# NANCE v. BONDS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · October 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656836

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** October 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656836

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of Doe defendants pursuant to Rule 21

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LYLE D. NANCE,
Case No. 17–cv–00679–ESK–SAK
Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION
WILLIE BONDS, et al.,
Defendants.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on defendants Willie Bonds,
Johnathan Gramp, and Dianna Sheehan’s motion for summary judgment
(Motion) (ECF No. 109.) The Motion is unopposed. For the following reasons,
I will grant the Motion and enter judgment in defendants’ favor.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint on January 31, 2017 alleging various
violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint) while he was
incarcerated at South Woods State Prison (South Woods) and East Jersey State
Prison (East Jersey). (ECF No. 1 (Compl.).) Plaintiff also filed a separate
action in the Newark vicinage about his confinement in East Jersey. See
Nance v. Nogan, No. 17–cv–00672. He filed a motion to consolidate cases.
(ECF No. 14.) District Judge Noel L. Hillman denied the motion in this case
and stayed consideration of the Complaint while the consolidation motion was
pending in Newark. (ECF No. 15.)
On December 21, 2020, Judge Hillman lifted the stay and allowed the
Complaint to proceed in part. (ECF No. 17.) Judge Hillman dismissed
plaintiff’s claims regarding the alleged deprivation of an effective grievance
procedure, deprivation of property, sexual harassment, and conspiracy to
deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. (Id. passim). He permitted
plaintiff’s claims that South Woods administrator Willie Bonds, assistant
superintendent Johnathan Gramp, and mailroom supervisor Dianna Sheehan
retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances to proceed. (Id. ¶ 15.)
II. FACTS
A. Allegations in Complaint
Plaintiff was transferred to South Woods from East Jersey on March 10,
2015. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff went to pick up his personal property items,
but a South Woods mailroom officer refused to give him items that were
considered to be prohibited items at South Woods even though plaintiff had
been permitted to have them at East Jersey. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff filed a
prison inquiry on March 23, 2015 with Sheehan asking for an accounting of his
property that he had packed up in East Jersey. (Id. ¶ 24.) Prison officials
rejected the inquiry because he “initialed his first name … .” (Id.) Gramp
removed plaintiff from the NJSTEP1 program on March 26, 2015 and assigned
plaintiff a job that paid significantly less than plaintiff’s job at East Jersey.
(Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff sent the New Jersey Department of Corrections
Ombudsman a letter detailing his difficulties with South Woods. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance on May 4, 2015 about the items that were being
withheld from him. (Id. ¶ 36.) The grievance was rejected and returned to
plaintiff with the instruction to file a property claim. (Id.) On May 12, 2015,
plaintiff sent a letter to Sheehan telling her that his father would pick up the
property and requesting the return of his surge protector. (Id. ¶ 38.) She did

1 “The New Jersey Scholarship and Transformative Education in Prisons
(NJSTEP) initiative is an association of higher education institutions in New Jersey
that works in partnership with the State of New Jersey Department of Corrections and
New Jersey State Parole Board to provide higher education courses toward a college
degree for students while they are incarcerated, and to assist in their transition to
college life upon release from prison.” (ECF No. 109–1 p. 8.)
not respond. (Id.) Plaintiff received a letter from the Ombudsman that
stated Sheehan “was ‘aware of the situation with [p]laintiff’s property, and was
‘unsure’ why his surge protector was rejected.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Sheehan also
claimed that plaintiff could not have his college books and calculator “because
he was ‘not currently active in the college program at [South Woods.]’” (Id.)
She also did not permit plaintiff to have his eyeglasses “because they were metal
frames when in fact, all three were plastic” or his sunglasses “because they were
not prescription, when in fact they were and transitional lenses.” (Id.)
Plaintiff got his surge protector back on May 15, 2015. (Id. ¶40.)
Plaintiff obtained permission to have his father collect his property as well
as an extension of time to collect the property. (Id. ¶ 41.) He wrote to
Sheehan asking that his items be mailed to his father because his father was
ill. (Id. ¶ 42.) She did not respond. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote to Bonds asking to
be transferred back to East Jersey and for help getting his property back, but
Bonds did not respond either. (Id. ¶ 45.)
