# JORJANI v. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656362

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656362

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that high school teacher’s relationship with school district, superintendent, and principal did not require personal loyalty or confidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
: FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JASON JORJANI,
yuma Civ. No, 2:18-cv-11693 (WIM)
‘ Civ. No. 2:20-cv-1422 (WJM)
NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF
OPINION
TECHNOLOGY et al.,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon the cross motions for summary judgment
filed by Plaintiff Jason Jorjani (“Plaintiff”), ECF No. 118, and Defendants New Jersey
Institute of Technology, Joel Bloom, Kevin J. Belfield, Fadi P. Deek, Holly Stern, and
Christine Li (“Defendants”), ECF No. 180. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions
closely, the Court decides the motions without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.
Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED and
Plaintiff?s motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This action for First Amendment Retaliation arises out of the non-renewal of
Plaintiff's contract as a lecturer at New Jersey Institute of Technology (“NJIT”), a public
university in Newark, New Jersey. Plaintiff began teaching as a full-time philosophy
lecturer in the Department of Humanities at NJIT in the Fall of 2015, Pl.’s SMF 1.
Lecturers are teaching faculty that rank above adjuncts, but below tenure track faculty and
tenured professors. Jd. 9] 2. Plaintiff's contract was renewed in the Spring of 2016 and again
in the Spring of 2017. /d. 4 4.

1 The Court will refer to the parties’ Statements of Material Facts pursuant to L. Civ. R. 56.1, and responses thereto,
as follows: Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts (“PL’s SMF”), ECF No. 121; Defendants’ Statement of Material
Facts (“Defs.” SMP’), ECF No. 181-1; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Materia] Facts (“Defs.’ Resp.
Pl.’s SMF”), ECF No. 184-1; Plaintiff's Response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’
SME”), ECF No. (85-1. The Court will refer to exhibits to the Certification of Frederick C. Kelley, ECF No. 119, as
Plaintiff’s Exhibit (“PL’s Ex.”) and exhibits to the Certification of Mare D. Haefner, ECF No. 181-2, as Defendants’
Exhibit (Defs.’ Ex.”).

A. New York Times Op-Ed and Response
In the Fall of 2016, Plaintiff formed alliances within the political movement known
as the Alt Right to promote his philosophy of an “affirmation of the Indo-European
Tradition,” which Plaintiff describes as the idea that “European cultures are intimately
related to those of Greater Iran and the Persianate World, Hindu India, and the Buddhist
East and are the sources of the world’s greatest scientific, artistic, and spiritual
developments.” Am. Compl. § 24, ECF No. 30; PL.’s Resp. to Defs.’” SMF ¥j 2. To broaden
this message, Plaintiff formed the “Alt Right Corporation.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.” SMF q 3.
In the Summer of 2017, a graduate student purportedly named Erik Hellberg, who was
interested in “how the Left persecutes and silences Right wing thought in academia,” set
up a meeting with Plaintiff □□ discuss the topic. /d. 4. In actuality, Hellberg was an agent
of the ideological watchdog group “Hope Not Hate,” which has the goal of
“deconstructing” individuals it labels as fascists or extremists. Jd. { 5. Hellberg, whose real
name was Patrik Hermansson, videotaped their conversation without Plaintiffs
knowledge,” which touched on matters of race, immigration, and politics. Jd § 6. On
September 19, 2017, The New York Times (“NYT”) published an op-ed (“Op-Ed”)
containing an edited version of the recorded conversation (“Recording”), Id. § 7. In the
Recording, a clip of Plaintiff speaking at a conference shows Plaintiff characterizing
“aniversal human rights” as an “ill-conceived and bankrupt” socio-political ideology. Jesse
Singal, Opinion, Undercover With the Alt-Right, N.Y. Times (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://Awww.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/opinion/alt-right-white-supremacy-
undercover.html (last accessed July 29, 2024). The Recording then cuts to the video
recording of Plaintiff's conversation with Hellberg, where Plaintiff is seen calling for the
creation of a “revolutionary state” as the present order begins to disintegrate. Jd. He states
that “it’s going to end” with the expulsion of migrants and citizens who are primarily of
Muslim descent, concentration camps, and war “at the cost of a few hundred million
people.” Jd. Plaintiff then continues, “We will have a Europe, in 2050 where the banknotes
have Adolf Hitler, Napolean Bonaparte, Alexander the Great, And Hitler will be seen like
that: like Napolean, like Alexander; not like some weird monster, who is unique in his own
category. No, he’s just going to be seen as a great European leader.” PI,’s Resp. to Defs.’
SMF 4 8.
The next day, after reviewing the Op-Ed and Recording, Defendants J oel S. Bloom
(“Bloom”), NJIT’s President, and Kevin J. Belfield (“Belfield”), Dean of NJIT’s College

2 The Court notes that the unedited video footage demonstrates that just a few minutes into the conversation, Hellberg
holds up an audio recorder and asks Plaintiff if he can record their conversation, to which Plaintiff responds
affirmatively. Ex. 1 to Pi.’s Opp. Br. at 04:56, ECF No. 185. Plaintiff subsequently makes several references to the
conversation being “on the record,” id. at 17:37; 18:12; 33:30, until they reach the point of the conversation at issue
in the instant case, where Plaintiff says to Hellberg, “Now that you’re not recording... .” before continuing. fa at
7.54.

