# Hudson v. Gioe

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 23, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659500

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 23, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659500

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of a challenge to ongoing state criminal prosecution because Younger abstention required that result

## Opinion text

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
MICHAEL HUDSON,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-CV-1695(JMA)(ST)
FILED
-against-
CLERK

CHRISTOPHER M. GIOE, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 9/23/2024 10:41 am

P.O. DARWIN NETTO, P.O. DETECTIVE GUNLACK,
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
OFFICE, RIVERHEAD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY
RAY TIERNEY,

Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
AZRACK, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is incarcerated pro se Plaintiff Micheal Hudson’s Amended Complaint
asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and filed in response to the Court’s June
26, 2024, Memorandum and Order that granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) and sua sponte dismissed his claims against all Defendants other than those named as
“John Does.” (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 15); Hudson v. Gioe, No. 24-CV-1695, 2024 WL
3202857, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2024).1
At the outset, the Court vacates the portion of the July 26, 2024, Electronic Order that
directed the United States Marshal Service to effectuate service of the original Complaint. Upon
careful consideration of the Amended Complaint, the Court (1) dismisses Plaintiff’s claims
seeking intervention in his ongoing state court prosecution; (2) dismisses Plaintiff’s other claims
against the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office (“SCDAO”), the Riverhead Correctional
Facility Medical Department (“Jail Medical Dep’t”), and County of Suffolk (“Suffolk County”);
and (3) stays Plaintiff’s remaining claims pending the conclusion of his ongoing criminal

1 Plaintiff has also filed another IFP application and Prisoner Litigation Authorization form with his Amended
Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 16-17.) That application is denied as moot because the Court already granted Plaintiff IFP
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint and its Dismissal
Plaintiff filed his Complaint with Section 1983 claims against some eighteen individuals
involved with his July 19, 2023, arrest, subsequent detention at the Suffolk County Correctional
Facility, and related state court criminal prosecution.2 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Court granted
Plaintiff IFP status and, in accordance with the screening requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, determined that Plaintiff had not alleged the personal involvement of nine named
defendants and dismissed those claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. Hudson, 2024 WL 3202857, at *4. Further, the Court
dismissed the claims against the SCPD and SCDAO because neither entity has the capacity to be
sued, and dismissed the claims against Gioe because he is not a state actor. Id. at *4-5. Given
Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court also considered whether, liberally construed, the Complaint
plausibly alleged a claim against Suffolk County; the Court concluded that the Complaint made
no such claim. Id. at *6. However, the Court set forth the requirements for pleading such a claim
and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at *6-7.

2 The original defendants were Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney, Christopher M. Gioe (“Gioe”); the Suffolk
County Police Department (“SCPD”); SCPD Officers Darwin Neito (“P.O. Neito”) and Shaun Sullivan; six
unidentified Suffolk County police officers (John Does # 1-6); the SCDAO; three assistant district attorneys; two
Supreme Court Judges; the Suffolk County Jail Warden; and “Medical Staff Amy Malave.”

2
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint again names Gioe, P.O. Nieto and the SCDAO, and adds
Suffolk County, P.O. Detective Gunlack (“Det. Gunlack”), the Jail Medical Dep’t, and Suffolk

County District Attorney Ray Tierney (collectively, “Defendants”). Like the original Complaint,
the Amended Complaint challenges Plaintiff’s ongoing state court criminal prosecution.4 Plaintiff
submitted the Amended Complaint on the Court’s Section 1983 complaint form and again alleges
that Gioe, who was Plaintiff’s attorney in the 2023 Suffolk County criminal prosecution,
“neglected to advise the Court of an email he received pertaining to the chemical analysis which
confirmed that there was not any controlled substance identified in the confiscated substance that
was tested.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 15 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Gioe visited him and suggested
that Plaintiff consider cooperating with the police. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that, a few days
later, Gioe submitted a writ and Plaintiff was brought to the SCDAO, where Gioe advised Plaintiff
that the chemical analysis concluded that no controlled substances were present in the tested
samples. (Id. at 7.) According to the Amended Complaint, Gioe advised Plaintiff that he would
be released on his own recognizance. (Id.)

3 All material allegations in the Amended Complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. See,
e.g., Rogers v. City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte
dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true). Excerpts from the Amended
Complaint are reproduced herein exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar
are not corrected or noted.

