# HOLDREN v. ADMINISTRATOR, NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 7, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656003

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 7, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CARL J. HOLDREN,
Petitioner,
Civil Action No. 22-825 (MAS)
V.
OPINION
ADMINISTRATOR, NEW JERSEY STATE
PRISON, ef ai.,
Respondents.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Following an order to answer, Respondents
filed a response to the amended petition (ECF No. 13), to which Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 24).
For the following reasons, this Court will deny the petition, and will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability.
I. BACKGROUND
In its opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal, the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, summarized the factual background of Petitioner’s conviction as
follows:
In November and December 2006, Detective Sergeant Jeffrey Burke
of the NJSP was the lead detective in Operation Dawg Pound.
NJSP’s Street Gang Unit North had been conducting electronic
surveillance for several months of Anthony Carter OG, or “Original
Gangster,” of the Sex Money Murder (SMM) set of the United
Bloods Nation (Bloods) in New Jersey. Burke, who was qualified
as an expert in gang terminology, gang culture and gang dynamics,

explained that a set is “a subgroup that falls underneath the Bloods”
street gang. The two other top sets under the Bloods umbrella were:
G-Shine and the Brims. In the end of 2006, SMM “was at war or
beefing with G-Shine and Brims.”
Burke explained the hierarchy of the Bloods street gang. The
highest ranking member of a Bloods set is an “OG.” Below that
there are generals ranking from five star to one star, captain,
lieutenant, sergeant and the lowest rank, “foot soldiers.”
During the course of the investigation, a person known as “SB”
showed up on a number of Carter’s calls. Following his review of
those calls, Burke surmised that SB, or “Soldier Boy,” had a
leadership role with SMM in Monmouth and Ocean counties. SB
was identified as defendant Valdo Thompson. An order was
obtained that authorized electronic surveillance of Thompson’s
phone on November 22, 2006. Burke was able to determine that
Thompson was a four star general, and [Petitioner] Carl Holdren,
also known as “Killa,” was a lieutenant or LT.
At approximately midnight on November 22, 2006, Long Branch
Police Department (LBPD) dispatched officers to investigate 911
reports that two men had been shot inside a residence on
Hendrickson Avenue. Two victims, Michael Montgomery, a
member of the Brims, and Keith Logan, a member of G-Shine, were
found at the scene. Logan survived the shooting; Montgomery did
not.
The NJSP identified defendants as suspects in the
Montgomery/Logan shooting from calls intercepted before and after
the shooting. Two days before the shooting, Quemere McClendon,
an SMM member known as “Tragedy” or “Trag,” called Carter to
tell him that G-Shine members “tried to sleepwalk” him, which □□ .
meant they were trying to kill or seriously hurt him. McClendon
asked for Carter’s permission to retaliate and Carter gave him the go
ahead. On November 22, 2006, the day of the shooting, Thompson
called Carter to report the wrong person was killed and the Brims
knew that SMM was responsible.
On December 28, 2006, Michael Stallworth, a Brims member
known as “Lock,” kidnapped and assaulted an SMM member named
“Slash” in retaliation for Montgomery’s murder. Stallworth called
Thompson, admitted he kidnapped Slash and threatened additional
violence.
As documented in the intercepted calls, Thompson directed that
Stallworth be shot, and Holdren agreed to shoot him. Thompson

