# Blazquez v. City of Amsterdam

> District Court, N.D. New York · August 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659943

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 14, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659943

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALEXANDER BLAZQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:21-cv-1286 (BKS/DJS)

CITY OF AMSTERDAM, AMSTERDAM CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and NOAH WESTERN, MILLER, and
TYLER, as Police Officers of the Amsterdam Police
Department,

Defendants.

Appearances:

For Plaintiff:
Daniel R. Smalls
Law Office of Daniel R. Smalls, PLLC
240 State Street, Suite 4
Schenectady, New York 12305

For Defendants:
Thomas K. Murphy
Murphy Burns LLP
407 Albany Shaker Road
Loundonville, New York 12211

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2021, Plaintiff Alexander Blazquez initiated this action pro se1 against
Defendants City of Amsterdam, Amsterdam City Police Department, and Noah Western,
Thomas Miller, and Brandon Tyler, as officers of the Amsterdam Police Department, along with

1 At the time he filed his verified complaint, Plaintiff was proceeding pro se. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the motion-to-dismiss stage and remains counseled for the instant motion.
others that have since been dismissed, asserting claims in his verified complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and § 1985 for false arrest; malicious prosecution; unlawful search; abuse of process;
conspiracy; racial discrimination; and municipal liability and under New York law for
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Dkt. No. 1); see also Blazquez v.

City of Amsterdam, No. 21-cv-1286, 2023 WL 2164516, at *1, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920, at
*1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023) (construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint).
On March 1, 2022, Defendants City of Amsterdam, Amsterdam City Police Department,
Western, Miller, and Tyler answered the complaint. (Dkt. No. 18.) On February 22, 2023, the
Court granted the co-Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed all Defendants except
Defendants City of Amsterdam, Amsterdam City Police Department, Western, Miller, and Tyler.
See Blazquez, 2023 WL 2164516, at *11, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920, at *30. The Court also
granted Plaintiff leave to amend, see id., but Plaintiff did not amend his complaint. The Court
assumes familiarity with its prior Memorandum-Decision and Order. See id.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 47.) On March 5, 2024, more than a week
after Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion was due, Plaintiff requested an extension of time
to respond. (Dkt. No. 48.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s request because “Plaintiff failed to show
good cause for failing to file a timely response,” see N.D.N.Y. L. R. 7.1(a)(3), but allowed
Plaintiff until March 14, 2024, to file a letter-request providing a showing of good cause. (Dkt.
No. 49.) On March 15, 2024, a day after it was due, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter indicating
that his office was “playing catch up” due to “abrupt staff changes” yielding “a backload of civil
cases.” (Dkt. No. 50.) The Court granted Plaintiff an extension to April 2, 2024, to respond to
Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 51.)
On April 3, 2024, a day after Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion was due,
Plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter indicating that Plaintiff’s response would be filed the following
day. (Dkt. No. 52.) On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed what appears to be an incomplete version of
his response, which was missing pages, (Dkt. No. 53), and on April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his

complete response, (Dkt. No. 54). The Court accepted Plaintiff’s late response for filing. (Dkt.
No. 55.) Defendants did not file a reply brief.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part.
II. FACTS2
According to Defendants, on April 22, 2021, Defendants Miller and Tyler responded to
Plaintiff’s residence in the City of Amsterdam after receiving reports of a male with a machete
attacking other people. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 47-2,
at 1.) After arriving on the scene, Defendants Miller and Tyler interviewed Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s
tenant, and Plaintiff’s tenant’s friend, and as a result of those interviews, Defendants Miller and
Tyler learned that an altercation had occurred between Plaintiff and another individual who had

