# LE. L. v. BURLINGTON COUNTY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · October 22, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656872

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** October 22, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

Le. L.,

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 20-6027 (RMB-MSJ)
v.
OPINION (PUBLIC)
DETECTIVE JENNIFER
MARCHESE,

Defendant.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff Le. L. is a sergeant in the United States Air Force. In 2018, he was
under investigation by the Air Force and Burlington County Prosecutor’s Office
(“BCPO”) for sexual abuse of his eight-year-old daughter, L.L. Detective Jennifer
Marchese of the BCPO interviewed L.L. about those allegations in the presence of
Special Agents from the United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The
interview was inconclusive. Accordingly, Detective Marchese informed the Air Force
that there was insufficient evidence to charge Plaintiff with the commission of a crime.
Nevertheless, the Air Force special agents took Plaintiff into custody and criminally
charged him with sexually abusing his daughter.
The Air Force eventually dismissed the charges against Le. L. He filed this suit
for malicious prosecution and false arrest. But rather than sue the Air Force—the only
entity to take Le. L. into custody and charge him with a crime—he sued Detective
Marchese. He alleges that her interview of L.L. was improperly suggestive, and it was
based on her improper questioning that the Air Force brought criminal charges against
him.

Detective Marchese has moved for summary judgment.1 Because Plaintiff has
not shown that Detective Marchese initiated a criminal proceeding against him by
improperly influencing the Air Force’s decision to bring charges or that she took any
intentional acts to set the arresting Air Force agents into motion, the Court will
GRANT summary judgment and DISMISS the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of May 23, 2018, Jennifer Marchese, a detective at the BCPO,
received a call from a guidance counselor at Atlantis Elementary School expressing
concern that a second-grade student, L.L., had been sexually abused by her father,

Plaintiff Le. L., a United States Air Force staff sergeant. [SOMF ¶¶ 2, 6; RSOMF
¶¶ 2–3, 6; Docket No. 77, Ex. 14, Deposition Transcript of Le. L. (“Le. L. Depo.”) at
30:24–31:5.] L.L. disclosed to the guidance counselor earlier in the day that she was
experiencing a burning pain around her genitals and that sometimes, her father
touched her in that area. [SOMF ¶ 7 (citing Docket No. 73, Certification of Phoenix

1 The Parties’ submissions are referred to herein as follows: (i) Defendant’s Brief in
Support of Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 72-2], her Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts, [Docket No. 72-1 (“SOMF”)], and her Reply Brief in Further Support
of Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 78 (“Def.’s Reply”)]; and (ii) Plaintiff’s Brief in
Opposition to Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 77 (“Pl.’s Br.”)], his Responses to
Defendants’ SOMF, [Docket No. 77 at 29–31 (“RSOMF”)], and his Counterstatement
of Undisputed Material Facts, [Docket No. 77 at 31–34 (“CSOMF”)].
Meyers in Support of Summary Judgment (“Meyers Certif.”), Ex. E); RSOMF ¶ 7.]
She also apparently told the guidance counselor that the touching was supposed to be
a secret and that she did not want her father to get in trouble. [Id.]

Detective Marchese interviewed L.L. at the Burlington County Child Advocacy
Center. [SOMF ¶ 8; RSOMF ¶ 8.] Special agents from the United States Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”), who were also notified of L.L.’s statement to
the guidance counselor, were present for the interview, watching from behind a two-
way screen. [SOMF ¶¶ 9–10; RSOMF ¶¶ 9–10.] OSI’s investigation was separate from

Detective Marchese’s investigation on behalf of the BCPO. [SOMF ¶ 11; RSOMF
¶ 11.] The interview—which ran for nearly an hour and a half, [CSOMF ¶ 33]—was
far from conclusive. Detective Marchese asked L.L. what she talked to the school
guidance counselor about. [Meyers Certif., Ex. F (Video Interview of L.L.).] L.L.
again explained to Detective Marchese that, sometimes, her father touched her

genitals when helping her get ready to go swimming at the pool or at bathtime. [Meyers
Certif., Ex. F at 20:15–21:00; 29:00–29:15; [SOMF ¶ 7; RSOMF ¶ 7.] But L.L. could
not provide sufficient detail regarding whether the touching occurred in any
purposeful, sexualized manner or was simply for bathing, health, or hygiene
purposes.2

