# Akers v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · September 9, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10666048

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 9, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10666048

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an employee’s OADA claim failed for the same reasons her Title VII discrimination claim failed

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JAMIE AKERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-01067-JD
)
ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS, )
LP, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP’s
(“AstraZeneca”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) [Doc. No. 16], which seeks dismissal of
Plaintiff Jamie Akers’s (“Akers”) complaint [Doc. No. 1] for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Akers responded in opposition [Doc. No.
22], and AstraZeneca replied [Doc. No. 23]. For the reasons stated below, the Court
denies AstraZeneca’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
Akers worked for AstraZeneca for approximately 15 years, most recently in sales.
Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 13–14. In August 2021, AstraZeneca required its employees to
begin testing weekly for COVID-19. Id. ¶ 15. Then, in January 2022, AstraZeneca
announced that all employees would need to verify that they received a COVID-19

1 As explained below, the Court recounts the facts based on the well-pleaded
allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to Akers, and the Court
considers the religious accommodation request form.
vaccination to remain employed there. Id. ¶ 17. The next month, AstraZeneca notified
employees that if they qualified for a medical or religious exemption to the vaccination

policy, they could continue weekly testing for COVID-19 rather than receive the vaccine.
Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
Akers applied for a religious exemption to the vaccination policy. Id. ¶ 24. In her
application, Akers stated that, as a Catholic, she objected to using medications generated
using aborted fetal cells and her belief that the vaccine would defile the sanctity of her
body. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. She also noted her distrust of the “experimental injection” and her

belief that the “natural immunity” she developed after previously contracting the virus
would prevent COVID-19 more effectively than the vaccine. [Doc. No. 16-2 at 1]. Akers
attached a letter from a Catholic pastor, who explained that Akers has “a moral duty to
refuse the use of medical products, including certain vaccines that are created using
human cell lines derived from abortion,” and that she “is morally required to obey . . . her

conscience.” Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 25. “Therefore,” the letter concluded, “if a Catholic
comes to an informed judgment that he or she should not receive a vaccine, then the
Catholic Church requires that the person follow this judgment of conscience and refuse
the vaccine.” Id.
AstraZeneca rejected Akers’s request for a religious accommodation, citing in part

the “undue hardship” that would result from “business disruption/increased costs
resulting from illness-related absences.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. However, AstraZeneca approved a
“substantially similar accommodation request” from a younger employee who did not
belong to Akers’s church. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37. Having rejected Akers’s request for an
accommodation, AstraZeneca terminated Akers without severance on April 29, 2022,
because of her refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.

Akers then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 6, 2022. Id. ¶ 10. After
the EEOC dismissed her Charge of Discrimination, Akers filed this suit, asserting claims
of religious discrimination under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act. Id. ¶¶ 11, 45.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under this standard, the Court must “accept the
well-pleaded facts alleged as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10th Cir. 2023).
However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and the Court must “draw on its judicial

experience and common sense” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. “In other words, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate if the complaint alone is legally insufficient to state a claim.” Brokers’
Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 2017).
“Generally, a court considers only the contents of the complaint when ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion.” Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1275 (quoting Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708

F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013)). However, “[e]xceptions to this general rule include
the following: documents incorporated by reference in the complaint; documents referred
to in and central to the complaint, when no party disputes its authenticity; and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Berneike, 708
F.3d at 1146). Although Akers’s complaint does not expressly incorporate it by reference,
the Court considers Akers’s religious accommodation request form because she

repeatedly refers to the application in her complaint, Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 24–28, the
request is central to her complaint, and Akers does not dispute the authenticity of the
document attached to the Motion as Exhibit 2. See N. Arapaho Tribe v. Becerra, 61 F.4th
810, 814 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 144 S. Ct. 419 (2023), aff’d sub nom. Becerra v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 144 S. Ct. 1428 (2024) (considering documents referenced in the

complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the documents are central to the complaint
and the parties do not dispute their authenticity).
III. ANALYSIS
AstraZeneca seeks dismissal of Akers’s claim, arguing that she has failed to state a
claim under either Title VII or the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”).

A. Akers has sufficiently pleaded a claim under Title VII.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This proscription is “often referred
to as the ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional discrimination’) provision” of Title VII.

E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771 (2015). The statute
defines “religion” as including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
Considering these provisions together, the Supreme Court has established that

plaintiffs can bring “disparate-treatment claims based on a[n employer’s] failure to
accommodate a religious practice.” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773. To establish a prima
facie failure-to-accommodate claim, an employee must show “that 1) the employee has a
bona fide religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement, 2) the employee informed
the employer of this conflict; and 3) the employer fired the employee for failing to

comply with the job requirement.” Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 549 (10th Cir.
2018). “While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie
case in her complaint,” assessing these elements can “help to determine whether Plaintiff
has set forth a plausible claim.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th
Cir. 2012).

