# WG Woodmere LLC v. The Incorporated Village of Woodsburgh

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659448

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659448

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the takings claim in that case was “not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction” (emphasis added)
- noting that “[o]nce the government is committed to a position, . . . the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution”
- observing that plaintiffs’ premature withdrawal of their application for a variance rendered it less than meaningful
- holding that a complaint must set forth “a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WG WOODMERE LLC; SG BARICK LLC; AND LH
BARICK LLC, 23-CV-6966 (ARR) (AYS)

Plaintiffs,
OPINION & ORDER
-against-

THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF WOODSBURGH;
AND THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF
LAWRENCE,

Defendants.

ROSS, United States District Judge:

In this action alleging violations of federal and state law in connection with the rezoning
of a property located in Woodmere, New York, I have before me two fully briefed motions to
dismiss: one made by defendant Incorporated Village of Woodsburgh (“Woodsburgh”), and the
second by defendant Incorporated Village of Lawrence (“Lawrence”). See ECF Nos. 37–42.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because they are not ripe, because
they fail to state a claim, or because plaintiffs failed to join the Town of Hempstead, which
defendants contend is a necessary party to the litigation.
Having reviewed the complaint and the parties’ briefing on the instant motion, I grant
defendants’ motion in part and deny it in part. Specifically, I grant defendants’ motion to dismiss
with respect to plaintiffs’ equal protection, due process, and bill of attainder claims (the first, fifth,
sixth, and tenth causes of action), as well as one of their state law claims (the ninth cause of action).
I further grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims (the seventh
and eighth causes of action) without prejudice, so that plaintiffs may, if they desire, renew these
claims after seeking and obtaining leave to file a late notice of claim in state court. I deny
defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs’ takings claims (the second, third, and fourth causes
of action). The pending motion for a stay of discovery, see ECF No. 28, is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND

Factual Background
I assume the parties’ familiarity with plaintiffs’ complaint, which provides the factual
context for this action at this stage. The following facts, which are particularly relevant to the
present motion, are drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint and presumed to be true. See Lundy v. Cath.
Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013).
In 2017, plaintiffs acquired a 118-acre parcel of land, located at 99 Meadow Drive, in
Woodmere, New York. Compl. ¶¶ 96, 98, ECF No. 1. The property, known as the “Woodmere
Club,” operated for decades as a private country club offering golf, tennis, swimming, and other
amenities. Id. ¶ 98. The Woodmere Club property is in the jurisdiction of three municipalities:
approximately 55 acres are under the jurisdiction of the Town of Hempstead, 40.5 acres are in the
Village of Woodsburgh, and 22.9 acres are in the Village of Lawrence. Id. ¶ 100. Because of the

property’s location, it is subject to the planning authority of the municipalities as well as the Nassau
County Planning Commission (“NCPC”). Id. ¶ 101. Under New York state and county law, the
NCPC has primary jurisdiction over subdivision review of the Woodmere Club property. Id. ¶¶ 63,
65–69. At the time plaintiffs purchased the property, the then-applicable zoning regulations
allowed for development of a subdivision plan consisting of 284 single-family residential lots,
with 248 in Hempstead, 24 in Woodsburgh, and 12 in Lawrence. Id. ¶ 111. In December 2018,
plaintiffs filed an application with the NCPC for approval to subdivide the property into 284 single
family residential lots in compliance with the zoning regulations of the municipalities. Id. ¶¶ 190–
91. The NCPC approval process included a review under New York’s State Environmental Quality
Review Act (“SEQRA”), N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101–8-0117 (McKinney 2024). Compl.
¶ 195. The NCPC is the “Lead Agency” for purposes of the SEQRA review process, and the
Woodmere Club property is subject to “the most detailed and extensive form of environmental
review provided by law.” Id. ¶ 196. Plaintiffs have expended approximately $2.2 million in fees
and expenses associated with the NCPC application. Id. ¶¶ 213–14.

The local governments with jurisdiction over the property have long resisted plaintiffs’
development plans. In late 2016, before plaintiffs bought the property, the Hempstead Town Board
imposed a temporary moratorium on residential development of golf course properties located
within 500 feet of an incorporated village. Id. ¶ 113. Hempstead proceeded to extend the
moratorium six times. Id. ¶ 126. Following plaintiffs’ purchase of the property, Woodsburgh
imposed its own moratorium on subdivision approval. Id. ¶¶ 133–34. Plaintiffs challenged both
moratoria in state court; after the New York Supreme Court invalidated Hempstead's moratorium
as an unconstitutional taking, Woodsburgh agreed to let its moratorium expire. Id. ¶¶ 140–41.
Following the demise of its moratorium, Hempstead considered a new zoning proposal in 2018—

the “GC Golf Course Coastal Residence District.” Id. ¶ 145. This proposed zone, which would
have also applied to two other waterfront golf courses, would have almost tripled the required
minimum lot size and reduced the number of developable lots accordingly. Id. ¶ 149. Hempstead
ultimately abandoned the proposal in the face of public opposition. Id. ¶¶ 158–59, 168–69.
Hempstead then considered an alternative plan to use eminent domain to turn the property into a
town-owned park, but abandoned that idea when residents indicated they did not support raising
taxes to fund the project. Id. ¶¶ 172, 186.
Then, in late 2019 and early 2020, as plaintiffs were moving through the SEQRA process
before the NCPC, defendants Lawrence and Woodsburgh, together with the Town of Hempstead,
entered into an Intermunicipal Cooperation Agreement (“IMA”) to rezone the Woodmere Club
property. Id. ¶¶ 215–16. Under the IMA, the municipalities agreed to adopt zoning ordinances that,
when combined, would impose a single zoning scheme on the property. Id. ¶ 217. In May 2020,
defendants introduced the zoning scheme, called the “Coastal Conservation District – Woodmere
Club” (the “challenged zoning”). Id. ¶ 225. The challenged zoning went further than the GC Golf

Course Coastal Residence District, restricting residential development in areas of the property that
were developable under the earlier plan. See id. ¶ 151. Defendants’ stated purpose for enacting the
Coastal Conservation District – Woodmere Club was:
[T]o regulate development in the environmentally sensitive coastal areas that span
the municipal boundaries of the Town and the contiguous Villages of Lawrence
and Woodsburgh, including the area occupied by the former Woodmere Club –
allowing for the enhanced preservation and protection of the Town’s and
neighboring Villages’ environmental, coastal, open space and cultural resources
and the preservation of the residential neighborhoods.

