# WG Woodmere LLC v. The Incorporated Village of Woodsburgh

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659769

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WG WOODMERE LLC; SG BARICK LLC; AND LH
BARICK LLC, 23-CV-6966 (ARR) (AYS)

Plaintiffs,
OPINION & ORDER
-against-

THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF WOODSBURGH;
AND THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF
LAWRENCE,

Defendants.

ROSS, United States District Judge:

This action concerns alleged violations of federal and state law in connection with the
rezoning of property located in Woodmere, New York. On September 18, 2024, I issued an order
granting in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss brought by defendants, the Incorporated
Village of Woodsburgh (“Woodsburgh”) and the Incorporated Village of Lawrence (“Lawrence”).
See ECF Nos. 37–43. Now before me is defendant Woodsburgh’s fully briefed motion for
reconsideration of my prior order, seeking dismissal of the remaining claims against Woodsburgh
as unripe for adjudication. For the reasons set forth below, I deny Woodsburgh’s motion.
BACKGROUND

Factual Background
I assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case. The
following factual summary is drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint and from my opinion granting in
part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Compl., ECF No. 1; Op. & Order
(Sept. 18, 2024), ECF No. 43.
Plaintiffs own a 118-acre parcel of land known as the “Woodmere Club.” Compl. ¶¶ 96,
98. The Woodmere Club property is in the jurisdiction of three municipalities: the Town of
Hempstead, the Village of Woodsburgh, and the Village of Lawrence. Id. ¶ 100. Because of the
property’s location, it is subject to the planning authority of the municipalities as well as of the

Nassau County Planning Commission (“NCPC”). Id. ¶ 101. At the time plaintiffs purchased the
property, the then-applicable zoning regulations allowed for development of a subdivision plan
consisting of 284 single-family residential lots. Id. ¶ 111. In December 2018, plaintiffs filed an
application with the NCPC for approval to subdivide the property into 284 single family residential
lots, in compliance with the zoning regulations of the municipalities. Id. ¶¶ 190–91. The NCPC
approval process included a review under New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act
(“SEQRA”), N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101–8-0117 (McKinney 2024). Compl. ¶ 195. As
part of the SEQRA review for their proposed development, plaintiffs spent nearly two years and
$2 million preparing plans and studies, including a full draft environmental impact statement
(“DEIS”) analyzing the environmental impacts of the project. Id. ¶ 23.

Then, in late 2019 and early 2020, as plaintiffs were moving through the SEQRA process
before the NCPC, defendants Lawrence and Woodsburgh, together with the Town of Hempstead,
decided to rezone the Woodmere Club property. Id. ¶¶ 215–16. In May 2020, defendants
introduced the rezoning scheme, called the “Coastal Conservation District – Woodmere Club” (the
“challenged zoning”). Id. ¶ 225. The challenged zoning significantly reduces the number of lots
that plaintiffs can develop compared to the prior zoning regulations, from 284 to 59. Id. ¶¶ 236–
42.
Procedural Background
On August 24, 2020, plaintiffs sued the Town of Hempstead and the Villages of Lawrence
and Woodsburgh, asserting that the challenged zoning violated the U.S. Constitution, the New
York Constitution, and New York law. See Compl., WG Woodmere LLC v. Town of Hempstead

(Woodmere I), No. 20-CV-3903 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 2020), ECF No. 1. On December 1, 2022, I
issued an order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint in Woodmere I without prejudice. Woodmere I,
No. 20-CV-3903, 2022 WL 17359339, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2022). In particular, I found that
plaintiffs’ equal protection and takings claims were not yet ripe, id. at *4–7, because there was still
“significant ambiguity” as to how exactly the challenged zoning would “actually apply” to
plaintiffs’ property, id. at *6. Subsequent to my order in Woodmere I, on February 15, 2023,
plaintiffs filed applications with the villages of Lawrence and Woodsburgh, seeking variances that
would allow them to construct homes in certain parts of their property. Compl. ¶ 341. Both villages
denied those applications, and plaintiffs appealed the denials to each village’s respective zoning
board of appeals in April 2023. Id. ¶ 343.

