# Whitfield v. Muskingum County Ohio

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10665359

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10665359

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a municipality is only responsible for its own actions and wrongdoings, it is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees
- explaining that the pendency of criminal proceeding alone does not toll the obligation to bring forfeiture proceedings but is a factor to consider
- explaining that prejudice could be suffered if there was a loss of witnesses or other important evidence because of the delay

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BENYEHUDAH WHITFIELD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:23-cv-1448
v. JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Muskingum County, Ohio, Muskingum
County Prosecuting Attorney Ronald Welch, and Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office Detective
Richard Perry’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Mot., ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs BenYeHudah
Whitfield and BenYeHudah’s National Transport Service, LLC (“BNTS”) responded and opposed
Defendants’ Motion. (Opp., ECF No. 8.) Defendants replied in support of their Motion. (Reply,
ECF No. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is about whether Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated when the
Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office and Prosecutor’s Office impounded Plaintiff BenYeHudah
Whitfield’s van for over 70 days without a post-seizure hearing.
A. The arrest of Kahmayee Whitfield and the impoundment of the van.
On July 30, 2022, police officers with the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office initiated a
traffic stop of Kahmayee Whitfield, Plaintiff BenYeHudah’s brother. (Compl., ¶ 19.) Kahmayee
worked as an independent contractor for his brother’s company, BNTS, and was making a delivery
when he was stopped by law enforcement. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) BNTS is a delivery company and
Kahmayee was driving one of two cargo vans owned by BenYeHudah and used to transport cargo
for BNTS. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.)
Kahmayee was stopped for purportedly running over the white line on the shoulder of the
road. (Id. ¶ 19.) After initiating the traffic stop, the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office brought a

drug sniffing canine to the scene and the canine alerted law enforcement to the presence of
narcotics in the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 22.) Following the positive alert, police searched the van and found
marijuana and two loaded firearms in a bag located behind the driver’s seat. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26; see also
ECF No. 3-1, PageID 38, 49–50 (a Maverick 12-gauge shotgun and Armi .380 caliber pistol).)
Kahmayee was arrested and charged with improper handling of a firearm under Ohio
Revised Code § 2923.16(b). (Compl., ¶ 27.) Because of his arrest, the police seized and impounded
the van. (Id. ¶ 28.) A few days later a grand jury returned an indictment charging Kahmayee with
two counts of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. (Id. ¶ 29; see also ECF No. 3-1,
PageID 61–62.) The Indictment includes language subjecting the property listed in the Indictment
(the Maverick 12-gauge shotgun and Armi .380 caliber pistol) to civil asset forfeiture. (Id.)

B. During Kahmayee’s criminal prosecution, BenYeHudah worked to secure
the return of the van and the van’s cargo.
BenYeHudah alleges that he learned of the van’s impoundment one day after Kahmayee
was arrested and immediately began working to get back the van and its cargo. (Compl., ¶ 32.) He
contacted the Muskingum County Jail and the Prosecutor’s Office, where he reached Defendant
Ronald Welch, Muskingum County’s elected prosecutor. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.) Prosecutor Welch
informed BenYeHudah that the van would not be released to him and that he should contact the
Sheriff’s Office to discuss the return of the van’s cargo. (Id. ¶ 38.)
A few days later, Muskingum County released the cargo of the van to BenYeHudah after
searching the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 43–45.) BenYeHudah consented to the search of the van to obtain
the release of the van’s cargo. (Id.) Defendant Perry, a detective with the Muskingum County
Sheriff’s Office, confirmed this in his August 2, 2022 report. (ECF No. 3-1, PageID 74.)
After receiving the van’s cargo, BenYeHudah continued to communicate with the
Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office and the Muskingum County’s Sheriff’s Office to obtain

the release of the van. (Compl., ¶¶ 54–55, 61, 63, 68–69.) Several of BenYeHudah’s emails to
Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry seeking the return of his van, or an explanation for why the
van would not be returned, went unanswered. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 67, 70; ECF No. 3-1, PageID 77–79.)
Eventually Detective Perry told BenYeHudah to contact the Muskingum County Prosecutor’s
Office with questions about the release of the van. (ECF No. 3-1, PageID 75.) When he did so,
Prosecutor Welch responded by referencing Rule 16 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which governs the type of information a defendant is entitled to in a criminal case and how to
request that information. (Id. ¶ 64; ECF No. 3-1, PageID 79.)
C. Defendants release the van on October 11, 2022.
Two months later, on October 11, 2022, the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office notified
BenYeHudah that the van was available for pick up. (Id. ¶ 81.) The van was thus impounded from