Id. ¶ 230.
The challenged zoning creates three “subdistricts” covering the Woodmere Club property:
the Open Space/Recreation Subdistrict (“Open Space District”), the Single-Family Residential
Subdistrict (“Residential District”), and the “Clubhouse/Hospitality Subdistrict” (“Clubhouse
District”). Id. ¶ 235. The Open Space District covers 83.3 acres and limits permitted uses to a
private or semi-private golf course or passive parkland. Id. ¶¶ 244–45. The challenged zoning
requires plaintiffs to install and maintain active flood management equipment in the Open Space
District to mitigate flood risk to neighboring properties. Id. ¶ 254. The Residential District covers
approximately 29.4 acres of the property, almost all of which lies within a flood zone. Id. ¶¶ 263,
269. The Residential District significantly reduces the number of lots plaintiffs can develop
compared to the prior zoning regulations, from 284 to 59 total, and more specifically from 12 to
zero in Lawrence, from 24 to 18 in Woodsburgh, and from 248 to 41 in Hempstead. Id. ¶¶ 236–
42. Finally, the Clubhouse District covers 5.7 acres of the property—encompassing the Woodmere
Club clubhouse building and its tennis courts, swimming pool, and parking lot—and allows for
the development of one building substantially identical to the existing clubhouse building in order
to “preserve and enhance the existing clubhouse of the Woodmere Club.” Id. ¶¶ 279–83.

Procedural Background
On August 24, 2020, plaintiffs sued the Town of Hempstead and the Villages of Lawrence
and Woodsburgh, seeking redress for alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution, the New York
Constitution, and New York law. See Compl., WG Woodmere LLC v. Town of Hempstead
(Woodmere I), No. 20-CV-3903 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 2020), ECF No. 1. On December 1, 2022,
after considering the report and recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields and
defendants’ objections thereto, I issued an order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint in Woodmere I
without prejudice. Woodmere I, No. 20-CV-3903, 2022 WL 17359339, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
2022). Specifically, I found that plaintiffs’ equal protection and takings claims were not yet ripe,

id. at *4–7, because there was still “significant ambiguity” as to how exactly the challenged zoning
would “actually apply” to plaintiffs’ property, id. at *6. I further held that plaintiffs’ due process
claims failed for lack of a protected property interest. Id. at *8. I also adopted Judge Shields’s
recommendation to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims arising under SEQRA and the New York
state constitution, and I declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims
given the dismissal of all federal claims. Id. at *9.
Subsequent to my order in Woodmere I, on February 15, 2023, plaintiffs filed applications
with the villages of Lawrence and Woodsburgh seeking variances that would allow them to
construct homes in the parts of their property where residential development is prohibited by the
challenged zoning. Compl. ¶ 341. Both villages denied these applications, and plaintiffs appealed
the denials to each village’s respective zoning board of appeals in April 2023. Id. ¶ 343.
On September 20, 2023, plaintiffs filed the complaint in the instant action against
defendants, the villages of Lawrence and Woodsburgh (but not the Town of Hempstead). The
complaint alleges: (1) a denial of equal protection under the federal and state constitutions; (2) a

temporary violation of the takings clause of the federal and state constitutions due to undue delay;
(3) a permanent violation of the takings clause of the federal and state constitutions due to a taking
of property; (4) the imposition of unconstitutional conditions/exactions under the Federal
Constitution; (5) a violation of the due process clause of the federal and state constitutions; (6) an
unconstitutional bill of attainder under the Federal Constitution; (7) an unlawful and ultra vires
exercise of zoning power; (8) an unlawful and ultra vires action in connection with the Clubhouse
District; (9) the adoption of local laws inconsistent with SEQRA; and (10) a use of the zoning
power in violation of the due process clause of the federal and state constitutions. Compl. ¶¶ 360–
475. The federal constitutional claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

In July 2024, defendants both moved separately to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 25, 26. They
subsequently also filed a motion for a stay of discovery, which remains pending. See ECF No. 28.
I received the fully briefed motions to dismiss on August 21, 2024. See Def. Lawrence’s Mot.
Dismiss (“Lawrence Mot.”), ECF No. 37-7; Def. Woodsburgh’s Mot. Dismiss (“Woodsburgh
Mot.”), ECF No. 40-1; Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF Nos. 38, 41-4;1 Def.
Lawrence’s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Lawrence Reply”), ECF No. 39; Def. Woodsburgh’s
Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Woodsburgh Reply”), ECF No. 42-12.

1 Plaintiffs’ opposition brief appears in identical form at both ECF No. 38 and ECF No. 41-4.
LEGAL STANDARD

When a motion to dismiss is brought under Rule 12(b)(6), I must liberally construe the
claims set forth in the complaint, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133,
139 (2d Cir. 2013). In resolving a motion brought under this rule, I may consider “documents
attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference [and] matters of which
judicial notice may be taken.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007); see also Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust
Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a complaint
must set forth “a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
Finally, Rule 12(b)(7) “authorizes dismissal of a pleading for failure to join a party under

Rule 19 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].” The latter rule “sets forth a two-step test.”
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 2000). “First, the court must determine
whether an absent party . . . qualifies as a ‘necessary’ party under Rule 19(a).” Id. If the absent
party is not necessary, I “need not decide whether its absence warrants dismissal under Rule
19(b).” Id. If, however, the absent party is necessary, and if “joinder of the absent party is not
feasible for jurisdictional or other reasons,” I “must finally determine whether the party is
‘indispensable.’” Id. at 725. Then, if the absent party’s presence is both necessary and
indispensable, I must dismiss the action. Id.
DISCUSSION