2
Plaintiff voluntarily appeared for questioning by Detective Marchese at the

BCPO later that evening. [Le. L. Depo. at 68:19–70:25.] OSI special agents remained
present to observe Plaintiff’s interview. [Meyers Certif., Ex. B, Deposition Transcript
of Detective Jennifer Marchese (“Marchese Depo.”) at 54:15–22.] Also present
observing were an assistant prosecutor and Detective Marchese’s supervisor. [Id.]
Detective Marchese questioned Plaintiff about any inappropriate touching of his

daughter. [Le. L. Depo at 163:10–164:5] After about ten minutes, Detective Marchese
suggested that Plaintiff had sexually abused L.L. which prompted Plaintiff to invoke
his right to counsel and end the interview. [Id. at 76:20–22, 163:10–164:5.]
The OSI Special Agents escorted Plaintiff out of the BCPO and back to Joint

Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst where he was formally arrested and charged with
sexually assaulting L.L. [SOMF ¶ 13; RSOMF ¶ 13.] Prior to escorting him back to
base, OSI informed Detective Marchese that they would be charging Plaintiff with
sexually assaulting L.L. Detective Marchese did not agree with that decision. [SOMF
¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14.] At her deposition, she testified that she told OSI that she did not

agree with its decision to take Plaintiff into custody and charge him with a crime given
the inconclusiveness of L.L.’s interview. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo.
at 51:2–12, 103:9–104:13.]
The BCPO never arrested or filed criminal charges against Plaintiff. [SOMF
¶ 16; RSOMF ¶ 16.]3 The Air Force eventually dropped all criminal charges against
Plaintiff and restored his rank and promotions. [SOMF ¶ 17; RSOMF ¶ 17.] But

because the Air Force’s Central Registry Board found that the incident met the criteria
for sexual maltreatment of L.L., it placed Plaintiff on the Department of Defense’s sex
offender registry. [SOMF ¶¶ 15, 17; RSOMF ¶¶ 15, 17.] Plaintiff alleges that he
remains on the registry to this day even though the Air Force dropped the criminal
charges. [Docket No. 24, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 25.]

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the Air Force was the only entity to pursue criminal charges against
Plaintiff, he sued Burlington County, the BCPO, CP&P, and Detective Marchese.
[Docket No. 1 at 1.] His First Amended Complaint dropped all defendants other than

Detective Marchese and brought claims against her for malicious prosecution, false
arrest and imprisonment and loss of consortium, each under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Docket
No. 12.] Relying mostly on an expert report prepared by Dr. Gerald Cooke, a licensed
clinical and forensic psychologist, Plaintiff alleges that Detective Marchese’s interview
of L.L. was unduly suggestive and produced unreliable responses from L.L. and it was

based on those unreliable responses that the Air Force wrongly charged Plaintiff. He
alleges that he suffered various injuries as a result of the later-dropped charges

3 The only state entity to bring proceedings against Plaintiff was The New Jersey
Division for Child Protection and Permanency (“CP&P”). But a family court judge
found CP&P’s proofs insufficient to sustain a finding of abuse against Plaintiff.
[Meyers Certif., Ex. C at 13.]
including remaining on the Department of Defense’s sex offender registry, pain and
suffering, loss of reputation, and separation from L.L.4
Detective Marchese moved to dismiss each claim. [Docket No. 19.] This Court

dismissed the malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment claims without
prejudice for failure to state a claim as conclusory and formulaic recitations of the
elements of the causes of action. Le. L. v. Burlington Cnty., 2021 WL 6125777, at *3–4
(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2021). The Court dismissed the loss of consortium claim with
prejudice because Section 1983 does not support a derivative claim for loss of

consortium. Id. at *4 (citing Armstrong v. Sherman, 2010 WL 2483911 at *5, (D.N.J.
June 4, 2010)).
Plaintiff filed his operative Second Amended Complaint alleging claims against
Detective Marchese only for malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment.
[SAC ¶¶ 36–52.] Detective Marchese filed an answer and moved for summary

judgment.
In support of summary judgment Detective Marchese argues that (i) she is not
a “person” amenable to suit in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) the
malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment claims fail because Detective