ry

of Science and Liberal Arts, sent a faculty- and staff-wide email (“September 20, 2017
Email’) stating: □
NJIT is a university that embraces diversity and sees it as a source of strength.
The statements made by Mr. Jorjani in a video recently published by the
[NYT] are repugnant and antithetical to our institution’s core values: We
presently are conducting a review of this matter and will provide additional
information as soon as that review is complete.
Id. 19; Defs.’ Ex. 4. In a September 21, 2017, email to Bloom and Belfield, Plaintiff
told NIIT that he was a victim of clever editing and that he had been grossly misrepresented
by the NYT Op-Ed and Recording. Jd. | 10; Defs.’ Ex, 5. On September 25, 2017, NJIT
placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave and launched an investigation. Id. 414; Dets.’
Ex. 6. NJIT’s letter to Plaintiff stated, in part:
We are aware of a recent New York Times article, as well as your responses
to that article. The article as related to you has caused significant disruption
at the university, and based on our information, we believe that the disruption
will continue to expand. Further, the article and subsequent information
provided by you reveals your association with organizations that were not
disclosed on your outside activity forms, despite being directed by your Chair
to fully update your outside activity disclosure form last Spring. Given the
disruptive impact of these events upon the university community, we are
placing you on paid administrative leave effective immediately. During that
time, we will continue our investigation with regard to whether your actions
have violated university and academic policies, as well as State ethics
violations.
Defs.’ Ex. 6. In the immediate aftermath of the NYT Op-Ed, Belfield testified that
“multitudes of faculty, staff, and students” came to his door to complain. Belfield Dep.
192:7-13, Additionally, Defendants, along with other NJIT faculty and personnel, received
approximately fifty communications from NJIT alumni, parents, and others both within
and outside of the university expressing concern and outrage regarding Plaintiff's views.
Pi.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF [ 29; Defs.’ Exs. 18-21; Deek Dep. 182:4-183:4. As part of these
communications, a student’s email was forwarded to Belfield and Eric Katz, Chair of
NIJIT’s Humanities Department, concerning a class meeting of Plaintiff's “The History of
Ideas” course, wherein the student recounted that Plaintiff “seemed to want to make the
case” that the “original white people, or Aryans, came from Iran ... . T googled him after
class and didn’t like what I found so I dropped his class.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’ SMF { 33.
B. “Against Perennial Philosophy” and Faculty Response
The NYT Op-Ed and Recording led to many of Plaintiffs co-workers examining
his scholarship and written works. /d. § 12. One of the works they found was Plaintiff's

October 21, 2016 post published on AltRight.com entitled, “Against Perennial
Philosophy,” which identifies Plaintiff as a full-time faculty member at NJIT. 3 Id.; Defs.’
Ex. 7. In the article, Plaintiff states that he was asked by the “think tank of the Tranian
Renaissance organization to which [he] belong[ed] . . . whether, or to what extent, anything
worthy of the name ‘Philosophy’ transpired in Iran during the so-called ‘Islamic Golden
Age.’” Defs.’ Ex. 7 at 2. Stating that his presentation “has profound significance for the
ideological structure of the New Right or AltRight movement[,]” id., Plaintiff posits that
“human racial equality” is a “left-wing myth” and that the mentality that produces great
incisive philosophy has “a genetic basis” that is not found in “Asians, Arabs, Africans, and
other-non-Aryan peoples[,]” id. at 9; PI.’s’ Resp. Defs.’ SMF { 16.
On this point, the article states, in relevant part, that:
It turns out that there were multiple co-existing Hominid species, which were
vastly unequal in significant respects such as their cognitive abilities. So-
called Homo Sapiens did not neatly and cleanly follow these extinct species
in evolutionary history, Rather, different groups of Hominids that are now
extinct mated with certain populations of Homo Sapiens and not with others.
For example, many Europeans have Neanderthal genes but no Africans do.
Many Africans and South Indians have genes from an extinct Hominid called
the Denosovan, but no Europeans have Denosovan genes. Racial difference
is real, and it matters. That Africans have an average IQ of around 75 whereas
whites have an average IQ of around 100, and Africans who have mixed with
whites (for example in North America or South Africa) have an average IQ
of around 85 has to do not with education or social conditioning, but with
different genetic inheritances from extinct Hominid species.
Defs.’ Ex. 7 at 9. Plaintiff also states that “[w]ith the emerging technologies of
embryo selection and genetic engineering” and with “the right leadership and government
planning,” it would be possible to produce thinkers on the level of “Hegel, Nietzsche, or
Heidegger,” to “restore the pre-Arab and pre-Mongo! genetic character of the majority of
the Iranian population within only one or two generations.” Jd. at 10. Plaintiff concludes
that he is “sorry to have to suggest that this might be necessary in order to Make Iran Great
Again.” fd,
On October 4, 2017, NJIT’s student newspaper, The Vector, published a “Statement
from the Department of Biological Sciences at NJIT” signed by eighteen individuals,
opining that Plaintiff's “beliefs, as revealed by his remarks, cannot help but produce a
discriminatory and intimidating educational environment for [NJIT’s} diverse student
body” and “makes him unfit to teach at NJIT, or indeed at any academic institution that
considers its students to have equal value and potential.” Defs.’ Ex. 9. On October 12,

3 Deek testified that he received notice of this article “about the same time” as the NYT Op-Ed. Deek Dep. 20:1-5.

2017, The Vector published an “Official Faculty Senate State [sic] Statement” declaring
that “NJIT is a university that embraces diversity and sees that diversity as a source of
strength. The NJIT Faculty Senate finds racist pronouncements made by University
Lecturer Jason Reza Jorjani to be morally repugnant. Hate and bigotry have no place on
the NJIT campus.” Defs.’ Ex. 10. On October 25, 2017, The Vector published a “Statement
by the Faculty and Staff of the Federated History Department at NJIT and Rutgers
University, Newark Regarding Dr. Jason Jorjani.” Defs.’ Ex. 11. The statement, which was
signed by thirty individuals, “denounce[s] NJIT University Lecturer Jason Jorjani’s views
on race in his comments, writing, and interviews.” Jd. The statement asserts in part that
“Dr, Jorjani’s published beliefs create a hostile learning environment for students of color
in particular, and his presence on the instructional staff at NJIT appears to legitimize
discredited race-based ideas about intelligence and citizenship that have no place in
academia. It is our collective belief that Dr. Jorjani’s eventual termination as a University
Lecturer would be justified and consistent with the principles of academic freedom and
NJIT’s mission.” Jd.
C. NJIT’s Investigation ‘
On October 12, 2017, NJIT retained Saiber LLC (“Saiber”) to investigate and □
determine whether Plaintiff: (1) violated any of his faculty obligations to NJIT, including
any violations of university policies, (2) fulling and accurately disclosed his outside
activities as required by New Jersey’s conflicts of interest laws and applicable regulations;
and (3) engaged in any outside activities that resulted in a conflict of interest with his
responsibilities toward NJIT. Defy.’ Ex. 23 at 1. However, inquiry into the content of any
speech by Plaintiff was outside the scope of Saiber’s charge. /d. at 1 n.1.
Saiber’s report found, infer alia, that: (1) Plaintiff violated the New Jersey ethics
code by failing to disclose that he was a founder, director, and shareholder of the AltRight
Corporation; (2) that Plaintiff violated NJIT faculty policy by cancelling 13 classes in the
Spring of 2017 without informing his department, that some of Plaintiff's absences were
not due to illness as he suggested, and that his class cancellations led to several students
including comments about the excessive cancellations in their student evaluations that
semester; (3) that Plaintiff's claims that video excerpts in the NYT Op-Ed were
misleadingly edited to paint Plaintiff in a false light regarding his statements about Hitler
and the genocide of Muslims were inaccurate and inconsistent with the unedited video; (4)
that Plaintiff exhibited a clear pattern of non-responsiveness from the time he started
working at NJIT and he did not, as was expected, regularly check his NJIT email or his
mailbox, causing a persistent problem. Defs.’ Ex. 23 at 3-4, 35-40.
Il PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action against NJIT, Bloom, Belfield, and other NJIT
employees on July 17, 2018. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed a second action against additional
individuals affiliated with NJIT, including Provost and Senior Executive Vice President

