# Zilinsky v. LeafFilter North, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10664833

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
James Zilinsky, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
et al.,
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229
Plaintiffs,
Judge Michael H. Watson
V.
Magistrate Judge Jolson
LeafFilter North, LLC,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
James Zilinsky, Geraldine Zilinsky, Cory Simpson, Brian Dering, Theresa
Dering, Meagan McGinley, Sandy Armstrong, Sandra GarrettDorsey, and Alan
Armstrong (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for final approval of the Parties’ class
action Settlement, ECF No. 98, and for an award of attorney's fees and service
awards, ECF No. 70. LeafFilter North, LLC (“Defendant”) does not oppose either
motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint (“Action”) against Defendant in
December 2020, alleging that Defendant materially misrepresented that its gutter
protection system would not clog or overflow when, in fact, the system was
defective and allowed debris to accumulate on top of the gutters. Compl., ECF

No. 1. Plaintiffs assert consumer protection and common law tort claims under
various states’ laws. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs later filed an Amended
Complaint with substantially the same allegations. ECF No. 19.
The Parties fully briefed a motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 30, 33, & 36.
Before the Court ruled on the motion, the Parties moved for a stay pending
mediation, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 46 & 47. Subsequently, the
Parties notified the Court that they reached a settlement. ECF No. 50. The
Parties moved for preliminary approval of their Settlement Agreement, which the
Court granted. ECF Nos. 54, 56, & 58. The Court held a fairness hearing on
March 24, 2023, and now turns to Plaintiffs’ unopposed motions for final approval
of the Settlement and for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and service awards.
ECF Nos. 70 & 98.
B. The Settlement Agreement
Per the Parties’ representations at the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement
Agreement creates a $5.2 million Settlement Fund for the benefit of the Class.
The Settlement Fund will cover settlement payments to Class Members, costs of
notice to the Class and administration of the settlement, reimbursement of Class
Counsel’s reasonable costs and expenses, attorney's fees for Class Counsel,
and service awards to named Plaintiffs. See generally Settlement Agreement,
ECF No. 56-2. Class Members had the opportunity to submit a claim form to
receive one of four benefits: (1) vouchers for future gutter cleanings;
(2) reimbursement for past gutter cleaning; (3) a combination of vouchers and
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 2 of 22

reimbursement; and (4) partial reimbursement for removal of the gutter
protection system. /d.
The Settlement Class is defined as follows:
[A]ll LeafFilter customers in the United States who appear in
LeafFilter’s customer care database with a Debris-Related Final Issue
Code for their service request. The Class Period shall mean the time
period from January 1, 2016 through the date that the Settlement
Agreement is fully executed.
Id. at 11. The Parties represent that there are nearly 58,000 Class Members.
Id.
C. Notice
The Court appointed KCC Class Action Services, LLC (“KCC”) to be
the Settlement Administrator. See Order 6, ECF No. 58; Jue Decl. 1, ECF
No. 98-3. KCC was responsible for providing Notice to Class Members. See
generally Jue Decl., ECF No. 98-3. KCC reviewed the records provided by
Class Counsel, obtained updated mailing addresses and email addresses,
and sent the Notice via mail to 57,704 Class Members and via email to
39,855 Class Members.' Jue Decl. 7] 2-3, ECF No. 98-3. Although over
1,000 notices initially came back as undeliverable, KCC was ultimately able to
send notices to all but 354 Class Members. /d. J 6.

1 As the Parties represent that there are nearly 58,000 Class Members, the Court
assumes there were several Class Members that received both an email and a mail
version of the Notice.
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 3 of 22

ll. APPROVAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT
To grant final approval of a settlement class, the Rule 23 requirements
must be satisfied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Court has already preliminarily
approved the Class for settlement purposes, ECF No. 58, and now finds that the
standards required for final approval are satisfied.
A. Numerosity
To satisfy numerosity, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “There is no strict
numerical test for determining impracticability of joinder.” In re Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he
numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each case
and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc., v. EEOC,
446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Here, the Class contains nearly 58,000 members.
Numerosity is satisfied because it would be impractical, if not impossible, to join
all of these members into one action.
B. Commonality
To establish commonality, there must be “questions of law or fact common
to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the Class Members have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50, 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The claims “must depend on a common contention . . . of
such a nature that is capable of classwide resolution—which means that

