismiss Mr. Adams’s state law claims on the grounds
that he fails to comply with the certificate of merit requirements for a professional negligence

6
claim and does not allege “egregious” enough conduct for an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. Id. at 17-21.
In his opposition brief to the medical defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Adams alleges
that he met with Dr. Philips on the morning of his third day at George W. Hill. DI 63 at 12. He

alleges that he informed Dr. Phillips of his prescribed medications and “tried pleading” with him
for 16 milligrams of Suboxone and his psychiatric medications. Id.
The motions are ripe for disposition.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine
whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted). At this stage in the litigation, “we accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Klotz v.
Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP, 991 F.3d 458, 462 (3d Cir. 2021). However,

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. As Mr. Adams is proceeding pro se, we
construe his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants The GEO Group and John Christakis are dismissed for lack of service.

Though over ninety days have passed since Mr. Adams filed the amended complaint, two
named defendants — The GEO Group, Inc. and Chief Medical Officer John Christakis — have
not been properly served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). We are sympathetic to the challenges of
7
effectuating service while incarcerated and have issued orders on three occasions to remind Mr.
Adams of the service requirement. DI 60, 66, 69. But service has not been effectuated.
Accordingly, we dismiss all claims against The GEO Group and John Christakis without
prejudice. We will address Mr. Adams’s claims against the remaining four named defendants.

B. The official-capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Mr. Adams asserts ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims against Warden Williams in her individual and official capacities. Mr. Adams’s official
capacity claims against Warden Williams are duplicative of his claims against the County. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits, in contrast,
‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.’” (quoting Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978))). We will construe the official capacity claims against Warden Williams as against the
County and analyze the claims against Warden Williams as individual capacity claims.
Mr. Adams also asserts ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment,
professional negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Nurse
Ford and Dr. Phillips in their individual and official capacities. Mr. Adams’s official capacity
claims against the medical defendants are not cognizable because they are employees of The
GEO Group, a private entity. See Kreis v. Northampton County Prison, No. 21-2360, 2022 WL
4236692, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2022) (dismissing official capacity claims against employees
of a prison medical provider). Official capacity suits against employees of private entities would
effectively be a suit against the employer. See id. at *8; Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66.
Accordingly, we dismiss all of Mr. Adams’s official capacity claims against Nurse Ford and Dr.

8
Phillips with prejudice. Should Mr. Adams wish to assert claims against The GEO Group, he
can do so through a timely served complaint.4
C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of
her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
29 U.S.C § 794(a).
“The ‘substantive standards for determining liability [under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act] are the same.’” Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2021)
(quoting McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995)).

“[W]hen a plaintiff sues under both the RA and the ADA, [courts] often address both claims in
the same breath.” Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 117 (3d Cir.

4 If The GEO Group had been properly served, we may have liberally construed Mr.
Adams’s official capacity claims against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips as claims against The GEO
Group and analyzed them accordingly. See, e.g., Miller v. Chester Cnty. Commissioners, No.
23-4192, 2024 WL 3606334, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2024) (dismissing official capacity claims
against prison medical provider employees as “duplicative” of existing direct claims against their
employer). Given that The GEO Group has not been properly served and thus has not had an
opportunity to respond to any claims against it, we decline to do so here. Cf. Graham, 473 U.S.
at 166 (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an
official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”)
(emphasis added).

9
2018) (internal quotations omitted). To state a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a
plaintiff must assert “that he is a qualified individual with a disability, who was precluded from
participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by
reason of his disability.” Furgess v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir.