I. Ripeness

Defendants argue for dismissal of this action on the grounds that plaintiffs’ claims are not
ripe. As an initial matter, I reiterate that, as I found in my decision dismissing plaintiffs’ first suit
against defendants, “the specific ripeness requirements applicable to land use disputes are not
jurisdictional.” Woodmere I, 2022 WL 17359339, at *4 (first citing Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569
U.S. 513, 526 n.6 (2013); and then citing Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 533, 545 (2d Cir.
2014)). Therefore, the proper standard for me to apply is that under Rule 12(b)(6): accepting
plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.
Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139. Considering the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as the exhibits
attached to it and additional public records submitted by the parties in the course of briefing the
instant motion,2 I conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are now ripe for adjudication.3

2 Defendant Woodsburgh argues that I should “disregard new factual allegations” that relate to
events that took place following filing of the complaint, asserting that plaintiffs “sought to
improperly supplement the record.” Woodsburgh Reply at 1. This argument is perplexing because
it was in fact defendant Lawrence who first brought these facts to my attention, in exhibits attached
to its motion to dismiss. See Lawrence Mot., Exs. C–E, ECF Nos. 37-4, 37-5, 37-6. In any event,
I can and do consider the facts referred to in Exhibits C, D, and E attached to Lawrence’s motion,
as these are all “public records of which a court may properly take judicial notice.” Lia v. Saporito,
909 F. Supp. 2d 149, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 541 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2013).

3 Because plaintiffs brought this suit alleging, in part, that “Defendants’ actions violate the
constitutional takings clauses both as applied and on their face,” Compl. ¶ 384, arguably, the
ripeness requirements under Williamson County do not even apply to this action. See Yee v. City
of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992). For this reason, I ordered the parties to “discuss
how the court should address these two types of constitutional challenges” in their briefing. Dkt.
Order (June 5, 2024). As plaintiffs note, defendants did not address this issue in their papers. See
Pls.’ Opp’n at 26 n.13. In any event, because I conclude the Williamson County ripeness
requirements are met here, I need not decide whether plaintiffs have successfully made out a facial
takings challenge to the challenged zoning.
There is no dispute that, in land use cases such as this one, a plaintiff’s claim “is not ripe
until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan.
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), overruled on other grounds
by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180 (2019). But, as the Supreme Court has explained,

“[t]he finality requirement [under Williamson County] is relatively modest. All a plaintiff must
show is that there is no question about how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in
question.” Pakdel v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474, 478 (2021) (alterations
adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). At the time of my decision in Woodmere I, I
concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were unripe because defendants had not yet reached a final
decision regarding plaintiffs’ property, since plaintiffs had not yet complied with the requirement
to submit “at least one meaningful application for a variance,” Murphy v. New Milford Zoning
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005), that would permit them to develop their property
notwithstanding the challenged zoning ordinances. See Woodmere I, 2022 WL 17359339, at *6

(observing that “perhaps the zoning regulations and allowed variances will permit productive use
of the property” (emphasis added)). Such a variance application is necessary to ripen claims of this
type, because “only if a property owner has exhausted the variance process will a court know
precisely how a regulation will be applied to a particular parcel.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348.
Since my decision in Woodmere I, plaintiffs have “filed variance applications with
Lawrence and Woodsburgh seeking permission to develop residential lots . . . where such lots are
presently prohibited by the [challenged zoning].” Pls.’ Opp’n at 15. Plaintiffs contend that both
defendants have denied the variance applications, thus “commit[ing] to a final position” regarding
plaintiffs’ use of their property. Id. Defendants respond by arguing that plaintiffs’ variance
applications were “sham submission[s], unsupported by any of the materials that would allow a
. . . determination in their favor.” Lawrence Mot. at 20–21. Defendant Woodsburgh further argues
that it has, in fact, not yet decided plaintiffs’ variance application, as the Woodsburgh Board of
Zoning Appeals’ most recent action was to “continue[] the underlying hearing pending submission
of [an] impact statement,” which plaintiffs have not submitted. Woodsburgh Mot. at 10.

Bearing in mind my obligation at this stage to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
plaintiffs, I find that, as alleged, they have satisfied their burden to submit meaningful variance
applications to both defendants and that both variance applications have been denied. See Compl.
¶¶ 341–43. Although defendants contend that plaintiffs’ variance applications were not
meaningful, they cite no authority holding that an application is not “meaningful” just because it
lacks certain supporting evidence sought by defendants. Cf. BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Vill. of
Monroe, 93 F.4th 595, 604 (2d Cir. 2024) (observing that plaintiffs’ premature withdrawal of their
application for a variance rendered it less than meaningful). Moreover, plaintiffs allege that they
submitted “all the materials required for a completed application . . . including a ‘full’ or ‘long

form’ environmental assessment form.” Compl. ¶ 349. Given the facts alleged, I am compelled to
find that plaintiffs have availed themselves of all available opportunities to obtain administrative
relief.
As defendants note, in addition to “requesting variance relief,” “appealing [the denial of a
variance] to the Zoning Board of Appeals” is also a “necessary prerequisite[] to ripeness.”
Woodsburgh Mot. at 7 (quoting BMG Monroe I, LLC, 93 F.4th at 601). I find, based on the public
records the parties have presented and of which I take judicial notice, that plaintiffs sought relief
from the boards of appeals in both defendant villages, which both boards denied. See Lawrence
Mot., Ex. D (decision and hearing transcript from the Lawrence Board of Zoning Appeals); id.,
Ex. E (hearing minutes from the Woodsburgh Board of Zoning Appeals). The Lawrence Board of
Zoning Appeals explicitly voted to deny plaintiffs’ appeal. Id., Ex. D at 8. The Woodsburgh Board
of Zoning Appeals (“Woodsburgh Board”), on the other hand, resolved “that the public hearing on
the Proposed Action [be] continued without date pending submission of a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement [DEIS].” Id., Ex. E at 17. Defendant Woodsburgh argues strenuously that

submission of a DEIS—that is, a document “that analyze[s] the environmental consequences of
each and every component of the project,” Compl. ¶ 23—is required for plaintiffs to “complete
their application.” Woodsburgh Mot. at 10. Plaintiffs have stated that they do not intend to submit
a DEIS, Pls.’ Opp’n at 16, and contend that, “since more than 62 days have elapsed” since the
Woodsburgh Board’s last hearing, their appeal has been “denied as a matter of law,” id. (citing
N.Y. Village Law § 7-712-a(8), (13)(b)). I do not fault the Woodsburgh Board for deciding it
needed plaintiffs to submit a DEIS before it could adjudicate plaintiffs’ appeal. I note, however,
that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that they have already spent “almost two years and nearly $2
million” to prepare a DEIS for their intended development, which they submitted to the NCPC in