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 4 of 22

determination of its truth or its falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” /d. at 350.
Here, the lawsuit raised numerous common questions including whether
Defendant made the alleged misrepresentations and whether the gutter
protection system had a defect that allowed debris to accumulate on top of it. In
addition, the Class Members have the same alleged injury: the gutter protection
system did not perform as allegedly promised. Accordingly, the commonality
requirement is satisfied.
C. _Typicality
A class representative’s claim is typical if “it arises from the same event or
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other Class
Members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Beattie

v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The
typicality requirement “tend[s] to merge” with the commonality requirement. Gen.
Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 (1982).
Here, the typicality element is satisfied because the Class claims are
based on the same legal theories and the same alleged conduct.
D. Adequacy of Representation
The adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between
named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Products, Inc., v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). To determine the adequacy of
representation requirement, a court must consider two elements: “1) the
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 5 of 22

representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class,
and 2) it must appear that the representative[] will vigorously prosecute the
interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Pelzer v. Vassalle, 655 F. App’x
352, 364 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the Class Representatives and Class Members share common
interests. No conflict exists between the Class Representatives and the Class
Members they seek to represent. Also, Class Counsel have extensive
experience in class action litigation and corporate matters. See Warwick Decl.
8-21, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. | 4, ECF No. 56-8. Thus, adequacy is
met.
E. Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a
showing that common questions of fact or law predominate over any individual
questions and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
1. Predominance
“To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that
issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole
predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.”
Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’! Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 353 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 6 of 22

Predominance is satisfied here. There is one set of operative facts which
would render Defendant liable to each potential class member, as evident in the
definition of the class. Each class member had one of Defendant's gutter
protection systems installed and had a “Debris-Related Final Issue Code”
request in Defendant’s records. Consequently, the alleged injuries to Class
Members are of the same nature and each class member will have experienced
similar misrepresentations by Defendant. The Court therefore finds common
questions predominate over individual issues in this case.
2. Superiority
Finally, before certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find
that a class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). To make this decision,
the Court considers:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.
Here, class treatment is superior to other available methods. The Class
Members have little interest in individually controlling separate actions as the
amount of individual damages is likely to be small. “[S]mall awards weigh in
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 7 of 22

favor of class suits.” Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., 654 F.3d 618, 631 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). The Court is not aware of

any litigation concerning this controversy that has already begun by or against
the Class Members. It is desirable to concentrate the litigation in this forum as
the Parties and, to a lesser extent, the Court have already expended significant
time and resources on this case. Last, the difficulties in managing a class action
do not outweigh the benefits of certifying a class in this case. Accordingly, a
class action is clearly the superior method of adjudicating this case.
For these reasons, the Class is certified for purposes of the Settlement,
and the Court appoints Varnell & Warwick, P.A. and Goldenberg Schneider, LPA
as Class Counsel.
lll. APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT
When deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, the Court must
consider whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
In making this determination, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by
the parties; (4) the likelinood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions
of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent
class members; and (7) the public interest.
Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 244
(6th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
“enjoys wide discretion in assessing the weight and applicability of these factors.”
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 8 of 22

Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1992).
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable.
A. _ The Risk of Fraud or Collusion
First, the Court finds that there is no evidence—or even a suggestion—that
the Settlement was the product of fraud or collusion. See /UE-CWA v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 238 F.R.D. 583, 598 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“Courts presume the
absence of fraud or collusion unless there is evidence to the contrary.”). Rather,
the Settlement is the result of arm’s-length, well-researched, and protracted
negotiations. The Court concludes that this factor favors approval of the
Settlement.
B. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation
Generally, “[mJost class actions are inherently complex and settlement
avoids the costs, delays, and multitude of other problems associated with them.”
In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1013 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(quoting /n re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164,
174 (S.D. N.Y. 2000)). Here, the difficulty Plaintiffs would encounter in proving
their claims, the substantial litigation expenses, and the possibility of further
delay in recovery due to the appellate process weigh in favor of approving the
Settlement.
The Parties have been litigating this case for over two years. Absent the
Settlement, continued litigation of this case, as Class Counsel explained at the
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 9 of 22

hearing, would have resulted in substantial additional time and effort spent
preparing for litigation, including additional depositions, record review, expert
depositions, class certification and dispositive motions, and trial preparation.
Settling the case now saves time and money for the Parties and the Court.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement. It

secures a substantial benefit for the Class Members, undiminished by further

expenses and without the delay, cost, and uncertainty of protracted litigation.
C. The Amount of Discovery Engaged in By the Parties
To confirm that Plaintiffs “have had access to sufficient information to
evaluate their case and to assess the adequacy of the proposed Settlement,” the
Court must consider the amount of discovery engaged in by the Parties. /n re
Broadwing, Inc. ERISA Litig., 252 F.R.D. 369, 374 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citations
omitted). “In considering whether there has been sufficient discovery to permit
the plaintiffs to make an informed evaluation of the merits of a possible
settlement,” courts “should take account not only of court-refereed discovery but
also informal discovery in which parties engaged both before and after litigation
commenced.” UAW v. Gen’ Motors Corp., No. 05-CV-73991-DT, 2006 WL
891151, at *19 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006). In this consideration, “the absence of
formal discovery is not unusual or problematic, so long as the parties and the
court have adequate information in order to evaluate the relative positions of the
parties.” /d. (citing cases).