laid out a plan for the killing. He ordered Zachery Butts, another
SMM member, to obtain a rental car and deliver a gun to Holdren
for the purpose of Killing Stallworth. Butts obtained a rental car, a
2006 Mitsubishi Galant, and the gun. The plan was foiled when the
rental car was stopped for speeding by Lakewood Police and, acting
on information received from NJSP, officers searched the car and
recovered the gun.
[Petitioner was] charged [along with others] . . . with first-degree
racketeering . . . (count one); first-degree conspiracy to murder
Logan .. . (count two); three counts of second degree possession of
a weapon for an unlawful purpose ... (counts three, five and
twenty); first-degree attempted murder of Logan . . . (count four);
first-degree purposeful or knowing murder of Montgomery . . .
(count six); first-degree conspiracy to murder Stallworth (count
nineteen); and first-degree attempted murder of Stallworth...
(count twenty-one). [Petitioner was not charged in counts ten
through seventeen of the indictment. |
In addition, [Petitioner] was charged with second degree conspiracy
to commit armed robbery . . . (count seven), an additional count of
second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose...
(count eight) and first-degree armed robbery .. . (count nine).
[Petitioner] was convicted by a jury on counts one through six,
nineteen, twenty and twenty-one. He was found not guilty on counts
seven, eight, and nine.
(ECF No. 14-9 at 2-6.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim
presented in his petition based upon the record that was before the state court. See Eley vy. Erickson,
712 F.3d 837, 846-47 (3d Cir. 2013). Under the statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (“‘AEDPA”), district courts are required to give

great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559
U.S. 766, 772-73 (2010).
Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court shall
not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 ULS.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly
expressed in “only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta[,]” of the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015). “When reviewing state criminal
convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by
overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.”
Id. Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts,
“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the]
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
I. DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner’s Severance Claim
In his first claim, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever
the counts of the indictment related to the attempted murder of Stallworth from the remaining
RICO-related counts, notwithstanding their relatedness to the RICO scheme. The Appellate
Division rejected this claim on direct appeal, finding that the counts were properly joined together

under state law as the counts were all clearly related and found no clear evidence of prejudice to
Petitioner from the joining of the claims for trial as a result.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself, violate the
Constitution. Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it
results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
United States y. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). While “an important element of a fair trial
is that a jury consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or
innocence, . . . a fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence.”
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 532, 540 (1993). Mere allegations of prejudice or assertions that
a defendant may have faired better at trial are insufficient to require counts be severed, and an
actual showing of prejudice is instead required. United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400
(3d Cir. 1981).
In Petitioner’s case, the conspiracy to murder and attempted murder counts related to the
scheme to kill Stallworth were directly alleged, and ultimately found by the jury to have been, part
of the underlying RICO scheme of the SMM set, and thus the evidence of that scheme would have
been relevant and admissible in the RICO trial even if the charges themselves were severed.
Petitioner, therefore, was not prejudiced by these related charges being heard together by the same
jury. As there was no prejudice to Petitioner from the joinder of the charges, and as it is clear in
any event that the joinder of these charges did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair,
the Court finds that Petitioner’s severance related claims are without merit and fail to set forth a
basis for finding a Due Process violation. Petitioner’s severance related claims thus provide no
basis for habeas relief.

B. Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment Claims
Petitioner next asserts that the state courts improperly denied his motion to suppress
evidence seized from the rented Mitsubishi Gallant, and that the failure to suppress that evidence
amounts to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
however, the Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment claims were not cognizable in habeas
petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 where a petitioner had been accorded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his suppression claims in the state courts. Jd. at 494. Thus, so long as a
habeas petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on his Fourth Amendment challenge
in state court, he may not re-raise those claims in a habeas petition and any such claims are barred
and may serve as no basis for habeas relief. Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 82 (3d Cir. 2002).
As Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims both in the state
trial court and on direct appeal, he is barred from raising those claims in this § 2254 matter.
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims are thus barred and cannot serve as a valid basis for habeas
relief.
C. Petitioner’s Grand Jury Challenge
Petitioner argues that the state court erred in denying the motion to dismiss his indictment
based on the prosecution’s failure to present allegedly exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The
Appellate Division rejected this claim, finding that the omitted testimony in question was not
exculpatory—it placed Petitioner at the scene of a shooting and did not exclude him as one of the
shooters—and that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by
grand jury is not applicable to state prosecutions, and therefore an error of state law as to such
grand jury proceedings do not serve as a basis for relief. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wojtycha
v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86