2020. Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. It is therefore reasonable to infer—as, at this stage of the litigation, I
must—that the dispute between plaintiffs and the Woodsburgh Board is not truly over the
submission of a DEIS, but rather over the merits of plaintiffs’ variance application. I conclude that
the Woodsburgh Board’s decision continuing the hearing “without date,” Lawrence Mot., Ex. E at
17, bears sufficient “indicia of finality” to constitute a final denial of plaintiffs’ application, and
thus to render plaintiffs’ claims ripe, Vill. Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287,
298 (2d Cir. 2022).
In addition, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims are still not yet ripe because plaintiffs’
land use application for a 59-lot subdivision remains pending before the Nassau County Planning
Commission (NCPC). See Lawrence Mot. at 18; Woodsburgh Mot. at 5–6. This argument is
unavailing. As I previously noted, the existence of the pending application for a 59-lot
development before the NCPC “is not dispositive of the ripeness issue.” Woodmere I, 2022 WL
17359339, at *6 n.1. Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants are premised on the contention that the
challenged zoning ordinances are unlawful because they “take[] away Plaintiffs’ ability to develop

80% of the acreage” on which plaintiffs wish to build. Compl. ¶ 5. Therefore, to ripen their claims,
plaintiffs needed to “exhaust[] the variance process,” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348, in order for me to
be able to ascertain that the challenged zoning would indeed affect plaintiffs in the way that they
allege. In contrast, the 59-lot application now pending before the NCPC was specifically tailored
to comply with the challenged zoning. See Compl. ¶¶ 338–40. Thus, whether the NCPC approves
or denies the pending application will not affect whether the challenged zoning constraints remain
in place. Either way, plaintiffs will be permitted to develop, at most, the 59 lots “left to them” by
the challenged zoning. Id. ¶ 340; see Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479 (noting that “[o]nce the government
is committed to a position, . . . the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution”). For these reasons, I

conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are now ripe for adjudication.
II. Joinder of Necessary Parties

I turn next to defendants’ argument that plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join the Town of Hempstead as a defendant. See Lawrence Mot.
at 43; Woodsburgh Mot. at 19. Both defendants argue that Hempstead is a necessary and
indispensable party to this suit on the grounds that Hempstead (1) was a party to plaintiffs’ first
suit in Woodmere I; (2) “is one of the three contractual parties to the challenged [intermunicipal
agreement]”; (3) “is a majority stakeholder by geographical area” in the challenged zone; and (4)
“is central to Plaintiffs’ factual allegations.” Lawrence Mot. at 43. As I will proceed to explain,
these arguments are without merit.
Rule 19 requires me first to determine whether Hempstead is a necessary party to the action
under either of two standards. Viacom, 212 F.3d at 724. A party is necessary if, “in that person’s
absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1)(A). Alternatively, a party is necessary if “that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action” and proceeding without that person would either “impair or impede” the
protection of that interest or “leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring . . .
inconsistent obligations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). Under either standard, Hempstead is not a
necessary party here. First, Hempstead’s absence poses no obstacle for me to accord complete
relief among the existing parties, so Hempstead cannot be a necessary party under Rule
19(a)(1)(A). As plaintiffs correctly note, I “can grant the relief sought by Plaintiffs without the
presence of Hempstead,” and, if defendants are found liable for damages, “they are . . . free to file
their own third-party claim against Hempstead for contribution or indemnity.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 51–

52. Nor is Hempstead a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). As the Second Circuit has held,
“the plain language of Rule 19(a)(1)(B) requires the absentee to ‘claim an interest’ in the litigation.
Fed. Ins. Co. v. SafeNet, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Peregrine
Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1996)). Moreover, “the absent party must be the
one claiming the interest. . . . A party named in the litigation cannot assert the interest on the absent
party’s behalf.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. 05-CV-7874, 2008 WL 1752231, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008). Since Hempstead has not claimed any interest in this litigation, it
cannot be a necessary party within the meaning of Rule 19(a)(1)(B).
Even if Hempstead had claimed an interest in this action, I would still find that it is not a
necessary party under Rule 19, because adjudication of this case would neither impair or impede
Hempstead’s ability to protect its interest, nor subject it to the risk of inconsistent obligations.
“Courts often conclude that the suit will not impair or impede an absentee’s interests if the
absentee’s interests are adequately represented by an existing party.” Fed. Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp.