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 10 of 22

In this case, the Parties engaged in extensive discovery. Both sides have
ample evidence with which to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their
positions and determine that the Settlement is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. The Court finds that both sides made well-informed decisions to
enter into the Settlement. This factor weighs in favor of approving the proposed
Settlement.
D. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“The most important of the factors to be considered in reviewing a
Settlement is the probability of success on the merits. The likelihood of success,
in turn, provides a gauge from which the benefits of the settlement must be
measured.” Poplar Creek, 636 F.3d at 245 (quoting /n re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co.
Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant misrepresented the capabilities of its
gutter protection system and that the system is defective. Defendant
unequivocally opposes all allegations. Among other issues, it would be difficult
for Plaintiffs to prove which specific misrepresentations were made to which
customers. Accordingly, due to the existence of uncertainties inherent in their
claims, Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of its claims remains
uncertain. This factor therefore weighs in favor of approving the Proposed
Settlement.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 11 of 22

E. The Opinions of Class Counsel and Class Representatives
The recommendation of Class Counsel, skilled in class actions and
corporate matters, that the Court should approve the Settlement is entitled to
deference. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983)
(‘The court should defer to the judgment of experienced counsel who has
competently evaluated the strength of his proofs . . . . [T]he deference afforded
counsel should correspond to the amount of discovery completed and the
character of the evidence uncovered.”); see a/so Kritzer v. Safelite Solutions,
LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0729, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74994, at *7 (S.D. Ohio May 30,
2012) (“The Court gives weight to the belief of experienced counsel that a
settlement is in the best interests of the class.”).
In this case, Class Counsel have extensive experience in class action
litigation and corporate matters. See Warwick Decl. {ff 8-21, ECF No. 56-7;
Goldenberg Decl. J 4, ECF No. 56-8. Equipped with extensive experience, Class
Counsel have concluded that the Settlement is not only fair and reasonable but
also confers substantial benefits on the Settlement Class. Warwick Decl. {J □□□
24, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. {§] 6-8, ECF No. 56-8. The Court therefore
finds that this factor favors approval of the Settlement.
F. The Reaction of Absent Class Members
The Court must also consider the reaction of the Class Members. Poplar
Creek, 636 F.3d at 244; In re Broadwing, 252 F.R.D. at 376.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 12 of 22

Individual notice packets were sent by first class mail to nearly 58,000
Class Members and via email to almost 40,000 Class Members. Jue Decl. {J 3—
6, ECF No. 98-3. Only 354 of those Class Members were unable to receive the
Notice. /d. at 76. Nearly 50 Class Members objected, and approximately 250
Class Members opted-out of the Settlement. /d. at {J 10-11; Notice, ECF No.
103; Notice, ECF No. 105. Thus, approximately 0.08% of Class Members
objected and 0.4% opted out; both percentages are quite low and demonstrate
that, as a whole, the Class supports the Settlement. Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 98-1.
Moreover, many objections expressed beliefs that Class Members should receive

a higher recovery. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 63, 75, & 88. Of course, it is
understandable that class members would want as high a recovery as possible,
but compromises are often required for settlement. As explained throughout this
Opinion and Order when one considers all the relevant factors, the settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable. Thus, the objectors’ desire for higher recovery
carries little weight.
In sum, the overall positive response from the Class Members weighs in
favor of approving the Settlement.
G. The Public Interest
“Public policy generally favors settlement of class action lawsuits.” Hainey
v. Parrott, 617 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (citation omitted). In this

case, the Settlement confers immediate benefits on the Class Members, avoids

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 13 of 22

the risks and expenses in further litigation, and conserves judicial resources.
The Court therefore finds that this factor favors approving the Settlement.
In sum, after considering all of the relevant factors, the Court concludes
that the Settlement provides a substantial benefit to the Parties and is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
A. Attorney’s Fees
Class Counsel seeks an award of one-third of the total Settlement Fund in
the amount of $1,749,416.31. Mot. for Attorney’s Fees 1, ECF No. 131.
Defendant has not opposed this request for fees nor have any Class Members.
“When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make sure
that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the
results achieved.” Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516
(6th Cir. 1993). Rule 23 authorizes a court to “award reasonable attorney's fees
and non-taxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
District courts apply a two-part analysis to assess the reasonableness of