July 30, 2022 until October 11, 2022—just over 70 days. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 81.) Plaintiffs allege that the
van was a “critical component” of BNTS’s business and because of the van’s impoundment,
Plaintiffs suffered economic losses. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 77, 88.)
In January 2023, several months after the van was released, Kahmayee entered a plea of
no contest and was found guilty of one count of Improper Handling of a Firearm in a Motor
Vehicle. (ECF No. 3-1, PageID 69–70.)
D. Plaintiffs filed suit.
Plaintiffs filed this Complaint raising three claims. Plaintiffs allege that (1) all Defendants
violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Defendants Welch and Perry
engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (3) that
Defendants violated Ohio Revised Code § 2921.45 by depriving Plaintiffs of their civil rights as
public servants. (Compl., ¶¶ 92–97.) Plaintiffs sue Prosecutor Welch in his official and individual
capacity and Detective Perry in his official capacity only.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “after the pleadings are closed—but
early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard of
review as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Penny/Ohlmann/Nieman, Inc. v. Miami Valley Pension Corp.,
399 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court “must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to plaintiffs, accept all well-pled factual allegation as true, and determine whether
plaintiffs undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of those allegations that would entitle
them to relief.” Bishop v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). To survive a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the “complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations re[garding] all
material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. (quoting Mezibov v.

Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Conclusory allegations or legal conclusion
masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Id. (citing Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 716).
When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court can consider the
pleadings and any written exhibits attached to the pleadings. See Gillispie v. City of Miami Twp.,
No. 3:13-cv-416, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193831, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2022) (Rose, J.).
Although allegations in the complaint are the primary focus, a court may also consider “matters of
public record, orders [and] items appearing in the record of the case.” Id. (citing Barany-Snyder v.
Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dept. of Hum. Servs.,
901 F.3d 656, 695 (6th Cir. 2018) (considering exhibits attached to the motion “so long as they are
referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.”).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that most of Plaintiffs’ claims
lack any legal basis. The Court first addresses Defendants’ argument that BNTS lacks standing.
Finding that BNTS has standing, the Court then turns to whether Prosecutor Welch is entitled to

either absolute or qualified immunity in his role as the elected prosecutor of Muskingum County.
Then the Court dismisses as duplicative Plaintiffs’ claims against Detective Perry and Prosecutor
Welch in their official capacities, before analyzing whether Defendant Muskingum County can be
held liable as a municipality under Monell. After concluding that Plaintiffs’ may proceed on their
claims against Muskingum County, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to statutory
immunity on Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims.
A. BenYeHudah’s National Transport Service, LLC’s Standing
Defendants argue that BNTS lacks standing to bring its federal claims. (Mot., PageID 125–
26.) To support this argument, Defendants assert that BNTS did not own the van to claim an injury
for standing. (Id.)

“Standing is a threshold issue for bringing a claim in federal court and must be present at
the time the complaint is filed.” Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 847 F.3d 399, 402 (6th Cir.
2017). The general requirements of standing are familiar. Under Article III of the Constitution,
federal courts are restricted to adjudicating “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
“To ensure that a case or controversy is before a court and to avoid rendering an advisory opinion,
three basic requirements must be met.” Carman v. Yellen, No. 23-5662, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS
20033, at *23–24 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). The plaintiffs must show (1) that they suffered an injury
in fact, (2) a ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a
likelihood that the injury “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction”—here,
Plaintiffs—“must establish these elements commensurate with the burden of proof required at each
stage of the litigation.” Id. at *24. At this juncture, the Court accepts the facts as pleaded by

Plaintiffs. Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2014).
BenYeHudah bought the van at issue in 2021 for about $43,000.00. (Compl., ¶ 13.)
BenYeHudah allowed BNTS to use the van to deliver freight as part of the business enterprise.
(Id. ¶ 12.) Although BenYeHudah owned the van, the van was “a critical component of BNTS’s
business.” (Id. ¶ 14.) When Defendants seized and retained the van for over 70 days, BNTS
suffered lost business opportunities and lost profits because the business could not use half of its
essential equipment. (Opp., PageID 59.) Plaintiffs seek an award of monetary damages to
compensate both BenYeHudah and BNTS for the economic losses suffered for the time when the
van was seized by Muskingum County. (Compl., PageID 12.)
Accepting the facts as pleaded by Plaintiffs, BNTS has satisfied the three standing

requirements. Because the van was seized by Defendants, BNTS did not make as many deliveries
as it otherwise would have and suffered lost profit and business opportunities. BNTS’s injury is
concrete and traceable to Defendants’ conduct. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
425 (2021) (“The most obvious [concrete injuries] are traditional tangible harms, such as physical
and monetary harms.”). BNTS’s injury could be redressed by a favorable decision awarding
Plaintiffs monetary relief.
Since the Court finds that BNTS has standing, the Court now addresses Plaintiffs’ claims
against Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry in their official capacities.
B. Plaintiffs’ Official-Capacity Claims Against Prosecutor Welch and
Detective Perry
Plaintiffs sue Muskingum County as well was the County’s elected prosecutor—Ronald
Welch individually and in his official capacity. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs also sue Defendant
Richard Perry in his official capacity as a detective employed by the Muskingum County’s Sheriff
Office. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry engaged in a
conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Suing a government employee in his or her official capacity “generally represent[s] only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kouider v.