4 According to the New York State Office of Court Administration, Plaintiff is a defendant in two cases
pending in Suffolk County Court under indictment numbers: IND-71479/23/001 and IND-71191-24/001. See
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcrim_attorney/DefendantSearch (last visited Sept. 23, 2024). In the 2023
Indictment, Plaintiff pled guilty on December 18, 2023, to count four of the indictment, conspiracy in the third degree
to sell a narcotic, cocaine hydrochloride. However, on June 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to withdraw his
guilty plea. That motion remains pending. In the 2024 Indictment, Plaintiff pled not guilty to a four count indictment
charging him with two counts of violation NY Penal Law 220.16(1) and two counts of violation of NY Penal Law
220.39(1).
3
involved in an automobile accident shortly before his incarceration, he was assigned a top bunk

when bottom bunks were available. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was released from custody on August 2, 2023, after having been
detained since July 20, 2023. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff complains that Gioe received a copy of the
exculpatory lab report on July 24, 2023, yet “neglected to advocate the news to the Court on my
behalf” until early August. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Gioe, a former prosecutor, has a personal
relationship with Det. Gunlack and alleges that they have known each other since high school and
have worked on hundreds of cases together. (Id. 7-8.)
Regarding his claims against P.O. Nieto and Det. Gunlack, Plaintiff alleges that they
interviewed him at the Jail without first notifying his attorney in the 2024 Indictment, Chris Cassar.
Plaintiff alleges that these officers attempted to coerce him to become a confidential informant.
(Id. at 5-6.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that, after he was released, he was “harassed” on multiple
occasions by Suffolk County police officers. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that he was followed and
intimidated. (Id.)
According to the Amended Complaint, Suffolk County “faile[d] to train, supervise, and
intervene in numerous of situation throughout this case but this specific situations with the Social
Services Dept. which denied me assistance after being released from the County Correctional

Facility.” (Id.) In this regard, Plaintiff alleges that he called the Emergency Services Unit on
August 3,2023, and was denied assistance “because of a missed phone call.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
that he could not pay his phone bill and his phone would be shut off by the time the interview
would have been conducted. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff also alleges that, a few days later, he was given
a housing placement at a shelter and was given four bus tokens at 5:20 pm to travel there. (Id. at
9.) However, Plaintiff first stopped at his self-storage unit, then missed the bus, and arrived at the
4
permitted to stay. (Id.) Plaintiff complains the shelter “had bed bugs and the bathroom was very

unsanitary.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that he left and slept in his self-storage unit. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint next alleges that, on or about October 9, 2023, Gioe met with
Plaintiff and allegedly “applied pressure for me to make a decision to cooperate with the ADA and
his friend and local detectives.” (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff “refused” and then declined to meet with
Gioe prior to the next court date scheduled for December 11, 2023. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff claims
that he asked Gioe whether he was going to be taken into custody on that date and Gioe told him
“no.” (Id.) However, on December 11, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested at the Riverhead
courthouse “for two drug sales.” (Id.) Plaintiff was arraigned on December 12, 2023, pled not
guilty, and was taken into custody having not met the $500,000 bail that was set. (Id.) During
Plaintiff’s next court appearance on December 18, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Gioe “coerced me
into pleading [guilty] with knowledge of me being off my medication. . . .” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff
describes that he “was withdrawing from Suboxone and not being on my psychotropic medication,
I took the plea . . .” (Id.) According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff “is being prosecuted as
a form of retaliation for not cooperating with law enforcements investigators.” (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Jail “fail[ed] to provide medical attention to my lower
back, lower neck, headaches and blurred vision.” (Id. at 12.) In this regard, Plaintiff claims that

he submitted sick call slips and grievances and they were denied. (Id.) Plaintiff also complains
that his grievances concerning law library access, returned mail, lack of religious services, and the
failure of the kitchen staff to follow his medically prescribed diet were all denied. (Id.)

5
required or provided, Plaintiff wrote:

PTSD, social anxiety disorder that I now receive severe medications, ruptured cyst
in nose, bruising, bleeding, financial damage as legal fees, medical fee for mental
health, loss of work opportunities, deprivation of liberty and privacy by being
incarcerated, TERROR, FEAR, INTIMIDATION from brutal attack by officers,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of relationships with family mainly
mother, kids and fiancé, and the ongoing psychological abuse while incarcerated.

(Id. at ¶ II.A at p.5.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief, intervention with state criminal proceeding either suppression of
tainted evidence and witness or dismissal. Request monetary compensation for pain
and suffering and for future pain and suffering in amount of $7,000,000.
Defendants that qualify for termination in their current positions, charges possibly
imposed against police officer defendant for falsifying business records and penal
laws 195.07, 215.40, 205.60 especially penal law 200.56.