&

(1983) (state court errors do not warrant relief in habeas “unless they rise for some other reason to
the level of a denial of rights protected by the . . . constitution’); Yough v. Lord, No. 19-601, 2020
WL 6689854, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2020). Errors in grand jury proceedings are likewise rendered
harmless by a subsequent guilty verdict from a petit jury. See Yough, 2020 WL 6689854, at *9;
see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986). Thus, even if Petitioner had
identified a legitimate flaw in his grand jury proceedings, such a claim would likewise fail to state
a basis for habeas relief absent some basis for showing that he was truly denied Due Process in his
grand jury proceedings. Yough, 2020 WL 6689854, at *9; see also Hopkins, 517 F.2d at 425.
Here, Petitioner has identified no such error which would warrant relief. As explained by
the state courts, (see ECF No. 14-9 at 9-11), the purported testimony of the witnesses that Petitioner
believes was not put before the grand jury would have placed Petitioner at the scene of a shooting,
near an armed compatriot. Although the proposed witnesses apparently did not see Petitioner with
a gun, they also did not testify that Petitioner was not armed. Given that Petitioner was charged
as both an accomplice and as a direct actor, his presence with an armed compatriot was not omitted
exculpatory evidence, but was instead at least partially inculpatory. The statements in question
did not directly negate Petitioner’s guilt, and thus they were not required to be presented to the
grand jury under state law. Because no presentment is required by federal law, Petitioner has not
shown that he suffered a denial of Due Process as a result of his grand jury proceedings or the
denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment. In any event, because Petitioner was ultimately
convicted by a petit jury, any such defect would be harmless in this habeas matter, and would serve
as no basis for habeas relief.
D. Petitioner’s Evidentiary Claims
Petitioner next asserts that the state courts erred in permitting his conviction to stand
because the testimony provided by Detective DeVirgiliis on whether Petitioner’s gang activity had

an effect on local commerce amounted to improper net opinion testimony. The Appellate Division
determined that some portions of the detective’s testimony did amount to improper net opinion
testimony insomuch as Detective DeVirgiliis testified that he believed that the activity of the gang
in which Petitioner was involved had an effect on local business and real estate values. The
Appellate Division, nevertheless, found any error harmless as the lack of an evidentiary basis for
that opinion was fully addressed on cross examination and the state in any event clearly proved
that the gang had an effect on local commerce as it had engaged in selling guns and other items;
further, the Appellate Division found that Detective DeVirgiliis had properly provided expert
testimony as to those transactions and their effect on commerce. (See ECF No. 14-9 at 36.)
Because “[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely-
tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules,” see Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,
438 n.6 (1983), claims challenging the admissibility of testimony or other evidence are normally
considered questions of state law which are not cognizable in habeas corpus. See Keller v. Larkins,
251 F.3d 408, 416 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A federal habeas court . . . cannot decide whether the
evidence in question was properly allowed under the state law of evidence”); see also Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 US. 62, 67-70 (1991); Wilson v. Vaughn, 533 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 556 U.S. 1170 (2009). A habeas petitioner may therefore raise a habeas claim based on a
state law evidentiary decision only where he can show that the admission of the evidence at issue
denied him Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of the “fundamental
elements of fairness in [his] criminal trial.” Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 149 (1992) (Thomas, J. dissenting)). “The Supreme
Court has ‘defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly,
based on the recognition that, beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the
Due Process Clause has limited operation.’” Jd. (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443