Parma City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 3d 772, 780 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)). When a government entity is also named as a defendant,
along with the government official in his or her official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the
official capacity claim. Id.; see also Johnson v. Wash. Cnty. Career Ctr., No. 2:10-cv-076, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62597, at *11 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010) (Smith, J.) (“Courts regularly dismiss
as redundant claims against agents in their official capacities when the principal entity is also
named as a defendant in the suit.”).
Here, Plaintiffs sued Defendant Muskingum County, Ohio directly as well as Prosecutor
Welch and Detective Perry in their official capacities. Since the government entity is also named
as a defendant, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry

are redundant and subsumed by the claims against Muskingum County. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
claims against Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry in their official capacities are DISMISSED.
C. Prosecutor Welch’s Immunity Under § 1983
Plaintiffs also sue Prosecutor Welch in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of their due process rights. Defendants raise both absolute and qualified immunity as
defenses to Prosecutor Welch’s liability in his individual capacity. (Mot., PageID 116–122.) The
Court will address each defense in turn.

i. Prosecutor Welch’s absolute immunity is a close call.
Defendants argue that Prosecutor Welch is entitled to absolute immunity from suit under
§ 1983 because the decision to retain the van as evidence was within the scope of his prosecutorial
immunity. (Id. PageID 118–19.)
Absolute immunity is the exception rather than the rule, and has traditionally been reserved
for those activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1979). Prosecutors have absolute immunity for the initiation and
prosecution of a criminal case, including the presentation of the State’s case at trial. Id. at 431;
Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that absolute immunity
applies to a prosecutor’s “professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and

appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek
an indictment has been made.”). But a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when acting
as an administrator or investigator, instead of an advocate. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
273 (1993). “The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity, therefore, is advocacy—whether the
actions in question are those of an advocate.” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir.
2000). “[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity
is justified for the function in question.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).
Here, Defendants argue that Prosecutor Welch’s decision to maintain custody of the van as
evidence was a professional evaluation of the evidence necessary to present the state’s case against
Kahmayee at trial. (Mot., PageID 119.) Plaintiffs counter that if the Court grants Prosecutor Welch
absolute immunity, any prosecutor could retrospectively shield themself from liability by claiming
their conduct was done in preparation for a possible trial, thereby allowing the exception for a
prosecutor’s trial preparations to swallow the rule that only a prosecutor’s actions as an advocate

are entitled to immunity. (Opp., PageID 152.)
The Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit articulated a reluctance to extend the doctrine of
absolute immunity. E.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87 (explaining the presumption that “qualified
rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in their exercise of their
duties”); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (describing absolute immunity
as a shield “to ensure that those individuals intimately involved in the judicial process are able to
carry out their responsibilities without the constant threat of vexatious lawsuits, not a sword
allowing them to trample the . . . rights of others”).
The Court finds whether Prosecutor Welch’s actions were that of an advocate, or rather
those of an administrator or investigator, to be a close call. But since the Court finds that Prosecutor

Welch is entitled to qualified immunity, it need not determine whether he is entitled to absolute
immunity at this time.
ii. Prosecutor Welch is entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants argue Plaintiffs § 1983 and § 1985 claims against Prosecutor Welch fail as a
matter of law because Prosecutor Welch is entitled to qualified immunity. (Mot., PageID 119–20.)
This Court agrees. Since the alleged unlawfulness of his conduct was not clearly established,
Prosecutor Welch is entitled to qualified immunity.
A district court may consider qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (“Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation
of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before
the commencement of discovery.”); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation
omitted) (explaining that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability). Regardless of the stage of litigation, the Court must balance the need for public

officials to be free from the constant fear of lawsuits stemming from the performance of their
official duties, with the reality that an action for damages may offer the only avenue for vindication
of constitutional guarantees. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving that the defendant is not entitled to the defense once asserted. Baker v. City
of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2006).
To determine whether a government official is shielded from liability by qualified
immunity, the Court asks two questions: “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make
out a violation of a constitutional right,” and “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’
at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
(articulating the test for qualified immunity). For immunity to attach, both prongs must be satisfied,

but it does not matter which prong is addressed first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–42. The Court
begins the analysis with the second prong—by asking whether the unlawfulness of Prosecutor
Welch’s conduct was clearly established when Plaintiffs’ van was seized and retained.
A right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable official that their conduct
was unlawful in the situation they confronted. McIntyre v. Love, No. 2:23-cv-679, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 163014, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 13, 2023) (citing Yerkes v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No.
22-3030, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 35260, at *11 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2022)). If an official has “fair
warning” that their actions are unconstitutional, then the right is clearly established. Hood v. City
of Columbus, 827 F. App’x 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Generally, case law from
the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the highest state court is necessary to
clearly establish a right. Durham v. Nu’man, 97 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs argue that the law clearly establishes that law enforcement may not retain a seized
vehicle for a prolonged period without initiating forfeiture proceedings or conducting a hearing.