Fadi P. Deek (“Deek”), General Counsel and Vice President Holly Stern (“Stern”), and
Associate General Counsel and Ethics Liaison Officer Christine Li (“Li”), on February 11,
2020. Civ. No. 2:20-cv-01422, ECF No. 4. The cases were consolidated on December 9,
2020, with the instant case serving as the lead case. ECF No. 56. After significant motion
practice, the following claims remain: (1) First Amendment Retaliation against NJIT and
Bloom in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff's Civil Rights
against Bloom and Belfield in violation of § 1983; and (3) Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff's
Civil Rights against Deek, Stern, and Li in violation of § 1983 A
Id. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the Court construes all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Boyle y. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion and identifying
those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact—that is, the “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174,
185 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co.
vy, Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). The non-moving party must present
actual evidence that creates a genuine issue for trial—reliance on unsupported assertions,
speculation, or conclusory allegations is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Engineers, 41 F. App’x 585, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324), Furthermore, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise propertly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 247-48 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ .. . if its existence
or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.”
Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 Gd Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson, 477 US. at 248
(1986)). “A dispute over a material fact is ‘ genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Jd. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S, at 248).
Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the summary
judgment standard does not change. Ja re Cooper, 342 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385 (D.N.J. 2008)
(citing Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987)), The court must

4 Though not explicitly stated in the first cause of action in the Amended Complaint, the Court reads Plaintiff's First
Amendment Retaliation claim against NJIT and Bloom as an alleged violation of § 1983.

consider each motion independently and view the evidence on each motion in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Unite □
Here Loc. 54, No. CIV.08-0016, 2009 WL 540675, at *4 (D.N.J, Mar. 3, 2009) (first citing
Williams v. Philadelphia House Auth., 834 F. Supp. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 27
F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994); and then citing Matsushita, 475 US, at 587).
IV. DISCUSSION
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff moves for partial
summary judgment against Defendants Bloom and Belfield for their conduct leading up to
and including the September 20, 2017 Email and Plaintiffs placement on paid leave,
whereas Defendants move for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs case in its entirety.
A. First Amendment Retaliation
“To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must show
that (1) his speech is protected by the First Amendment and (2) the speech was a substantial
or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if both are proved, shifts the
burden to the employer to prove that (3) the same action would have been taken even if the
speech had not occurred.” Dougherty v. Sch, Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d
Cir, 2014). The first element—whether the employee’s speech is protected by the First
Amendment—is a question of law, while the second and third elements are questions of
fact. Id. at 987. The Court need only consider the first element to find that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims.
l. Protection Under the First Amendment
“(PJublic employees do not surrender all of their First Amendment rights merely
because of their employment status.” Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch, Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 465
(3d Cir, 2015) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006)). “As the Supreme
Court has reiterated time and time again, ‘free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance’ is ‘the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.’”
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 987 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573
(1968)). However, “[a]t the same time, the Supreme Court also aptly recognizes the
government’s countervailing interest—as an employer—in maintaining control over their
employees’ words and actions for the proper performance of the workplace.” Jd, “[P]Jublic
employers are still employers, and they therefore have the same concern for efficiency and
the need to review and evaluate employees as any other employer in order to ensure that
the actions of employees do not interfere with the performance of public functions.” Miller
v, Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 383-89 (1987)).
Thus, “[a] public employer... may impose speech restrictions that are necessary
for efficient and effective operations.” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466. The Court’s task “is to

seek ‘a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568), As
such, a three-step inquiry is conducted to determine whether a public employee’s speech is
protected by the First Amendment: “first, the employee niust speak as a citizen, not as an
employee[;] second, the speech must involve a matter of public concern{[;] and third, the
government must lack an ‘adequate justification’ for treating the employee differently than
the general public based on its needs as an employer under the Pickering balancing test.”
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 987,
For purposes of the instant motion, the parties have conceded the first two elements,
namely, that Plaintiff was speaking as a citizen, and that the speech at issue involved a
matter of public concern. Defs.’ Mov. Br. 8 n.1; PL.’s Opp. Br. 9. And “{flor the most part,
the relevant facts here are not in dispute; the parties [instead] differ primarily on their legal
effect.” Czurlanis vy. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the parties’
briefs assert divergent outcomes of the Pickering balance test.°
Under the Pickering balance test, courts are required to “balance the interests of the
employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466 (cleaned up) (quoting Dougherty, 772
F.3d at 991 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)).
a) Parties’ Respective Interests
Plaintiff asserts that his interest in speaking on matters of public concern is
particularly strong because universities, unlike elementary or secondary schools, are a
marketplace of ideas. Pl.’s Mov. Br. 14. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that the public’s strong
reaction to his speech facilitated free and open debate, which he argues is essential to “the
proper functioning of a university.” Pl.’s Opp. Br. 11. Further, Plaintiff points out that his