2 These facts are drawn, in part, from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Material Facts, (Dkt. No. 47-6), to
the extent the facts are well-supported by pinpoint citations. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’
Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement, (Dkt. No. 54, at 1), is improper because it fails to “mirror [Defendants’] Statement of
Material Facts by admitting and/or denying each of the . . . assertions in a short and concise statement, in matching
numbered paragraphs” and does not “set forth a[ny] specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises.” See
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(b). Accordingly, the Court may deem admitted any properly supported facts set forth in
Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement. See id. However, “[e]ven when a motion for summary judgment is
unopposed, the district court is not relieved of its duty to decide whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law,” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 2004), and the Court will therefore
conduct an independent review of the record and consider Plaintiff’s affidavit, (Dkt. No. 54, at 10–12), and Plaintiff’s
verified complaint, (Dkt. No. 1); see Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A verified complaint is to
be treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes, and therefore will be considered in determining whether
material issues of fact exist, provided that it meets the other requirements for an affidavit under Rule 56[(c)(4)].”),
abrogated on other grounds by Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus, these facts are also drawn
from those sources.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear at the Rule 16 conference, (Text Entry dated Apr. 21,
2023), and Defendants’ counsel has represented that Plaintiff’s counsel “served no mandatory disclosure, served no
responses to Defendants’ discovery demands, and served no discovery demands,” (Dkt. No. 47-1, ¶¶ 16–20). The
failure of Plaintiff’s counsel to comply with the Court’s orders and Local Rules is unacceptable.
left the scene. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 2.) A witness stated that
she observed Plaintiff threatening the other individual with a machete. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 3; Dkt.
No. 47-3, ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) During the course of the interview of Plaintiff at his
residence, Plaintiff stated that he went into the common hallway of his residence armed with a

machete to confront the other individual, whom Plaintiff believed did not belong at the residence.
(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 5–6: Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 2, 3–4.)
Defendant Tyler states that Plaintiff showed him the “machete,” which was sitting on Plaintiff’s
table. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 6: Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 2, 3–4.)
Plaintiff states that on April 22, 2021, he was on his own property and another individual
was also on Plaintiff’s property. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff asserts he entered
his own apartment and closed the door, and the other individual began hitting Plaintiff’s door
with a baseball bat while wielding a knife. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff armed
himself with “a hammer and a knife” to defend himself and asked the other individual to leave
the property. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 6.) A third individual called the police and informed

them that Plaintiff was “wielding a machete and running around the block,” which Plaintiff states
was not true. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 19.) According to Plaintiff, when Defendants Miller and Tyler
arrived, they “got out of the car running and held both the Plaintiff and his 18[-]year[-]old son at
gun point on the Plaintiff[’s] front porch.” (Id. ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 7.)
Defendant Western states that on April 23, 2021, he became aware of the incident and,
because he knew Plaintiff was on parole, Defendant Western contacted Plaintiff’s parole officer.
(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶¶ 2–3; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 5.) Plaintiff’s parole officer
informed Defendant Western that she would follow up with Plaintiff and the other individual
involved in the incident. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 5.)
Defendant Western states that the following day, April 24, 2021, the other individual
involved in the incident provided a sworn statement regarding the incident to Defendant Western
at the Amsterdam Police Headquarters. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 47-2, at
7–9.) In the sworn statement, the individual accused Plaintiff of threatening him with a machete

on April 22, 2021, and indicated that the individual wanted to pursue criminal charges against
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 7–9.) Defendant Western
then notified Defendant Miller about the sworn statement. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 47-3,
¶ 12; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that on April 24, 2021, he called Defendant Amsterdam City Police
Department and spoke to Defendant Western about pressing charges against the individual who
had been on Plaintiff’s property two days before. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 23; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 9.)3 Defendant
Western “stated that he would come to [Plaintiff’s restaurant] or send someone there to take the
Plaintiff[’]s statement but no-one ever showed up.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 10.) But,
Plaintiff states, Defendant Western “telephoned the Plaintiff[’]s upstairs tenant and had her call

[the individual who had been on Plaintiff’s property] to press charges against the Plaintiff.” (Dkt.
No. 1, ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 10.)
Defendant Miller states that on April 26, 2021, he contacted the Montgomery County
District Attorney’s office and received assistance and input in evaluating the evidence he had
obtained about the incident, and a determination was made that Plaintiff would be charged with
violations of New York Penal Law section 265.02(1), possession of a weapon in the third degree,