(1992)). “In order to satisfy due process, [Petitioner’s] trial must have been fair; it need not have
been perfect.” /d. (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 (1983)). Thus, a Due Process
violation will only occur in the context of a state court evidentiary ruling when that ruling was “so
arbitrary or prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Scott v. Bartkowski, No.
11-3365, 2013 WL 4537651, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2013) (citing Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S.
1, 12-13 (1994)).
The admission of Detective DeVirgiliis’s testimony did not deprive Petitioner of a
fundamentally fair trial. Although he may have provided an improper net opinion that gang
activity affects business and property values, the majority of his testimony was properly admitted
to explain gang communications and activities. The net opinion in question was ultimately
harmless in light of the more than sufficient evidence that Petitioner and his cohorts had engaged
in the trade of firearms, which, as discussed below, provides more than enough support for the
conclusion that Petitioner’s organization had an effect on commerce sufficient to provide for RICO
liability. As the admission of the testimony did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair,
that ruling provides no basis for habeas relief.
Petitioner also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte strike testimony that
ajuvenile, identified as being a member of a rival gang, had been found in possession of a weapon,
as he believes that testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. Although the Appellate Division
agreed that the admission of the evidence was largely irrelevant, the testimony was not prejudicial
as it involved a member of a rival gang whose weapon possession cast no aspersions or
implications upon Petitioner and his co-defendants, and was therefore harmless. (ECF No. 14-9
at 36-37.) This ruling did not have a propensity to render Petitioner’s trial unfair. As the Appellate
Division explained, the juvenile in question was a member of a rival gang whose activities had
little ability to cast any doubt or suspicion on Petitioner’s character, and it is exceedingly unlikely

oO

that this outsider’s possession of a weapon had any impact whatsoever on the jury’s perceptions
and conclusions as to Petitioner, especially in light of the significant evidence of Petitioner’s guilt.
Because the admission of this testimony, without objection, did not render Petitioner’s trial
fundamentally unfair, it provides no basis for habeas relief.
In his final challenge to the state courts’ evidentiary rulings, Petitioner contends that the
trial court erred by excluding testimony from the girlfriend of one of the victims that McClendon
had bragged about committing one of the killings for which Petitioner was convicted, which
Petitioner asserts was admissible as a statement against interest or a co-conspirator’s statement by
McClendon.! The Appellate Division rejected that argument because, even if McClendon’s
alleged braggadocio would have been otherwise admissible, the witness in question admitted to
the trial court that McClendon never made this statement to her, and that she had instead heard of
it from unspecified third parties “on the street,” which makes the statement hearsay within hearsay
and inadmissible. (ECF No. 14-9 at 40.) Given the multiple levels of hearsay involved, the unclear
source of the rumored bragging to the victim’s girlfriend, and the fact that even if McClendon had
been involved it would not necessarily be exculpatory for Petitioner who was also subject to
accomplice liability, this ruling did not rob Petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial and serves as no
basis for habeas relief.
E. Petitioner’s Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims
Petitioner also asserts that the state court failed to prove one of the elements of the RICO
conspiracy with which he was charged—that his gang activity affected trade and commerce. The

' Although Petitioner asserts that this decision amounted to a limit on cross-examination, it was
not presented to the state courts nor in this matter as a Confrontation Clause issue. Even if it had
been raised as such, this claim would still not serve as a basis for habeas relief as state courts are
permitted to set reasonable limitations on cross-examination, such as the entirely reasonable
limitation on hearsay accusations made by unspecified third parties who may not have been present
for the event itself. See, e.g., Wright v. Vaughn, 473 F.3d 85, 93-94 (3d Cir. 2006).

Appellate Division rejected this argument, finding that there was more than adequate testimony
indicating that the gang had engaged in both the purchase and sale of weapons and in drug
trafficking, both of which sufficiently affect trade to support a conviction under the New Jersey
state RICO statute. (ECF No. 14-9 at 38-39.)
When a habeas petitioner presents a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
produced at trial, “a reviewing court must ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Eley, 712 F.3d at 847 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). A court sitting in habeas review may therefore overturn a conviction based
on insufficient evidence only “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no
rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” /d. (quoting
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). Under this “deferential federal standard,” juries have “broad discretion
in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial” and federal courts must
not “unduly impinge[] on the jury’s role as factfinder” by engaging in “fine-grained factual
parsing.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012).
As the Appellate Division explained to Petitioner, a conviction under the state RICO statute
requires proof of only a “minor influence” on commerce, such as that the gang engaged in any
“economic activity involving or relating to any commodity or service.” (ECF No. 14-9 at 32.)
The evidence produced at trial included testimony that the gang engaged in weapons transactions,
which involve the requisite economic activity related to any commodity or service—specifically
the selling and buying of firearms. Clearly, a rational juror could therefore have found the requisite
minor impact on commerce, and the evidence as to that element was more than sufficient to support
Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner’s claims relating to the sufficiency of the evidence of the RICO
conspiracy’s impact on commerce thus serve as no basis for habeas relief.