On May 28, 2015, plaintiff was given “gang minimum status” and denied
“full minimum status.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff sent a letter to Bonds objecting to
his transfer from East Jersey, classification status, removal from the NJSTEP
program, and the lack of response to his inquires. (Id. ¶ 49.) He filed a formal
grievance on June 3, 2015. (Id. ¶ 50.) Bonds rejected plaintiff’s grievance on
June 25, 2015. (Id. ¶ 55.)
On June 15, 2015, Sheehan disposed of plaintiff’s property. (Id. ¶ 52.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance on June 18, 2015 and sent a property claim to Bonds
on June 30, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56.) He also sent Bonds a list of 49 items valued
at $ 3,357.08 that were missing. (Id. ¶ 56.) Despite paying to send the letter
via certified mail, the post office never received the mail. (Id.)
Plaintiff was taken to the hospital for a dislocated finger on July 10, 2015.
(Id. ¶ 58.) When he returned to the prison, he was taken to South Woods’s
extended care unit. (Id.) His property was taken to the unit’s storage room,
and he discovered that some items had been stolen or broken when he went to
retrieve his property on July 17, 2015. (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiff mailed another
complaint to Bonds on August 5, 2015 containing receipts for his discarded
property as well as for the damaged and stolen property that had been in the
storage room. (Id. ¶ 64.) Sheehan charged $5.53 to have the mail sent by
certified mail. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff filed an inquiry asking for the date that
his items arrived in the storage room,2 but staff returned the inquiry and gave
plaintiff directions on how to file a property claim “as if having knowledge that
an act of maleficence had occurred.” (Id. ¶ 68.) He filed another grievance
seeking compensation for money that Sheehan deducted from his account for
postage that he did not request. (Id. ¶ 72.) Bonds denied plaintiff’s property
claim on September 14, 2015. (Id. ¶ 76.)
Bonds wrote to plaintiff on September 29, 2015 stating that he could not
tell plaintiff why he had been transferred from East Jersey. (Id. ¶ 78.) Bonds
denied plaintiff’s request to be transferred back to East Jersey. (Id. ¶ 79.)
Bonds also acknowledged that South Woods had charged inmates to file
inquiries on the prison kiosks. (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff states this continued until
July 15, 2016. (Id. ¶ 81.)
On December 7, 2015, plaintiff was directed to pack up his property
because he was being transferred to Northern State Prison (Northern State).
(Id. ¶ 88.) He packed 10 boxes to be transferred with him. (Id.) The transfer
was cancelled, but Sheehan “allowed” plaintiff’s items to be shipped to Northern
State on December 9, 2015. (Id. ¶ 89.) Plaintiff filed a grievance claiming
this had been done to retaliate against him. (Id.)

2 Plaintiff later learned through a different inquiry that staff did not know the
specific date but that his property should have arrived the same day plaintiff went to
the extended care unit, i.e., on July 10, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 70.)
Plaintiff received some of his property on December 22, 2015. (Id. ¶ 91.)
He filed a grievance against Sheehan on December 24, 2015 for an
“unreasonable delay of [six] additional days before [he] received the remaining
items minus his ‘missing’ Grand Jury and Post Conviction Relief transcripts.”
(Id.) He filed an inquiry on December 29, 2015 asking why it had taken 17
days to send out his word processor for repair. (Id. ¶ 92.) Plaintiff filed
another grievance regarding his missing transcripts on January 7, 2016 and
another inquiry about his word processor on January 13, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 94, 95.)
B. Defendants’ Statement of Facts3
Plaintiff received the Inmate Handbook when he arrived at South Woods
in March 2015. (ECF No. 109–20 ¶ 8.) It states that “non-permissible
property shall be removed by a family member or friend within [30] days after
written notification.” (Id.) It also states that a “correctional facility shall
hold non-permissible for property for up to [60] days and that the correctional
facility shall not be liable for non-permissible property held longer than [60]
days.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Claims of lost, damaged, or destroyed property had to be filed
within 15 days of discovery. (Id. ¶ 10.) “The Institutional Classification
Committee will make all job assignments. The job needs of the institution
have priority.” (Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The handbook

3 Plaintiff did not submit opposition to the Motion when it was originally filed.
(ECF No. 110.) On January 23, 2024, Judge Hillman denied plaintiff’s request to stay
the proceedings until plaintiff was released from prison but, “in light of [p]laintiff’s pro
se status and the preference that matters be decided on the merits,” briefly extended
the time for plaintiff to file opposition to the Motion to February 16, 2024. (ECF No.