3 Plaintiff alleges that this was his second interaction with Defendant Western. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 22; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff alleges that on September 12, 2020, Defendant Western took $8,075 from Plaintiff and then “tried to say that
there was not any money in the house.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff then “showed Western where
the money was and Western . . . proceeded to say that [Western] dropped the money on the table in the house which
was also not true.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 26.)
and section 120.14(1), menacing in the second degree. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 17;
Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3, 10–11.) Defendant Miller states that, while preparing the charging
documents, he observed New York State parole officers outside of police headquarters and spoke
with Plaintiff’s parole officer, who indicated they were planning on searching Plaintiff’s

residence. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) Defendant Miller states
that the parole officers were conducting the search of Plaintiff’s residence to check compliance
with Plaintiff’s conditions of parole. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 18.) Defendant Miller
informed Plaintiff’s parole officer of the charges to be filed against Plaintiff, and Defendants
Miller and Tyler accompanied the parole officers to Plaintiff’s residence. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 16;
Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) Defendants Miller and Tyler state
that while parole officers conducted the search, Defendants Miller and Tyler stood by Plaintiff
and did not participate in the search. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶¶ 17, 22–23; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶¶ 19, 24; Dkt.
No. 47-4, ¶¶ 6, 8; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) Defendant Western states that he was not present at
Plaintiff’s residence during the search and did not participate in the search or Plaintiff’s arrest.

(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 9.) After the
search, parole officers informed Defendants Miller and Tyler that there would be a warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest for violating the terms of his parole. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 20;
Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) Defendant Miller states that, after he was advised that
parole officers would be obtaining a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, he placed Plaintiff under arrest
for parole violations and transported Plaintiff to Amsterdam Police Headquarters for processing.
(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶¶ 20, 23; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 3.) A warrant for Plaintiff’s
arrest was issued by the New York Division of Parole and was provided to Amsterdam Police.
(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 47-2, at 12.)
Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges that Defendant Western arrested Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s
residence. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 27.) Plaintiff’s parole officer, along with “other Defendant Police
Officers” and other parole officers, searched Plaintiff’s residence “pursuant to an arrest warrant,
and not a search warrant.” (Id. ¶¶ 28–30, 32–33; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that his

parole officer is “personal friends” with Defendant Western. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 28; Dkt. No. 54,
¶ 13.) Plaintiff states that during the search, Defendant Western “was walking around the
Plaintif[f’]s home . . . wielding a knife and h[olding] a bag with a white powdery substance
pretending that it was drugs.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 31; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 15.) Several police officers
“destroyed the Plaintiff[’]s apartment and caused damage[] to items in his house.” (Dkt. No. 1,
¶ 32.) Plaintiff states that during the search, Plaintiff’s parole officer said to a police officer that
the search was illegal. (Id. ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that “[D]efendants planned
the police encounter to damage [P]laintiff in his personal and professional life and to gain
retribution against him for daring to file an earlier criminal complaint.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 78.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Western charged Plaintiff with criminal possession of a

weapon in the third degree and menacing in the second degree and the charges were ultimately
dismissed on November 23, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 42–43; Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 2.)
Defendants state that on December 7, 2021, a final parole revocation hearing was held for
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to one of the charged violations of his conditions
of release—specifically that he had possessed a dangerous instrument with which he is alleged to
have threatened the other individual on April 22, 2021. (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 36-2, at 5;
Dkt. No. 36-4, at 6.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if
all submissions taken together “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A
fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and is
genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d
549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The moving party bears the initial
burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. The moving party may meet this burden by citing “particular parts of materials in the
record,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), or by showing that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see
also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that summary
judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to “‘come forth with evidence
sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on’ an essential

element of a claim” (quoting In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir.
2010))). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, “[t]he role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but
to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson v. NW Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010)).
“When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d
775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the

true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment,” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins.
Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Quarles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d
Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, “[m]ere conclusory allegations or denials . . . cannot by themselves
create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist.” Hicks v. Baines, 593
F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d
1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant Amsterdam City Police Department
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Defendants’ argument that Amsterdam City
Police Department is not a suable entity. (Dkt. No. 47-7, at 17.) In opposition, Plaintiff refers
only to qualified immunity, (Dkt. No. 54, at 8–9), which was not raised by Defendants.

Under Rule 17(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an entity’s capacity to sue
or be sued is determined by state law. “Under New York law, departments [that] are merely
administrative arms of a municipality[] do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the
municipality and cannot sue or be sued.” Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases); Loria v. Town of Irondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 606
(W.D.N.Y. 1990). Accordingly, Defendant Amsterdam City Police Department, an arm of the
City of Amsterdam, is not a suable entity, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted with respect to Defendant Amsterdam City Police Department.
B. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for
false arrest and malicious prosecution because there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Dkt.
No. 47-7, at 5–8.) Plaintiff argues that questions of fact exist to preclude summary judgment as
to these claims. (Dkt. No. 54, at 5–7.)

