# FISHER v. COUNTY OF MERCER

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656358

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656358

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the second type of Monell claim involves failures to train, supervise, or discipline

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GREGORY FISHER, Civil Action No. 23-20947 (GC-JBD)
Plaintiff, □
OPINION

COUNTY OF MERCER, :
Defendants. :

CASTNER, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants County
of Mercer and Warden Charles Ellis (together, “County Defendants”). (ECF No. 4.) The County
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff Gregory Fisher’s Complaint, which raises claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (““NJCRA”). For the reasons explained in this
Opinion, the motion to dismiss the § 1983 and NJCRA claims against the County Defendants is
GRANTED. The Court dismisses the Complaint without prejudice and provides Plaintiff with
leave to submit an amended complaint within 45 days.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. The Complaint
Plaintiff's Complaint arises from alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional
rights that occurred at Mercer County Correctional Center (““MCCC”) in July and August 2022,
after Plaintiff was transferred to MCCC from Camden County Correctional Facility (““CCCF’).
(See Generally, Complaint.)

Count One is asserted against Warden Ellis in his official capacity. (See Complaint
Heading at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2022, he was examined by a Nurse Practitioner,
Nancy Gordon, who is an employee of C.F.G. Health Systems, LLC, and was responsible for
Plaintiff's health care. (Complaint at J§ 9-11.) Gordon noted in Plaintiff's chart that he had
chronic back pain, consisting of a herniated nucleus pulpous, confirmed by MRI, chronic knee
pain as a result of four knee surgeries, and was taking medications. (/d. at { 12.) Also on July 12,
Gordon authorized back and knee braces for Plaintiff to wear and noted in his chart that “Plaintiffs
workup for confirmation of malignancy concerning lesions on his thyroid, liver[,] and lung w[ere]
in process.” (Id. at ff 13-14.) The malignancy workup started at the CCCF medical department.!
(Id. at J 15.) On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff received his back brace and knee brace. (ld. at J 17.)
“Prior to July 31, 2022, Plaintiff was allowed to sleep on two mattresses to get relief from
his back pain[,]” but on that date “one of the two mattresses which Plaintiff used to sleep on was
taken away by order of Lieutenant Fioranti[,]” an employee of the County of Mercer. (Id. at Jf
18-21.)
On July 25, 2022, and August 1, 2022, Plaintiff submitted medical slips to the Medical
Department. (Ud. at {J 22-23.) In the medical slips, Plaintiff “requested treatment for serious
medical need(s),” but these medical slips “were ignored” by the Medical Department. (/d. at JJ
24-25.) On August 7 and 8, 2022, an “outside caller made phone calls to the Medical Department
on Plaintiffs behalf’ and requested “immediate treatment for serious medical need(s).” (Jd. at □□□
26-28.) These outside calls were also ignored by the Medical Department. (Id. at { 29.)

I Plaintiff was transported to Cooper Hospital on July 11, 2022, and received an MRI on his
liver. (d. at J 16.)

About a day later, on August 9 or 10, 2022, Plaintiff was examined by Gordon, and she
“noted on the chart that Plaintiff had positive complaints of dizziness, pain, and overall not feeling
well”? and also noted that Plaintiff was requesting information on the status of his treatment. (Jd.
at 30-32.) On August 10, 2022, Gordon “admitted to Plaintiff that he would not be receiving
any further treatment from the [MCCC] medical department as retaliation for filing a lawsuit
against C.F.G. and [CCCF].” (Ud. at { 33.) On the same date, Gordon also “admitted to Plaintiff
that the retaliation he was experiencing was as the result of a policy of C.F.G. and the [MCCC] to
deny him any further treatment for his serious medical need(s).” (/d. at J 34.) Gordon told Plaintiff
“her hands were tied” and there was nothing she could do to get him adequate treatment for his
serious medical needs. (/d. at { 35.)
Gordon also admitted to Plaintiff that his second mattress was taken away by officers as
retaliation for filing a lawsuit against C.F.G. and CCCF. (/d. at 36.) Gordon further admitted
that the retaliation Plaintiff was experiencing resulted from a “policy of the [MCCC] to deny him
any further relief for his serious back condition.” (/d. at { 37.) Gordon also allegedly “admitted
to Plaintiff that her hands were tied and there was nothing she could do to order him a second
mattress to get relief for his serious medical condition.” (/d. at J 38.) Plaintiff alleges that he was
denied further medical treatment/relief for his serious medical needs until he was transferred out
of MCCC on or about August 16, 2022. (Id. at | 39.)
According to the Complaint, “[t]he individual Defendant WARDEN CHARLES ELLIS,
promulgated a policy denying Plaintiff any further treatment for his serious medical needs for the
duration of Plaintiffs stay in MCCC[,]’” and “the policy to deny Plaintiff any further treatment for