114 ¶¶ 9, 10.) Judge Hillman warned plaintiff that the Motion “will be considered
unopposed if [p]laintiff does not submit his papers by that date.” (Id.) Plaintiff did
not submit any opposition by the time set by Judge Hillman. I denied plaintiff’s May
17, 2024 request for a further extension because he had not asserted any facts that
would warrant another extension. (ECF No. 117.) Accordingly, the Motion is
considered unopposed and defendants’ statement of material of facts is “deemed
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.” L. Civ. R. 56.1(a).
states that an inmate may request to be enrolled in educational programs but
acceptance is not automatic. (Id. ¶ 13.)
According to Bonds, plaintiff was transferred to South Woods for
administrative reasons. (Id. ¶ 16.) A prisoner could be transferred within the
New Jersey Department of Corrections for several reasons. (Id. ¶ 17.) Bonds
was not involved with plaintiff’s transfer to South Woods beforehand and
“would not expect anyone to tell him about [plaintiff’s] history.” (Id. ¶ 18.) He
states that all inmates that were “mistakenly charged a fee were reimbursed.”
(Id. ¶ 19.)
Bonds sent plaintiff a memorandum on September 14, 2015 responding to
plaintiff’s property claim. (Id. ¶ 20.) He told plaintiff that plaintiff had been
notified on April 7, 2015 that he had 60 days to have a friend or family member
retrieve his property. (Id. ¶ 21.) Bonds also told plaintiff that his property
had been disposed of on June 15, 2015 because no one had claimed the property
for plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff admitted at his deposition that he had
received the memorandum. (Id. ¶ 23.) He also admitted that Bonds had
never indicated that he was aware of plaintiff’s grievances at East Jersey. (Id.
¶ 14.) Bonds also never said anything to plaintiff about retaliating against
him. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Gramp stated that he would have only learned about plaintiff’s transfer
from East Jersey from the daily movement sheet and that he did not know
“anything about [plaintiff] that distinguished him from other general
population prisoners.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Gramp denied that he retaliated against
plaintiff when plaintiff was not put into the NJSTEP program, which was just
getting started at South Woods. (Id. pp. 29, 30.) Plaintiff’s “prior
participation in the program at East Jersey State Prison placed him at a higher
education level.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff started NJSTEP at South Woods on
June 25, 2015. (Id. ¶ 31.) Gramp told plaintiff “that due to his accumulated
amount of points, [plaintiff’s] status was being changed to ‘gang minimum
status’ which was a better status than [plaintiff’s] current status and it meant
[plaintiff] would be afforded more liberties.” (Id. ¶ 33.)
According to Sheehan, plaintiff’s property arrived at South Woods between
March 12, 2015 and March 19, 2015. (ECF No. 109–20 ¶ 34.) She never
spoke with plaintiff about any retaliation. (Id. ¶ 36.) Sheehan did not know
about plaintiff’s grievances at East Jersey as her first contact with plaintiff was
through his March 23, 2015 property grievance. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.) Some of his
property was found after he filed the grievance. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff received
multiple notices from South Woods staff about the need to claim his property.
(Id. ¶ 40.) Sheehan responded to plaintiff’s property grievance on June 25,
2015, stating that she had given plaintiff an additional 30 days beyond the 60
days set forth in the handbook to have someone retrieve his property. (Id.
¶¶ 40, 41, 42.) Plaintiff failed to have anyone pick up the property. (Id. ¶¶ 44,
46.) Sheehan acknowledged that plaintiff had been overcharged for mail and
had contacted the business office to have them refund plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 50.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material
if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” and a dispute
about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion
and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 323. The moving party must cite specific materials in the record. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged
by ‘showing’ … that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has
satisfied its burden, the non–moving party, “must present affirmative evidence
in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. “While the evidence that the non–moving party
presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a
preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Hugh v. Butler
Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 251).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims that they
retaliated against him because he filed grievances and inquiries at East Jersey
and South Woods. To prove his retaliation claim, plaintiff must show that: “(1)
he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he suffered some
adverse action at the hands of prison officials, and (3) his constitutionally
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision’ to take
that action.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned
up). “Once the prisoner has made his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it ‘would have made
the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest.’” Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 190 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Defendants concede that filing prison grievances and inquiries are
constitutionally protected activities. (ECF No. 109–1 p. 11.) In addition to
asserting that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proof, defendants also
argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. p. 20.)