On September 20, 2023, plaintiffs filed the complaint in the instant action against
defendants, the villages of Lawrence and Woodsburgh (but not the Town of Hempstead), again
asserting claims under the federal and New York constitutions, as well as New York law. See
Compl. ¶¶ 360–475. As relevant here, plaintiffs allege that the challenged zoning is an
unconstitutional taking because, by reducing the permitted number of residential lots from 284 to
just 59, it “takes away Plaintiffs’ ability to develop 80% of the acreage” that they seek to develop.
Id. ¶ 5. In July 2024, defendants moved separately to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 25, 26. On September
18, 2024, I issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Specifically, I found that plaintiffs’ claims under the Takings Clause were ripe for adjudication
and sufficiently pled to survive dismissal, but I dismissed the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims. See
Op. & Order at 1–2; see also id. at 10 (finding plaintiffs’ takings claims to be ripe because, as
alleged, plaintiffs “satisfied their burden to submit meaningful variance applications,” thereby
“avail[ing] themselves of all available opportunities to obtain administrative relief”).

Subsequently, defendant Woodsburgh filed this timely motion for reconsideration, which is now
fully briefed. See Def. Woodsburgh’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Reconsideration (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No.
48; Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Reconsideration (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 49; Def. Woodsburgh’s
Reply Supp. Mot. Reconsideration (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 52.
LEGAL STANDARD

“The standard for granting . . . a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration
will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995);
see also In re Salomon Winstar Litig., No. 02-CV-6171, 2006 WL 510526, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2006) (“Reconsideration . . . is appropriate only where there is an intervening change of
controlling law, newly available evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.”). Such a motion “should not be granted where the moving party seeks . . . to relitigate
an issue already decided,” Shrader, 70 F.2d at 257, or seeks “to advance new issues or theories of
relief that were not previously presented to the court,” Mahadeo v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 514
F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION

Nearly four decades ago, the Supreme Court set forth the ripeness requirements that apply
in takings cases like this one. As the Court explained, a takings claim that challenges a
governmental regulation—such as the zoning regulations at issue here—“is not ripe until the
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan.
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), overruled on other grounds

by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180 (2019). More recently, the Supreme Court has
commented that “[t]he finality requirement [under Williamson County] is relatively modest.”
Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal., 594 U.S. 474, 478 (2021). To meet the requirement,
“[a]ll a plaintiff must show is that there is no question about how the regulations at issue apply to
the particular land in question.” Id. (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, of course, the “regulations at issue” are the challenged zoning ordinances, which allegedly
reduce the number of developable lots by approximately 80 percent (from 284 to 59). Compl. ¶ 5.
Moving for reconsideration of my prior order, Woodsburgh again argues that plaintiffs’
claims remain unripe, for at least two reasons. First, Woodsburgh argues that plaintiffs’ claims are
not ripe because plaintiffs have not completed the administrative process under SEQRA, the New

York statute governing environmental review. See Def.’s Mot. at 5 (“Completion of the SEQRA
review process . . . is a required predicate to any determination on [plaintiffs’] application.”).
Second, Woodsburgh argues that it has yet to reach a final decision on plaintiffs’ application
because the most recent hearing before the Woodsburgh Board of Zoning Appeals (“Woodsburgh
Board”) “was continued pending [plaintiffs’] submission of” a full draft environmental impact
statement, or DEIS. Id. As I explain in further detail below, I find Woodsburgh’s arguments to be
meritless.
I. Despite the Pending SEQRA Review Process, There Is No Question as to How the
Challenged Zoning Applies to Plaintiffs’ Property.