2d at 258. Here, defendants Lawrence and Woodsburgh are present and vigorously defending the
challenged zoning that was established pursuant to the intermunicipal agreement, making the very
same arguments that Hempstead, if it were a party here, would presumably make. And, while “[i]t
is well-established that a party to a contract which is the subject of the litigation is considered a
necessary party,” Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(citations omitted), plaintiffs’ claims in this litigation do not require interpretation of any contract,
and there is therefore no risk of inconsistent interpretations causing prejudice to Hempstead’s
interests.
For these reasons, I reject defendants’ arguments for dismissal of the action pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).4 I will thus move on to address defendants’ remaining arguments for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), taking each set of plaintiffs’ claims in turn.
III. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which arises under the Equal
Protection Clause, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under either the “selective
enforcement” or the “class of one” theory of harm. See Lawrence Mot. at 26–31; Woodsburgh
Mot. at 12–14. As I will explain, I agree with defendants and find plaintiffs’ arguments to the

4 Because I conclude that Hempstead is not a necessary party to this action under Rule 19(a), I
need not analyze whether it would also be an “indispensable” party under Rule 19(b). See Bodner
v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
contrary unpersuasive. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 19–26. I therefore grant defendants’ motion to dismiss
with regard to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
First, I agree with defendants that plaintiffs have not made out a selective enforcement
claim, because they have failed to allege that defendants’ challenged actions resulted from an
impermissible motive. See Vertical Broad., Inc. v. Town of Southampton, 84 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390

(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Lisa’s Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir.
1999) (“The ‘key issue’ in an equal protection claim alleging selective enforcement is
impermissible motive.”)). Plaintiffs’ complaint does contain a passing reference to “animus,”
insinuating that defendants’ actions may have been motivated by plaintiffs’ religion or state of
residence. See Compl. ¶ 310. But elsewhere in the complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants’
“true motives” were “to find any way possible to prohibit as much development as possible for as
long as possible.” Id. ¶ 9. Assuming that allegation to be true, as I must, “there is no allegation that
the actions—as arbitrary or irrational as they may have been—were motivated by a constitutionally
impermissible consideration.” Payne v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 2d 116,

119 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Rather, plaintiffs have merely alleged that defendants have a strong and, in
plaintiffs’ view, irrational opposition to development on plaintiffs’ land. This is not enough to
make out a claim of selective enforcement, which requires plaintiffs to allege “an intention to
discriminate based upon impermissible considerations, such as race or . . . a malicious or bad faith
intent to injure the person.” Vertical Broad., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
Nor have plaintiffs successfully made out an equal protection claim under their “class of
one” theory, as they have failed to identify any similarly situated comparator who was treated
differently by defendants. As the Second Circuit has held, “class-of-one plaintiffs must show an
extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare
themselves.” Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the question
of “whether parties are similarly situated is a fact-intensive inquiry” generally best suited for the
jury, I may find in a defendant’s favor and dismiss a class of one claim “where no reasonable jury
could find that the persons to whom the plaintiff compares itself are similarly situated.” Id. Here,
plaintiffs’ complaint has identified four purported comparator properties. See Compl. ¶ 306 (listing

four “Comparator Golf Clubs”). But plaintiffs have failed to allege that any of those properties
was sufficiently similar to their own. Although the complaint alleges that all of the comparators,
like plaintiffs’ property, were in use as golf clubs when defendants adopted the challenged zoning,
see id. ¶ 308, it does not contain any allegation that any of the comparator properties are, or ever
were, slated for residential development of the kind plaintiffs hope to construct. This is fatal to
plaintiffs’ class of one claim because, “in the land-use context, to be prima facie similar, the
comparators must be engaged in the same type of land use.” Clubside, 468 F.3d at 160 (citing
Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also Campbell, 434
F.3d at 1314–15 (noting, since the plaintiffs in that case sought to build an apartment complex,

that “only developers who sought approval of apartment building plans could be considered
similarly situated”). Plaintiffs intend to convert their property into a residential development,
whereas the comparator golf clubs do not. This difference is enough for me to find that no
reasonable juror could find plaintiffs’ property and the proffered comparator properties to be
similarly situated. Consequently, I must dismiss plaintiffs’ first cause of action.
IV. Plaintiffs’ Takings Claims

Plaintiffs assert three causes of action under the Takings Clause: one alleging a “temporary
taking,” another alleging a permanent “taking of property,” and a third claim that alleges an
unconstitutional “exaction.” See generally Compl. ¶¶ 370–413; Pls.’ Opp’n at 26–38. Defendants
argue for dismissal of all three of these claims. See Lawrence Mot. at 31–34; Woodsburgh Mot. at
16–18. For the reasons that follow, I find that plaintiffs have successfully made out all three of
their takings claims, and I therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs’ second,
third, and fourth causes of action.

A. Plaintiffs’ permanent takings claim

Plaintiffs allege, in their third cause of action, that defendants’ actions “violate the
constitutional takings clauses both as applied and on their face.” Compl. ¶ 384. Defendants seek
dismissal of this claim on the grounds that plaintiffs “cannot plausibly claim the [challenged
zoning] has rendered their . . . property nearly valueless.” Lawrence Mot. at 31; see also
Woodsburgh Mot. at 16. Plaintiffs have asserted two independent bases for their permanent takings
claim against defendants. They claim that defendant Lawrence, but not defendant Woodsburgh,
has effected “(1) a per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992),” and further claim that both defendants have effected “(2) a taking under Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).” Pls.’ Opp’n at 26–27. I will address these
issues in turn, beginning with plaintiffs’ theory of a per se, or categorical, taking. I conclude that,
under either theory, plaintiffs have successfully made out a plausible claim alleging an
unconstitutional taking, and, consequently, I deny defendants’ motion as to plaintiffs’ third cause
of action.
In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that “when the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good . . . he has
suffered a taking” for which the Constitution requires compensation. 505 U.S. at 1019. Plaintiffs’
complaint alleges that defendant Lawrence, but not defendant Woodsburgh, has effected a per se
taking under Lucas, because the challenged zoning “has eliminated 100% of the building lots
situated within Lawrence, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of all economically beneficial use of that
portion of their Property.” Compl. ¶ 396. In response, defendants argue that since, “even under the
new zoning, Plaintiffs can still pursue residential development” on some of their property, “they
cannot allege a categorical taking.” Lawrence Mot. at 33. In other words, the parties dispute how
to define the extent of the property interest against which the alleged taking should be measured—

which is admittedly a “difficult question,” as the Supreme Court noted in Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1016
n.7; see also id. (“When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or
as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.”
(emphasis added)). Here, though, because plaintiffs allege a per se taking only by defendant
Lawrence, I find defendants’ contention—that the proper point of comparison is the property as a
whole—to be unpersuasive. Considering only the part of the property situated within Lawrence’s
boundaries, plaintiffs allege that they “are now barred from creating a single building lot anywhere

within Lawrence’s jurisdiction.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 27. Thus, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
defendant Lawrence has forced them to “sacrifice all economically beneficial uses” of their
property within Lawrence, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, thus making out a per se takings claim.5
I turn now to plaintiffs’ assertion of a non-categorical taking under Penn Central, which I
find plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged. In analyzing this type of claim, the Supreme Court