2019).
1. Warden Williams (in her individual capacity), Nurse Ford, and Dr. Phillips are not
proper defendants under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Mr. Adams brings ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against Warden Williams,
Delaware County, Nurse Ford, and Dr. Phillips in their individual capacities. Under ADA Title
II, the proper defendant is the public entity or an individual who controls or directs the
functioning of the public entity. Miller v. Chester Cnty. Commissioners, No. 23-4192, 2024 WL
1096530, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2024); see Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d
Cir. 2002). The proper defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the recipient of
federal financial assistance, not individuals. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 804
(3d Cir. 2007).
The Third Circuit has not squarely decided the question of individual damages liability
under ADA Title II in precedential decisions, see Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 n.12 (3d
Cir. 2023), but it has dismissed claims for individual damages liability “for the simple reason
that there is no such liability,” Kokinda v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 779 F. App’x 938, 942 (3d Cir.
2019); see also Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he District Court
could have properly followed the holdings of those circuits which have concluded that there is no
individual damages liability under Title II of the ADA, which provides an additional basis to
affirm the dismissal of this claim.”); Roman v. Cnty. of Chester, No. 23-4032, 2024 WL
10
2136010, at *16 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2024); Brown v. Monsalud, No. 1:20-CV-0849, 2021 WL
4502238, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021). We follow suit. Mr. Adams’s individual capacity
claims against Warden Williams are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
In addition, we agree with the medical defendants that Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips are

not proper defendants under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. DI 58 at 12. Mr. Adams alleges
that Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips are employees of The GEO Group, a private correctional
management company. DI 56 at 14-15. The medical defendants are not public entities, nor
entities receiving federal financial assistance, and thus are not proper defendants under ADA
Title II or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Miller, 2024 WL 1096530, at *8
(dismissing ADA claims against a private prison medical provider). Mr. Adams’s ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips are dismissed with prejudice.5
2. Mr. Adams states a claim against Delaware County for ADA and Rehabilitation Act
violations.

The county defendants contend that Mr. Adams has not alleged that he was precluded
from any program, benefit, or service, only that he was denied proper medical treatment. DI 61
at 5. They further argue that Mr. Adams did not allege that any denial or discrimination was
because of his disability. Id. at 6-7. On both points, we disagree.
“[T]he phrase ‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II, like ‘program or activity’
under Section 504, is ‘extremely broad in scope and includes everything a public entity does.’”
Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (quoting Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Human
Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015)). As the Supreme Court has stated, “[m]odern prisons

5 Mr. Adams asserts that The GEO Group receives federal financial assistance. DI 56 at
14. Should Mr. Adams wish to bring a claim under Section 504 against The GEO Group, he
should do so directly in a properly pleaded and served complaint.
11
provide inmates with many recreational activities, medical services, and educational and
vocational programs, all of which at least theoretically benefit the prisoners (and any of which
disabled prisoners could be excluded from participation in).” Pa Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (internal quotations omitted); see United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151,

157 (2006) (noting that “deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [the plaintiff’s]
disability-related needs in such fundamentals as . . . medical care, and virtually all other prison
programs” could constitute exclusion from, or denial of the benefits of, prison services,
programs, or activities).
Mr. Adams alleges that the county defendants denied him Suboxone, psychiatric
medication, and medical help with withdrawal. DI 56 at 23. He claims that due to withdrawal
symptoms, he struggled to exercise, read, and eat. Id. Under the broad definition of “service,
program, or activity” articulated by the Third Circuit, these are adequate allegations that he was
denied the benefit of the prison’s medical services and / or precluded from participating in
programs or activities.

To satisfy the causation requirement under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff “must prove that they were treated differently based on the
protected characteristic, namely the existence of their disability.” CG v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2013). Mr. Adams alleges that he suffers from OUD and
mental illness. DI 56 at 16. He claims that he was denied his previously prescribed Suboxone
dosage in favor of a lesser amount and then denied Suboxone or other MOUD completely. Id. at
19-20, 22. He further claims that George W. Hill refused to provide him with medication to aid
his withdrawal or psychiatric medication. Id. at 23. Construing Mr. Adams’s claims liberally,
we agree with other courts in this district and beyond that have viewed similar facts as
12
sufficiently pleading discrimination by reason of disability.6 See Strickland v. Delaware County,
No. 21-4141, 2022 WL 1157485, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims where the plaintiff alleged that he was excluded from
participation in the prison methadone program, and the prison “failed to undertake an