In determining whether an employee’s bona fide religious belief conflicts with a
job requirement, the Tenth Circuit has explained that “religious beliefs have a distinctive
content related to ultimate ideas about life, purpose, and death.” E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie
& Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded on other
grounds, 575 U.S. 768 (2015). However, “even if an applicant or employee claims to be
acting for ‘religious’ reasons, if those reasons actually do not pertain to such ultimate

ideas, then that person’s conduct would fall outside the protective ambit of Title VII.” Id.
In the free-exercise context, the Supreme Court has warned that this kind of
determination is “a difficult and delicate task,” as “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 716
(1981).
Akers has pleaded a plausible claim for relief under Title VII. First, Akers alleges

that she has a bona fide religious objection to AstraZeneca’s vaccination requirement.
Akers’s complaint describes her objection as rooted in her opposition to medications
produced using aborted fetal cells and her belief that the vaccine would “defile the
sanctity of her body,” and she connects these beliefs to specific religious principles.
AstraZeneca argues that Akers’s objection was actually based only on personal

justifications, not religious ones, including her views on the experimental nature of the
vaccine and that she had “natural immunity” because she previously contracted COVID-
19 and recovered. However, the Court determines that Akers’s objection is sufficiently
tied to “ultimate ideas about life, purpose, and death” to constitute a bona fide religious
belief. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1119. Even if Akers’s objection was based both on

religious and secular grounds, she has alleged facts permitting the plausible inference that
her objection is tied to some aspect of “religious observance and practice, as well as
belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).2 To hold otherwise would fail to give effect to the statutory
definition of “religion” and ignore the Supreme Court’s admonitions not to act as an

“arbiter[] of scriptural interpretation.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
Second, Akers alleges that she informed AstraZeneca about the conflict between
her religious beliefs and the vaccination requirement. According to the complaint, Akers
applied for a religious accommodation to the vaccination policy, and that request detailed
the nature of her religious objection. She alleges that she made this request in a timely
manner and in accordance with AstraZeneca’s guidance for submitting such applications.

Third, Akers alleges that she was fired for failing to comply with AstraZeneca’s
vaccination requirement after her request for an accommodation was rejected. Akers
alleges that AstraZeneca informed her that she would be terminated on April 29, 2022, if

2 Since the parties concluded their briefing on the Motion, other circuit courts have
agreed. For instance, the Seventh Circuit recently held that “[a]n employee may object to
an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds—for
example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and
implicate health and safety concerns.” Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009
(7th Cir. 2024). “Congress permitted this,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “as we see no
other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of ‘religion.’” Id.; see also
Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2024) (reversing a
district court’s dismissal, which “focus[ed] on specific parts of the complaints to rule the
anti-vaccine beliefs ‘personal’ or ‘medical’” because, when “read as a whole,” the
complaints plausibly pleaded religious beliefs in conflict with an employer’s vaccine
requirement); Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C., 103 F.4th 1241, 1243 (6th Cir.
2024) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations of particular facts—she prayed, she received an answer,
she acted accordingly— . . . . were almost self-evidently enough to establish, at the
pleadings stage, that her refusal to receive the vaccine was an ‘aspect’ of her religious
observance or belief.”). While not binding law on this Court, the Court finds these sister
circuit opinions persuasive.
she did not receive the vaccination. According to the complaint, AstraZeneca fired Akers
on that date after she refused to get vaccinated.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. Given these allegations, the Court can draw the reasonable inference that
AstraZeneca failed to accommodate Akers’s religious belief in violation of Title VII.3
B. Akers has stated a claim for relief under the OADA.

The OADA creates a “cause of action for employment-based discrimination,” 25
Okla. Stat. § 1350(A), and forbids an employer “to discharge, or otherwise to
discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions,
privileges or responsibilities of employment, because of . . . religion,” id. § 1302(A)(1).
The statute includes an exhaustion requirement. “In order to have standing in a court of
law to allege discrimination arising from an employment-related matter,” an employee
must, within one hundred eighty (180) days from the last date of alleged
discrimination, file a charge of discrimination in employment with the Attorney
General’s Office of Civil Rights Enforcement or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission alleging the basis of discrimination believed to have
been perpetrated on the aggrieved party.

Id. § 1350(B). Akers satisfied this requirement by filing a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC within this time frame after AstraZeneca terminated her employment.

3 The parties also dispute whether Akers stated a claim under an intentional-
discrimination theory. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir.
2012). Because the Court holds that Akers has stated a claim under a failure-to-
accommodate theory, it does not reach the parties’ arguments regarding the intentional-
discrimination theory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“If a party makes alternative
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”).
Section 1302(A)(1) of the OADA is in pari materia with Title VII’s disparate
treatment provision. The text of the two provisions is substantially similar, and both
statutes were enacted to protect employees from discrimination by their employers based
on protected characteristics such as religion. Section 1350(F), which provides that an
employer defending against an employee’s OADA action “may allege any defense that is
available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” further demonstrates that the
Oklahoma legislature enacted the OADA with an eye to Title VII. The Tenth Circuit has
recognized the connection between these statutes, noting that “[t]he OADA 1s analyzed
similarly to Title VII claims.” Jones v. Needham, 856 F.3d 1284, 1292 (10th Cir. 2017);
see also Bennett v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 792 F.3d 1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2015)
(holding that an employee’s OADA claim failed for the same reasons her Title VII
discrimination claim failed).
Therefore, the Court interprets Akers’s OADA claim in-line with her Title VII
claim and concludes that Akers has stated a plausible claim for relief under the OADA
for the same reasons it concludes she has stated a claim under Title VI.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES AstraZeneca’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.
16].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of September 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10666048. Public record. Not legal advice.