Marchese did not initiate a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff and her actions did
not set the arresting OSI agents in motion; and (iii) even if those claims do not fail as

4 Plaintiff is no longer separated from L.L. who spends the school year months with
Plaintiff and the summer months with her mother. [Le. L. Depo. at 15:9–16.]
a matter of law, she is entitled to qualified immunity. [Def.’s Br. at 1–2.]5 Plaintiff
opposed, and Detective Marchese filed a reply brief in further support of summary
judgment. The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will “affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is
“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. at 250.
When deciding the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court's role is
not to weigh the evidence: all reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility

should be resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d
303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir.1983). However, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence,”
without more, will not give rise to a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
In the face of such evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “[w]here the record
... could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party....” Matsushita

Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). “Summary
judgment motions thus require judges to ‘assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a

5 Because the Court will grant summary judgment on all claims, it does not consider
Detective Marchese’s argument that Dr. Cooke is unqualified to render an expert
opinion. [Def.’s Br. at 8; Def.’s Reply at 2.]
“fair-minded” jury could “reasonably” decide.’” Williams v. Borough of West Chester,
Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c)). Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary judgment [has been]
made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). The non-
movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete evidence in the record”; mere
allegations, conclusions, conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary

judgment. Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Detective Marchese is Not a “Person” Subject to Section 1983
Liability in Her Official Capacity

Section 1983 authorizes relief against any “person” who acted under color of
state law to deprive a plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Even
though state law enforcement officials, like prosecutors and detectives, are literally
“person[s],” they are not persons subject to suit in their official capacities for damages
under Section 1983. Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850, 856 (3d
Cir. 2014) (state detectives and prosecutors not “persons” amenable to suit under
Section 1983 for damages in their official capacities); Martinez v. Choe, 2019 WL
6487315, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2019) (same); Greene v. Perez, 2016 WL 781690, at *2

(D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2016) (same). That is because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
a Section 1983 suit against a state official acting in her official capacity is the same as
suing the State itself, an entity subject to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989) (citing Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
54 (1996). So, as long as state law enforcement engages in “classic law enforcement
and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State” and are therefore not
amenable to suit in their official capacity for damages under Section 1983. Est. of
Lagano, 769 F.3d at 856. If, however, a state law enforcement officer performs

administrative functions “unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution,”
they act as county officials who are amendable to suit for damages under Section 1983.
Id. at 855–56 (citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505–06 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Detective Marchese is not a person amendable to suit in her official capacity

under Section 1983. Her investigation on behalf of the BCPO to determine whether
Plaintiff engaged in criminal misconduct involved classic law enforcement functions
including interviewing L.L., a potential victim, and Plaintiff, the investigation’s target.
Plaintiff admits as much. [Pl.’s Br. at 14 (“[T]he averred misconduct against Defendant
Marchese is directly related to her law enforcement and/or investigative
functions[.]”).]6 Accordingly, the claims against Detective Marchese in her official
capacity fail as a matter of law. The remainder of the analysis considers each claim
asserted against Detective Marchese in her personal capacity. Hafner v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21 (1991) (state officials sued for damages in personal capacity are “person[s]” subject
to Section 1983 liability).
B. Malicious Prosecution

To establish a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under Section
1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)
the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding
without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Johnson

v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d
497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).7