After reviewing the evidence submitted by defendants, I find that they
have shown that plaintiff cannot establish that his constitutionally protected
activity was a substantial or motivating factor in any actions they took. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
A. Gramp4
Plaintiff alleges Gramp did not permit him to continue the NJSTEP
program after transferring to South Woods and assigned plaintiff to the lowest
paying job. (Compl. ¶ 122.) He also alleges that Gramp changed his
classification to “gang minimum status” to punish him for filing grievances at
East Jersey. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he could not say why Gramp “did
what he did” and could “only tell you the results of what happened to [him].”
(ECF No. 109–4 p. 21.) He relies on an “underlying belief … that [he] was
going to be punished … for [his] activities at [East Jersey] once [he] got to [South
Woods]” and an assumption that Gramp knew plaintiff was being transferred
to South Woods as Gramp was part of the administrative staff. (Id. pp. 21, 33.)
Gramp never made a statement to plaintiff that indicated Gramp was
motivated by plaintiff’s grievance activity at East Jersey. (Id. p. 23.) Plaintiff
theorizes that Gramp set his classification as “gang minimum status” in order
to keep him from participating in NJSTEP, but he admitted that Gramp never
said anything to him that would support this theory. (Id. p. 54.) Plaintiff also
admitted that classification status is determined by an objective score

4 The copy of Gramp’s responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories that was filed with
the Motion is unsigned. (ECF No. 109–6 p. 13.) “The evidentiary value of this
declaration is drastically reduced because it is unsigned.” Arnold v. Gilmore, No.
2:16–cv–01299, 2019 WL 430503, at *7 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2019). I will not consider
this document as part of the Motion. See Bastista v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 129 F. App’x
724, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We will not consider the unsigned declaration that the
Government submitted to show that Bastista failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies.”)
calculation based on the individual prisoner and their behavior and that even
prisoners with the highest custody status are permitted to participate in
NJSTEP. (Id. pp. 51, 52.)
After considering the undisputed record and evidence, I find that plaintiff
cannot establish Gramp was motivated by plaintiff’s East Jersey grievances.
To the extent plaintiff relies on the short period of time between his transfer to
South Woods and Gramp’s actions to prove causation, he needs “to show … that
the decision maker had knowledge of the protected activity.” Moore v. City of
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006).
“It is not reasonable for a factfinder to infer that [defendant’s] reaction was
motivated by an intent to retaliate for conduct of which the … decision maker
was not aware.” Id. Plaintiff has not supplied this evidence, citing only his
“underlying belief” that retaliation played a role. “A non–moving party must
point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element
of his case.” Herbert v. Newton Mem’l Hosp., 933 F. Supp. 1222, 1229 (D.N.J.
1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 468 (3d Cir. 1997). “ [A] party cannot rely upon self–
serving conclusions, unsupported by specific facts in the record.” Id. Gramp
has shown that plaintiff cannot meet his burden on proof for his retaliation
claim; therefore, Gramp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. Bonds
Plaintiff alleges Bonds “personally direct[ed] or acquiesce[ed] to the
inexplicable transfer” to Northern State out of retaliation and to prevent him
from filing further grievances. (Compl. ¶ 113.) He also claims Bonds allowed
his property to be destroyed. (Id. ¶ 117.)
According to Bonds, prisoners within the New Jersey Department of
Corrections may be transferred between state prisons for a number of reasons.
