# Beaman v. New York City

> District Court, S.D. New York · October 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10663790

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10663790

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[w]hen the state conduct in question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies procedural due process requirements so long as it provides meaningful post-deprivation remedy”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHELTON BEAMAN,
Plaintiff,
24-CV-2350 (LTS)
-against-
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
NEW YORK CITY, et al.,
Defendants.
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state
law, alleging that Defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of access to
supportive housing. By order dated April 1, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court dismisses the complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a
complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to
construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –
to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow
the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In
reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal
conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded
factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely
possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is homeless, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his rights

by depriving him of access to supportive housing. Named as defendants are: (1) the City of New
York; (2) New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”); (3) New York City
HIV/AIDS Services Administration (“HASA”); and (4) Ms. Barnes, identified as an employee of
HASA who works closely with the Commissioner of HASA. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
unspecified injunctive relief, as well as money damages.
The following information is taken from the complaint. Plaintiff is a client of HASA who
is eligible for supportive housing. In 2019, he submitted a Permanent Supportive Housing
(“PSH”) 2010e application for an apartment located at 257 West 29th Street in Manhattan, but
Defendant Barnes “adamantly claimed that a ‘Mental Diagnosis’ was a requirement for PSH
eligibility for HASA clients” at that apartment building.1 (ECF 1 ¶ 14.) On March 21, 2024,
Plaintiff met with Defendant Barnes and a Ms. Cherri in a conference room at the Crown
Residence (“Crown”), where he resides. Barnes informed Plaintiff that his recently filed PSH
2010e application would be processed and he would get a decision from HRA. Barnes then asked

Plaintiff whether he had previously submitted a PSH 2010e application, and he responded that,
he had in 2014, under a Veterans Affairs program. Barnes asked if Plaintiff had had a mental
diagnosis, and when Plaintiff said no, she told him that he would need a mental diagnosis to be
eligible for supportive housing. Barnes asked several more questions and typed information in a
laptop she had with her. She then stated that according to their records, Plaintiff had an approved
2019 PSH 2010e application, but that there was no indication of a mental diagnosis, and she
asked him if he had had a mental diagnosis, to which he responded, no. The following then
happened:
Barnes, with intent to injure and harass Plaintiff, issued an ineligible
determination with knowledge that Plaintiff could not have possibly asserted or
claimed that he had a mental diagnosis on the initial Supportive Housing 1020-e
application date in 2019, said “So then you’re not eligible!
(Id. ¶ 34.) Barnes then referred to Plaintiff’s residence at Crown since June 29, 2023, and left the
room to get Inez Logan, the Clinical Director of the Crown.
Less than a minute later, Barnes returned to the conference room with Logan. She stated
to Logan, “He doesn’t have a mental diagnosis so he’s not eligible.” (Id. ¶ 36.) Logan responded
that, since Plaintiff had been a resident of Crown for six months, that they would need to meet
with his case manager “to see what’s what.” (Id. ¶ 37.) After considering for a couple of days the

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar
are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
“tremendous loss of housing as a result of an impermissibly imposed wrongful determination,”
Plaintiff filed this action. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “had terminated [his] right to supportive housing since
he had no mental diagnosis, without due process[,]. i.e. written notification.” (Id. § 42.) He also

claims the following: (1) HRA had “negligently failed” to inform him of the approved 2019 PSH
2010e application (id. ¶ 15); (2) he was denied the right to apply for supportive housing without
a mental diagnosis; (3) Barnes and Logan threatened him with an unlawful eviction; (4) he was
denied access to viable permanent housing resource, which denied him an “opportunity to regain,
among other things, wellness and self-sufficiency” (id. ¶ 16); (5) he was denied the opportunity
“to participate in the achievement of housing stability, increasing his income and skills” (id.);
and (6) he was kept in a “chronic homelessness state,” and unidentified persons are “now
preparing to oust him into homelessness without the aid and assistance of housing program staff
and support services as a viable option” (id.). Plaintiff indicates his intention of filing a state
court action in the “Civil Court, State of New York.” (Id.) Along with his due process claim,

Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of abuse of process, negligence, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
DISCUSSION
A. Claims against HRA and HASA
Plaintiff’s claims against the HRA and HASA must be dismissed because agencies of the
City of New York are not entities that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll
actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought
in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise
provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also
Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is
generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Plaintiff’s claims against HRA and
HASA will be considered as brought against the City of New York, which he also names as a
defendant.
B. Procedural Due Process
The Court understands that Plaintiff is claiming that he has a right to supportive housing

without a psychiatric evaluation and that Defendants terminated his PSH 2010e application
without due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. He bring his due process claims against the City of New York and Barnes under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under Section 1983, an individual may bring claims in federal court, asserting
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person
acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “The two
threshold questions in any Section 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether

the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or
federal statutes, and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that
interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
Public assistance benefits “have long been afforded constitutional protection as a species
of property protected by the federal Due Process Clause.” Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d
Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970)); see also M.K.B. v.
Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Persons who are qualified to receive
welfare benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.”). Applicants for
benefits, no less than recipients, possess such a property interest. Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113. In the
context of public assistance benefits, due process typically requires pre-deprivation notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260-61; Hart v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., No. 98-CV-8034, 2003 WL 22595396, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Where the government deprives a plaintiff of some property interest pursuant to an
established procedure,2 procedural due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of
hearing is provided before the individual is deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus, 644
F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). By contrast, where a person is deprived of a property right because
of a random and unauthorized act, rather than through the operation of established state
procedures, the Due Process Clause is satisfied if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that a “random and
unauthorized” deprivation of a protected interest does not result in a violation of procedural due
process, as long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy); Rivera-Powell v.
New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “[w]hen the state

conduct in question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies procedural due process
requirements so long as it provides meaningful post-deprivation remedy”).
New York State law provides public assistance applicants remedies to challenge the
denial of benefits, including fair hearings under N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 22 and 18 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 358, as well as an appeals process through Article 78 proceedings. These procedures have been
found to be constitutionally sufficient to challenge adverse determinations in connection with

2 Conduct is undertaken in accordance with established state procedures when, for
example, it is “pursuant to a statute, code, regulation, or custom,” or is the result of a decision
made by a high-ranking official with “final authority over significant matters.” See Viteritti v.
Inc. Vill. of Bayville, 918 F. Supp. 2d 126, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Chase Grp. All. LLC v.
City of New York Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 152 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010)).
government entitlement programs. See, e.g., Banks v. HRA, No. 11-CV-2380, 2013 WL 142374,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); Vapne v. Eggleston, No. 04-CV-565 (NRB), 2004 WL 2754673,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).
Here, even if the Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff’s PSH 2010e application

constitutes a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protections, Barnes’ denial of the
application alone does not deprive Plaintiff of that interest. His claim is not viable because he
does not allege that he pursued an administrative remedy such as requesting a fair hearing or
pursuing relief in state court under Article 78 before filing this action. Because Plaintiff does not
allege that available state remedies are inadequate to challenge the adverse determination on his
PSH 2010e application, he does not state a due process claim against the City of New York or
Barnes. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. State law claims
Plaintiff also brings various state law claims, including negligent infliction of distress

caused by the denial of his application for supportive housing. A district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law
claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the
federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original
jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims
Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental
jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’”
(quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for failure to
state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). All other

pending matters in this case are terminated.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 28, 2024
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10663790. Public record. Not legal advice.