6 Plaintiff, relying on Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443 (N.J. 2001) argues that the State
may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of prosecutors and their
investigative subordinates. [Pl.’s Br. at 13.] But Wright was not a Section 1983 case. It
was brought under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act which abrogates sovereign
immunity against the State for acts of negligence. And, unlike the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act, Section 1983 does not abrogate sovereign immunity such that state
officials can be held liable for damages in their official capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 66
(explaining that Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
7 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint bases his claim for malicious prosecution
solely under the Fourth Amendment. [SAC ¶ 41.]
“Prosecutors, not police, are generally responsible for initiating criminal
proceedings.” Dress v. Falls Twp., 2017 WL 2215270, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2017).
So, in order to hold Detective Marchese responsible for initiating a criminal

proceeding against Plaintiff, she must have done something to affirmatively
“influence[] or participate[] in the decision to institute [the] criminal proceeding[] such
as “conceal [or] misrepresent material facts” to the prosecutor. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750
F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2014); Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)

(“Decisions have recognized that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim might be
maintained against one who furnished false information to, or concealed material
information from, prosecuting authorities.”); Dress, 2017 WL 2215270, at *3 (“To hold
a police officer responsible for initiating a criminal proceeding, a plaintiff needs to
demonstrate that the officer knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or

otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s informed discretion.”). Put differently, the
defendant-officer’s affirmative misconduct, misrepresentations, encouragement, or
pressure must have been the but-for and the proximate cause of the criminal
prosecution. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308, 308 n.5 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff
“must show that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the

defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute” when
considered against traditional tort causation principles) (cleaned up); Cruz ex rel. Alvarez
v. City of Phila., 2008 WL 4347529, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2008) (“[Detectives] may,
however, be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff can establish that the
[] officers exerted pressure or influence on the prosecutor to initiate proceedings or
made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor.”); see also WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971) (common law malicious prosecution claim requires
defendant to “take[] some active part in instigating or encouraging the prosecution”

and that her “persuasion was the determining factor in inducing the [prosecution]”);
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1750 (2024) (elements of Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim shaped by common law tort principles).
Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law because there
is no evidence to support that Detective Marchese did anything to affirmatively cause

the Air Force to bring the criminal charges against him. She did not misrepresent or
furnish false information to OSI regarding L.L.’s interview or otherwise advise,
encourage, or pressure OSI to bring charges. Indeed, OSI was present for the interview
and came to its own independent conclusion related to its own separate investigation

that Plaintiff should be court martialed. Cf. Stief v. Robeson Twp., 2021 WL 2137588, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2021) (no allegations to permit reasonable inference that officer
interfered in any way with the prosecutor’s independent decision to bring charges).
And Detective Marchese disagreed with OSI’s decision to charge Plaintiff. She testified
that she told the OSI agents that she disagreed with its decision to take Plaintiff into

custody and charge him with a child sex abuse crime given the inconclusiveness of
L.L.’s interview. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo. at 51:2–12.]
Plaintiff claims that Detective Marchese “technically” initiated a criminal
proceeding against him and characterizes Detective Marchese’s testimony as “self-
serving.” [Pl.’s Br. at 15.] But Plaintiff fails to point to any concrete evidence in the
record establishing a genuine issue of material fact that Detective Marchese
encouraged or influenced OSI to bring criminal charges. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484
(nonmovant must point to concrete evidence in the record to defeat summary

judgment). The record, in fact, reflects the opposite—Detective Marchese disagreed
with OSI’s decision to charge. Additionally, if Detective Marchese encouraged or
influenced OSI to bring criminal charges because she believed that there was probable
cause that Plaintiff committed a crime, it would have made sense for the BCPO to
likewise bring criminal charges against Plaintiff. But it did not. [SOMF ¶ 16; RSOMF

¶ 16.]
Similarly, Plaintiff argues that Detective Marchese was “one of the only persons
who had the knowledge and ability to conceal or misrepresent the veracity and
reliability [of] her interview[] with L.L” based on her “extensive experience and
training in handling child sexual abuse victim interviews.” [Pl.’s Br. at 15.] Even if that

were true,8 Plaintiff fails to point to anywhere in the record to create a genuine dispute
of material fact that Detective Marchese in fact concealed or misrepresented the
veracity and reliability of L.L.’s interview to OSI. Plaintiff could have called the OSI
agents to testify at a deposition regarding their interactions with Detective Marchese
to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. He did not do so. Accordingly, the Court