(ECF No. 109–5 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was transferred for administrative reasons, the
specifics of which “cannot be shared with the inmate population” as it concerns
the security and operation of the facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) Bonds stated that he
usually would not know about a prisoner’s disciplinary history when they
arrived at South Woods, especially if they had no prior disciplinary history like
plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 3.) Bonds denied authorizing or acquiescing to the
destruction of plaintiff’s property and denied that his “express written or verbal
authorization” was required to destroy property. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.) Generally
speaking, “[p]roperty issues were handled by mailroom staff.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
Bonds had no recollection of receiving a letter from plaintiff that requested help
in retrieving plaintiff’s property or about plaintiff’s father trying to make
arrangements to pick up the property. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) Bonds certified that
he did not arrange to have plaintiff transferred to Northern State out of
retaliation. (Id. ¶ 22.) Bonds states that all inmates who were mistakenly
charged fees for copies of inquiries or grievances were refunded. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Bonds has presented evidence that he was not aware of plaintiff’s history
of grievances at East Jersey and that he was not involved in the destruction of
plaintiff’s property or plaintiff’s transfer to Northern State. He also has
submitted evidence that the unauthorized charges to plaintiff’s account were
the result of a prison-wide problem, which was rectified, and not a targeted
action against plaintiff. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to contradict
Bonds’s sworn statements.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had no personal knowledge that
Bonds knew about his East Jersey grievances, stating only that he was “sure
[Bonds] was privy to [his history] … .” (ECF No. 109–4 pp. 71, 72.) Plaintiff
admitted that he never had a direct conversation with Bonds about anything.
(Id. p. 80.) “‘[A]n inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not
create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.’
Inferences must flow directly from admissible evidence.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer,
750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914
F.2d 360, 382 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Bonds cannot have been motivated by plaintiff’s East
Jersey grievances if he was not aware of them. Moore v. City of Philadelphia,
461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006).
Plaintiff also has not established causation between his grievances filed at
South Woods and the cancelled transfer to Northern State. “When a plaintiff
relies solely on circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity, the time between
the protected conduct and the adverse action is often measured in days rather
than weeks or months.” Owens v. Deb, No. 4:22–cv–01571, 2024 WL 387675,
at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2024) (citing Conard v. Pennsylvania State Police, 902
F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2018)). Plaintiff filed a state tort claim about the June
15 destruction his property on August 31 and September 8, 2015. (Compl.
¶¶ 73, 74.) Plaintiff submitted a prison property claim to Bonds on June 30,
2015, (Id. ¶ 56), which Bonds denied on September 14, 2015, (ECF No. 109–8
p. 1). Plaintiff was not almost transferred to Northern State until December
9. (ECF No. 109–4 p. 62.) A difference of nearly three months between
plaintiff’s property grievances and the cancelled transfer is not unusually
suggestive timing. “Where the temporal proximity is not so close as to be
unduly suggestive, the appropriate test is timing plus other evidence.” Watson
v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has not
produced “other evidence” of retaliation. Moreover, the undisputed evidence
in the record does not support a reasonable inference of a pattern of antagonism.
Accordingly, I find that Bonds has shown that plaintiff cannot meet his burden
on proof for his retaliation claim; therefore, Bonds is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
C. Sheehan
Plaintiff alleges that Sheehan caused the destruction of his property and
improperly charged him fees in order to retaliate against him for his East Jersey
and South Woods grievances. (Compl. ¶ 138.)
Sheehan certified that plaintiff’s property arrived at South Woods from
East Jersey sometime between March 12, 2015 and March 19, 2015. (ECF No.
109–7 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff would have been provided “an inventory slip from both
[East Jersey] and [South Woods] which would have contained an itemized list
of his property.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff filed a grievance on March 23 asking to
inventory his property from East Jersey. (ECF No. 109–4 p. 86.) He sent
another letter to Sheehan on March 26 stating that certain transcripts and legal
briefs were missing. (Id. p. 88.) Plaintiff received some of his property as a
result of his grievances. (Id. p. 91.)
On April 7, plaintiff was informed that he had 60 days to pick up his items.
(ECF No. 109–8 p. 1.) Plaintiff’s father spoke with Sheehan and told her that
he would come pick up the items on May 26, so Sheehan extended the time for
plaintiff to retrieve his items. (ECF No. 109–10.) Plaintiff’s father never
arrived to pick up the items and Sheehan did not hear anything else from
plaintiff, so plaintiff’s items were destroyed on June 15 pursuant to South
Woods’s policy. (Id; ECF No. 109–9 p. 98.) Sheehan denied that she disposed
of plaintiff’s property in order to retaliate against him for filing grievances and
complaints. (ECF No. 109–7 ¶ 17.) She further denied purposely sending
plaintiff’s property to Northern State after the transfer was cancelled or
overcharging him to retaliate against him. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.)
