# Dahl v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, N.D. New York · July 22, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659896

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 22, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KELI ANN D.,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:23-CV-765
(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
KIRK & TEFF, LLP DREW A. CHISHOLM, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 Westbrook Lane
PO Box 4466
Kingston, New York 12402
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. FERGUS J. KAISER, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER!
Plaintiff, Keli Ann D., brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not

' Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General
Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 7 & General Order 18.

disabled. Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 12 & 14.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings be granted and Defendant’s Motion be denied.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Background
Plaintiff was born in 1964. Dkt. No. 9, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”), p. 61. Plaintiff
reported completing twelfth grade, Tr. at p. 215, and she has past work experience as a
customer service representative, a call quality auditor, and a dental assistant. Tr. at p.
204. Plaintiff alleges disability based upon an anterior cervical discectomy fusion on
“| the spine from C5 to C7, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and anxiety. Tr. at p.
214. Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance benefits in December 2020.
Tr. at p. 179. She alleged a disability onset date of October 29, 2020. Tr. at p. 179.
Plaintiff's application was initially denied on April 6, 2021, Tr. at p. 75, and the claim
was subsequently denied upon reconsideration on July 26, 2021. Tr. at p. 91. Plaintiff

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (‘ALJ’). Tr. at pp. 124-25.
She appeared at a hearing before ALJ Dennis G. Katz, on September 29, 2022. Tr. at
pp. 32-60. On October 27, 2022, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was
not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. at pp. 17-26. On April 20, 2023, the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at pp. 1-6.

B. The ALJ’s Decision
In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2025, and that she had not engaged in
4) substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. Tr. at p. 19. Second, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of
the cervical spine with stenosis, spondylosis, and radiculopathy; myofascial pain
syndrome; right shoulder impingement syndrome; and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
Tr. at p. 20. Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (the “Listings”). Tr. at p 21. Fourth,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform
light exertion level work as defined in regulations in that she is able to sit for eight hours
and stand and/or walk for eight hours during the course of an 8-hour work day” and that
“t]he claimant is able to lift and/or carry objects weighing 20 pounds and can frequently

reach, handle, finger, and turn the neck.” Tr. at p. 21. Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
could perform her past relevant work as a call quality auditor. Tr. at p. 26. Sixth, the
ALJ found that based upon Plaintiff's age, education, and functional abilities there were
also other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
can perform, specifically work as a customer service clerk. Tr. at p. 26. The ALJ,
therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. at p. 26.

Il. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
“S| Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied
correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of
“| the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983), Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). “Substantial evidence” is evidence that
amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that

which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court
must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference, and may not
substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably
have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. Bowen vy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The five-step
process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who
is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial

gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,
the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he
has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if
the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the
proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the
final one.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can
be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.
20, 24 (2003).
I. ANALYSIS

A. ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints
Plaintiff broadly asserts that the ALJ improperly analyzed her subjective
complaints. Upon review the Court disagrees. Where the claimant’s self-reported
symptoms are more severe than the medical evidence alone supports, an ALJ must
consider several factors to assess those subjective complaints. Fiedler v. Colvin, 54 F.
Supp. 3d 205, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). “These include: (1) an individual’s daily activities;
“| (2) the location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain or symptoms; (3) factors that
precipitate and aggravate symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
of medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5)
treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for pain or other
symptoms; (6) measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve

pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the individual’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.” J/d. at 217-18 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)).
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ engaged in an improper credibility analysis and
ignored regulations relating to the alleged onset date (“AOD”). Particularly, Plaintiff
argues that consideration of the AOD in connection with her receipt of unemployment
benefits was improper. In support of this allegation, Plaintiff first references the ALJ’s
decision which states that rather than claiming an alleged onset date at the time of her
cervical discectomy and fusion, she alleged disability as of October 29, 2020. Tr. at p.
22. The ALJ then states that the AOD roughly coincided with the period during which
“| the Plaintiff began obtaining unemployment benefits. Tr. at p. 22. Plaintiff did in fact
receive unemployment benefits from the fourth quarter of 2020 through the third quarter
of 2021. Tr. at p. 199. These statements are best characterized as the ALJ stating facts
in the record. As discussed below, to the extent the ALJ engaged in a credibility analysis
based on these facts, he did not err in doing so.