5 Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. A10, 425 (2006) that the Court’s
“customary employee-speech jurisprudence” may not account for additional constitutional interests implicated by
“expression related fo academic scholarship or classroom instruction,” Plaintiff suggests that Pickering should not
apply in the context of higher education. P1.’s Mov. Br. 23; Pl.’s Reply Br. 8-10. Because the parties agree for purposes
of this motion that Plaintiffs speech was in his capacity as a citizen—and not related to “academic scholarship or
classroom instruction” pursuant to his official duties as a Lecturer at NJIT—the Court will apply Pickering to the
instant case. See Defs.’ Opp. Br. 15; PL’s Reply Br. 9, Plaintiff also contends that Pickering is “useless” in the
university context because no federal circuit court has upheld a lower court’s finding against a university professor
under Pickering balancing. Pl.’s Mov. Br. 23; PL.’s Reply Br. 10. Plaintiff's assertion is immaterial: Pickering is widely
applied in the public university context among circuit courts, including the Third Circuit. See Gorin v, Sessoms, 561
3d 179, 186 n.6 Gd Cir. 2009) (stating that Pickering applies where “Garceiti’s official duty test does not apply to
a public instructor’s speech ‘related to scholarship or teaching’”), see also Gruber v. Tennessee Tech Bd. of Trustees,
No. 22-6106, 2024 WL 3051196 (6th Cir. May 16, 2024) (affirming district court’s finding against professor after
balancing parties’ interests under Pickering).

speech was extra-mural and made in confidence within a private conversation off campus.
Pl.’s Opp. Br. 5.
Defendants, in contrast, argue that the NYT Op-Ed and Recording resulted in a
“flurry of communications expressing outrage on the part of various constituencies both
within and without NJIT (and indeed, nationally) and prompted statements disavowing
Plaintiff's laudatory depiction of the Holocaust’s architect.” Defs.” Mov. Br. 12. Because
of this, Defendants point out that “NJIT personnel were forced to divert their focus from
NIIT’s educational mission in favor of addressing voluminous complaints about Jorjani.”
Td. at 17.5. Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs post on AltRight.com, entitled
“Apainst Perennial Philosophy,” “impaired employee harmony” as evidenced by the
“outpouring of communications” and “long string of letters that Plaintiff's coworkers
published attacking his racist views[,]” which “recognized and expressed serious concerns
about the harm to NJIT’s learning environment posed by Plaintiffs ideology.” Jd. at 13-
14.
Further, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs speech “created an unworkable situation”
whereby Plaintiff “would be teaching students of ethnicities he deemed to be of inherently
lesser intellectual value and injurious to the goal of restoring the preeminence of the Aryan
heritage.” Jd. at 14-15. Defendants also maintain that the students’ focus was diverted from
the subject matter Plaintiff “was supposed to be teaching them” to Plaintiff's “racist beliefs
and the disruption those beliefs had caused.” Jd, at 15. In support of this notion, Defendants
point to Plaintiffs statements to a reporter that after the NYT Op-Ed was published, his
students looked like they “had been gut-punched,” as well as Bloom’s testimony that the
students were the first group to be upset by Plaintiff's beliefs. Jd, Defendants note that these
disruptions occurred against the backdrop ofa university that has a “racially diverse student
body” and currently lists “celebrat[ing] the inclusiveness of [the] university community”
and being “sensitive to cultural and personal differences” as one of its core values. /d.
(quoting NJIT, Our Mission and Values, https:/Avww.njit.edu/about/our-mission-values
(last accessed July 29, 2024)).°
Relatedly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's paid leave and subsequent contract non-
renewal was “justified and lawful” because “NJIT was seeking to protect the proper
functioning of the university’s educational purpose.” /d. at 16. Comparing Plaintiff's
speech to the speech at issue in Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454 (3d Cir.
2015}—-where a high school teacher’s derogatory remarks online about her students were
found to have disrupted the plaintiff's teaching duties and the functioning of the school
districtDefendants assert that Plaintiff's speech similarly caused disruption at NJIT
because the student body that Plaintiff was tasked with teaching necessarily included

6 Defendants note that 61% of NJIT’s current student body is not white, Defs.’ Mov. Br. at 17 n.4 (citing U.S, News
& World Report, New Jersey Institute of Technology, https:/Avww.usnews.com/best-colleges/njit-262! (last accessed
July 29, 2024).

students of backgrounds that he deems “genetically inferior” and “subject to selective
genetic engineering[.]” Defs.’ Mov. Br. at 16-17.7 Thus, Defendants conclude that NJIT
has a “substantial interest in avoiding the educational and operational harms arising from
the tension between (i) Jorjani’s expression of the need to eliminate racially inferior genetic
characteristics, on the one hand; and (ii) having Jorjani teach students having those genetic
characteristics he posits ought to be eliminated, on the other.” fd, at 17.
Because the “First Amendment does not require a Government employer to sit idly
by while its employees insult those they are hired to serve|,]” Defendants argue, Plaintiff
was “properly suspended with pay and his contract was properly not renewed|[.]” fd. at 17-
18 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d
159, 183 (2d Cir. 2006)).
b) Balancing of Pickering Factors
“The balancing we must undertake is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires
consideration of the entire record, and must yield different results depending on the relative
strengths of the issue of public concern and the employer’s interest.” Miller, 544 F.3d. at
548 The statements at issue “will not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and
place of the employee’s expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute
arose,” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. “On the employee’s side of the scale, we must consider
the interests of both [the employee] and the public in the speech at issue.” Dougherty, 772.
F.3d at 991. “The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails.”
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390. Conversely, regarding the government’s interests, courts typically
consider “whether the speech ‘impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-
workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties
or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991
(quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388).
Weighing the parties’ respective interests here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's
interest in his speech is outweighed by the Defendants’ interest in maintaining the efficient
provision of hostile-free educational services that it provides to the public.

7 Defendants also cite to the opinion of their psychological expert, Alisha Ali, PhD. Defs.’ Ex. 17. In her report, Dr.
Ali opines that psychological research into what makes 4 good learning environment shows that “Jorjani would be
unable to teach students philosophy and history, in part, because they would worry that their grades would be a product
of Jorjani’s stated racist disdain for the intelligence of certain groups of NJIT students.” Defs,’ Mov. Br. at 16, Dr. Ali
also includes an interview with Bloom in her report during which he recounts conversations on two occasions with
students regarding their concerns about Plaintiff. Zd, at 15. However, unsworn expert reports are inadmissible on a
summary judgment motion, Snead v. Casino, No. CV2116875, 2023 WL 7151187, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct, 31, 2023) (citing
Fowle v. C&C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 67 Gd Cir. 1989)). Thas, the Court will not consider Defendants’ expert report at
this juncture.