individualized review of [his] situation to determine whether he could be safely provided with
his prescribed medical treatment . . . an adequate alternative treatment, or otherwise reasonably
accommodate [his] disability”); Miller, 2024 WL 3606334, at *1, *7 (upholding ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims where defendant “received no MAT or medication for opioid use
disorder” and “was forced to detox himself”); Roman, 2024 WL 2136010, at *17 (denying
motion to dismiss ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiff “alleged that he suffers
from opioid use disorder and has been intentionally excluded from participation in the MAT
program or provided an acceptable alternative treatment”); Schiovane v. Luzerne County, No,
3:21-CV-01686, 2022 WL 3142615, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims where the county denied the plaintiff access to medication

and “failed to accommodate her needs during withdrawal from opioids”); McPherson v. Cnty, of
Dauphin, No. 1:19-CV-01865, 2020 WL 1558206, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2020) (denying a
motion to dismiss ADA claims where the plaintiff with bipolar disorder was denied access to his
prescribed medications).
In Brown v. Deparlos, 492 Fed. App’x 211 (3d Cir. 2012), which the county defendants
rely on in their motion to dismiss, the plaintiff “merely assert[ed] that defendants violated the

6 Mr. Adams alleges that he was denied Suboxone two days after prison staff accused him
of “cheeking” medication. DI 56 at 20. Notably, Mr. Adams can state a claim under the ADA
even if his disability was not the “sole cause” of the discriminatory action. See Durham, 82
F.4th at 226 (“[T]he ADA only requires but-for causation.”).
13
ADA” and “fail[ed] to allege any facts that demonstrate[d] that the alleged inadequate or
improper medical care . . . was because of a disability.” Id. at 215 (emphasis added). That is not
the situation here.
Finally, the county defendants argue that Mr. Adams’s disability claims must be

dismissed because he has not shown intentional discrimination. DI 61 at 7-8. Claims for
compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
require a showing of intentional discrimination. S.H. ex. rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion School
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2013); Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289. “To prove intentional
discrimination, an ADA claimant must prove at least deliberate indifference, and to plead
deliberate indifference, a claimant must allege (1) knowledge that a federally protected right is
substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” Haberle v.
Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Mr. Adams has plead sufficient facts to support a claim of intentional discrimination.
Mr. Adams alleges that George W. Hill forced approximately 10,400 detainees to withdraw from

opioids without access to MOUD from January 2018 through March 2021. DI 56 at 27. He
further alleges that Delaware County passed a resolution in 2021 to expand MOUD treatment for
incarcerated people. Id. at 40. These facts, if true, suggest that the county defendants were
aware of the dangers of forced withdrawal and the importance of MOUD for people suffering
from opioid addiction. According to Mr. Adams, the county defendants nonetheless cut off Mr.
Adams’s Suboxone, forced him into withdrawal, and denied him medical help with withdrawal.
Id. at 20-23.
The county defendants contend that they could not have intentionally discriminated
against Mr. Adams because a policy of denying Suboxone prescriptions over 8 milligrams is
14
non-discriminatory. DI 61 at 8. Even if the policy were not discriminatory — which we do not
decide at this stage — the decision to completely cease Mr. Adams’s Suboxone and deny him
medical help with withdrawal could have been. See Strickland, 2022 WL 1157485, at *4
(denying a motion to dismiss where “[d]efendants were aware of the value of methadone as an

OUD treatment” and the “inadequacy of the OUD treatment provided by George W. Hill” and
“[n]onetheless denied Plaintiff his prescribed treatment”). Mr. Adams alleges sufficient facts to
support a claim of intentional discrimination, and he states a claim against the county defendants
for compensatory damages.
3. Mr. Adams cannot recover punitive damages from the county defendants for ADA or
Rehabilitation Act violations.