The ALJ’s decision in connection with the evidence of Plaintiff receiving
unemployment benefits states “[a]lthough receipt of unemployment insurance benefits
does not automatically preclude a finding of disability at Step 1... it does tend to
undermine the claimant’s allegations that she has been ‘unable’ to work since the alleged
onset date.” Tr. at p. 24. First, the ALJ states that it “tends to” undermine the Plaintiff's
claim. However, the ALJ did not rely solely on this evidence in determining that

Plaintiff is able to work. Rather, the ALJ considered the record in its entirety, which
included the evidence at issue here, but also included consideration of the other relevant
factors laid out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ explicitly considered Plaintiffs
daily activities which include doing light chores, preparing easy meals, driving, doing
“laundry, and shopping. Tr. at p. 24. The ALJ also considered the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of Plaintiff's pain, as well the fact that certain activities such as
sitting for long periods aggravate the pain. Tr. at p. 22. Moreover, the ALJ considered
the Plaintiff's use and the effectiveness of oral medication, steroid injections, and nerve
blocks as well as surgical intervention to alleviate the pain. Tr. at p. 23.
During his consideration of the above information, the ALJ discussed the
“| Plaintiff's receipt of the unemployment benefits. “Courts in the Second Circuit have
held that an ALJ may consider evidence that the claimant received unemployment
benefits and/or certified that [s]he was ready, willing, and able to work during the time
period for which [s]he claims disability benefits as adverse factors in the ALJ’s
credibility determination.” Felix v. Astrue, 2012 WL 3043203, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July

24, 2012). Where the Plaintiff's receipt of unemployment benefits is one part of the
ALJ’s consideration of the record rather than the dispositive basis for his decision, there
is not legal error. See Carol Ann T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 3165353, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021).
Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ improperly drew negative inferences about
the claimant’s credibility at this point. Yet, Plaintiff fails to highlight any portion of the

decision where the ALJ erroneously relied on this information. Receipt of
unemployment benefits during the same period as a claimant is alleging disability is
relevant to an ALJ’s credibility determination, and there is no indication that the ALJ
gave significant weight to this evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in considering
4) Plaintiffs receipt of unemployment benefits after the alleged onset date because it was
just one of many considerations relevant to assessing Plaintiff’s credibility.
Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ erred by not giving proper weight to her
unsuccessful attempts to work following her 2019 surgery. This claim, however, is
without merit. An ALJ “is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and [his]
failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.” Barringer
“ly. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 358 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted).
B. ALJ’s Duty to Adequately Explain Rationale
This Court does, however, agree with Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ did not
sufficiently explain his RFC determination. An ALJ has a legal obligation “to
adequately explain his reasoning in making the findings on which his ultimate decision

rests, and in doing so must address all pertinent evidence.” Calzada v. Astrue, F. Supp.
2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Compliance with this obligation permits a reviewing
court to “judge the adequacy of [the ALJ’s] conclusions.” Rivera v. Sullivan, 771 F.
Supp. 1339, 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Where an ALJ fails to provide a rationale for a
particular determination, the evidence in the record must permit a reviewing court to
“glean the rationale of the ALJ’s decision.” Monguer v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040

(2d Cir. 1983). Consequently, if a review of the record does not allow the reviewing
court to understand the ALJ’s reasoning, remand is warranted. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Astrue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (remanding for ALJ to explain
rationale more clearly).
Plaintiff first alleges that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by any
medical opinion in the record and that the ALJ interpreted raw medical evidence.
However, rather than the ALJ wrongly interpreting raw medical data, this Court believes
the issue is better characterized as the ALJ’s failure to adequately explain his
determination. An ALJ is “entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an
RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole” and that finding need not
“yerfectly correspond with any of the opinions of the medical sources cited in his
decision.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). In fact, it may be
appropriate for an ALJ not to rely on any particular medical opinion where they offer
conflicting opinions. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971). But, as
stated above, an ALJ is required to explain how he arrived at his decision. Calzada v.