Once again, there is nothing but speculation supporting plaintiff’s
retaliation claim against Sheehan. “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put
up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut
the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in
the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd.
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (“[T]he plaintiff must present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.”). “[C]ausation, like any other fact, can be established from the
evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,
424 (3d Cir. 2016). There is no evidence that Sheehan was aware of any
grievances filed at East Jersey, and plaintiff never had a direct conversation
with Sheehan about anything. (ECF No. 109–4 p. 80.)
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony is full of speculation and assumptions
about Sheehan’s motivations, but he has not submitted any affirmative
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could rule in his favor. He argued
during his deposition that Sheehan did not follow the relevant policy about
notifying him of the specific date his property would be destroyed, (see, e.g., ECF
No. 109–4 pp. 94, 98, 99, 103), but plaintiff received a letter from the
Ombudsman on May 14, 2015 stating that “someone must pick-up the items in
question by May 19th.” (ECF No. 109–12.) The letter from assistant
superintendent Christopher Cline dated May 18, 2015 only confirms that
plaintiff was to arrange to have his father pick up the property. (ECF No. 109-
13.) Sheehan held onto plaintiff’s property for another 28 days; Cline’s letter
did not require Sheehan to hold the property indefinitely. After the
considering the record as a whole, there is insufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact that Sheehan had a retaliatory motive for disposing of plaintiff’s
property.
Alternatively, Sheehan has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
she would have made the same decision to destroy the property regardless of
whether plaintiff had filed grievances. Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 190 (3d
Cir. 2017). South Woods policy only requires the mailroom to hold onto excess
property for a maximum of 60 days, after which time the prison is no longer
responsible for any property. (ECF No. 109–9 p. 98.) “The property will be
disposed of if it is not removed by a specific date.” (Id.) Plaintiff received
notices from the mailroom on March 19 and March 26 that he had unauthorized
items in the South Woods property room. (ECF No. 109–10.) On April 7,
plaintiff was informed that he had 60 days to pick up his items. (ECF No. 109–
8 p. 1.) Plaintiff received a letter from the Ombudsman on May 14, 2015
stating that “someone must pick-up the items in question by May 19th.” (ECF
No. 109–12.) Sheehan gave plaintiff extra time beyond this date because
plaintiff’s father said he would come to pick everything up on May 26. (ECF
No. 109–10.) In total, plaintiff’s property was stored for 97 days after his
arrival at South Woods and 69 days after receiving the March 31, 2015 property
memo. (ECF No. 109–8 p. 1.) This was longer than South Woods was
required to store his property, supporting Sheehan’s assertion that she would
have disposed of the property as part of normal policy and procedure even in
the absence of any grievances from plaintiff. (ECF No. 109–7 ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that his grievances were a substantial or motivating factor for
defendants’ actions. Therefore, I will grant the motion for summary
judgment.5
D. Doe Defendants
I will also dismiss plaintiff’s claims against the still unnamed Doe
defendants. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Fact discovery closed May 31, 2023. (ECF No.
83.) Despite the close of discovery, plaintiff has failed to identify these

5 As summary judgment will be granted in favor of Gramp, Bonds, and Sheehan,
it is unnecessary to address their qualified immunity argument beyond noting that the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff does not show that defendants
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right.
unnamed defendants. Because plaintiff has failed to identify them and
because the time for doing so has since past, I must dismiss them pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which allows a court to “on motion or on its
own, … at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see
also Blakeslee v. Clinton County, 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of Doe defendants pursuant to Rule 21). “Use of John Doe
defendants is permissible in certain situations until reasonable discovery
permits the true defendants to be identified. If reasonable discovery does not
unveil the proper identities, however, the John Doe defendants must be
dismissed.” Id. Plaintiff has had more than enough time to allow him to
identify the individual unnamed defendants and thereafter to amend the
complaint, but he has failed to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I will grant defendants’ unopposed motion
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 109.) An appropriate Order accompanies
this Opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 17, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656836. Public record. Not legal advice.