Briefly, we agree with the county defendants that punitive damages against municipal
entities are not available under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. DI
61 at 5. See Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 457 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e find that Title
II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act lack any indicia of Congress' intent to
override the settled common law immunity of municipalities from punitive damages.”); Talley v.
Clark, No. 19-3078, 2023 WL 118470, at *1 n.2 (“We also note that punitive damages are not
available under Title II of the ADA.”). Mr. Adams’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against
the county defendants for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice.
D. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Mr. Adams asserts claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He brings these claims via 42 U.S.C
§ 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
15
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In the Prisoner Complaint form attached to Mr. Adams’s handwritten amended
complaint, he asserts that he is a pre-trial detainee. DI 56 at 4. The Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to pre-trial detainees. Hubbard
v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005). We therefore analyze Mr. Adams’s claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment.
To plead inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must
allege “(1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or omissions by [individuals] that indicate a
deliberate indifference to that need.” Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir.
2023) (internal quotations omitted). “A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by
a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.’” Id. (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1987)). Deliberate indifference is a

subjective standard consistent with recklessness. Id. It requires that an individual “both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
1. Mr. Adams states a Monell claim against Delaware County.
To plead a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a municipal entity under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “A plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of
the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by
the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93,
16
105 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy
with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Estate of Roman v.
City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895

F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a
given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-
settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d
845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Mr. Adams alleges that the county defendants have official policies or customs of
denying prescribed dosages of Suboxone that exceed 8 milligrams and denying prescribed
mental health medications Seroquel and Doxepin. DI 56 at 39. The county defendants’ sole
argument against a Monell claim based on the MOUD policy is that Mr. Adams fails to state a
claim because “there is no constitutional right to the requested dosage of suboxone.” DI 61 at
12. We agree that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not a support a

constitutional violation. Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 346. Still, the mere fact that the alleged
MOUD policies allow for some level of treatment does not necessarily defeat a Monell claim at
this stage. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]here are
circumstances where some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional
requirements.”). Construing Mr. Adams’s complaint liberally, he sufficiently pleads a Monell
claim against Delaware County.

17
2. Mr. Adams does not state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Williams.

The county defendants contend that Mr. Adams does not allege sufficient facts to show
that Warden Williams was personally involved in the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation.
DI 61 at 10-11. Based on the facts asserted in Mr. Adams’s amended complaint only, we agree.
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs. Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). Liability
cannot be predicated solely on the basis of respondeat superior. Id.; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, a supervisor can be liable if (1) “they established and
maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm”; or (2)
“they participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons
in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.” Parkell v.
Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121,
129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Mr. Adams alleges that Warden Williams oversees all aspects of George W. Hill,

including medical care, and has “rulemaking or policymaking authority regarding the jail.” DI
56 at 39. He further alleges that she was aware of the resolution to expand the MAT program
and the risks of forced withdrawal, detox, and denial of MOUD and psychiatric medication. Id.
at 38. In his amended complaint, Mr. Adams does not allege any facts showing that Warden
Williams participated in the denial of Mr. Adams’s care, directed others to deny his care, or had
knowledge of her subordinates’ decisions to deny him care. See Parkell, 833 F.3d at 330. Mr.
Adams’s general statement that Warden Williams has “rulemaking and policymaking authority”
at the jail does not provide a sufficient factual basis for us to infer that she developed the policy
or custom that caused his forced withdrawal and subsequent hospitalization.
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In his opposition brief to the county defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Adams claims
that Warden Williams interfered with the provision of his medical care. DI 64 at 3. See Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that prison officials act deliberately indifferent
when they “intentionally deny[] or delay[] access to medical care or interfer[e] with the

treatment”). Yet his amended complaint includes no facts supporting this contention. Mr.
Adams also alleges additional facts in opposition to show that Warden Williams had knowledge
of the inadequacy of his care. He alleges that Warden Williams signed off on his transfer to
George W. Hill with full knowledge of his medical needs, and she knew of his pain and suffering
from the grievance system and weekly staff meetings. DI 64 at 1-3. Because Mr. Adams did not
include these additional facts in his amended complaint, we cannot consider them at this stage.
See Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is
axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss."); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 1992) (in a pro se proceeding,
refusing to consider additional facts in an affidavit filed after the complaint). Accordingly, we

dismiss Mr. Adams’s individual capacity Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden
Williams without prejudice.
3. Mr. Adams states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nurse Ford but does not
state a claim against Dr. Phillips.