(1) Manner, Time, and Place of Speech
The U.S. Supreme Court has “recognized that certain private remarks” can “touch
on matters of public concern and should thus be subject to Pickering balancing.” City of
San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). For purposes of this motion, the parties
have stipulated that Plaintiff's speech touched on matters of public concern. However,
courts also consider “the manner, time, and place of the employee’s expression” while
balancing the parties’ interests at the third step of the Pickering analysis. Rankin, 483 U.S.
at 388. Here, the Court accords some weight to the fact that the conversation between
Plaintiff and Hellberg depicted in the NYT Op-Ed and Recording was conducted under
surreptitious conditions,® and that Plaintiff was not speaking on campus or using university
resources to promote his messages. Cf Gruber v. Tennessee Tech Bd. of Trustees, No. 22-
6106, 2024 WL 3051196, at *4 (6th Cir. May 16, 2024) (relevant to Pickering analysis that
professor posted flyers calling students and professor racist on college campus as opposed
to off-campus). However, the Court notes that Plaintiff was aware that Hellberg had a tape
recorder with him to assist with his purported student thesis, and that Plaintiffmade several
references “to the record” during their conversation before presuming that Hellberg was
not recording when he said the statements about Hitler that were ultimately included in the
NYT Op-Ed and Recording, Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 01:37:54. Additionally, the remainder of
Plaintiff's speech at issue here was not conducted as privately. Plaintiff's speech
condemning universal human rights at the start of the NYT Recording was part of the
remarks he gave as a speaker at the 2016 National Policy Institute conference, Pl’s Aff
14, ECF No. 120, and his post on Al(Right.com, “Against Perennial Philosophy,” was
publicly available online and excerpted from a “heavily redacted portion” of his
presentation to an Iranian Renaissance organization, Defs.’ Ex. 7.
(2) Interest of the Public in the Speech at Issue
Next, though the parties stipulate that Plaintiffs speech touched on matters of public
concern, the Court must further weigh the relative interest of the public in the speech at
issue. The Court finds that the public’s interest in Plaintiff's speech is limited, as there is
no assertion that Plaintiffs speech brought to light “any corruption, fraud, or other forms
of illegal conduct on the part of Defendants,” or any other government impropriety, which
“occupies the highest rung of First Amendment protection.” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 473
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “Defendants [are] not required to
make an especially vigorous showing of actual or potential disruption in this case.” /d. To
the extent Plaintiff argues that his speech collides with government policy because the
“civil rights regime” was “pioneered by the federal courts,” Pl.’s Mov. Br. 22-23, the
speech at issue docs not resemble the objections to government impropriety that courts
typically afford strong public interest.

8 Such surreptitious conduct is not condoned by the Court.

(3) Harmony Among Co-Workers and Close Working
Relationships
Further, while the Court notes Plaintiffs speech certainly impaired “harmony
among co-workers” at NJIT—as evidenced by the public petitions of NJIT and Rutgers
professors in protest of PlaintifPs speech and continued employment—at the college level
it is not necessary for Plaintiff to have a “close working relationship” with faculty and
school administrators. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 476 (holding that high school teacher’s
relationship with school district, superintendent, and principal did not require personal
loyalty or confidence); see also Bauer vy. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[G]iven the nature of academic life, especially at the college level, it was not necessary
that Bauer and the administration enjoy a close working relationship requiring trust and
respect—indeed anyone who has spent time on college campuses knows that the vigorous
exchange of ideas and resulting tension between an administration and its faculty is as
much a part of college life as homecoming and final exams.”).
(4) Likelihood of Further Disruption to the Administration
and Faculty
Plaintiff argues that the complaints the NJIT administration received regarding
Plaintiff's speech “were all merely negative reactions to Jorjani’s speech by other people,
rather than disruptions by Jorjani himself.” Pl.’s Mov, Br. 13. Further, he asserts that “to
complain, as Bloom and Belfield have done, as though they were burdened by a genuine
disruption when fielding complaints from vicious and intolerant people who wanted Jorjani
fired on the basis of pure speech, is an exercise in infantilism” that “reveals a disgraceful
of backbone.” Jd. (citations omitted), Plaintiff maintains that the “general rumblings
against Jorjani’s speech and even some classroom disruption would still not rise to the level
of a ‘substantial disruption’ under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and its progeny.” Jd. at 13-14 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922-23, 931-32 (3d Cir, 201 1)).
The authorities cited by Plaintiff in support of his assertions are unpersuasive. While
Tinker and J.S. may elucidate general principles about the importance of free speech in
academic settings, both cases relate to disruptions in public K-12 schools caused by student
speech—rather than disruptions in university settings caused by professors or other
government employees—and are thus not controlling in a Pickering context. See Borden
v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168 n.8 3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
Tinker did not alter the test that the Supreme Court established to evaluate the speech of a
public employee in Pickering). Plaintiff also cites to Trotman v. Bd. of Trustees of Lincoln
Univ., 635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1980) to argue that at the college level, a university must be
willing to accommodate much greater disruption than the disruption alleged here before
Pickering balancing would weigh in its favor. Pl.’s Mov. Br. 14-15. Plaintiff contends that
the Trotman Court found that “years long disputes involving ‘dismissal of a dissenting
family member, disruption of classes, arrest of faculty members ..., attempted stifling of