(Opp., PageID 145, 152–53.) Because Defendants seized the van and did not initiate forfeiture
proceedings, Defendants violated clearly established law. (Id.) It is Defendants’ position that there
is neither a clearly established right to post-seizure hearing, nor to the immediate return of lawfully
seized property during the pendency of a criminal investigation. (Mot., PageID 101.)
Plaintiffs point to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Ingram v. Wayne County and argue that
the Sixth Circuit clearly established the right to a timely post-seizure hearing. 81 F.4th 603, 620
(6th Cir. 2023) (holding that the county violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights by seizing and
holding their vehicles for months without either a hearing to contest the seizure or initiating civil
forfeiture proceedings). (Opp., PageID 145, 150.)
But recently the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion overruling Ingram in part.

Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024) (citing United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 55 (1983), and
United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242 (1986)). There, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution only requires a timely forfeiture hearing but not a separate preliminary hearing to
determine whether the police may retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing. Id. at 384.
Reliance on either case is improper. Plaintiffs’ van was seized on July 30, 2022 and held
until October 11, 2022. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 81.) Both cases post-date the seizure and retention of
Plaintiffs’ van. See, e.g., Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., 93 F.4th 919, 927 (6th Cir. 2024) (finding
cases that post-date the conduct “do not clearly establish anything ‘at the time’ the offic[ials]
acted”). Meaning that neither case establishes whether the law was clearly established at the time
of the alleged constitutional violation.
At the time Defendants seized and held Plaintiffs’ van, it was clear that under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, an individual deprived of their property has the

right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Morrison v. Warren, 375
F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545
(1985)). And “a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” as it relates to seized property
entitles an individual to a timely forfeiture proceeding, not more. $8,850, 461 U.S. at 562–63
(holding a post-seizure delay “may be become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner
has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time”); Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 247
(applying the four factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and concluding
that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the post-seizure hearing required by
due process” to protect the plaintiff’s property interest); State v. Baumholtz, 553 N.E.2d 635, 636
(Ohio 1990) (applying Barker and holding five-and-a-half-month delay in initiating forfeiture

proceedings without a credible justification rises to the level of a due process violation).
The case law above establishes that when an individual’s property is seized, the individual
is entitled to a forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable time, which will be violated if the delay
exceeds more than a few months. See Baumholtz, 553 N.E. at 636 (five and a half months). To
assess whether the delay rose to the level of a constitutional violation, courts apply the four factors
set forth in Barker v. Wingo: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) any prejudice suffered. Id.; see also Von Neumann, 474
U.S. at 247. The case law does not, however, establish that individuals are entitled to a preliminary
hearing after the seizure, but before forfeiture proceedings. Id. This conclusion, based on the law
at the time of the alleged conduct, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s later holding in Culley.
601 U.S. at 384.
Thus, at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, it was not clear that holding
Plaintiffs’ van without a separate post-seizure, pre-forfeiture hearing violated Plaintiffs’ due

process rights. The case law made clear that failing to initiate forfeiture proceedings five-and-a-
half months after property is seized may rise to the level of a constitutional violation, after
considering all factors in Barker v. Wingo. But Plaintiffs cite no case that clearly establishes that
holding property for 70 days, or roughly two-and-a-half months, without initiating forfeiture
proceedings violates the Constitution.
Further, as the Court in Baumholtz explained, the pendency of criminal proceedings
impacts the reasonableness of the delay in initiating forfeiture proceedings. Baumholtz, 553 N.E.2d
at 639 (explaining that the pendency of criminal proceeding alone does not toll the obligation to
bring forfeiture proceedings but is a factor to consider). Criminal proceedings against Kahmayee
Whitfield remained pending for the entire time Defendants held the van. (Mot., PageID 108–09.)

No governing caselaw put forth by Plaintiffs establishes that holding a vehicle for 70 days during
the pendency of a criminal proceeding violates the Due Process Clause. Thus, there would be no
way for Prosecutor Welch to know that doing so was unlawful. Because the alleged unlawfulness
of Prosecutor Welch’s conduct was not clearly established, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiffs’ claims against
Prosecutor Welch in his individual capacity are dismissed.
D. Defendant Muskingum County’s Municipal Liability
The Court now turns to the remaining § 1983 claim against Muskingum County. Plaintiffs
bring a Monell liability claim against Defendant Muskingum County for alleged violations of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that Prosecutor Welch, who
had final policymaking authority, created or ratified the allegedly unconstitutional policy in
Muskingum County permitting law enforcement to seize and retain vehicles indefinitely without
a hearing or a legitimate justification. (Opp., PageID 156–57.)
The qualified immunity that shielded Prosecutor Welch in his individual capacity from

§ 1983 liability does not apply to government entities like Muskingum County. See Shadrick v.
Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d 724, 749 (6th Cir. 2015) (clarifying that qualified immunity protects only
individual public officials and should not be confused with governmental immunity). A local
government unit and its officials may be liable under § 1983 when a constitutional deprivation
arises from a government custom or policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (explaining that a municipality is only responsible for its own actions and wrongdoings, it
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees). To succeed on a Monell
claim, a plaintiff must prove that his “constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom
of the municipality was the moving force behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Miller
v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 254–55 (6th Cir. 2010).

The plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that
the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Searcy v. City of
Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Under Monell and its progeny, there
are four ways to establish a constitutional deprivation through policy or custom: “(1) the
municipality’s legislative enactments or official policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final
decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of
tolerance of acquiescence of federal violations.” Hood v. City of Columbus, 827 F. App’x 464, 472
(6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs do not allege that Muskingum County maintained an official unconstitutional
policy in a written or formal manner, instead they proceed on the second theory. Under this theory,
Plaintiffs argue that Prosecutor Welch, who had final policymaking authority, ratified the allegedly
unconstitutional policy in Muskingum County permitting law enforcement to seize and retain

vehicles indefinitely without a hearing or a legitimate justification. (See Compl., ¶ 89 (“It is the
policy of Muskingum County that the release of seized vehicles is solely at the discretion of the
County Sheriff, Sheriff’s Department Employees, and/or the County Prosecutor.”).)
Defendants make two counterarguments. First, that Plaintiffs are only able to identify one
allegedly violative act—not a custom or policy—to give rise to municipal liability. (Reply, PageID
188–89.) And second, that Prosecutor Welch did not have final policymaking authority over the
retention of lawfully seized property. Id. The Court reviews the counterarguments in reverse order.
First, “in Ohio, a county prosecutor has final decision-making authority with regard to the
operation of their offices and discharge of their duties.” Burchwell v. Warren Cnty., Ohio, No.
1:13-cv-297, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41116, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014) (Barrett, J.), aff’d,

582 F. App’x 656 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Stone v. Holzberger, 807 F. Supp. 1325, 1335 (S.D. Ohio
1992) aff’d, 23 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).
Therefore, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Prosecutor Welch is a final decision-maker for the
purposes of Muskingum County municipal liability.
But the only evidence Plaintiffs offer of the policy or custom that allegedly violates the
constitution is the decision to retain Plaintiffs’ van after it was lawfully seized by law enforcement
subsequent to Kahmayee’s arrest. Assuming that this single action was unconstitutional, “[p]roof
of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,
unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy.” Phillips v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:18-cv-541, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89421,
at *29 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2019) (Black, J.) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
824 (1985)). Accordingly, the Court begins with an analysis of whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled
a constitutional violation to survive the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and then turns to

whether Plaintiffs put forth satisfactory evidence that the single incident suggests an
unconstitutional municipal policy.
i. Plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their due process rights by seizing and retaining
their van for over 70 days without adequate process to contest the seizure. (Opp., PageID 145–46.)
Defendants counter that Plaintiffs were neither entitled to the immediate return of their van that
was lawfully seized during the pendency of a criminal proceedings, nor additional post-seizure
process. (Reply, PageID 179.) Thus, according to Defendants, no constitutional violation occurred
and Plaintiffs’ remaining claims must fail as a matter of law. (Id.)
As explained above when analyzing whether the law was clearly established for purposes
of qualified immunity, when an individual’s property is seized, the individual is entitled to a

forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable time, which will be violated if the delay exceeds more
than a few months. See Baumholtz, 553 N.E. at 635 (five and a half months). But due process only
requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing, not a separate preliminary hearing to determine
whether the police can retain the property pending the forfeiture hearing. Culley, 601 U.S. at 384
(citing $8,850, 461 U.S. 55, and Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242); see also Cremeans v. Taczak, No.
22-3730, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21425 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023) (concluding that the police
department violated due process by holding money seized for 19 months without a forfeiture
hearing and without a credible explanation for the delay). As the Court explained above, the law
did not clearly establish whether 70 days without a hearing and without initiating forfeiture
proceedings rose to the level of a constitutional violation. (See supra, Section III.C.ii.)
Determining whether the seizure and retention violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights will require
the Court to apply the facts here to the four factors in Barker v. Wingo. See, e.g., Culley, 601 U.S.
at 384.

a. Length of Deprivation
Starting with the first factor, the Court analyzes whether the delay in initiating forfeiture
proceedings rises to the level of a due process violation. Plaintiffs’ van was held for over 70 days
without a hearing or opportunity to contest the seizure. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 81.) While the Court
acknowledges that this is not an insignificant amount of time to be without one of the two vans
BNTS uses to make deliveries, the deprivation was significantly less than the five-and-a-half-
month delay suffered by the plaintiffs in Baumholtz or the 19-month delay in Cremeans. Plaintiffs
ask the Court to extend the Sixth Circuit’s recent holding in Cremeans and find that even a two-
month delay in initiating forfeiture proceedings is unlawful. But Plaintiffs offer no support for this
extension of the law. Accordingly, the length of the deprivation does not support the conclusion