Woodsburgh argues that, to ripen their claims, plaintiffs must complete the entire
environmental review process, as contemplated by SEQRA, before the Nassau County Planning
Commission (“NCPC”). See Def.’s Mot. at 3 (asserting that “[t]he environmental review process
was never even completed” because plaintiffs never filed a final environmental impact statement
(“FEIS”), and because the NCPC has yet to adopt a “SEQRA findings statement”). This argument
does not withstand scrutiny. Woodsburgh fails to explain why those procedural steps must take
place prior to judicial review of plaintiffs’ claims in this action, and the Williamson County
ripeness doctrine imposes no such requirement. Under Williamson County, the key question is
whether the defendant—here, Woodsburgh—“has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue.” 473 U.S. at 186. As I discuss further in the
following section, Woodsburgh has reached just such a final decision by denying plaintiffs’ appeal
to the Woodsburgh Board.
Although plaintiffs’ complaint does not clearly allege as much, Woodsburgh asserts that
plaintiffs “have decided to hold [the] next SEQRA steps in abeyance.” Def.’s Mot. at 7. Even
assuming that assertion to be true, it does not render plaintiffs’ claims unripe. If plaintiffs were to
plow ahead with the SEQRA review process before the NCPC, the challenged zoning would still
prevent plaintiffs from developing most of their land. Presumably, this is the very reason why

plaintiffs have put the SEQRA process on hold: They have no hope of progressing further in the
review process because the challenged zoning specifically precludes them from developing most
of the lots where they seek to build homes. Woodsburgh’s argument might hold water if plaintiffs
were challenging some decision made by the NCPC, or some action taken during the SEQRA
process, but they are not. Plaintiffs are challenging the zoning adopted by defendants, which, they
allege, constitutes an unconstitutional taking without compensation. The only question, therefore,
is whether Woodsburgh has reached a final decision as to how the challenged zoning will affect
plaintiffs’ land. I turn to that question in the section that follows.

II. Woodsburgh Has Made a Final Decision.

As I explained in my prior order, Woodsburgh has denied plaintiffs’ application for a
variance as well as their subsequent appeal of that denial to the Woodsburgh Board of Zoning
Appeals. See Op. & Order at 10–11. In its motion for reconsideration, Woodsburgh repeats the
argument that it has not yet made a final decision, because at the most recent hearing on May 23,
2024, the Woodsburgh Board voted only to continue the hearing “pending the applicant’s
submission of a DEIS.” Def.’s Mot. at 5. This argument is without merit.
As Woodsburgh notes, SEQRA undisputably “mandates the preparation of [a DEIS] when
a proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment.” Id. (quoting Vill. of
Tarrytown v. Planning Bd., 741 N.Y.S.2d 44, 48 (2d Dep’t 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But plaintiffs have already prepared a DEIS, spending two years and nearly $2 million
to do so. Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. Seeking to justify its demand for a second, brand-new DEIS,
Woodsburgh proffers a variety of explanations. See Def.’s Mot. at 4. Some of these purported
explanations relate to changes that have allegedly taken place since the first DEIS was prepared.
See id. (referring, inter alia, to “significant climate changes” and “changes in driving patterns”).1
But the other reasons given by Woodsburgh are more telling. For instance, Woodsburgh asserts
that a second DEIS is necessary because “use variances are required” for plaintiffs’ development.
Id. Obviously, plaintiffs need variances from Woodsburgh’s zoning regulations to be able to build

1 Even assuming that such changes have occurred, Woodsburgh fails to explain how it is necessary
for plaintiffs to prepare a wholly new DEIS to address them.
their development—indeed, that is the relief plaintiffs sought from the Board in the first place. See
Compl. ¶¶ 341–43. Even if plaintiffs were to spend additional years and millions of dollars
preparing a new DEIS, they would still need Woodsburgh to grant them use variances—variances
which, to date, Woodsburgh has shown no sign that it will ever be willing to grant. On this record,