an attorney fee petition. See In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litigs., 528 F. Supp.
2d 752, 760 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2007). First, the court must determine the
appropriate method to calculate the fees, using either the percentage of fund or
the Lodestar approach. /d. Whichever method is utilized, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit requires “only that awards of attorney’s fees
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 14 of 22

by federal courts in common fund cases be reasonable under the
circumstances.” Rawlings, 9 F.3d. at 516. Second, the Court must consider six
factors to assess the reasonableness of the fee. See Moulton v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, the Court applies the percentage of the fund method. See, e.g.,
Gascho v. Global Health Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir.
2016) (indicating that the district court must make a “clear statement” as to which
calculation method is being applied (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will
consider the following factors in determining whether the fee request is
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value
of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were
undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding
attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive
to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional
skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.
Moulton, 581 F.3d at 352 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under the circumstances of this specific case, particularly where neither
Defendant nor any Class Member oppose the fee request and the Class has
received a “substantial benefit,” the Court concludes that all of these factors
weigh in favor of approving an award of attorney's fees.
As to the first factor, the Court has already described at length the benefit
conferred to the Class Members through Settlement. The total settlement
amount is for $5.2 million, and each class member had the opportunity to select

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 15 of 22

one of four benefits. This factor therefore weighs in favor of approving the
requested award.
Second, the value of the services on an hourly basis, multiplied by the
hourly rate, favors the proposed fee award. Here, although not required, a cross-
check using Class Counsel's lodestar amount weighs in favor of granting the
requested fee award of $1,749,416.31, which is a 2.18 multiplier of the lodestar
amount. “Because of the inherent risks of litigation, courts in this district award
multipliers of between 2.0 and 5.0.” Karpik v. Huntington Bancshares Inc., No.
2:17-cv-1153, 2021 WL 757123, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2021) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rudi v. Wexner, No. 2:20-cv-
30682022 WL 1682297, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2022) (“2.75 multiplier falls at
the low end of that reasonable range”).
Third, Class Counsel represents that they took on this case pursuant to a
contingency fee agreement. In doing so, Class Counsel assumed a real risk in
taking on this case, preparing to invest time, effort, and money over a period of

years with no guarantee of recovery. This factor weighs in favor of approving the
requested fee award. See, e.g., In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis
Liability Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 907, 936 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Absent this class
action, most individual claimants would lack the resources to litigate a case of
this magnitude.”).
The Court next considers whether the fourth factor, society’s stake in
rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits, militates in favor of an award of
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 16 of 22

the requested attorney's fees. Class actions such as this have a “value to
society more broadly, both as deterrents to unlawful behavior—particularly when
the individual injuries are too small to justify the time and expense of litigation—
and as private law enforcement regimes that free public sector resources.”
Gascho, 822 F.3d at 287 (citing cases). Without a class action, the individual
plaintiffs would not have had a strong incentive to pursue recovery because any
monetary award would have been severely outweighed by the costs to litigate
their cases.
The remaining two factors, the complexity of the litigation and the
professional skill and standing of the attorneys involved, also weigh in favor of
granting the requested award. This is a complex case with nuanced issues and
significant litigation.
Class Counsel have extensive experience in class action litigation similar
to this action. See Warwick Decl. J] 8-21, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. □□ 4,
ECF No. 56-8. As discussed above, the hours expended and time records
submitted by Class Counsel further underscore their competency and efficient
handling of this matter, favoring approval.
For these reasons, the Court approves the fee award of $1,749,416.31 to
Class Counsel.
B. Settlement Administration Costs and Out-of-Pocket Expenses
“Under the common fund doctrine, class counsel is entitled to
reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs in
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 17 of 22