that Plaintiffs suffered a violation of their procedural due process rights.
b. Muskingum County’s Reason for the Deprivation
Muskingum County explains that it seized and retained Plaintiffs’ van because the van was
potentially needed as evidence in Kahmayee’s trial for improperly handling a firearm in a motor
vehicle. (Mot., PageID 108–09.) The County offers only one piece of evidence to support this
justification, an email from Prosecutor Welch to BenYeHudah:
Criminal Rule 16 in Ohio provides for the manner in which a defendant may receive
discovery in a criminal matter. Please refer to the rule for [determining] the type of
information the defendant is entitled, whom may request that information and the
manner in which it will be provided.
(ECF No. 3-1, PageID 78–79.) Presumably, Prosecutor Welch’s email meant the van was evidence
and to receive such evidence, BenYeHudah needed to adhere to the process provided in Rule 16.
Plaintiffs argue this justification was concocted after Plaintiffs filed suit to avoid liability.
And if the van were needed as evidence, then logically, Defendants would have held the van until

the criminal proceedings against Kahmayee concluded. But that was not the case here. Defendants
released the van to BenYeHudah on October 11, 2022, but did not accept Kahmayee’s plea of no
contest until January 2023.
Ohio law permits law enforcement to retain property lawfully seized until “the time it is no
longer needed as evidence or for another lawful purpose.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2981.11(A)(1). The
statute both allows law enforcement to keep property as evidence, but also imposes a duty on law
enforcement to return seized property without unnecessary delay. See State v. Grace, 2023-Ohio-
165, ¶ 18, 205 N.E.3d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2023). The statute mirrors the general
presumption in the law that property seized must be returned to its owner once criminal
proceedings conclude. See Savoy v. United States, 604 F.3d 929, 932 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Rule

41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Wilson, No. 1:07CR137, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61858, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 31, 2011) (“W]hen the Government seizes property
for use in an investigation or trial the property must be returned once criminal proceedings have
concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture.”).
But the pendency of a criminal proceeding alone does not justify seizing property
indefinitely without a hearing. See Baumholtz, 553 N.E.2d at 639. The Due Process Clause requires
a timely forfeiture hearing, and the pendency of a criminal proceeding is only an element
considered when determining whether the delay in initiating forfeiture proceedings was
unreasonable. Id.
While it is certainly a plausible justification that Defendants kept the van as evidence, the
Court is not prepared to conclude as a matter of law based on a single email that this was the only
justification or that this explanation justifies the duration of the seizure. Plaintiffs’
counterargument raises questions about Defendants’ purported justification. If the van were

needed as evidence, Defendants would have kept it at least until Kahmayee entered his plea of no
contest. Ascertaining the truth of Defendants’ explanation involves questions of fact and
credibility determinations better reserved for the trier of fact. Thus, this factor favors Plaintiffs.
c. Plaintiffs’ Diligence in Seeking the Return of the Van
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not show diligence in seeking the return of the van
because they did not utilize any remedies available under state law. (Mot., PageID 116–18.) But
Plaintiffs submit many emails where BenYeHudah diligently sought the return of the van and its
cargo. (See ECF No. 3-1, PageID 75–80.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that the delay between the seizure and the forfeiture hearing
becomes more unreasonable when a plaintiff diligently asserts their right to the return of their

property. Cremeans, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21425, at *11. In Cremeans, the plaintiffs made
multiple written requests to the Chillicothe Law Director seeking the return of their property and
eventually filed a state-court action for replevin. Id. Even though the plaintiffs did not initiate a
hearing under Ohio Revised Code § 2981.03(A)(4),1 the district court found—and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed—that the plaintiffs had “adequately asserted their rights to the property.” Id. The
plaintiffs’ diligence made the delay before the forfeiture hearing unreasonable. Id.

1 Ohio Revised Code § 2981.03 is Ohio’s forfeiture statute. Ohio Revised Code § 2981.03(A)(4)
gives an individual the right to file a motion for their return of their property.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds BenYeHudah
plausibly alleged diligence in seeking the return of the van and its cargo. Within days of the van’s
impoundment, BenYeHudah contacted the Muskingum County Jail and the Prosecutor’s Office.
(Compl., ¶¶ 32, 34, 36.) He arranged a meeting with Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry, (ECF