Astrue, F. Supp. 2d at 269.
This Court finds the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiffs manipulative limitations
problematic. In his decision, the ALJ states, “[s]he was still able to perform reaching,
handling, and fingering despite her diagnosis — estimated by the undersigned to be 50%
of the time during a typical workday when viewed in combination with her shoulder
impairments.” Tr. at p. 23. While the RFC determination does not need to perfectly
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correspond with any of the medical opinions of record, it is unclear how the ALJ arrived
at this 50% quantification. Both state agency medical consultants, Dr. Mohanty and Dr.
Auerbach, opined that the claimant had no manipulative limitation. Tr. at pp. 70, 87.
However, the consultative examiner, Dr. Figueroa, opined that Plaintiff would have
severe limitations. Tr. at p. 427.
Since the RFC is “what an individual can still do despite . . . her limitations,” this
Court is hesitant to accept the unsupported quantification of Plaintiffs reaching,
handling, and fingering limitations. Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 210
(N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). Furthermore, this Court is unable to “glean the
rationale for the ALJ’s decision.” Monguer v. Heckler, 722 F.2d at 1040. The ALJ
“| references Plaintiffs possible sensory deficit in the median nerve distribution, moderate
left and right carpal tunnel syndrome, and complaints of hand pain with numbness and
tingling. Tr. at p. 23. Immediately following discussion of these symptoms, the ALJ
“estimates” Plaintiff's ability to reach, handle, and finger during 50% of the workday.
This ALJ’s decision includes no rationale for the determination and is unsupported by
of the above cited medical opinions. As Plaintiff points out, there is potentially a
significant difference between no limitation and a severe limitation. See Beth Marie N.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 6065309, at * 5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023). Without
an explanation of how the ALJ arrived at this determination, it appears that he “jumped
to conclusions that were not adequately supported by the consultant reports before
[him].” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ erred because he did not adequately explain the
supportability and consistency factors. “The revised regulations for evaluating opinion
evidence place substantial emphasis on both supportability and consistency and require
the ALJ to explain the analysis of each of those factors. Balotti v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
F. Supp. 3d 610, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). “To
analyze supportability, the ALJ must conduct ‘an inquiry confined to the medical
source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical source supported and explained
their opinion.’” Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting
Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021)). The persuasiveness
of a medical opinion from a medical source or prior administrative finding depends on
its relevancy to the objective medical evidence and the source’s supporting explanations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). “On the other hand, to analyze consistency, the ALJ must
conduct ‘an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is
supported, or not supported, by the entire record.’” Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d
at 30 (quoting Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 319354, at *6). That analysis of the record is

not sufficiently detailed in the ALJ’s decision.
An ALJ’s failure to explain the supportability and consistency factors when
assessing the persuasiveness of a medical opinion does not automatically warrant
remand. Wanda N. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4376484, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 2022). If the ALJ’s “consideration of the relevant factors can be gleaned from the

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ALJ’s decision as a whole,” remand is not necessary. John L. M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL
3500187, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022).
Here, the ALJ relied on the medical opinions of Dr. Figueroa, Dr. Mohanty, and
Dr. Auerbach for his assessment of Plaintiff's physical limitations. Tr. at pp. 24-25. In
discussing each of these medical opinions, the ALJ’s decision lacks a sufficient
explanation from which this Court can glean his consideration of the relevant factors.
Beginning with the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion, the ALJ
indicated that he found the opinion only partially persuasive. Tr. at p. 24. However, the
only indication of why he found this opinion only partially persuasive is Dr. Figueroa’s
failure to “qualify the degree to which the claimant is limited from performing these
“| activities” in vocationally specific terms. Tr. at 24. After referencing several physical
exam findings that Dr. Figueroa made, the ALJ stated that “this examination, which is
consistent with the claimant’s orthopedic treatment records, does suggest some degree
of limitation in the upper extremities, so the resulting opinion is partially persuasive.”
Tr. at p. 24. The ALJ did discuss this opinion’s consistency with the Plaintiff's medical

record, and it is possible to see how the ALJ was persuaded by the doctor’s findings that
supported the opinion.
However, the ALJ’s only explanation as to why that opinion was only partially
persuasive was its lack of clarity as to Plaintiff's degree of physical limitation. Tr. at p.
24. The ALJ’s discussion of this opinion ends with: “the degree of limitations has been
incorporated in the RFC set forth below.” Tr. at p. 24. The ALJ failed to explain how
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the opinion simultaneously lost credibility due to vagueness while at the same time he
somehow qualified that degree of limitation and “incorporated it” into the RFC. This
failure to “explain the link between the RFC assessment and the record evidence” is a
basis for remand. See Rhiannon W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 6118267, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2023) (citation omitted). Further, the ALJ’s reasoning for finding
Dr. Figueroa’s opinion only partially persuasive is conclusory, without sufficient
discussion of supportability and consistency, which is also a basis for remand. See
Jaleesa H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 580 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (W.D.N.Y. 2022).
The ALJ’s evaluation of the two State agency medical consultant opinions also
does not provide a sufficient explanation of his consideration of the supportability and
consistency factors. The ALJ found both opinions to be “generally persuasive.” Tr. at
p. 25. Both Dr. Mohanty and Dr. Auerbach opined that Plaintiff could perform light
work with some additional limitations when climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching,
crawling, and balancing. Tr. at p. 24. The ALJ provided no explanation as to how either
of these consultant’s “supported and explained their opinions.” Vellone v. Saul, 2021