The elements of a claim for false arrest under § 1983 are: “(1) the defendant intended to
confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not
consent to the confinement[,] and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Toussaint
v. County of Westchester, 615 F. Supp. 3d 215, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (alteration in original)
(quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2003)). But “[t]he existence of
probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and ‘is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest,’ whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.” Jenkins v. City of New
York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)).
A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires demonstrating: “(1) the initiation or
continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in

plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual
malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” See Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d
149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997)). As is true
for a claim of false arrest, “the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of
malicious prosecution.” See Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
An officer has probable cause when they have “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.”
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006). To determine the existence of probable
cause, a court “must consider those facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and
immediately before it.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Caldarola
v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002)). “[P]olice officers, when making probable cause
determinations, are entitled to rely on the victims’ allegations that a crime has been committed,”

Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff,
63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995)), if the circumstances do not “raise doubt as to the person’s
veracity,” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395).
Here, there existed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on undisputed evidence—
namely, an eyewitness’s statement, the alleged victim’s sworn statement, and Plaintiff’s own
statements all confirming that Plaintiff had wielded a bladed weapon,4 which Plaintiff showed to
Defendant Tyler in his residence. (Dkt. No. 47-2, at 1–4, 6–9, 13–16; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶¶ 6–7, 13–
14; Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 54, ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 47-2,
at 2, 3–4.) This evidence provided Defendants with reasonably trustworthy information that
Plaintiff had committed a crime,5 and therefore, there existed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

See Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 152–53; Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395–99; see also Singer, 63 F.3d at 119
(“An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has
signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect
an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.”); Morris v. Johnson,
No. 17-cv-371, 2020 WL 4365606, at *5, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135092, at *11–13 (N.D.N.Y.

4 Defendants characterize the weapon as a machete, (Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶¶ 1, 3–5), while Plaintiff characterizes the weapon
as a knife, (Dkt. No. 54, ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 18). This distinction is immaterial. Plaintiff also stated that in addition
to the bladed weapon, he wielded a hammer. (Dkt. No. 54, ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 18.)
5 Prior to the search of Plaintiff’s residence, Defendant Miller, in consultation the Montgomery County District
Attorney’s Office, decided to charge Plaintiff with violations of New York Penal Law sections 265.02(1), possession
of a weapon in the third degree, and 120.14(1), menacing in the second degree. (Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 17; see also Dkt.
No. 47-2, at 10, 13.)
July 30, 2020) (finding that corroborated eyewitness testimony is sufficient to establish probable
cause).6 Because the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to claims of false arrest
and malicious prosecution, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims
for false arrest and malicious prosecution is granted.

C. Illegal Search
Defendants argue that, because parole officers were “pursuing legitimate parole-related
objectives” and because Defendants Miller and Tyler did not participate in the search of
Plaintiff’s residence and Defendant Western was not present at the time of the search,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s illegal search claim.
(Dkt. No. 47-7, at 8–10.) Plaintiff argues without citation to caselaw or facts in the record that
“there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a crime was committed” and the
search of Plaintiff’s residence was “unlawful and unreasonable.” (Dkt. No. 54, at 7.)
As discussed in the Court’s prior decision, see Blazquez, 2023 WL 2164516, at *6, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920, at *14–18, “the operation of a parole system . . . presents special needs
justifying a departure from the traditional Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” United

States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). Whether the warrantless
search of a parolee comports with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment depends on
whether “the conduct of the parole officer was rationally and reasonably related to the
performance of the parole officer’s duty.” United States v. Barner, 666 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.