there is simply no reason to believe that if plaintiffs redid their $2 million DEIS from scratch,
Woodsburgh would be convinced to reverse itself and grant the requested variances. Thus, it
appears that Woodsburgh’s demand for a second DEIS is largely a pretext and perhaps even a
deliberate effort to delay this federal court proceeding. Under these circumstances, Woodsburgh’s
arguments ring hollow.
Moreover, even if Woodsburgh’s demand for a second DEIS had been justified, I would
still find that Woodsburgh has reached a final decision to deny plaintiffs’ application for a variance
and their subsequent appeal, due to the application of section 7-712-a of the New York Village
Law. That statute, which sets forth procedures for village boards of zoning appeals in New York,
states in relevant part that “if an affirmative vote of a majority of all members of the board is not

attained on a motion or resolution to grant a variance . . . within [sixty-two days of the hearing of
the appeal], the appeal is denied.” N.Y. Village Law § 7-712-a(13)(b) (McKinney 2024). Since
more than sixty-two days have elapsed since the Board’s hearing on May 23, 2024, the plain
language of the Village Law establishes that plaintiffs’ appeal has been denied. The decision in
New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Riverhead Town Board, 118 F. Supp. 2d 333
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), on which Woodsburgh relies, is inapposite. In that case, the court held that,
despite the passage of sixty-two days after the hearing, the defendant’s issuance of a “positive
SEQRA determination”—that is, a request for a DEIS to be prepared—was “not a final agency
action” ripe for judicial review. Id. at 338, 342. That case is distinguishable, however, because
there the plaintiff was seeking review of the positive SEQRA determination itself, before preparing
a DEIS. Here, in contrast, plaintiffs, who have already prepared a DEIS, seek to challenge
defendants’ zoning regulations. Therefore, in the absence of any authority to the contrary, I find
that plaintiffs’ appeal was denied as a matter of law by the passage of sixty-two days, pursuant to
section 7-712-a of the New York Village Law.2

To reiterate, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine requires plaintiffs to show only that
defendant Woodsburgh has reached “a final decision regarding the application of the zoning
ordinance . . . to [plaintiffs’] property.” Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186. Plaintiffs have made
that showing. To be clear, it is not Woodsburgh’s decision to request a DEIS that is the “final
decision” at issue here. Plaintiffs are challenging Woodsburgh’s decision to adopt the challenged
zoning in the first place. Seeking to ripen their claims, plaintiffs sought a variance from the zoning
regulations, which Woodsburgh denied. Plaintiffs appealed that denial, and, as I explained above,
Woodsburgh denied their appeal. Thus, Woodsburgh has reached a final decision: No variance
having been granted, the challenged zoning precludes plaintiffs from developing most of their

property into residences. Under the Williamson County doctrine, plaintiffs’ takings claims are
therefore ripe for judicial review.
III. Plaintiffs’ Request for Fees Is Denied.

In their opposition to Woodsburgh’s motion, plaintiffs ask me to impose sanctions on
Woodsburgh by awarding plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Pls.’
Opp’n at 5–6. As the Second Circuit has stated, “an award under § 1927 is proper when the
attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have

2 Woodsburgh notes the existence of this statutory provision but asserts that it only applies when
“a board’s tie vote results in a default denial upon the passage of 62 days.” Def.’s Mot. at 8. That
is not what the statute says, and Woodsburgh has provided no basis for its interpretation.
been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.” Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265,
1273 (2d Cir. 1986). “[A]n award made under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of bad faith
similar to that necessary to invoke the court’s inherent power.” Id. Here, the record does not
conclusively indicate that Woodsburgh’s counsel acted in bad faith, nor that the filing of the instant

motion was “undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.” Id. Thus, although I find
Woodsburgh’s arguments to be unavailing, I decline to impose sanctions on Woodsburgh’s
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Woodsburgh’s motion to reconsider is DENIED.
Plaintiffs’ request for costs and attorneys’ fees is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/
Allyne R. Ross
United States District Judge

Dated: October 30, 2024
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659769. Public record. Not legal advice.