5 Defendants assert that, “[e]ven if the [challenged] zoning completely prohibited residential
development, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege that [their] 118-acre ocean-front golf course
property has no economic value.” Lawrence Mot. at 34. Plaintiffs have, however, alleged that the
property’s history “shows that use . . . as an 18-hole golf course is not economically viable,” as it
was previously operated as a golf club at a loss of over $1 million per year. Compl. ¶¶ 246–47.
Taking these allegations as true, as I am constrained to do, neither party has proposed any
economically viable use of the property other than as a residential development.
has instructed the lower courts to consider, inter alia, “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Plaintiffs contend that the challenged zoning “ma[kes] it economically unfeasible” for plaintiffs to
develop their property, Compl. ¶ 392, that it “interferes with and destroys [plaintiffs’] legitimate

investment-backed expectations,” id. ¶ 388, and that defendants achieved these results
“intentionally,” id. ¶ 392. In response, defendants argue that the challenged zoning “did not result
in ‘one step short of’ a complete diminution of the Property’s value,” which, defendants contend,
means no taking has occurred. Lawrence Mot. at 34 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8). They
further argue that the challenged zoning “could not have impacted any reasonable investment-
backed expectations,” because, at the time plaintiffs purchased the property, a moratorium on
residential development there was in effect. Id. at 33–34.
Defendants’ arguments on this point are unavailing. Plaintiffs allege that, by adopting the
challenged zoning, defendants “decreased the Property’s value by at least 80%,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 28,

thereby “forc[ing] Plaintiffs to give up any economic benefit from the vast majority of their
property,” id. at 30. Defendants ask me to read far too much into the “one step short” language
that appears in a footnote to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucas. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019
n.8 (rejecting the assumption that “the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete
is not entitled to compensation”). Nothing in that footnote requires plaintiffs to show that the
alleged taking leaves them “one step short” of a total deprivation of their property. Later in the
same footnote, the Court explained that “[i]t is true that in at least some cases the landowner with
95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full.” Id. In other
words, while alleging a very high (e.g., 95%) diminution in value is not sufficient to prove a taking,
defendants have cited no authority stating that it is necessary for plaintiffs to allege as much for
their takings claim to survive dismissal. In addition, defendants’ contention that the challenged
zoning could not have affected plaintiffs’ “reasonable investment-backed expectations” because
of the moratorium in effect at the time of purchase, Lawrence Mot. at 34, does not hold water,
because the Supreme Court rejected the very same argument in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533

U.S. 606, 630 (2001) (holding that the takings claim in that case was “not barred by the mere fact
that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction” (emphasis added)).
Admittedly, the moratorium that was in place at the time plaintiffs purchased the property was
similar in purpose to the challenged zoning at issue now—but, notably, the moratorium was
ultimately struck down in state court. Pls.’ Opp’n at 31–32. Moreover, the former moratorium
cannot be considered a background principle shaping plaintiffs’ investment-backed expectations,
because “a regulation . . . is not transformed into a background principle of the [local] law by mere
virtue of the passage of title,” nor “by enactment itself.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30.
For these reasons, I conclude that plaintiffs have made out a claim of an unconstitutional

taking, and I therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs’ third cause of action.
B. Plaintiffs’ temporary takings claim

Plaintiffs raise an additional claim, their second cause of action, seeking “damages from
Defendants compensating Plaintiffs for the temporary taking . . . of Plaintiffs’ Property.” Compl.
¶ 381 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304
(1987)). While, as plaintiffs note, “Defendants’ motions do not address” this claim, Pls.’ Opp’n at
34, in any event, I find that plaintiffs have successfully made out their claim of a temporary taking.
In First English, the Supreme Court held that “‘temporary’ regulatory takings which, as here, deny
a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which
the Constitution clearly requires compensation.” 482 U.S. at 318. Thus, if the government effects
a taking, the Takings Clause “requires that the government pay the landowner for the value of the
use of the land during this period,” even if the taking is ultimately reversed, by judicial action or
otherwise. Id. at 319.
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action seeks damages for a “temporary taking,” Compl. ¶ 381,

presumably anticipating the possibility that the challenged zoning ordinances could be held
invalid, thus turning the alleged permanent taking of plaintiffs’ land into a temporary one. Since,
as I explained above, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a permanent taking, in the event the
challenged zoning is ultimately invalidated as a taking, defendants will be required to compensate
plaintiffs for the temporary taking up until that date. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (“[W]here
the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective.”). Therefore, I deny defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
second cause of action.

C. Plaintiffs’ exaction claim

Plaintiffs further allege, in their fourth cause of action, that, by requiring plaintiffs to set
aside most of their property as open space “as a condition on developing what remains of the
Property,” defendants have imposed an unconstitutional “condition” or “exaction” on plaintiffs’
use of their property. Compl. ¶ 408; see also id. ¶¶ 401–13. Defendant Lawrence asserts that this
claim should be dismissed, because plaintiffs “do not—and cannot—claim [defendants] ha[ve]
demanded any payment in exchange for granting a land-use permit.” Lawrence Mot. at 34. To the
extent Lawrence argues that an exaction can only take the form of a direct demand for a bribe, that
argument falls flat. I therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.
Under Supreme Court precedent, “the government may choose whether and how a permit
applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may not leverage
its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and
rough proportionality to those impacts.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S.
595, 606 (2013). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that, by adopting the challenged zoning, defendants

have required plaintiffs “to expend approximately $3 million dollars to install flood mitigation
improvements . . . solely for the benefit of [neighboring] residents . . . and not for themselves,”
Compl. ¶ 403, and that defendants are “forcing Plaintiffs to maintain over 70% of the Property to
achieve conservation purposes for the public at Plaintiffs’ sole cost,” id. ¶ 404. Plaintiffs further
allege that these requirements have been imposed as “a condition on developing what remains of
the Property.” Id. ¶ 408. Thus, plaintiffs have unmistakably alleged that defendants imposed “an
obligation to spend money” on plaintiffs in exchange for the right to develop their property, which,
as the Supreme Court has held, constitutes a so-called “monetary exaction[]” that can support a
takings claim. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 612.