2 Plaintiff does not provide facts connecting these sympienn: to the specific medical
conditions he describes in the complaint.

his serious medical needs was a form of punishment.” (/d. at § 40-41.) This policy to deny
Plaintiff further treatment for his serious medical needs was allegedly executed by the employees
of C.F.G. from July 25, 2022, to August 16, 2022, and violated his rights under the Due Process
Clause. (Id. at J 42-43.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Ellis “promulgated a policy denying Plaintiff a second mattress
to get any further relief from his serious back condition” and that “the policy ... was a form of
punishment.” (d. at J{ 44-45.) The policy of denying Plaintiff a second mattress was allegedly
“executed under the command of Lieutenant Fioranti[.]” (d. at | 46.) Plaintiff contends that the
policy of denying Plaintiff a second mattress violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. □□□□
at J 47.)
In Count Two of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a Monell’ claim and NJCRA claim against
the County of Mercer and alleges that Warden Ellis “was a high-enough-ranking public official so
that the policies he promulgated could be said to be the policies promulgated by Defendant
COUNTY OF MERCER.” (/d. at § 50.) Plaintiff claims that Ellis’ policies to 1) deny Plaintiff
further treatment for his serious medical needs and 2) deny Plaintiff a second mattress for his
serious back condition were also “policies promulgated by the County of Mercer.” (/d. at {J 51-
52.)
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 and the
NJCRA against Warden Ellis in his official capacity. (See Complaint Heading at 10.) Plaintiff
alleges that he engaged in protected activity by filing and serving a complaint in Civil Action No.
21-13212 (RBK-EAP) against the County of Camden and C.F.G. (Ud. at { 55.) Plaintiff further
alleges that Ellis “came to know of this protected activity” and promulgated policies “to deny

a See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Plaintiff any further treatment for his serious medical needs” and “deny Plaintiff a second mattress
to get further relief for his serious back condition.” (Ud. at J] 55-58.) Plaintiff alleges that these
two policies “were caused by [Ellis’] knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected activity” and were done
in retaliation for Plaintiffs exercise of his right to file and serve Civil Action No. 21-13212. □□□□
at 59-62.) Plaintiff also alleges that Ellis’ retaliatory policies violate Plaintiffs federal and state
constitutional rights of “free exercise/petition/access to [the] courts.” (/d. at J 63.)
In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges a Monell and NJCRA claim against the County of Mercer.
Plaintiff alleges that Ellis’ policies to deny Plaintiff medical treatment and a second mattress in
retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of a lawsuit were also policies of the County of Mercer, “caused by
the County’s knowledge of Plaintiff's protected activities.” Ud. at [{] 66-67.) Plaintiff further
alleges that these policies, which were acts of retaliation by Ellis, were also acts of retaliation by
the County of Mercer, for Plaintiffs filing of Civil Action No. 21-13212. (ld. at J§ 68-69.)
Plaintiff contends that the County of Mercer’s retaliation against Plaintiff violates his federal and
state constitutional rights to “free expression/petition/access to [the] courts.” (/d. at J 70.)
In Count Five of the Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim for denial of access to the Courts
against Defendant Ellis in his official capacity. (See Complaint Heading at 13.) Plaintiff alleges
that when he was transferred from MCCC to Cooper Hospital to Burlington County Detention
Center (“BCDC”) on August 16-18, 2022, Ellis “formulated a policy not to transfer Plaintiff’s
legal work, legal documents, and other property to [BCDC].” (/d. at J] 73-74.) Ellis allegedly did
so “deliberately to deprive Plaintiff of their use.” (/d. at J 74.) Plaintiff complained to the
transporting officer that he was being transferred without his legal work, legal documents, and
other property, and the officer admitted to Plaintiff that “he was right to complain” about this issue.
(Id. at {| 75-76.) The transporting officer told him “it was safe to say that Plaintiff was pissing off