8 Detective Marchese did not have extensive experience in handling child sexual abuse
victim interviews. She testified that she was new to the child sex abuse unit at the time
of L.L.’s interview and that, accordingly, her supervisor was present monitoring the
interview. [See Def.’s Reply at 8 (citing Marchese Depo. at 12:3–18).]
will GRANT summary judgment for Defendant Marchese on the malicious
prosecution claim.9

C. False Arrest/Imprisonment

A claim for false arrest or false imprisonment requires a plaintiff to show that
he was unlawfully detained without probable cause. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700
F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 2012). Without allegations that Detective Marchese personally
arrested or imprisoned Plaintiff (which she did not), Plaintiff must show that Detective
Marchese’s “intentional actions set the arresting [OSI agents] in motion.” Berg v.
County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff has not done so. Without any evidentiary support, Plaintiff baldly
concludes that Defendant Marchese’s “joint investigation” with OSI “greatly
influenced” the Air Force’s decision to take Plaintiff into custody. As an initial matter,

Plaintiff has admitted that OSI’s investigation was concurrent, not joint, with
Burlington County’s investigation. [SOMF ¶ 11; RSOMF ¶ 11.] Moreover, the record
evidence (again) establishes precisely the opposite—Detective Marchese attempted to
influence OSI not to press charges because she believed that there was no probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo. at 51:2–7.] OSI

9 And even if Plaintiff could establish that Detective Marchese instituted a criminal
proceeding against him, there is no evidence in the record that she did so maliciously.
Nor does Plaintiff attempt to argue otherwise in his summary judgment brief. [Pl.’s Br.
at 15–16 (arguing only Detective Marchese instituted a criminal proceeding against
him).] A summary judgment opponent cannot “merely rely upon conclusory
allegations in [its] pleadings or in memoranda and briefs.” Harter v. GAF Corp., 967
F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). He must establish the essential elements of his claim to
survive summary judgment.
proceeded to bring charges against Plaintiff anyway. Because Detective Marchese “did
not initiate or even actively participate in the arrest or criminal prosecution of
[P]laintiff,” the Court will GRANT summary judgment for Defendant Marchese on

the false arrest/imprisonment claim. Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 265 (D.N.J.
1997); Berg, 219 F.3d at 274 (to avoid summary judgment on false arrest claim, plaintiff
“must point to some evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
[defendant] intentionally caused his arrest”); Garcia v. City of Paterson, 2015 WL

857801, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2015) (granting summary judgment where there was no
evidence suggesting that defendant officer instigated the arrest, or requested that
plaintiffs be arrested).10

10 Even if Plaintiff could somehow establish each element of his malicious prosecution
and false arrest/imprisonment claims, the Court finds that Detective Marchese would
be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields state officials sued in
their personal capacity for damages so long as their conduct did not “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A right is clearly established
where existing precedent has ‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’” Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., --- F.4th ----, 2024 WL 4262139,
at *7 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Plaintiff
generically points to the clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and to due process. [Pl.’s Br. at 20.] But the constitutional right for
purposes of qualified immunity must be defined at a much more specific level of
generality “to determine ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
established.’” Williams, 2024 WL 4262139, at *8 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff fails to cite to any clearly
established precedent establishing a Fourth Amendment violation against a state law
enforcement for conducting a suggestive interview of a potential child sex abuse victim
during the course of a criminal investigation. Cf. Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 816
(9th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity on fabrication of evidence claim
where officer used “overbearing tactics” in interviewing child abuse victim); Devereaux
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of qualified immunity
on fabrication of evidence claim and holding that there is “no constitutional due
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

GRANTED. An accompanying Order shall issue.

October 22, 2024 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

process right to have child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed
in a particular manner, or to have the investigation carried out in a particular way”).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656872. Public record. Not legal advice.