# White v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · June 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10664320

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10664320

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1989) and its progeny

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISON

Jason White, ) CASE NO. 1:24 CV 478
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
vs. )
)
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation )
and Corrections, et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
)
Defendants. )

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”), CO Kristen Dreeszen (“CO Dreeszen”), CO Brandon
Waller (“CO Waller”), and Warden Jennifer Black (“Warden Black”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
(Doc. 11.) This is a Section 1983 case, alleging excessive force. For the reasons that follow, the
motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
Pro se plaintiff Jason White (“White”) is an inmate detained at the State of Ohio’s Lorain
Correctional Institution. He alleges that on some day in November 2023,1 he attempted to leave his

1 White’s Complaint says “[o]n or about 11/ /23 . . . .” (Doc. 1, at 3.) It appears White forgot to
indicate the exact day in November 2023 on which the alleged incidents occurred. White filed a
separate Motion to Preserve Evidence, in which he claims the date of the incident was November
16, 2023. (Doc. 3.)
housing unit on a library pass, but CO Dreeszen denied his pass. According to White, he immediately
requested a supervisor to explain, but CO Dreeszen called for yard officers instead of a supervisor.
CO Waller and “Blaise”2 allegedly entered the unit and began arguing with White. White
claims that he raised his hands above his head and CO Dreeszen deployed “OC aiming at [White’s]
face but hitting CO Waller.”3 (Doc. 1, at 4.) According to White’s allegations, “multiple correctional
officers” then began kicking his back and legs and grabbing his arms and back. White alleges that
CO Dreeszen sprayed OC into a rag and placed the rag into White’s mouth while grabbing his nose

and covering his mouth. White says he could not breathe for several moments. White claims that CO
Waller and Blaise then escorted him in handcuffs to medical. On the way, White alleges that CO
Waller “threw [White] sideways, head first[sic], against the exterior brick wall,” “accompanied . . .
with a threat.” (Id.)
White brings this suit, alleging that Defendants violated Section 1983 because CO Dreeszen
and CO Waller used excessive force against him. Defendants move to dismiss White’s entire
Complaint for failure to state a claim. White has not opposed Defendants’ motion.4

2 White does not further identify Blaise, nor does he name as a defendant any person by this name.
3 White does not clarify what “OC” is but, to the best of the Court’s knowledge, OC likely refers to
oleoresin capsicum (i.e., pepper spray), an aerosol spray carried by correctional officers in many
correctional institutions.
4 Defendants filed their motion on April 17, 2024. As of May 21, 2024, White had not responded to
the motion. The Court noticed, however, that the certificate of service attached to Defendants’
motion did not list White’s correct inmate identification number. Given the error, the Court had
concerns that White did not receive a copy of the motion. Therefore, the Court ordered Defendants
to serve their motion on White again and certify to the Court that it was served using the correct
identification number. (Doc. 12.) Defendants unnecessarily refiled their entire motion to dismiss but
did not correct the inmate identification number in the certificate of service. (Doc. 13.) Thereafter,
Defendants filed an Amended Certificate of Service, certifying that a copy of the Motion to Dismiss
was served upon White using his correct inmate identification number. (Doc. 14.) Defendants also
2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek Mgmt. Corp., 335 F. App’x
587, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.
2008)). That said, the complaint must set forth “more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.”
Allard v. Weitzman (In Re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Scheid
v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)). The Court is not required to

accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,
123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th
Cir. 1987)).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in [the] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be
sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include

detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that

included tracking information that noted a copy of the Motion to Dismiss was mailed to White
(using his correct inmate identification number) on May 22, 2024, and received. (Id.) Given these
facts, White had until June 24, 2024, to respond to Defendants’ motion. To date, he has not
responded.
3
merely offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
meet this pleading standard. Id.
Although pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers” and must be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), courts are not required to conjure unpleaded facts or
construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d
567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
White brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, White must
show that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980) (citation omitted).
1. ODRC
As an initial matter, ODRC is not a proper party to this civil rights action. The Eleventh
Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon state agencies. Latham v. Office of
Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005); Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp.
46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985). ODRC is clearly a state agency and entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Accordingly, White’s claim against ODRC must be dismissed.

2. CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black
To the extent White has sued CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black in their official
capacities only, the Eleventh Amendment also precludes White’s claims against these defendants.
White does not explicitly state in his Complaint whether he sues CO Dreeszen, CO Waller,
and Warden Black in their individual and/or official capacities. In the Sixth Circuit, there is no per se
4
rule that a plaintiff must affirmatively plead “individual capacity” in his complaint. Moore v. City of
Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir.
1989) and its progeny). But, “‘absent any indication that these defendants are being sued individually,
[the Court] must assume that they are being sued in their official capacities . . . .’” Moore, 272 F.3d
at 772 (quoting Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1991) (further citation omitted in
original; emphasis added in original)). The Sixth Circuit “applie[s] a ‘course of proceedings’ test to
determine whether § 1983 defendants have received notice of the plaintiff’s intent to hold them

personally liable[.]” Moore, 272 F.3d at 772. This test “considers such factors as the nature of the
plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses
raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity, to determine whether
the defendant had actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability.” Id. at 772 n.1
Additionally, a court should consider “whether subsequent pleadings put the defendant on notice of
the capacity in which he or she is [being] sued.” Rogers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 594 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1).
Here, some facts suggest White intends to sue CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black
in their individual capacities. White names the individual defendants by name only (without reference
to their titles) in his Complaint’s caption (Doc. 1-1), he seeks compensatory damages,5 and his

5 “Although Moore recognizes that the request for monetary damages is one factor that might place
an individual on notice that he is being sued in his individual capacity,” Shepherd v. Wellman, 313
F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit has clarified that it “[does] not read [Moore] as
holding that a request for money damages is alone sufficient to place a state official on notice that
he is being sued in his individual capacity. To so hold would be inappropriate, [when] the rest of the
complaint so strongly suggests an official capacity suit.” Id.
5
Complaint attributes his harm to the actions of the individual defendants, rather than some custom or
policy of ODRC. See Kirkland v. ODRC, 2023 WL 8807240, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2023)
(“Plaintiff’s amended complaint attributes each of the Defendants’ actions to them personally. . . .
[A]n official capacity suit against Defendants would stem from policies and procedures of the
officials or inadequate training claims.”).
Considering the course of the proceedings as a whole, however, the Court finds that
insufficient indicia exist suggesting that White has sued CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black

in their individual capacities. While the Complaint’s caption does not include any titles, White did
include titles when listing defendants in his form complaint (Doc. 1, at 3), and he attempted to serve
each individual defendant at their place of employment. White does not individualize the damages he
seeks from each Defendant. Instead, he seeks general compensatory damages for the harm he faced
“while ODRC employees were negligent and violent.” See Vittetoe v. Blount Cty., 861 F. App’x 843,
852 (6th Cir. 2021) (affirming ruling that defendant was sued in his official capacity where, among
other things, plaintiff requested damages in general). Further, none of the individual defendants has
raised a qualified immunity defense. Cf. Lindsay v. Bogle, 92 F. App’x 165, 169 (6th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he assertion of a qualified-immunity defense (even a contingent qualified-immunity

defense) indicates that the defendants were aware they could be held personally liable[.]”). Finally,
White has not responded to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and, thus, has offered nothing to rebut
Defendants’ contention that White has sued CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black in their
official capacities only. See Patterson v. City of Akron, 2016 WL 3364919, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 17,
2016) (finding plaintiff sued police officers in their official capacities based on the court’s reading of
the entire complaint in its own context, in view of the fact that plaintiff did not oppose defendants’

6
assertion that the complaint was aimed at them only in their official capacities, even though police
officer defendants were listed in the caption of the complaint as being sued in both their individual
and official capacities, and plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, jointly and severally,
against all of the defendants).
Having found that White has sued CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black in their
official capacities only, the Court must dismiss White’s claims against these defendants. It is well-
settled that state officials, sued for monetary relief in their official capacities, are not “persons” within

the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). As the Supreme
Court has explained, although “state officials literally are persons . . . a suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office. As such it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Therefore, because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against the State, it also
bars suits against state employees sued in their official, as opposed to individual, capacities. See id.
at 66-71; see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–41 (1979). Accordingly, White’s claims
against CO Dreeszen, CO Waller, and Warden Black6 in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed.

6 Even if White had sued Warden Black in her individual capacity, White’s claims against her
would still be dismissed. White has failed to allege any facts in his Complaint that suggest Warden
Black committed any act that deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.
White’s only allegation concerning Warden Black is that she “undergo retraining as CO Dreeszen’s
employment record recognizes her as unfit to fulfill her duties.” (Doc. 1, at 5.) It is well-settled,
however, that Section 1983 does not provide for vicarious or respondent superior lability. The Sixth
Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged
violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each
defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684
(6th Cir. 2008). Further, “a supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control, or train the offending
7
CONCLUSION
For all the aforementioned reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the
case is DISMISSED. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 6/26/24

individual is not actionable, unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th
Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10664320. Public record. Not legal advice.