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Petitioner also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the
attempted murder of Michael Stallworth as Petitioner believes there was no evidence that he took
a substantial step towards the murder to support an attempt. The Appellate Division rejected this
argument as meritless. The record at trial contained intercepted phone conversations during which
Petitioner agreed to commit the murder of Stallworth, and made arrangements to have a pistol
delivered to him for the purposes of committing the murder. Indeed, when the first plan fell
through after the seizure of the Mitsubishi Galant, Petitioner attempted to make other arrangements
to secure a weapon to use to murder Stallworth. (ECF No. 19-2 at 25-27.) The intercepted phone
conversations were therefore more than sufficient to indicate that Petitioner had taken a substantial
step towards committing the murder of Stallworth. Petitioner agreed to commit the killing, and
then made multiple attempts to acquire a pistol and transportation to accomplish that goal. The
evidence was more than sufficient to permit a rational juror to convict Petitioner of the attempted
murder, and the state courts’ refusal to acquit Petitioner on that basis thus fails to present a valid
basis for habeas relief.
F. Petitioner’s Sentencing Claims
Petitioner next argues that his sentence was excessive and contrary to the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Miller vy. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny regarding the sentencing of
juveniles to life sentences without the possibility of parole. As federal courts do not have authority
during habeas review to re-examine issues of state law, Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-69, and “sentencing
is a matter of state criminal procedure and [generally] does not involve such a denial of
fundamental fairness as to fall within the purview of federal habeas corpus,” alleged sentencing
error by a state court will not warrant habeas relief unless the sentence imposed was outside of the
range authorized by the crime in question or was otherwise beyond the sentencing judge’s
authority to give. See, e.g., Sutton v. Blackwell, 327 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486 (D.N.J. 2004) (quoting

19

Grecco v. O’Lone, 661 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D.N.J. 1987). On direct appeal, the Appellate Division
determined that each of Petitioner’s sentences was proper under state law and appropriate under
the circumstances, and thus did not exceed the sentencing judge’s authority or the applicable
statutory ranges. Thus, to the extent that Petitioner argues his sentence was excessive, this Court
is without authority to second guess the Appellate Division’s determination, and that claim
provides no basis for habeas relief.
Turning to Miller, the Appellate Division rejected Petitioner’s claim because he fell outside
of the group of individuals Miller and its progeny were intended to protect. In Miller, the Supreme
Court held that state sentencing regimes which imposed sentences of “mandatory life without
parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” violated the Eighth Amendment
unless those schemes permitted the sentencing judge to consider factors including the defendant’s
age and maturity in determining whether such a life sentence was appropriate. See 567 U.S. at
465-69. In Miller and subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear
that this rule only applies to schemes which impose life without parole on juvenile offenders, and
that the rule in Miller in no way impacted or affected lesser sentences up to and including /ife with
the possibility of future parole. /d.; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).
Thus, Miller and its progeny apply only to those who were juveniles at the time of their offenses,
received life without parole, and did not have an opportunity to have the sentencing judge consider
their age and immaturity in determining the sentence.
Petitioner falls into none of these categories. He was over 18 at the time of the events in
question, was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, and the sentencing judge
explicitly considered his age and inexperience in arriving at the sentence. (See ECF No. 14-9 at
49-50.) Miller and its progeny thus do not apply, and serve as no basis for habeas relief.