Defendant Lawrence responds by defending the challenged zoning as “an effort . . . to
address legitimate environmental concerns.” Lawrence Reply at 25. But at this stage of the case,
where I must construe plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, the record is not sufficient for me to
definitively conclude that “there is a nexus and rough proportionality between the government’s
demand and the effects of the proposed land use.” Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599 (internal quotation
marks omitted). I therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs’ fourth cause of
action.
V. Plaintiffs’ Bill of Attainder Claim

Defendants argue for dismissal of plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action, which alleges that the
challenged zoning is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, asserting that “that constitutional
provision simply does not apply in this context.” Lawrence Mot. at 35; see also Woodsburgh Mot.
at 18. In response, plaintiffs cite Achtien v. City of Deadwood, 814 F. Supp. 808, 818 (D.S.D.
1993), for the proposition that a “city’s rescission of [a] building permit may constitute a bill of
attainder.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 46. As defendants note, however, see Lawrence Reply at 26, the court in
Achtien dismissed the plaintiffs’ bill of attainder claim, reasoning that the challenged ordinance
did not meet the historical, functional, or motivational tests for a bill of attainder, 814 F. Supp. at
818. Likewise, here, I find that plaintiffs have failed to make out a plausible bill of attainder claim.
The Supreme Court has “set forth a three factor inquiry for determining whether a statute imposes
‘forbidden punishment’ under the bill of attainder clause,” requiring me to determine “(1) whether
the statute falls within the historical meaning of punishment, (2) whether the statute furthers non-
punitive goals, and (3) whether legislative history evinces an intent to punish.” ABN 51st St.

Partners v. City of New York, 724 F. Supp. 1142, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Selective Serv.
Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)). I find that the challenged zoning
ordinances fail all three tests and therefore do not constitute a bill of attainder.
First, “‘mere denial of a noncontractual government benefit’ [is] beyond the scope of those
penalties historically attributed to bills of attainder.” Id. (quoting Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at
853). Since “[a]pproval of a building permit . . . is a government benefit to which no inherent
entitlement exists,” id., defendants’ refusal to grant plaintiffs permission to develop their land as
they desire cannot meet the historical test for a bill of attainder. Second, although the parties
dispute what defendants’ true motives in adopting the challenged zoning were, defendants have
proffered numerous alternative justifications for their actions, such as a desire to protect the
property’s “unique environmental attributes” and “its contribution to local community character,”
as well as a desire to mitigate “the threats posed to the area by overdevelopment.” Lawrence Reply
at 16. Since “the challenged ordinances can be reasonably said to further nonpunitive goals,”
Selective Serv. Sys, 468 U.S. at 854, they do not meet the functional test for a bill of attainder,

either. Finally, while plaintiffs’ complaint contains an allegation that defendants’ “long history of
frustrating development” on plaintiffs’ property “evinces a legislative motivation to punish
Plaintiffs,” Compl. ¶ 437, plaintiffs also contend that defendants’ goal was “to prohibit as much
development as possible for as long as possible,” id. ¶ 9. Defendants’ alleged desire to prevent
development does not imply a desire to punish plaintiffs. Therefore, plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged that defendants’ motivation for adopting the challenged zoning was punitive, and so their
claim fails the motivational test for a bill of attainder, too. As a result, I must dismiss plaintiffs’
bill of attainder claim.6

VI. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Defendants raise several arguments for dismissal of plaintiffs’ seventh, eighth, and ninth
causes of action, which arise under New York law. See Lawrence Mot. at 36–43; Woodsburgh
Mot. at 18–19. As I will explain in more detail below, I find these arguments persuasive. I therefore
dismiss plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth causes of action, which allege that defendants’ actions were
ultra vires, for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the procedural requirement to serve a notice of

6 Because I dismiss plaintiffs’ bill of attainder claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,
I do not reach defendants’ alternative argument that this claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. See Lawrence Mot. at 35 (citing Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir.
2015)).
claim. I also dismiss plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action, which I find to be barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
Plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth causes of action allege that the challenged zoning was an
ultra vires application of the zoning power, because it “exceed[ed] the proper limits of the zoning
power,” Compl. ¶ 446, and because it was “an improper effort to enact landmarking legislation

through the guise of zoning,” id. ¶ 453, respectively. Under New York law, a local government’s
exercise of its zoning power, “to the extent that it is lawful, must be founded upon a legislative
delegation to so proceed, and in the absence of such a grant will be held ultra vires and void.”
Golden v. Plan. Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 370 (1972). Defendants seek dismissal
of these claims, arguing that (1) plaintiffs failed to allege compliance with New York procedural
requirements; (2) these claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) defendants had the
power to create the challenged zoning under New York law. See Lawrence Mot. at 36–37, 38–40.
I find defendants’ first argument convincing, and I therefore dismiss these claims without reaching
defendants’ alternative arguments.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs were obliged to allege compliance with the procedural
requirements under New York law to serve a notice of claim and sit for a required statutory hearing.
See Lawrence Mot. at 36–37; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 9802 (McKinney 2024). I agree. As the Second Circuit
has stated, “federal courts entertaining state-law claims against . . . municipalities are obligated to
apply the [state] notice-of-claim provision.” Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164
F.3d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Section 9802 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”)
“sets forth the procedure by which certain actions against villages may be maintained.” Solow v.
Liebman, 573 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (2d Dep’t 1991). In addition to certain provisions concerning
contract actions, that statute provides that “no other action shall be maintained against a village
unless . . . a notice of claim shall have been made and served in compliance with section fifty-e of
the general municipal law.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 9802 (emphasis added). And, as the New York courts
have held, “[t]he ‘no other action’ language . . . permits no exceptions.” Solow, 573 N.Y.S.2d at
711 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 9802). Thus, I find that I am constrained to dismiss plaintiffs’ seventh