debate and other sorry incidents’ including on-campus picketing by faculty (and off-
campus picketing of both a university trustee and the university attorney)” was protected
under the First Amendment. Jd, at 15. While the Trotman Court held that this conduct was
largely “‘core’ speech squarely encompassed within the First Amendment” while
analyzing plaintiffs’ prior restraint claim, the Court explicitly stated that it was referring to
the embodiment of activity within the legal definition of “speech” as distinguished from
“obscenity,” which is not protected under the First Amendment. 635 F.2d at 225 & n4.
The Trotman Court further specified that “the ‘protection’ afforded by the First
Amendment even to expressions falling within its scope can be diminished since [under
Pickering,| consequences such as dismissal may flow under certain circumstances from the
expression by public employees of what would ordinarily be fully protected speech.” □□
(emphasis added). Indeed, when analyzing the plaintiffs’ retaliation claim, the Trotman
Court explicitly noted that the district court found the conduct at issue to be “disruptive”
under Pickering, though it ultimately remanded the case so that the district court could
apply the correct burden of proof on another ground. Jd. at 230-31. Thus, the conduct at
issue in Trotman does not serve as a minimum benchmark for disruption at the university
level under Pickering.
While Defendants do not assert that any protests or demonstrations resulted from
Plaintiff's speech, a government employer is not required “to allow events to unfold to the
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983); see also
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 472 (“The government need not show the existence of actual
disruption if it establishes that disruption is likely to occur because of the speech.”). “[T]he
Supreme Court has deferred heavily to employers’ reasonable interpretations of employee
speech and predictions of disruption[.|” Fenico v. City of Philadelphia, 70 F Ath 151, 168
(3d Cir, 2023) (noting that the Court has especially deferred to an employer’s reasonable
interpretation where the employer has performed an internal investigation into the matter)
(citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S, 661, 676 (1994)). Based on these principles, the Court
finds that Defendants have made a sufficient showing that disruption to the administration
and faculty of NJIT had occurred—and was likely to continue occurring—in response to
Plaintiff's speech.
Within days of the publication of the NYT Op-Ed and Recording, Belfield testified
that “multitudes of faculty, staff, and students” came to his door or called to complain.
Belfield Dep. 192:7-13. Additionally, Defendants, along with other NJIT faculty and
personnel, received approximately fifty communications from NJIT alumni, parents, and
others both within and outside of the university expressing concern and outrage regarding
Plaintiff's views. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF §j 29; Def.’ Exs, 18-21; Deek Dep. 182:4-
183:4; Bloom Dep, 131:2-11 (“[T]his is very disruptive to what we do here. We’re a very
thinly staffed organization. I’ve got all of these people, it looks like, from just all this last
row of E-mails. We’ve got the department chair. We've got two or three faculty members.
So, yeah, we’re clearly — we’re clearly being disrupted by this. Yeah. And a lot of people
are offering all kind of stuff that this guy is involved in.”); Stern Dep. 180:11-12 (The

1°

phones were ringing off the hook. Other activities were stopped.”). Because of these
complaints, Defendants sent the September 20, 2017 Email to faculty and staff stating that
they would review the matter one day after the publication of the NYT Op-Ed and
Recording. Belfield testified that he sent the message to quell the risk of further disruption.
Belfield Dep. 192:10-13 (“[T]here was such disruption that I felt that there needed to be
some message that was sent to try to bring a little sense of calm to those that were
extraordinarily offended and upset by Jorjani[.]”); see also Pl,’s Ex. 42 (email from
Science, Technology & Society Program Director Maurie Cohen to Humanities
Department Chair Eric Katz on September 20, 2017, “Would it be possible to get any
insight . , . into how this situation is being administratively handled? . . . [B]ased on the
flow of incoming email messages it is starting to turn into a major embarrassment for the
university and that concerns me greatly”); Defs.’ Ex. 18 at NJITESI-000573 (email from
Interim Dean Anthony Schuman to Deek and Bloom on September 21, 2017 forwarding a
complaint from a parent and stating, “I appreciate the delicacy of the matter involving due
process and free speech, but am wondering if you plan to issue any public statement in the
neat future”).
The NJIT Administration had already diverted resources to address the unfolding
situation, and the concentration of complaints it received over such a short time span
suggests that it was reasonable to predict that further disruption was likely to occur. See
Hedgepeth v. Britton, No. 21 CV 3790, 2024 WL 689959, at *2 n.4, *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20,
2024) (noting that “the District was forced to divert resources from the normal operations
of school services to address [plaintiff high schoo! teacher’s] posts” and finding 113 emails
and 76 public comments in one month about plaintiffs speech relevant to Pickering
balancing).
Further, the Court finds Plaintiffs argument that Bloom, Belfield, and the rest of .
the NJIT administration “fostered the disruption” similarly unavailing. P1.’s Mov. Br. 16-
20. No language in the September 20, 2017 Email, which was sent only to faculty and staff,
“signaled” others to “attack” Jorjani. And, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the record does
not reflect a situation comparable to Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 107 Gd Cir. 1983),
where the court discredited disruption caused by several petitions and letters signed by the
plaintiff's co-workers because the plaintiff's supervisor solicited the letters and had
“instigated” at least one of the petitions. While the faculty statements against Jorjani in The
Vector were sent to Bloom, Belfield, and other administrators before they were published,
the authors did not seek approval from the administration before they were published.
Other than acknowledging receipt, the only advice given was by NJIT’s Chief Strategy
Officer, who opined that signatories should sign their respective statements individually so
that they “would not be misinterpreted as a university statement.” PL.’s Ex. 40 at NJITESI-
005161. There is no suggestion that Bloom or Belfield otherwise had any involvement in
the creation of the faculty statements.’

9 Plaintiff argues that Defendants engaged in viewpoint discrimination because Bloom and Belfield testified that they
personally disagreed with Plaintiff's viewpoints, and because Belfield stated that he was not aware of anyone at NHT
tA