someone at [MCCC], and withholding his legal work, legal documents, and other property was
retaliation on the part of MCCC.” (Ud. at §77.) Upon arrival at BCDC, Officer Fulton “admitted”
that Plaintiff's arrival without any property was “unheard of” and also stated that Plaintiff must
have “pissed someone off’ at MCCC because he should have been accompanied by “at least his
legal documents, per policy.” (Jd. at { 78.) Officials at BCDC, Plaintiff’s family members, and
Plaintiff’ s criminal attorney “reached out to MCCC numerous times about sending Plaintiff’ s legal
work, legal documents, and other property to BCDC, all to no avail.” (Id. at ¢ 79.) On September
15, 2022, Plaintiff's attorney in this civil action, Peter Kober, Esq. (“Mr. Kober’’), spoke with
Warden Ellis on the phone and he promised he would look for Plaintiffs property; Mr. Kober also
submitted an authorization to permit Plaintiffs property to be sent to his law office, as requested
by Ellis, but nothing came of this conversation. (/d. at J 80.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a result of not being in possession of his legal work, legal
documents, and other property, Plaintiff was unable to assist his attorney in preparing an adequate
defense to the criminal charge(s) pending against him.” (/d. at [J 81-82.)
In Count Six, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim under § 1983 and the NJCRA arising from
these same facts and alleges that
[t]he policy promulgated by Defendant WARDEN CHARLES
ELLIS to withhold Plaintiff's legal work, legal documents, and
other property was also the policy promulgated by Defendant
COUNTY OF MERCER, and, as such it was a policy which
infringed on Plaintiffs right of access to the courts, to assist legal
counsel and participate in his own defense to criminal charges
pending against him[.]
(Id. at J 87-88.)
In Count Seven, Plaintiff brings § 1983 and NJCRA claims against Warden Ellis in his
official capacity (see Complaint Heading at 16) and alleges that Ellis knew about Plaintiff’ s lawsuit
and created the policy to withhold Plaintiff's legal work, legal documents, and other property in

retaliation for Plaintiff's filing and serving of that action. (Complaint at 17; id. at J§f 91-92.)
Plaintiff also alleges that retaliation for filing a lawsuit is a violation of Plaintiffs federal and state
constitutional rights. (/d. at J 93.)
In Count Eight, Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against the County of Mercer, and alleges
that Ellis’ policy of withholding Plaintiffs legal work in retaliation for his filing and serving of
his federal lawsuit was also a policy of the County of Mercer, which had knowledge of Plaintiff’ s
protected activity, i.e., the filing and serving of Plaintiff's lawsuit. (Ud. at □□ 93-98.)
b. Procedural History
Plaintiff's counsel originally filed Plaintiff's Complaint in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Mercer County, on August 16, 2023. (ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal at 1-2.) The County
Defendants were served on August 31, 2023. (Id. at 2.) On November 29, 2023, the County
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff filed an opposition brief
through counsel. (ECF No. 9.) On January 10, 2024, County Defendants filed their reply brief,
and Plaintiff's counsel filed a sur-reply brief on January 16, 2024, after receiving the Court’s
permission. (ECF Nos. 10-13.) The matter is fully briefed and ready for a decision.
IL. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts “accept the factual allegations in
the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and assess whether
the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting
Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Scranton, 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2020)). “A claim is
facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”” Clark v. Coupe, 55