(Id. at ¶ III at p.14.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act or IFP Statute
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint
brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, the IFP statute requires a court
to dismiss an action upon determination that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as
soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

6
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and
federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Thomas
v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
two elements: (1) ‘the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States,’ and (2) ‘the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.’” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004)); see Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 78
(2d Cir. 2023); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[T]he
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
C. Plaintiff’s Pro Se Status
Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In
addition, the Court is required to read a plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

7
rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While “‘detailed factual
allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Pursuit of Injunctive Remedies for his
State Court Prosecution
The Supreme Court has long held that, under what has become known as the Younger
abstention doctrine, federal courts must abstain from interfering in ongoing state criminal
proceedings. See Sprint Communs., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (explaining how that
rule derives from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); e.g., Cavanaugh v. Geballe, 28 F.4th
428, 433 (2d Cir. 2022). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief in his state court prosecution
are implausible and dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii),
1915A(b). See, e.g., Jordan v. Bailey, 570 F. App’x 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of
a challenge to ongoing state criminal prosecution because Younger abstention required that result).

8
Unlike claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, claims for monetary damages should
not be dismissed under Younger abstention. Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir.

2000). However, given that Plaintiff’s claims relating to his state court prosecution are closely
intertwined with the ongoing criminal case, litigation of such claims at this juncture would be
premature. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s damages claims relating to his criminal prosecution are stayed
pending the conclusion of the criminal case. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 201-03
(1988); Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 238; Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981).
C. Jail Medical Dep’t and SCDAO are Dismissed as Nonsuable Entities
Plaintiff names Jail Medical Dep’t and SCDAO as Defendants. Under New York law,
however, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality cannot be sued
because they lack a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality. See, e.g., Henry v.
Cnty. of Nassau, 6 F.4th 324, 336 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76,
93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007)). For that reason, courts routinely dismiss claims against the Jail and
SCDAO. See, e.g., Hudson, 2024 WL 3202857, at *4 (dismissing claims against the SCDAO);
Reed v. Suffolk Cty Corr., No. 22-CV-7579, 2023 WL 1863370, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2023)
(dismissing claims against the Jail). Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Jail Medical
Dep’t and SCDAO are not plausible and are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii),
1915A(b).

D. Plaintiff’s Municipal Liability Claim Fails
As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, a Section 1983 claim against Suffolk County
must comply with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and
its progeny. Hudson, 2024 WL 3202857, at *6. “Monell expressly prohibits respondeat
superior liability for municipalities . . . meaning that a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘through its
9
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan

Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). This requires Plaintiff to “show that he suffered the
denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” Frost
v. New York City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). A
policy or custom may be established by any of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by
government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that
caused the particular constitutional deprivation in question; (3) a practice so
consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a
custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or
(4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to
subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.
Alwan v. City of New York, 311 F. Supp. 3d 570, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted); see Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (similar).
“[A] single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,
unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy that can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” Mitchell v. City of N.Y., 841
F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)
(plurality)) (brackets omitted); see DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] single
incident in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does
not suffice to show a municipal policy.”).
Here, even affording the pro se Amended Complaint a liberal construction, there are no
factual allegations from which the Court may reasonably infer that the conduct or inaction of which
Plaintiff complains was caused by a policy or custom of Suffolk County. See Mitchell, 841 F.3d
at 80 (dismissing Monell claim for lack of a municipal policy or custom underlying the challenged
10
plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a

municipal policy or custom exists.”). Accordingly, the Amended Complaint’s Section 1983 claim
against Suffolk County fails to state a claim and is implausible because Plaintiff has not alleged
the existence of a relevant municipal policy or custom. For that reason, Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claim against Suffolk County is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).
E. Leave to Amend
“Although district courts generally grant pro se plaintiffs leave to amend a complaint, that
leave may be denied when a plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend.” Zaerpour
v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 23-845, 2024 WL 2069555, at *2 (2d Cir. May 9, 2024) (citing
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). Here, Plaintiff has already amended his
Complaint. Upon careful consideration, the Court declines to presently grant Plaintiff leave to
further amend his Amended Complaint. Rather, Plaintiff may request that the Court re-open this
case and he may also request leave to file a second amended complaint once his ongoing criminal
prosecution concludes.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, (1) the Court VACATES the portion of the July 26, 2024,
Electronic Order that directed the United States Marshal Service to effectuate service of the

original Complaint; (2) Plaintiff’s duplicate application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 17) is DENIED
AS MOOT; (3) Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief seeking intervention in his ongoing state
court prosecution are DISMISSED; (4) Plaintiff’s claims against the SCDAO, Jail Medical Dep’t,
and Suffolk County are DISMISSED; and (5) Plaintiff’s remaining claims are STAYED pending
the conclusion of his ongoing criminal prosecution.

11
Clerk of the Court is also respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the

Plaintiff at his address of record in an enveloped marked “Legal Mail” and note such mailing on
the docket. Plaintiff may request in writing that this case be re-opened within fourteen days of the
conclusion of his state court criminal proceedings. Plaintiff may also request leave to file a second
amended complaint at that time.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Memorandum
& Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 23, 2024
Central Islip, New York
(/s/ JMA)
JOAN M. AZRACK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659500. Public record. Not legal advice.