(5) Disruption to NJIT’s Institutional Mission and
Plaintiff’s Ability to Perform His Teaching Duties
In addition to disrupting NJIT’s administration and faculty, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs speech interfered with NJIT’s institutional mission of providing the public with
a hostile-free educational environment and hindered Plaintiffs ability to perform his
teaching duties.
“Academic freedom prevents ‘a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom’ fand] fosters
‘that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth.’” Kinda v. Muhlenberg Coll, 621
F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)). Thus, “in cases dealing with academia, the standard applied in evaluating the
employer’s justification should be the one applicable to the rights of teachers and students
‘in light of the special characteristics of the school environment|.]’” Trotman, 635 F.2d at
230 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). Plaintiff asserts that because universities do not
assume the same “custodial and tutelary” role of K-12 public schools, NJIT has “no
countervailing interest whatsoever in sparing delicate ears from the burden of confronting
ideas they find alarming.” Pl.’s Mov. Br. 14-15.
While “public universities are intended to function as marketplaces of ideas” and
have pedagogical and custodial goals that differ from K-12 public schools, McCauley v.
Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2010), schools at the university
level still maintain a well-recognized interest in “fostering a collegial educational
environment.” Gruber v. Tennessee Tech Bd. of Trustees, No. 22-6106, 2024 WL 3051196,
at *3 (6th Cir. May 16, 2024) (quoting Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[A] university has an interest in fostering a collegial educational environment while
doing everything within its power to maintain its reputation in the academic community
both on campus and around the nation.”),; aecord Bonnell vy. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823
(6th Cir, 2001) (“[C]olleges and universities are legally required to maintain a hostile-free _
learning environment and must strive to create policies which serve that purpose.”). Thus,
even though “a professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are
paramount in the academic setting, they are not absolute to the point of compromising a
student’s right to {earn in a hostile-free environment.” Bonnell, 241 F 3d at 823-24.

In the NYT Op-Ed and Recording, Plaintiff is first shown speaking at a conference
calling “universal human rights” an “ill-conceived and bankrupt” socio-political ideology.
Singal, supra at Section LA. Plaintiff is then shown in the midst of his conversation with

who approved of Plaintiff's speech and political associations. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mov. Br. 8. The fact that the individual
defendants—and others at NJIT—personally disapproved of Plaintiff's speech does not conclusively give rise to
viewpoint discrimination, which is notably not a cause of action alleged in this case. Further, the individual defendants’
personal beliefs “do[} not diminish the evidence in the record that external complaints about [Plaintiff's] speech
amounted to significant disruption.” Hedgepeth, 2024 WL 689959, at *10,

Hellberg, where he is discussing the disintegration of the present order and the need to
create a “revolutionary state” before stating that “it’s going to end” with the expulsion of
migrants and citizens who are primarily of Muslim descent, concentration camps, and war
“at the cost of a few hundred million people.” /d. Plaintiff then continues, “We will have a
Europe, in 2050 where the banknotes have Adolf Hitler, Napolean Bonaparte, Alexander
the Great. And Hitler will be seen like that: like Napolean, like Alexander; not like some
weird monster, who is unique in his own category. No, he’s just going to be seen as a great
European leader.” P1.’s Resp. to Defs.’? SMF { 8.
A professor that calls universal human rights “ill-conceived and bankrupt” and
predicts that Muslims will be expelled and put in concentration camps while Hitler is □
praised as a “great European leader”—regardless of the exact context of these statements—
certainly presents a level of hostility that is likely to disrupt NJIT’s mission of fostering a
collegial pedagogical environment.!° See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 676-77
(plurality opinion) (ooking to government employer’s reasonable understanding of speech
at issue, even where employer’s understanding is inaccurate). The complaints sent to NJIT
following the publication of the NYT Op-Ed and Recording reflect a concern about NJIT’s
ability to pursue its mission of providing a collegial educational environment to its diverse
student population with Plaintiff on the faculty. See Defs.’ Ex. 18 at NJITESI-004675
(“{Plaintiff’s] public statements and his other employment are in direct conflict with the
university’s principles, and he is teaching humanities and philosophy.”); Defs.’ Ex. 19 at
NJITESI-000573 (“It is deeply troubling to find someone with such heinous views in a
school of young people, especially NJIT which embraces people of all nationalities and
races. His views are not just a political viewpoint, he clearly states his belief in the
principles and actions of Hitler, advocating genocide of Jews and Muslims.”); Defs.’ Ex.
21 at NJITESI-000575 (“As an NJIT alumni and a member of at least one group of human
beings people like Mr, Jorjani would see gassed, I am horrified and embarrassed by my
alma mater’s association with him. The views he espouses are diametrically opposed to the
diverse environment NJIT has become in the years since I have been there, I urge you to
cut ties with him as quickly as possible. He is a stain on our university’s marvelous
reputation.”).
The record also shows that NJIT students were impacted by Plaintiffs speech.
Plaintiff is quoted in an interview with The Star-Ledger, a New Jersey newspaper, stating
that “I like teaching and I had a great rapport with my students. ... The worst thing in this
entire episode has been the huge change in attitude toward me on the part of my students.”
Defs.’ Ex. 12 (omission in original). The news article further quotes Plaintiff stating that
during one of his classes after the NYT Op-Ed was published, “it looked like the students
had been gut-punched. It was awful.” Jd. Additionally, Defendants testified that they

(0 ‘To the extent Plaintiff argues that the NYT Recording was edited to misconstrue his statements, P1.’s Opp. Br. 3-4,
it is clear to this Court that minutes later in the unedited recording of the conversation, Plaintiff states that he himself
wanted a Europe that featured Hitler on a banknote. Pl,’s Ex. 1 at 1:43:27 (emphasis added),

received complaints from students. See Bloom Dep. 172:2-5 (“The form of the disruption
was students first. There are a number of them that saw or read or observed the New York
Times article.”); Belfield Dep. 182:10-13 (‘Students were complaining about it. Faculty
were complaining about it. Staff were complaining about it. It was -- those type of
comments and views ate... not part of a university community.”); 193:6-7 (disruption
took the form of “[a]ngry phone calls, angry visits to my office. Students being very
concerned,”); 195:16-25 (disruption included disruption to the “students[’] ability to learn
because they were upset”).
Further, circuit courts have recognized the interest of government employers—
including universities——in preventing “disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insuiting”
employee speech. See Mitchell v. Hillsborough Cnty., 468 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Lith Cir.
2006); see also Gruber v. Tennessee Tech Bd. of Trustees, No. 22-6106, 2024 WL
3051196, at *3 (6th Cir. May 16, 2024), Plaintiff's post on AltRight.com entitled “Against
Perennial Philosophy” fails to uphold NJIT’s interest in providing a non-denigrating
environment and “erode[s] the necessary trust and respect between [Plaintiff] and [his]
students.” Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 474 (d Cir. 2015). In support
of his unsupported statement that only Aryan people have the genetic ability for top-level
philosophic thought, Plaintiff explains that African people have a lower average IQ than
white people not due to “education or social conditioning, but [due to] different genetic
inheritances from extinct Hominid species.”!'! Defy.’ Ex. 7 at 9. A page later, Plaintiff
advocates for the use of “embryo selection and genetic engineering” to “restore the pre-
Arab and pre-Mongol genetic character of the majority of the Iranian population within
only one or two generations” to potentially “Make Iran Great Again.” Jd. at 10.
Defendants testified that there was a reasonable concern that, particularly due to
NJIT’s diverse student body, Plaintiff's speech flatly demeaned the intelligence of his
students by stating that a person’s ability to succeed as a philosophical thinker—ie.,
succeed in the very subject Plaintiff was hired to teach—is pre-determined based on the
person’s race and background. See Deek Dep. 74:3-11. C[It] [c]oncerned me that we have
these students, precisely the students that Dr. Jorjani is talking about. He is teaching them.
He’s going to walk into that classroom. He’s going to see the Africans, he’s going fo see
the Arly]ans, he’s going to meet—he’s going to see the people in between. He’s going to