Deliberate indifference requires “significantly more than negligence.” Hope v. Warden
York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 329 (3d Cir. 2020); see Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 849-50 (1998). As previously stated, “mere disagreement” as to an appropriate medical
response will not suffice. Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 346. Deliberate indifference may be
properly alleged when a prison official “(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but
19
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-
medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical
treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
The medical defendants characterize Mr. Adams’s allegations as mere disagreement with

the care provided. DI 58 at 13-15. They argue that Mr. Adams does not point to any facts
showing that the medical defendants acted with deliberate indifference or knew that their
conduct presented a substantial risk of harm to Mr. Adams and acted or failed to act anyway. Id.
at 13-14.
As to claims against Nurse Ford, we disagree. Mr. Adams alleges that he repeatedly
informed Nurse Ford of his need for 16 milligrams of Suboxone and psychiatric medication. DI
56 at 20. He alleges that when Nurse Ford abruptly stopped his Suboxone on December 29, he
told her that doing so would cause him physical harm. Id. She reportedly stopped it anyway. Id.
Mr. Adams further claims that Nurse Ford is responsible for distributing Suboxone and
overseeing “all aspects concerning suboxone” at George W. Hill. Id. at 39. He says that despite

his many requests for medical help after December 29, 2022, he was repeatedly denied Suboxone
and medical help with withdrawal. Id. at 23. The medical defendants argue that Mr. Adams
received Suboxone until he “violated the prison’s rules and attempted to hide medication.” DI
58 at 16. Nonetheless, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, we must accept the claimant’s
version of events as true. See Klotz, 991 F.3d at 462. Mr. Adams alleges sufficient facts to
support a deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Ford.
Turning to Dr. Phillips, Mr. Adams alleges that, on an unspecified date, he asked Dr.
Philips for 16 milligrams of Suboxone and 100 milligrams of Seroquel. DI 56 at 21. Dr. Phillips
allegedly informed him that the prison only provides 8 milligrams of Suboxone and denied his
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request for psychiatric medication. Id. Mr. Adams also claims that Dr. Phillips and others
“formulated the care plan… which consisted of Mr. Adams forced withdrawal,” but he does not
specify any details about Dr. Phillips’ involvement. Id. at 22. Based on these facts alone, we
cannot reasonably infer that Dr. Phillips was subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to

Mr. Adams and that he intentionally refused, delayed, or prevented treatment. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837; Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
Mr. Adams alleges in opposition to the motion to dismiss that he met with Dr. Phillips on
his third day at George W. Hill. DI 63 at 12. He alleges that he informed Dr. Phillips of his
prescribed dosages for all of his medications and tried “pleading” with him for his Suboxone and
anti-psychotic medication, but Dr. Phillips denied him. Id. As previously stated, we cannot
consider these additional facts at this stage. Mr. Adams’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against
Dr. Philips is dismissed without prejudice.
E. Mr. Adams’s professional negligence claims are dismissed for failure to comply with
certificate of merit requirements.

Mr. Adams alleges professional negligence under Pennsylvania state law against Nurse
Ford and Dr. Phillips. The medical defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed for
failure to comply with certificate of merit (COM) requirements. DI 58 at 17-18.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3(a) provides:
(a) In any action based upon an allegation that a licensed professional deviated
from an acceptable professional standard, the attorney for the plaintiff, or the
plaintiff if not represented, shall file with the complaint or within sixty days after
the filing of the complaint, a certificate of merit signed by the attorney or party
that . . . an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement that
there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint,
fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause
in bringing about the harm . . . .
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(e) If a certificate of merit is not signed by an attorney, the party signing the
certificate of merit shall . . . attach to the certificate of merit the written statement
from an appropriate licensed professional as required by subdivisions (a)(1) and
(2).