WL 319354, at *6. To that extent, the ALJ acknowledges that neither State agency
examiner was able to consider six additional sets of medical records submitted by
Plaintiff after their assessments. Tr. at p. 25. The ALJ’s failure to explain the
supportability of these opinions is especially troubling because he relied on their RFC
assessments in making his RFC determination. Tr. at p. 25.

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These two opinions are clearly consistent with each other. However, the ALJ
provides no explanation about how either of these opinions are consistent with the record
as a whole or supported by their objective medical findings. As Plaintiff points out:
Neither doctor provided supporting explanations that articulated the
relevance of the objective medical evidence cited in the PAMF. For
example, in the Reconsideration denial explanation, Dr. Auerbach
summarizes the 05/13/2021 treatment note by Dr. Jeffry Arliss, which
included positive objective findings and positive radiology findings. The
Plaintiff's subjective complaints of numbness and tingling are mentioned
in both Dr. Arliss’s note and in the 02/23/2021 consultative exam that Dr.
Auerbach also cites... . Yet Dr. Auerbach offered no explanation for
concluding the Plaintiff had zero manipulative limitations.

Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 18-19.
Here, absent an explanation of the supportability of the opinions of Dr. Auerbach,
and Dr. Mohanty, and how they are consistent with the record as a whole, this Court
cannot discern how and why the ALJ found these opinions more persuasive than Dr.
Figueroa’s, which opined more extreme physical limitations. There are several issues
with the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinions he relied upon which warrant
remand. First, the ALJ’s conclusory analysis of each of the medical opinions “precludes
Court from undertaking meaningful review” of these medical opinions; therefore
“remand is . . . required on this basis.” Jaleesa H. v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 580 F. Supp.
3d at 9. The ALJ also does not point to any specific evidence in the record that supports
the findings the state agency consultants made over the findings of Dr. Figueroa. See
Raymond M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 706645, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021).

15

Likewise, the ALJ provides no analysis of how any of the above doctors supported their
own findings, which precludes an understanding of how the ALJ gave more weight to
Dr. Mohanty and Dr. Auerbach’s opinions.
“However, the Court need not remand the case if the ALJ only committed
harmless error, i.e., where the ‘application of the correct legal principles to the record
could lead only to the same conclusion.’” Navedo v. Kijakazi, 616 F. Supp. 3d 332, 344-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Where the record contains medical opinions which opine limitations that could have led
the ALJ to a finding of disability, the ALJ’s failure to explain the persuasiveness of those
opinions is not harmless error. See Navedo v. Kijakazi, 616 F. Supp. 3d at 352. A review
“| of the record and application of the correct legal principles does not lead this Court to
believe that the same conclusion the ALJ reached is inevitable. /d. at 344-45. Dr.
Figueroa’s opinion established greater limitations than the opinions of Dr. Mohanty and
Dr. Auerbach. While it is possible that the ALJ will arrive at the same conclusion, it is
also possible that Dr. Figueroa’s opinion could establish limitations severe enough to

alter the ALJ’s RFC determination and lead to a finding that Plaintiff is disabled. Since
this Court believes that a proper evaluation of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion “could impact the
ALJ’s .. . RFC determination, the Court . . . concludes that remand is necessary.”
Johnathon W. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1163632, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021).

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C. Plaintiff's Remaining Arguments
“Finding remand necessary for the reasons explained above, the Court need not
and does not reach Plaintiff's remaining arguments... .” Rowe v. Berryhill, 2018 WL
4233702, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2018). Those arguments include Plaintiff's claim
4) that the neither the ALJ nor the medical opinions he relied upon adequately considered
Plaintiff's symptoms associated with myofascial pain syndrome, the claim that the ALJ
improperly treated Dr. Tandon’s consultation notes as a functional assessment, and the
claim that the step four vocational finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four; and it is

further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-

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Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: July 22, 2024
Albany, New York

Ip i;
Dail 1 Sevan
U.SMMagistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659896. Public record. Not legal advice.