6 Though Plaintiff does not raise this argument, his assertion that he was wielding the weapon for self-defense, (Dkt.
No. 54, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 18), does not negate the existence of probable cause because a defendant is “not required to
explore and eliminate every plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest” even where, as here, the plaintiff
“claimed that he had a valid explanation for his actions.” See Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 153. Nor does Plaintiff’s suggestion
that the eyewitness had lied, (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 19), because the existence of probable cause depends on “those
facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it,” Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395, and there
is no evidence in the record that would “raise doubt as to the person’s veracity,” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82
(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395). Thus, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, probable cause
still existed.
2012) (quoting People v. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1977)). A parole officer’s duties
include a duty “to investigate whether a parolee is violating the conditions of his parole, . . . one
of which, of course, is that the parolee commit no further crimes.” Id. at 85 (quoting United
States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 459 (2d Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, other officers are permitted to

take part in a “coordinated effort” “as long as the probation officers are pursuing legitimate
probation-related objectives.” See Reyes, 283 F.3d at 464.
Here, Plaintiff was on parole. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 28, 30.) Defendant Western “contacted
[Plaintiff’s parole officer] on April 23, 2021 after learning of the incident involving [P]laintiff
and advised her of the same.” (Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s parole officer informed Defendant
Western “that she would follow up with the other individual involved in the incident . . . as well
as [P]laintiff.” (Id.) Defendant Miller “spoke with [Plaintiff’s parole officer,] who stated that she
and her fellow officers were planning on responding to [P]laintiff[’]s residence to conduct a
search to check for Plaintiff[’]s compliance with the conditions of his parole in light of the
incident that occurred” on April 22, 2021. (Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 18.) Defendant Miller “advised

[Plaintiff’s parole officer] of the pending charges.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s parole officer and others
subsequently conducted a search of Plaintiff’s residence. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20; Dkt. No. 47-4, ¶¶ 6–7;
Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 29.)
In light of the evidence supporting probable cause to arrest, of which Plaintiff’s parole
officer was aware, (Dkt. No. 47-5, ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 47-3, ¶ 18), the search was rationally and
reasonable related to the performance of the parole officers’ duty to “investigate whether a
parolee is violation conditions of his parole.” See Barner, 666 F.3d at 85; see also Purnell v.
Scarglato, 409 F. Supp. 3d 54, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“There can be no question that the
warrantless search by the parole officer was reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty—the
officer had been informed of contraband in Plaintiff’s home.”).7 Even accepting Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendants participated in the search as true, (Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 1,
¶¶ 29, 31–32), Defendants were permitted to take part in the “coordinated effort” because the
“officers [were] pursuing legitimate probation-related objectives.” See Reyes, 283 F.3d at 464.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s
illegal search claim.
D. Abuse of Process
Defendants argue that there exists no admissible evidence in support of Plaintiff’s abuse
of process claim. (Dkt. No. 47-7, at 11.) Plaintiff does not provide a counterargument. (Dkt. No.
54, at 7.)
As discussed in the Court’s prior decision, see Blazquez, 2023 WL 2164516, at *7–8,
2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920, at *19–21, “[a] malicious motive alone . . . does not give rise to a
cause of action for abuse of process,” Savino, 331 F.3d at 77 (quoting Curiano v. Suozzi, 469
N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (N.Y. 1984)). Rather, “a plaintiff must establish that the defendants had an
improper purpose in instigating the action,” and to establish an improper purpose, “it is not

sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that the defendants were seeking to retaliate against him by
pursuing his arrest and prosecution.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Instead, a plaintiff
“must claim that [the defendants] aimed to achieve a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to
his criminal prosecution.” Id.
Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is premised on his allegation that Defendants “abused
otherwise regularly issued legal process in a further effort to inflict economic harm against

7 Defendants refer to certain conditions of Plaintiff’s parole, which are found in an exhibit to a prior motion to dismiss.
(Dkt. No. 47-6, ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 36-2.) Such conditions include refraining from possessing any instrument readily
capable of causing physical injury without a satisfactory explanation for possession and refraining from violating
provisions of law to which he is subject that provide a penalty of imprisonment. (Dkt. No. 36-2.)
plaintiff and to exact retribution.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 79.) And although, taking Plaintiff’s allegations
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s restaurant closed and
he lost income as a result of Defendants’ actions, (id. ¶¶ 56–57, 74–75), Plaintiff offers no
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any Defendant acted with the

collateral purpose of causing Plaintiff harm, economic or otherwise. Plaintiff refers to Defendant
Western previously having stolen $8,075 from Plaintiff, (Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 25),
and to “an earlier criminal complaint” Plaintiff filed, (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 78), that allegedly gave rise
to Defendants’ retribution. But Plaintiff adduces no evidence whatsoever about the “earlier
criminal complaint” or as to any specific improper purpose separate from a malicious motive, see
Savino, 331 F.3d at 77, on the part of any Defendant apart from these conclusory allegations. See
Grytsyk v. Morales, No. 19-cv-3470, 2023 WL 6122693, at *10, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166555,
at *27–28 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2023) (granting summary judgment on an abuse of process claim
where the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to support his conclusory claim that the “ulterior
and improper purpose” was “to drive him out of business” (citation omitted)); Dash v. Montas,

612 F. Supp. 3d 138, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Without evidence that Defendant [] harbored any
personal animus toward Plaintiff or acted with some other collateral objective—i.e., one not
related to law enforcement—in arresting Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious abuse of
process cannot succeed.”).8
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to
Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim.