No. 3-1, PageID 74; see also Compl., ¶¶ 43–45), and even after the van’s cargo was released, he
continued to communicate with Defendants to obtain the release of his van. (Compl., ¶¶ 54–55,
61, 63, 68–69.) He sent emails on August 5, August 9, September 15, September 22, and
September 27, 2022. (ECF No. 3-1, PageID 75–80.) Many of these emails went unanswered. (Id.)
Although BenYeHudah did not pursue other remedies under state law, like an action for replevin
as the plaintiffs did in Cremeans, failing to do so does not negate the fact that he diligently sought
the return of his property. Accordingly, this factor favors Plaintiffs.
d. Prejudice to Plaintiffs
The last factor evaluates any prejudice suffered by Plaintiffs, but the kind of prejudices it
addresses does not apply here because here no forfeiture proceedings were initiated. This factor

analyzes whether the delay hampered a claimant from presenting their defense in the forfeiture
proceeding or underlying criminal proceeding. Baumholtz, 553 N.E.2d at 639 (explaining that
prejudice could be suffered if there was a loss of witnesses or other important evidence because of
the delay); Cremeans v. Taczak, No. 2:19-cv-2703, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147827, at *41 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 17, 2022) (Marbley, J.), aff’d, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21425 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023)
(describing the inquiry as whether the delay prejudiced the ability to defend against a forfeiture).
Here, no forfeiture proceedings were initiated so the delay could not interfere with
Plaintiffs’ ability to defend against a forfeiture. The only prejudice Plaintiffs point to is the
hardship experienced from losing the ability to make deliveries for the approximately 70 days
Defendants seized and retained the van. This prejudice is not the kind of prejudice this factor was
intended to account for and accordingly, this factor is neutral.
The second and third factors, however, favor Plaintiffs. On balance, Plaintiffs alleged a
plausible violation of their due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause. The question now becomes whether a single purported incident of unconstitutional
activity allows Plaintiffs’ claims to survive.
ii. Although a close call, Plaintiffs plausibly allege a municipal policy for
purposes of Monell liability.
Generally, a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not enough to impose Monell
liability on a municipality. See Phillips, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89421, at *29. That said, a “single
decision can constitute a policy when ratified by an official with final decision-making authority.”
Wallace v. Coffee Cnty., 852 F. App’x 871, 877 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Prosecutor Welch’s decision to retain the van for over 70 days
without a hearing was made with final decision-making authority and thus constitutes a policy of
the municipality. (Opp., PageID 157–58.) The discretion afforded to Prosecutor Welch in
determining when to seize and retain vehicles, coupled with this allegedly unconstitutional
incident, demonstrates that the municipal policy did not include a timely forfeiture hearing. Id.
Plaintiffs cite Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati which held that a municipality can be held
liable under § 1983 for a single decision by the municipality’s policymakers. 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986). There, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the decision to adopt [a] particular course of

action is properly made by that government’s authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an
act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly understood. More importantly, where
action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally
responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Id.
Prosecutor Welch at minimum approved of the decision to continue holding Plaintiffs’ van.
In response to an email request from BenYeHudah seeking the return of the van or an explanation
for its continued retention, Prosecutor Welch pointed BenYeHudah to Rule 16 of the Ohio Rules
of Criminal Procedure. (ECF No. 3-1, PageID 47–48.) As Muskingum County’s elected

prosecutor, he was the County’s authorized decisionmaker on questions of evidence in a criminal
proceeding. Thus, his decision to continue holding the van without a hearing could represent an
act of official government policy.
Without more evidence, such as other incidents where Prosecutor Welch retained seized
property without forfeiture proceedings, the Court finds this to be a close call. But given the early
stage in the litigation, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible Monell liability claim. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs may proceed
on their § 1983 claims against Muskingum County, Ohio.
E. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
Plaintiffs bring claims against all Defendants for violations of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2921.45, which makes it a misdemeanor for a public servant to knowingly, deprive a person of

a constitutional or statutory right. (Compl., ¶¶ 96–97.) Defendants argue that they are shielded
from liability on principles of political subdivision immunity under Ohio’s Political Subdivision
Tort Liability Act (“PSTLA,” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02, et seq.) (Mot., PageID 126–127.) And
that Prosecutor Welch is immune under the PSTLA from state law liability as an employee of a
political subdivision. (Id. PageID 126.) The Court takes Defendants’ arguments in reverse order.
i. Prosecutor Welch’s state law immunity
Prosecutor Welch’s immunity under the PSTLA requires a two-step analysis. King v. City
of Columbus, No. 2:18-CV-1060, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59274, at *8–9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2019).
First, the Court must determine whether immunity presumptively applies to Prosecutor Welch. Id.
Under Ohio law, presumptive immunity applies to employees in civil actions brought to “recover
damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission in
connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A).
Here, presumptive immunity applies to Prosecutor Welch who was an employee of the

Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office and was acting within the course and scope of his
employment. All of Plaintiffs’ allegations against Prosecutor Welch involve conduct related to his
prosecutorial functions,2 which qualifies as a governmental function under § 2744. See Ohio Rev.
Code § 2744.01(c)(2)(f) (defining governmental function as including prosecutorial functions).
Having found that presumptive immunity applies, the Court now evaluates whether any of
the statutory exceptions rebut that presumption. See King, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59274, at *9.
Defendants maintain that no exceptions apply, but Plaintiffs argue that the statutory exception
under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) applies. (Opp., PageID 163–64.) Prosecutor Welch can
still be held liable in tort if his “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in
a wanton or reckless manner.” King, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59274, at *9 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege any wrongdoing with the requisite intent for this
exception to apply. Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not mention that Prosecutor Welch acted with
malice, bad faith, or in a reckless manner. (See Compl.) And in response to Defendants’ Motion,
Plaintiffs only argue that it is too early in the litigation to resolve whether Prosecutor Welch acted
with the requisite intent but put forth no factual allegations to support their claims. (Opp., PageID
162–63.) Without factual allegations to suggest that Prosecutor Welch actions were malicious,