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G. Petitioner’s Cumulative Trial Error Claim
Petitioner next contends that “the aggregate of errors” committed during his trial
cumulatively rendered his trial unfair and warrant relief. The Third Circuit has found that:
errors that individually do not warrant habeas relief may do so when
combined. .. . [A] cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all
the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, and.
therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative
effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can
no longer be determined to be harmless. Cumulative errors are not
harmless if they had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict, which means that a habeas
petitioner is not entitled to relief based on cumulative errors unless
he can establish actual prejudice.
Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1108 (2008). The Appellate Division rejected Petitioner’s cumulative error
claim on direct appeal as meritless. Having reviewed the record, Petitioner’s non-ineffective
assistance claims all cither fail to show that the state court erred or show at worst harmless error,
as none of the errors that Petitioner complains about had a substantial and injurious effect on the
outcome of his trial. As such, Petitioner’s claims fare no better in the aggregate than they do
individually, and Petitioner’s cumulative error claim fails to set forth a valid basis for habeas relief.
H. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
In his final series of claims, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. The standard applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well
established:
Claims of ineffective assistance are governed by the two-prong test
set forth in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Strickland y.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To make out such a claim under
Strickland, a petitioner must first show that “counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires [the petitioner to show] that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” at 687; see also
United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007). To

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succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must also
show that counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his
defense such that the petitioner was “deprive[d] of a fair trial...
whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Shedrick, 493
F.3d at 299,
In evaluating whether counsel was deficient, the “proper standard
for attorney performance is that of ‘reasonably effective
assistance.’” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 3d Cir. 2005). A
petitioner asserting ineffective assistance must therefore show that
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” under the circumstances. Jd. The reasonableness
of counsel’s representation must be determined based on the
particular facts of a petitioner’s case, viewed as of the time of the
challenged conduct of counsel. Jd. In scrutinizing counsel’s
performance, courts “must be highly deferential . . . a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466
USS. at 689.
Even where a petitioner is able to show that counsel’s representation
was deficient, he must still affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. /d at
692-93. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Jd.
at 693. The petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable
probability, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id, at 694; see also Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299. Where a “petition
contains no factual matter regarding Sirickland’s prejudice prong,
and [only provides] . . . unadorned legal conclusion[s] . . . without
supporting factual allegations,” that petition is insufficient to
watrant an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner has not shown his
entitlement to habeas relief. See Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386,
395 (3d Cir. 2010). “Because failure to satisfy either prong defeats
an ineffective assistance claim, and because it is preferable to avoid
passing judgment on counsel’s performance when possible,
[Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-98],” courts should address the
prejudice prong first where it is dispositive of a petitioner’s claims.
United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2002).
Judge v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 3d 270, 280-81 (D.N.J. 2015).
In his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel did
not adequately meet and consult with him, and, as a result, counsel failed to call as witnesses the

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two women discussed in Petitioner’s grand jury claim above, Brianna Robinson and Nichelle
Dupree. The Appellate Division rejected these claims, explaining as follows:
[Petitioner’s] argument is that Robinson and Dupree could have
testified that he fired no shots, thereby supporting his overall
defense, i.e., renunciation of any plot to shoot Logan[, based on their
statements to police.] However, the PCR judge noted that Robinson
and Dupree “placed [Petitioner] at the scene” of the fatal shooting,
whispering to a “masked person whom they saw commit the
shooting.” As the trial judge noted in denying [a motion at trial],
their statements included significant incriminating evidence.
Moreover, during the trial judge’s colloquy with counsel, the State
revealed that it no longer knew where either witness was and had no
ability to contact them. Trial counsel could hardly have rendered
ineffective assistance under these circumstances.