8 Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant Tyler’s involvement in the initiation or continuation of process at all.
E. Conspiracy and Racial Discrimination
Defendants argue that, “having conducted no discovery whatsoever, Plaintiff is unable to
come forward with any admissible evidence that his arrest pursuant to a warrant was anything
other than privileged, supported by probable cause as a matter of law, and not the result of any
purported conspiracy or because of any discriminatory purpose” and that “[t]here exists no

evidence that the defendant officers entered into an agreement with others to deprive Plaintiff of
his constitutional rights or that they arrested Plaintiff out of racial animus.” (Dkt. No. 47-7, at
13.) Plaintiff does not provide a counterargument. (Dkt. No. 54, at 7.)
Plaintiff has not demonstrated the violation of any of his constitutional rights or any other
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States by any Defendant that could provide the basis
for a § 1983 or § 1985 conspiracy claim. Nor has Plaintiff adduced any factual support for his
conclusory allegations that Defendants “engaged in a scheme and conspiracy designed and
intended to deny and deprive him of rights guaranteed to the plaintiff under the Constitution and
laws of the United States,” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 71), or that “the acts against him[] and the continuation
of criminal charges against him [were] done discrim[in]atorily because of [Plaintiff’s] [H]ispanic

race,” (id. ¶ 39). These conclusory allegations, without factual development, are insufficient to
establish either claim. See Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002);
Sommer v. Dixon, 709 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1983); Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110–11 (2d
Cir. 2003); see also Guillen v. City of New York, 625 F. Supp. 3d 139, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)
(collecting cases).9 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted with
respect to Plaintiff’s claims for conspiracy and racial discrimination.

9 Because Defendants do not raise the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the Court does not address its applicability
here. See Guillen, 625 F. Supp. 3d at 159–61.
F. Municipal Liability
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim against Defendant City of
Amsterdam because there are no facts demonstrating that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom of Defendant City of Amsterdam.
(Dkt. No. 47-7, at 13–14.) Plaintiff’s argument in opposition is limited to recitation of the

standard to state a Monell claim and the statement that “this case involves the arrest of an
Hispanic male from his hominin [sic] which he had not committed any crimes or violations of
the law.” (Dkt. No. 54, at 7–8.)
“To establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that he suffered the denial of a
constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” Bellamy v. City
of New York, 914 F.3d 727, 756 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Here, having granted Defendants’
motion for summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff’s other § 1983 claims, Plaintiff has
not established the violation of any of his constitutional rights by any Defendant that could
provide the basis for a municipal liability claim against Defendant City of Amsterdam under

Monell. See Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Nor has Plaintiff
adduced any fact to support such a claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim for municipal liability.
G. State-Law Claims
Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines, in its discretion, to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’ state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts consider “the values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “[I]n the usual case in which
all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Courts “commonly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after awarding defendants

summary judgment on plaintiffs’ federal claims.” Martin v. Sprint United Mgmt. Co., No. 15-cv-
5237, 2017 WL 5028621, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180395, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017)
(collecting cases); see also Sotak v. Bertoni, 501 F. Supp. 3d 59, 86 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Because
summary judgment will be granted as to the [federal] claims, the continued exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s] state law claims will be declined.”). Because this
is a “usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial” that presents no
exceptional circumstances, see Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims and dismisses those claims without
prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 47), is
GRANTED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 for false
arrest; malicious prosecution; unlawful search; abuse of process; conspiracy; racial
discrimination; and municipal liability are DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state-law claims, and those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in state court;
and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 14, 2024
Syracuse, New York □□□
DAA df Qa IC
Brenda K. Sannes
Chief U.S. District Judge

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659943. Public record. Not legal advice.