2 The Court views “prosecutorial functions” as enumerated under Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2744.01(c)(2)(f) more broadly than those of an advocate, or those activities “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” under absolute immunity. See Imbler,
424 U.S. at 430.
wanton, or reckless, the exception cannot apply. Prosecutor Welch is accordingly entitled to
immunity, and the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity state-law claims against him.
ii. Defendants’ state law immunity
Defendants next urge the Court to dismiss the remaining state-law claims against

Muskingum County and Detective Perry in his official capacity because Ohio’s PSTLA applies.
(Mot., PageID 126–27.)
To determine whether a political subdivision is immune, courts utilize a three-step analysis.
See King, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59274, at *13. As with Prosecutor Welch, the analysis begins
with whether presumptive tort immunity applies. Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(A)(1). And as with
Prosecutor Welch, the Court finds that it does. Muskingum County is a political subdivision of
Ohio and Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges conduct by employees of the county in furtherance of a
governmental function that caused loss to person or property. Id.; Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2744.02(A)(1). The power to impound and seize a motor vehicle constitutes a governmental
function under Ohio law. See, e.g., Pavlik v. City of Cleveland, 2009-Ohio-3073, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct.

App.) (“This court has held that the police power to impound a motor vehicle constitutes a
governmental function.”); Maine v. Boardman Police Dep’t, 2006-Ohio-4954, ¶ 28 (Ohio Ct.
App.) (holding that confiscating a boat during a criminal investigation was a governmental
function of the police department).
Next, the Court determines whether an exception applies. Section 2744.02(B) lists five
statutory exceptions to presumptive immunity. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B)(1)–(5). Plaintiffs
argue that the fifth exception applies. (Opp., PageID 166.) That exception allows a political
subdivision to be liable for claims involving civil liability expressly imposed on the subdivision
by another provision of the Ohio Revised Code. King, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59274, at *14.
Plaintiffs allege that their claims involve civil liability imposed on the County by Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2307.60. (Opp., PageID 166.) Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.60 authorizes a civil action for damages
caused by criminal acts. Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 161 N.E.3d 603, 605 (Ohio 2020) (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs allege that the interference with their constitutional rights, a misdemeanor

under Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.45, is a criminal act. Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument is that these two
statutory provisions (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2921.45 and 2307.60) overcome the presumptive
immunity. (Opp., PageID 168.)
Defendants do not address this argument in their reply in support of their Motion. (Reply,
ECF No. 12.) But even if this case fell within the exception under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B)(5),
the Court would turn to the third and final step of the analysis. A political subdivision can still
avoid liability under the third step if any of the immunities and defenses under Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2744.03 apply. See Wakefield v. Williamstown Volunteer Fire Co., No. 2:23-cv-01353, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203652, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2023) (Marbley, C.J.) (describing three-step
inquiry for statutory immunity); Theobald v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 332 F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir.

2003) (explaining several of the immunities and defenses under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03). A
political subdivision is immune from liability if the alleged injury resulted from an employee’s
“performance of a judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, or quasi-legislative function.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(1) (emphasis added).
Here, the statute provides for statutory immunity for political subdivisions engaged in a
prosecutorial function. Id. Because the van was seized in relation to the criminal prosecution of
Kahmayee Whitfield, the Court finds that Muskingum County and Detective Perry in his official
capacity are entitled to immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are DISMISSED.
F. Parties’ Motion and Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
Lastly, before the Court issued this Opinion and Order, the Parties also filed Motions for
Summary Judgment. (See Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21; Pl’s Partial Mot. for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22.) Because this Opinion and Order resolves several of Plaintiffs’
claims, the Parties are ORDERED to re-file their Motion and Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) and Plaintiffs’ Partial
Motion (ECF No. 22) are thus DENIED without prejudice for re-filing in light of this Opinion
and Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ claims against Prosecutor Welch and Detective Perry in their
official capacities are duplicative of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Muskingum County and
are DISMISSED. Because Prosecutor Welch is entitled to qualified immunity, Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims against him in his individual capacity are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs’ Monell liability claim
against Muskingum County may proceed, but Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against all Defendants
are barred by statutory immunity and are DISMISSED.

Finally, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) and Plaintiffs’ Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) are DENIED without prejudice for re-filing in
light of this Court’s Opinion and Order. The Parties are ORDERED to re-file their Motions for
Summary Judgment, if any, on or before November 4, 2024. Responses shall be filed by
November 25, 2024, and any replies shall be filed by December 9, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

9/18/2024 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10665359. Public record. Not legal advice.