" The Court takes notice of Plaintiff's repeated citations to the Brief for Appellants submitted by Thurgood Marshall,
et al., in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S, 294 (1955), See Pl’s Moy, Br, 22; PL’s Opp, Br, 8; PL.’s Reply Br,
4, Plaintiff invokes the scientific report appended to the brief in support of his assertion that “Thurgood Marshall and
Plaintiff Jorjani are in accord [that] there are in fact measurable differences in IQ between whites and blacks.” PI.’s
Opp. Br. 8. The Court finds that Plaintiffs arguments grossly mischaracterize the report’s findings in a misguided
attempt to provide legitimacy to Plaintiff's speech in “Against Perennial Philosophy.” Additionally, the cited report
concludes “that segregation, prejudices and discriminations, and their social concomitants potentially damage the
personality of all children—the children of the majority group in a somewhat different way than the more obviously
damaged children of the minority group.” Appendix to Brief for Appellants at *4, *12, Brown v. Board of Education,
1952 WL 47265 (1952). Thus, the report further supports the notion that prejudice disrupts an educational institution’s
ability to provide an effective educational environment,

be grading their work. Yes. Absolutely. It did... concern me.””); Bloom Dep. 56:1-4 (“We
have a context of [a] university that is extremely diverse. We do not put students in the
classroom to be denigrated, be insulted by extremes[.]”); Belfield Dep. 13:3-4 (“—TO]ur
primary mission is to educate students.”). While Plaintiff argues that his speech did not
refer to anyone at NJIT, Plaintiff's Opp. Br. 3, 5, his speech attacks wide swaths of people
that necessarily include individuals within NJIT’s student body. See Munroe, 805 F.3d at
474 “[I]nvective directed against the very persons that the governmental agency is meant
to serve could be expected to have serious consequences for the performance of the
speaker’s duties and the agency’s regular operations.”); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483
378, 390-91 (1987) (noting that the “burden of caution employees bear with respect
to the words they speak” will vary in part based on the extent of authority, public
accountability, and public contact their role entails); ef Pickering v. Bd. of Ed, 391 U.S.
563, 569-70 (1968) (considering that the appellant teacher’s statements were “in no way
directed towards any person with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the
course of his daily work as a teacher”),
Plaintiff refutes the proposition that students were negatively impacted by his
speech by citing to an email that one of his students sent to Eric Katz, Chair of NJIT’s
Humanities Department, on September 26, 2017. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mov. Br. at 2; Pl.’s Opp.
Br, at 11. In the email, the student writes in support of Plaintiff, and, purporting to speak
for the opinions of other unnamed students in Plaintiff's classes, states that they
“collectively feel that an injustice is being carried out against [their] professor.” Pl.’s Ex.
48, The student writes in part about the positive impact that Plaintiff has had on his studies
and maintains that based on how Plaintiff explains concepts in class, the NYT Op-Ed and
Recording took his speech out of context. /d. Plaintiff also notes that Defendants Belfield
and Deek testified that they believed that Plaintiff was popular with a number of his
students. Belfield Dep, 252:19-22; Deek Dep. 170:6-7. However, one student’s email in
support of Plaintiff, along with the general proposition that some students did in fact like
his classes, does not negate the disruption that his speech nonetheless caused. See
Hedgepeth v. Britton, No. 21 CV 3790, 2024 WL 689959, at *2 n.4 (N.D. Ul. Feb. 20,
2024). It was reasonable to believe that, had Plaintiff continued to teach, he would have
caused far greater disruption as additional students registered for his classes. See Gruber,
2024 WL 3051196, at *3 “[E]vidence of widespread destruction is not necessary: it was
reasonable for [the university’s Provost and Vice President] to believe that, had the flyers
remained posted, they could have caused far greater disruption.”).
Contrary to his assertions, Plaintiff's speech did not merely cause offense-—it
disrupted (and was likely to further disrupt) NJIT’s administration, interfered with NJIT’s
mission to efficiently provide a hostile-free learning environment for its students, and
impeded Plaintiff's ability to effectively perform his teaching duties. See Reges v. Cauce,
No, 2:22-CV-00964, 2024 WL 2140888, at *24 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2024) (“While
. offense alone does not amount to a legitimate interest to justify limiting speech, mitigating
interference with students’ studies and ability to learn can be such an interest.”). Weighing

the parties’ interests pursuant to the Pickering balancing test, the Court finds that
Defendants’ interest in mitigating the disruption caused by Plaintiff’s speech in the NYT -
Op-Ed and Recording as well as his online post entitled Against Perennial Philosophy
sufficiently outweighs Plaintiffs interest in its expression. Thus, Plaintiff's speech does
not merit protection under the First Amendment, and Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
In light of this finding, the Court does not reach the remaining two elements of a
First Amendment Retaliation claim, namely whether Plaintiff's speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory actions against him and whether Plaintiff would
have been terminated even if his speech had not occurred. The parties’ remaining
arguinents, including those relating to qualified immunity and damages, also need not be
addressed.
Vv. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion, ECF No. 118, is DENIED and
Defendants’ motion, ECF No, 180, is GRANTED. An appropriate Order shall follow.

□

WI M J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: July Xf, 2024

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656362. Public record. Not legal advice.