the prosecution of claims and in obtaining settlement[.]” In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 535 (E.D. Mich. 2003). These costs include
“expenses incurred in connection with document productions, consulting with and
deposing experts, travel and other litigation-related expenses.” /d.
Class Counsel avers that out-of-pocket expenses, which currently amount
to $25,583.69, were necessary and directly related to this litigation. Warwick
Decl. J 19, ECF No. 70-2; Goldenberg Decl. 4 10, ECF No. 70-4. The Court
finds that all of these costs are reasonable and necessary to litigate and settle
this case and therefore approves the request of $25,583.69 for out-of-pocket
expenses.
C. Class Representative Awards
Service “awards are efficacious ways of encouraging members of a class
to become class representatives and rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf
of the class.” Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). Notably,
“courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the
services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of the class
action litigation.” Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-1694,
2010 WL 776933, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, the Settlement Agreement proposes to award each Plaintiff
“household” up to $3,500. Each Plaintiff assisted in the prosecuting and settling
of the litigation, including communication with counsel and participating in
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 18 of 22

discovery. See James Zilinsky Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Geraldine Zilinksy
Decl. If] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Cory Simpson Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Meagan
McGinley Decl. ] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Sandra GarrettDorsey Decl. ff] 4-7, ECF
No. 70-7; Brian Dering Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Theresa Dering Decl. 1] 4—-
7, ECF No. 70-7; Alan Armstrong Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Sandy Armstrong
Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7. In light of this service, the Court approves the
service award of up to $3,500 per household to Plaintiffs.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 19 of 22

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS final approval of the
Settlement and enters final judgment as follows:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Action and
may grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement, including all Exhibits to
the Settlement Agreement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court also has personal
jurisdiction over the Named Plaintiffs, Defendant, and Class Members.
2. This Order granting final approval of class action settlement
incorporates by reference the definitions in the Settlement Agreement, and all
capitalized terms used herein that also appear in the Settlement Agreement shall
have the meanings set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
3. The Court grants final approval to this Settlement as it is fair, reasonable,
and adequate, consistent and in compliance with all applicable requirements of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Class Action Fairness Act, the United
States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), and the Rules of the
Court, and is in the best interests of each of the Parties and the Class Members.
Each Class Member is and shall be conclusively and forever bound by the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement shall be preclusive in all
pending and future lawsuits or other proceedings. It shall be binding as to all the
Released Claims as that term is defined by the Settlement Agreement. The
Court expressly adopts all defined terms in the Settlement Agreement, including,
but not limited to, the definition of Released Claims and Releasees.
Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 20 of 22

4. The Class approved by this Court, and for which final approval is
given, is as follows:
All LeafFilter customers in the United States who appear in
LeafFilter’s customer care database with a Debris-Related Final Issue
Code for their service request during the time period from January 1,
2016 through June 24, 2022. Excluded from the Settlement Class
are: (1) LeafFilter; (2) any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of LeafFilter;
(3) any entity in which LeafFilter has a controlling interest; (4) any
officer, director, or employee of LeafFilter; (5) any successor or assign
of LeafFilter; (6) any Judge to whom the Litigation is assigned; (7) any
person who has resolved or otherwise released their claims as of the
date of the settlement; and (8) any Settlement Class Member who
opts-out of the settlement.
5. The Court finds that the Class Notice and the notice methodology
implemented pursuant to this Settlement Agreement: (1) constituted the best
practicable notice; (2) constituted notice that was reasonably calculated, under
the circumstances, to apprise Class Members of the terms of the Proposed
Settlement, the available relief, the release of claims, their right to object or
exclude themselves from the proposed Settlement, and their right to appear at
the fairness hearing; (3) were reasonable and constitute due, adequate, and
sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice; and (4) met all applicable
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Class Action Fairness
Act, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), the Rules
of the Court, and any other applicable law.
6. This Action and every Released Claim (including all individual claims
and Class-wide claims presented thereby) is hereby dismissed on the merits and

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 21 of 22

with prejudice, without fees or costs to any Party except as provided in the
Settlement Agreement and as adopted and ordered by the Court in this Order.
7. Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ Motion For Approval of Attorney's Fees
Expense Reimbursement, and Class Representative Service Awards, and based
upon all previous filings in this action, the Court concludes and orders as follows:
(1) Plaintiffs’ requested award of Attorney's Fees of $1,749,416.31 is reasonable
and, therefore, is awarded; (2) Class Counsel shall be reimbursed $25,583.69 for
these reasonable expenses and costs; and (3) the Court awards service awards
of $3,500 per Named Plaintiff household.
8. This Order adjudicates all of the claims, rights and liabilities of the
Parties to the Settlement, and is intended to be final and immediately appealable.
9. Without affecting the finality of this Order for purposes of appeal, the
Court retains jurisdiction as to all matters relating to the administration,
implementation, consummation, enforcement, and interpretation of this
Settlement Agreement and this Order, and for any other necessary purpose.
The Clerk shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ihul LL
\ihuld| (ator
MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 22 of 22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10664833. Public record. Not legal advice.