This rule is substantive state law that applies in federal court. Liggon-Redding v. Est. of
Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011); Booker v. United States, 366 Fed. App’x 425,
426 (3d Cir. 2010). Failure to file a COM is a proper ground for dismissal when presented in a
motion to dismiss. See Booker, 366 Fed. App’x at 426-27; Turner v. Wetzel, No. 4:18-CV-
00361, WL 7253304, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2018). In situations where a plaintiff fails to file a
proper COM, courts can consider two equitable exceptions to Rule 1042.3: (1) whether the
plaintiff substantially complied with the rule; and (2) whether the plaintiff has offered a
reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the noncompliance. Ramos v. Quien, 631 F.
Supp. 2d 601, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2008); see Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 276-77, 280 (Pa.
2006). If a plaintiff “substantially complies” with the Rule’s requirements, technical defects are
excused. See Booker, 366 Fed. App’x at 428.
Mr. Adams did not file a COM with his original complaint. DI 2. The medical
defendants filed a notice of intent to enter judgment for failure to file a COM. DI 38. Mr.
Adams then included a signed Rule 1042.3 COM form with his amended complaint — filed over
sixty days after the original complaint — and checked the box stating that a licensed medical
professional had supplied him with a written statement. DI 56 at 50. However, rather than
attaching a written statement, he directs us to Exhibit 4 of his amended complaint, which
constitutes the medical records from his January 2023 hospitalization. Id. at 55-61. Nowhere in
the medical records does a medical professional comment on the care that Mr. Adams received
while incarcerated at George W. Hill. Id.
22
Mr. Adams’s efforts do not amount to substantial compliance. In Booker, the Third
Circuit held that a pro se plaintiff who “located a qualified physician, compiled his medical
records, timely filed the necessary requests for extensions of time and attempted to provide the
Court with a compliant COM,” even though the physician’s statement did not ultimately include

the required information, substantially complied with Rule 1042.3. 366 F. App’x at 429; see
also Ramos, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (granting exception when the plaintiff requested an extension
of time and filed within the time period granted, even though the state court did not have
jurisdiction when it granted the extension). Here, Mr. Adams filed an untimely COM, which
may bar relief under Pennsylvania law. See Hoover v. Davila, 862 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004) (holding that the 60-day clock begins on the date of the original complaint, not the date of
the amended complaint). More importantly, he failed to locate a medical provider to complete a
COM and submitted medical records that contain none of the information required by Rule
1042.3.
We recognize the challenges of pursuing legal claims without counsel, but we agree with

other courts in Pennsylvania that pro se status does not absolve a plaintiff of the responsibility to
comply with Rule 1042.3. See Brown v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-CV-86, 2019 WL 1331619, at *7
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2019) (dismissing claim when pro se plaintiff did not file a COM because it
was “burdensome”); Mayo v. Cnty. of York, No. 1:10-CV-1869, 2012 WL 948438, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (dismissing claim when pro se plaintiff filed an (improper) COM two months
after the deadline and did not file a motion for an extension of time); see Booker, 366 F. App’x at
428 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying COM rule to a pro se plaintiff). Mr. Adams’s professional
negligence claims against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips are dismissed without prejudice.

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F. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Mr. Adams brings state law claims against the medical defendants for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. He alleges that Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips acted in an “extreme
and outrageous manner” by failing to treat his opioid and mental health disorders and forcing
him to suffer pain and agony for weeks. DI 56 at 46.
1. Mr. Adams states an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Nurse
Ford but fails to state a claim against Dr. Phillips.

Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress
to establish four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous
conduct, (3) the conduct caused the distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Regan v. Twp. of
Lower Merion, 36 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1999). To give rise to liability, the conduct at
issue must be “both extreme and very offensive to the moral values of society.” Silver v.
Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 606 (3d Cir. 1990); see Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395
(3d Cir. 1988) (“It has been said that ‘[t]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.’” (quoting Buczek v. First Nat'l Bank of
Mifflintown, 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987))). To recover damages from an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the plaintiff “must suffer some type of resulting
physical harm due to the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231
(3d Cir. 2010).
The medical defendants compare Mr. Adams’s allegations to Pennsylvania decisions
where a party’s conduct did not support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. DI
58 at 10-21. According to the medical defendants, if this conduct was not outrageous, then
24
neither was their conduct. But none of the cases cited by the medical defendants concerns the
refusal to provide medical care to a claimant. We agree with other courts in this district that
outright refusal to provide medical care may indicate extreme and outrageous conduct. See
Charleston v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 17-3039, 2018 WL 1757606, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12,

2018) (granting health care provider's summary judgment motion in part because “[t]his is not a
case of outright refusal to provide medical care”); McDonald-Witherspoon v. City of
Philadelphia, 481 F. Supp. 3d 424, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (granting summary judgment because
prison medical providers “made efforts to evaluate [the plaintiff’s] physical and mental health
condition and provide him with appropriate medical care”); see also Wilson v. Jin, 698 F. App'x
667, 673 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment where prison healthcare
providers gave prisoner “extensive medical care over a period of several months” and thus did
not act outrageously or extremely).
Mr. Adams’s amended complaint, taken as true, demonstrates that Nurse Ford outright
refused to provide him with medical care after December 29. When he told Nurse Ford that she

could not abruptly cease his Suboxone, she allegedly replied, “I just did.” DI 56 at 20.
Furthermore, Nurse Ford allegedly oversees the prison’s entire Suboxone program. Id. at 39.
Mr. Adams claims that despite his apparent suffering and many requests for care, he was
repeatedly denied Suboxone and medical help with withdrawal. Id. at 23.
Mr. Adams does not make the same showing for Dr. Phillips. He alleges that Dr. Phillips
informed him of the 8 milligram Suboxone policy and denied him requested psychiatric
medications. Id. at 21. There are no allegations in the amended complaint that Dr. Phillips
outright denied Mr. Adams care in the face of clear distress. Construing Mr. Adams’s amended
complaint liberally, his allegations just cross the line to state an intentional infliction of
25
emotional distress claim against Nurse Ford but not Dr. Phillips. We dismiss the claim against
Dr. Phillips without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the following claims are dismissed without prejudice: all

claims against The GEO Group and John Christakis; Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against Warden Williams and Dr. Phillips in their individual capacities; all
professional negligence claims against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips; and the intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim against Dr. Phillips in his individual capacity.7
The following claims are dismissed with prejudice because they are not brought against
proper defendants, are not cognizable under law, and / or are duplicative of other claims: all
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against Warden Williams; ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims against Delaware County for punitive damages; all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips; Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims
against Warden Williams, Nurse Ford, and Dr. Phillips in their official capacities; intentional

7 Regarding the claims dismissed without prejudice, we also give Mr. Adams the option
to file a second amended complaint in the event he can allege additional details to state a claim
against the remaining defendants. A plaintiff may clarify his claims “by . . . explaining in the
[second] amended complaint the ‘who, what, where, when and why’ of [his] claim.” Gambrell v.
S. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., No. 18-16359, 2019 WL 5212964, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2019). Any
second amended complaint must clearly describe the factual basis for Mr. Adams’s claims
against the relevant defendants and how each defendant was personally involved in the alleged
denial of his constitutional rights. Any second amended complaint shall be a complete document
that does not rely on the initial complaint, the amended complaint, responses to the motion to
dismiss, or any other papers filed in this case to state a claim. This means that if Mr. Adams files
a second amended complaint, he must include allegations related to his claims that have not been
dismissed, if he seeks to proceed on those claims. He does not need to make new allegations as
to these claims but must reassert them. Claims that are not included in the second amended
complaint will not be considered part of this case because the second amended complaint
becomes the operative pleading.

26
infliction of emotional distress claims against Nurse Ford and Dr. Phillips in their official
capacities; and all Eighth Amendment claims.
The case will proceed on Mr. Adams’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against
Delaware County; Fourteenth Amendment claims against Delaware County and against Nurse

Ford in her individual capacity; and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Nurse Ford in her individual capacity.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667268. Public record. Not legal advice.