and eighth causes of action without prejudice, as they have not alleged service of the notice of
claim required by the CPLR.7
I turn now to plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action, which alleges that the challenged zoning
violated New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”). New York’s notice of
claim requirements, which I discussed above, would apply to this claim, as they do to plaintiffs’
other state law claims. Regardless, I must dismiss this claim with prejudice, as I find it to be barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. In Woodmere I, I adopted Magistrate Judge Shields’s finding that
“plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that defendants violated SEQRA” and dismissed the SEQRA
claim accordingly. Woodmere I, 2022 WL 17359339, at *9. Thus, plaintiffs are precluded from

again bringing their SEQRA claim, which appears to be identical to the claim they previously
brought in Woodmere I. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 459–64 with Compl. ¶¶ 381–86, Woodmere I, No.
20-CV-3903 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 2020), ECF No. 1; see also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131
(1979) (noting that “[u]nder res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by

7 New York law does provide for the possibility that plaintiffs may seek to file a late notice of
claim. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5) (McKinney 2024). However, the statute makes clear
that “[a]ll applications under this section shall be made to the supreme court or to the county
court.” Id. § 50-e(7) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I am without jurisdiction to hear these
applications. See Horvath v. Daniel, 423 F. Supp. 2d 421, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Therefore, I
dismiss plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth causes of action without prejudice, with leave to renew the
claims after seeking and obtaining leave in state court to file a late notice of claim.
parties or their privies based on the same cause of action” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).8
VII. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claims

Finally, I turn to plaintiffs’ fifth and tenth causes of action, which arise under the Due
Process Clause. Defendants argue these claims fail because plaintiffs’ complaint “fails to allege a
protectable property interest, much less that [defendants] deprived them of such an interest through
egregious, conscience-shocking conduct.” Lawrence Mot. at 22; see also id. at 22–26;
Woodsburgh Mot. at 14–16. Plaintiffs contend that they have a “constitutionally protected property
interest in the approval of their subdivision application,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 39, and assert violations
of both substantive and procedural due process, see id. at 38–46. As I will proceed to explain,
defendants are correct, and I therefore dismiss plaintiffs’ due process claims.
“To demonstrate a violation of due process rights based upon a zoning decision, whether
on procedural or substantive due process grounds, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he

possesses a federally protected property right to the relief sought.” Vertical Broad., 84 F. Supp. 2d
at 391 (citing Lisa’s Party City, 185 F.3d at 16). To establish such a protected property interest,
the plaintiff must “show a ‘clear entitlement’ to the relief sought.” Id. (quoting Natale v. Town of
Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A protected property interest will be found only if
the degree of discretion afforded the local authority is so narrow that approval is ‘virtually

8 Similarly, to the extent plaintiffs seek to raise independent claims under the New York state
constitution, these too are barred by the res judicata doctrine. In Woodmere I, I adopted the R&R’s
finding that plaintiffs’ “state constitutional claims [we]re either barred by the availability of a
federal remedy or subject to the same legal standards as the federal constitutional claims” and thus
subject to dismissal. Woodmere I, 2022 WL 17359339, at *9. That finding remains binding on me
and the parties today, and, therefore, to the extent plaintiffs bring separate claims under the New
York constitution, they are dismissed.
assured.’” Id. at 392 (quoting RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
Here, I find that plaintiffs have failed to allege that, absent the challenged zoning
ordinances, approval of their application to develop their property as they wish would be “virtually
assured.” Vertical Broad., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 392. In dismissing plaintiffs’ prior suit, I held that

plaintiffs’ “due process claims [we]re unsuccessful due to the discretionary nature of the
subdivision approval process.” Woodmere I, 2022 WL 17359339, at *8. The same is true for
plaintiffs’ due process claims now. While Plaintiffs argue that defendants have only “conditional”
power to deny plaintiffs’ subdivision applications, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 39, it is indisputable that,
under New York law, “planning boards are vested with the authority to weigh evidence and
exercise their discretion in approving or denying approval of a subdivision plat,” Deepwells Ests.
Inc. v. Incorporated Vill. of Head of Harbor, 973 F. Supp. 338, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Because
defendants possess this discretion, plaintiffs cannot plausibly claim that approval of their plan for
the property would be “virtually assured,” Vertical Broad., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 392, absent the

alleged due process violations. Moreover, “[t]his remains true even if the [challenged] ordinance
were to be held invalid,” because “[t]he discretion granted [defendants] under the ordinance, even
if such discretion was unlawful, prevents plaintiffs from having an expectation of being granted a
zoning variance sufficient to rise to the level of a protected property interest.” Id. at 393. Thus, I
hold that plaintiffs have failed to allege a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,
and, accordingly, I dismiss both their substantive and procedural due process claims. See id. at 392
(explaining that due process claims “may be dismissed at the outset based upon the lack of a
constitutionally protected property interest,” “without the necessity of exploring whether the local
authority has acted in an arbitrary manner”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I grant defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and deny it in part.
Plaintiffs’ claims under the first, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth causes of action are dismissed with
prejudice. The claims under the seventh and eighth causes of action are dismissed without
prejudice. Within seven days of this order, plaintiffs shall inform me whether they intend to seek

leave in state court to file a late notice of claim. Should plaintiffs obtain leave from the state court
to file a late notice of claim, they may then move for leave to amend their complaint in this action
to assert these state law claims. The pending motion for a stay of discovery is denied as moot.

SO ORDERED.

/s/
Allyne R. Ross
United States District Judge

Dated: September 18, 2024
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10659448. Public record. Not legal advice.