F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372
(3d Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, courts “disregard legal
conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported only by mere
conclusory statements.” Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d
892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021)). A defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion bears the burden of
“showing that a complaint fails to state a claim.” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab.
Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (Gd Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349
(3d Cir. 2016)).
I. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19834 and the NJCRA,> and
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state claims for relief against Warden Ellis in his individual
capacity, that Warden Ellis is entitled to qualified immunity, and that Plaintiff fails to state a
Monell claim against the County of Mercer. (See ECF No. 4-3 at 19-35.) Based on the Court’s
review of Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff has sued Warden Ellis in his official capacity only.® (See
Complaint Headings for Counts One, Three, Five, and Seven.) When a plaintiff names a
government official in his individual or personal capacity, the plaintiff is seeking “to impose

= “To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a
right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States committed by a person acting
under the color of state law.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580—
81 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
5 The NJCRA protects federal rights and substantive rights under New Jersey’s Constitution.
See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 97 (2014) (“Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of
federal rights, whereas N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 applies not only to federal rights but also to
substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.”). The NJCRA is typically
treated as the state court analog to § 1983, and the Court considers the claims together.
6 Plaintiff also lists John/Jane Does 1-10 in the caption, but he does not provide any facts
about these Defendants.

personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “Official-capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”
Id. at 165-66 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55). Therefore, “an official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity” and “‘the real party in interest is
the entity.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff, who has counsel, pleads Counts One, Three, Five, and Seven against Ellis
in his official capacity only. For that reason, the Court views these claims, as well as Counts Two,
Four, Six, and Eight, as arising under Monell and does not read the Complaint to allege any § 1983
or NJCRA claims against Ellis in his individual capacity. Therefore, the Court does not address
Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Warden Ellis in his
individual capacity or that Ellis is entitled to qualified immunity, which is only available to officers
in individual capacity suits.’ See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (“The principles
of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes
that his or her conduct complies with the law.”); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985)
(doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting and sued in their individual capacities),

i The Court notes, however, that defendants may be sued in their individual capacities as
policymakers “if it is shown that such defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, custom, or practice which directly caused [the]
constitutional harm.’” A.M. ex rel. JM.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989) )
Moreover, direct supervisory liability against the individual may be based on his or her
participation in the constitutional violation and does not require any proof of official policy or
custom as the “moving force,” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (quoting Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)), behind the conduct. Plaintiff’s counsel appears to
acknowledge that Warden Ellis is sued in his official capacity only in Counts I, II, V and VII. (See
ECE No. 13, Pl. Sur Reply at 7.) If, however, Plaintiff intended to sue Ellis in his individual or
personal capacity as a supervisor, he is free to submit an amended complaint that sets forth those
facts and claims.

Instead, the Court addresses Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff fails to state a Monell
claim against the County of Mercer, and, by extension, against Warden Ellis in his official
capacity. Under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory,
i.é., solely because it employs a tortfeasor; instead, “a city is only liable under § 1983 for
constitutional violations that are caused by its official policies and customs.”* Porter v. City of
Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); see also Baloga
v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 761 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a municipality is only
liable for a policy or custom promulgated by an actor with final decision-making authority). “A
policy need not be passed by a legislative body, or even be in writing, to constitute an official
policy for the purposes of § 1983. A pertinent decision by an official with final decision-making
authority on the subject constitutes an official policy for purposes of Monell liability. See Porter,
975 F.3d at 383 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)) (“Municipal
liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy
with respect to the subject matter in question.’’).
The “official policy” requirement was intended to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible. Monell reasoned that
recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly
8 A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two general ways. See Estate of
Roman vy. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798-99 (3d Cir. 2019). A plaintiff may allege that an
unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, id. at 798 (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694), or that his injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the
municipality that “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice,” see id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Forrest
v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the second type of Monell claim involves
failures to train, supervise, or discipline). Plaintiffs allegations involve the first type of Monell
liability.