... the trial evidence [further undermines Petitioner’s claim given
Petitioner’s] conflicting statements to police — first supplying a false
alibi, then admitting to being present, finally admitting to being
present but giving his gun to a third person and walking away before
the shooting occurred. Additionally, there was ample proof in the
taped conversations disputing [Petitioner’s] claim that he left the
scene before the shooting. Moreover, ballistic analysis of shells
recovered at the scene of the shooting revealed they had been fired
from two different weapons. That scientific forensic evidence
certainly would have limited any impact of Robinson’s and
Dupree’s testimony since neither one mentioned the presence of a
third man at the shooting.
Additionally, although not mentioned by the PCR judge, trial
counsel’s letter to [Petitioner] fully explained why he chose not to
call Robinson or Dupree as witnesses, specifically, that he could not
be sure exactly what they would say on the witness stand. He
presumed the State might call them in order to place [Petitioner] at
the scene, but, in the end, the prosecutor chose not to do so. At trial,
the State did not call any witness present at the Long Branch
shootings, including Logan himself. Instead, as trial counsel noted
[in his letter], the State relied upon [Petitioner’s] own incriminating
words that not only placed [Petitioner] at the scene but detailed his
actual involvement with the shooting pursuant to orders from the
gang’s leader. Counsel’s exercise of trial strategy by not calling
Robinson or Dupree was neither an example of deficient
performance nor prejudicial].
(ECF No. 14-20 at 9-11.)

As the Appellate Division aptly explained, counsel’s decision not to call Robinson or
Dupree was neither deficient nor prejudicial. Both witnesses would have put Petitioner at the
scene of the shooting, conferring with one of the individuals who engaged in the shooting, and
could not put the second gun in any hand other than Petitioner’s. Their testimony would thus
hardly have been exculpatory, and, given Petitioner’s own admissions in wiretapped
communications, likely would not have altered the outcome of Petitioner’s case at trial. Indeed, it
is at best unclear if they would have been available as witnesses, and counsel himself clearly
understood the massive risk for essentially no gain of calling them as witnesses. Petitioner thus
failed to show that counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s refusal to call the
two women as witnesses at trial. The Appellate Division’s decision was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of Strickland and provides no basis for habeas relief.
Turning to Petitioner’s final claim, he essentially argues that counsel did not meet with him
enough and was therefore unprepared for trial. The Appellate Division rejected this claim as
Petitioner failed to present any evidence as to what additional information or useful trial strategy
could have been surmised from any additional meetings or discussions in light of the strong
evidence of Petitioner’s guilt and counsel’s thorough cross examinations and arguments during the
course of trial. (ECF No. 14-20 at 11-12.) As a petitioner cannot prevail on such a claim without
a clear showing of what additional evidence would have resulted from additional preparation and
investigation, the Appellate Division’s rejection of Petitioner’s bald contentions of insufficient
discussion and preparation was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland.
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, No. 13-2552, 2016 WL 1732377, at *4-5 (D.N.J. May 2, 2016)
(stating that a failure to investigate claim requires a comprehensive showing of what would have
been obtained through further investigation and how it would have aided the petitioner’s case to
show prejudice). The state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims without a

17

hearing thus provides no basis for habeas relief, and Petitioner’s habeas petition is therefore
denied.”
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas
proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 327 (2003). “[A petitioner] satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason
could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
conclude [that] the issues presented here are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Jd. Because Petitioner’s habeas claims are without merit for the reasons set forth above,
he has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, and his petition is
not adequate to receive encouragement to proceed further. This Court therefore denies Petitioner
a certificate of appealability.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED, and Petitioner is
DENIED a certificate of appealability. An appropriate order follows.

fe A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* In addition to the many claims discussed in this Opinion, Petitioner also initially sought to raise
another claim which at the time was pending in a second state court PCR petition. (ECF No. 1 at
19-20.) Petitioner, however, withdrew that claim and chose to proceed only on his fully exhausted
claims, discussed throughout this Opinion. (See ECF Nos. 5-7.)
1Q

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10656003. Public record. Not legal advice.