10

speaking, acts “of the municipality’—that is, acts which the
municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.
Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80. Thus, “if the conduct was simply that of an individual employee
who was not acting pursuant to a policy or custom, that conduct cannot give rise to municipal
liability under Monell.” Porter, 975 F.3d at 383.
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Ellis promulgated unconstitutional “policies” directed solely
at him in retaliation for Plaintiffs filing of a prior federal lawsuit. The parties dispute whether
this type of decision can ever state a claim under Monell. A Monell claim can involve a single
decision or isolated incidents, see Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (An unconstitutional governmental
policy may “‘be inferred from a single decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting
policy in that area of the government’s business.”), and “[pJolicy is made when a decisionmaker
possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an
official proclamation, policy, or edict.” G.S. v. Penn-Trafford School District, 2023 WL 4486667,
at *3 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). At the
pleading stage, “a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is
responsible for the action.” See id. (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480
(3d Cir. 1990)). In turn, when “deciding who has policymaking responsibility, ‘a court must
determine which official has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action,’
a question that is answered by looking to state law.” Andrews, 895 F.3d at 1481; Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483 (‘[W]hether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.”).
Moreover, “[t]he fact that a particular official . . . has discretion in the exercise of particular
functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that
discretion.” Porter, 975 F.3d at 385 (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83). Instead, “[t]he official

11

must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before
the municipality can be held liable.” Jd.
At issue then is whether Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a Monell claim based on Ellis’ alleged
promulgation of retaliatory policies against him. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Warden Ellis is
“responsible for the operations of’ MCCC and promulgated policies to deny Plaintiff medical care,
remove a second mattress from his cell, and withhold Plaintiffs legal papers, legal documents,
and other property. According to the Complaint, Ellis allegedly found out about a federal lawsuit
Plaintiff filed in 2021 against C.F.G. and CCCF and created these policies to retaliate against
Plaintiff for his protected activity. Although Plaintiff repeatedly characterizes Warden Ellis’
alleged misconduct as “policies,” he fails to allege sufficient facts showing that Ellis was a
decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish these alleged policies on behalf of the County
of Mercer. That is, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts showing that Ellis had any
policymaking authority regarding an inmate’s medical care or property. Nor does he provide any
facts showing that New Jersey law provides the Warden with final policymaking authority in these
areas. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that Ellis “was a high-enough-ranking public official so
that policies that he promulgated could be said to be the policies promulgated by [the County of
Mercer].” (See Complaint at { 50.) These allegations do not state a plausible claim under Monell
because, accepting them as true, it is just as plausible that Ellis acted beyond the scope of his
employment when he made these decisions, which would not give rise to municipal liability. The
Court also credits Plaintiff's allegations that Gordon told him that he was being denied medical
care and a second mattress due to a policy at MCCC, but those facts do not suggest that Ellis had
any authority to create policies about Plaintiff's medical care on behalf of Mercer County. And
without sufficient facts from which the Court can infer that Warden Ellis has final policymaking

12

authority in the relevant areas, Plaintiff's claims against the County of Mercer rely on an
impermissible theory of respondeat superior.
Plaintiff also contends that the issue of whether Warden Ellis is a final policymaker is a
matter for discovery, but under Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, it is a legal question that is governed
by state law. The Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim must plead at least
some facts regarding this “key element.” See Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 135 n.11
(3d. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the issue of whether a defendant is a final policymaker is ultimately
a legal rather than a factual question but “that does not relieve her of the obligation to plead in
some fashion that he had final policy making authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim’).
For these reasons, the Court grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss? and provides
Plaintiff with leave to amend ifhe can cure the deficiencies in his Monell claims against the County
of Mercer and Warden Ellis or otherwise clarify his claims for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismisses without
prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Monell. Plaintiff may
submit an amended complaint within 45 days to the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his
federal claims for relief.'° An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: July 31, 2024 f □□
ORGETTE eeu.
United States District Judge
Because the Court grants the motion to dismiss the Complaint against the County of Mercer
and Warden Ellis in his official capacity for failure to plead the elements of a Monell claim, it need
not address County Defendants’ other arguments. If Plaintiff elects to submit an amended
complaint, he should include sufficient facts to meet the federal pleading standards, as set forth
above in Section IJ, for each claim for relief.
10 The request to stay discovery is denied as moot considering the dismissal of the Complaint.
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656358. Public record. Not legal advice.