# MCLEOD v. CAMPER

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10655997

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVE MCLEOD,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 19-20421 (RIK) (RLS)
Vv.
PATTI CAMPER, etal, MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss and/or Transfer
Venue, filed on June 12, 2023 by Defendants Pittsburgh Public Schools (“PPS”) and PPS
employces, Patti Camper and Shawn MeNeil, (ECF No. 48 (“Def. MTD”)) (collectively, the
“School Defendants”), a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed on June 28, 2023 by
Defendant and attorney Margaret Prescott, (ECF No. 54 (“Prescott MTD”)), and a Motion by
Plaintiff Steve McLeod to Vacate the Court’s Order staying discovery in this case pending
resolution of Defendants’' motions, (ECF No. 58). The Court has considered the parties’
submissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions are
GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff's Motion to
Vacate is DENIED as moot.

' The Court refers to the School Defendants and Prescott together as “Defendants.”

I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint is difficult to discern. (See generally ECF No. 45,
Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”).) It appears that this action arises from a dispute regarding
the court-ordered transfer of Plaintiff's daughter to a new school. On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff
learned that Defendant Patti Camper (“Camper”) had, based on a court order, initiated a transfer
of Plaintiff's daughter to attend Sister Thea Brown Catholic School. (Ud. at *4.) Plaintiff objected
to his daughter’s transfer and contacted Camper, a PPS employee, regarding same. (/d.) Camper
filed a complaint against Plaintiff, restricting him from coming to the school. (/d.) Camper alerted
the police and restricted Plaintiff from attending a parent-teacher meeting. (/d.) Camper then
participated in a “custody case” against Plaintiff on June 4, 2020 and “made [a] false case” on
December 20, 2022, making “‘false allegations” of harassment against Plaintiff and convincing the
“assistant of Joseph [K |ennedy|,] law clerk of |JjJudge Hugh F. McGough” that Sister Thea Brown
Catholic School “ha[d] the authority to transfer” Plaintiff's daughter. (/d.)
Thereafter, Camper failed to inform Plaintiff of his daughter’s graduation, which he missed
as a result. (/d.) The school’ has also refused to provide Plaintiff with access to his child’s school
file and refused to inform him about his child’s extracurricular activities. (/d.) According to
Plaintiff, Camper conspired with attorney Defendant Margaret Prescott (“Prescott”), and PPS
“conspired with both lawyers of [the] [W]omen Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh as well
as Dickic McCamey and Childcote Pc” to make “false claims of child abuse and harassment
against [P]laintiff.” (/d. at *8—9),

* It is not clear from the Third Amended Complaint whether “the school” to which Plaintiff refers is PPS
or Sister Thea Brown Catholic School.

Plaintiff alleges that the above conduct violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
and violated “19 U.S.C. [S]ection 242,” 31 U.S.C. Section 3729,” and “18 U.S.C. Section 1404.”
(Ud. at *8), Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered emotional distress, pain and suffering, and financial
expense and seeks one million dollars in “puni[t|ive damages, pain and su[f|fering, emotional
anguish[,| impending doom[,] stress, [and] depression.” (/d. at *5.)
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on November 18, 2019, naming both himself and AJM,
his minor child, as Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1.) The initial complaint named Camper and PPS as
Defendants. Ud.) On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint. (ECF No.
18.) The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 19), and Plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint on June 27, 2022 (ECF No. 20). The Amended Complaint removed AJM as a Plaintiff
and added Shawn McNeil (“McNeil”) as a Defendant. (/d.) Defendants moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction on August 26, 2022. (ECF No. 32.) On January 13, 3023, the Honorable Zahid N.
Quraishi, U.S.D.J., granted Defendants’ motion. (ECF Nos. 38 (“MTD Op.”).) Judge Quraishi
found that Defendants were not subject to general personal jurisdiction because each Defendant
was described as being a resident of Pennsylvania, nor were Defendants subject to specific
personal jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not assert how this cause of action was related to or
arose from contacts in New Jersey—-+ather, Plaintiff merely alleged that Defendants contacted him
while he was located in New Jersey. (Id. at 5-6.)
Judge Quraishi granted Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. (/d. at 7.) On
January 25, 2023, Plaintiff requested a six-month adjournment of this case due to Plaintiff's
hospitalization and ongoing medical issues and requested assignment of pro bono counsel. (ECF
No. 40.) Judge Quraishi denied Plaintiff's request for pro bono counsel, but granted Plaintiff's

adjournment request, administratively terminating this action. (ECT No. 41.) This case was
reopened on May 8, 2023, (ECF No. 42), and was reassigned to this Court on May 15, 2023. (ECF
No, 44.) On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint, which is now the
operative pleading in this case. (ECF No. 45.) On June 12, 2023, the School Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss and/or Transfer Venue. (Def. MTD.) That same day, the School Defendants
filed a Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or
Transfer Venue. (ECF No. 49.) On June 28, 2023, Defendant Prescott filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 54 (“Prescott MTD”).) On August 1, 2023, Defendant Prescott
also filed a Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution of her Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 56.)
On September 5, 2023, the Honorable Rukhsanah L. Singh, U.S.M.J., granted Defendants’
Motions to Stay discovery in this matter. (ECF No. 57.) Plaintiff did not file briefs in opposition
to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.’ Instead, Plaintiff moved to vacate Judge Singh’s Order
Staying Discovery. (ECF No. 58.) Now pending before this Court are Defendants’ unopposed
Motions to Dismiss, (Def. MTD; Prescott MTD), and Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate, (ECF No. 58).
II. LEGAL STANDARD‘
Rule 12(b)(2) permits a party to move to dismiss a case for “lack of personal jurisdiction.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Once a defendant raises a jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b)(2), the

> Failure to respond to arguments advanced in support of a motion to dismiss results in a waiver of the claim
sought to be dismissed. Rapid Models & Prototypes, Inc. v. Innovated Sols., 71 F. Supp. 3d 492, 506 (D.N.J.
2014) (citing Griglak v. CTX Mortgage Co., No. 09-5247, 2010 WL 1424023, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2010);
Leisure Pass N. Am., LLC vy. Leisure Pass Group, Ltd., No. 12-3375, 2013 WL 4517841, at *4 (D.N_J.
Aug. 26, 2013) (“Plaintiff has waived its opposition to this argument by failing to respond to it.”). Thus,
the Court could dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint on this basis alonc. However, given
Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court will analyze the merits of the issues presented in Defendants’ motions.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter. It is well established that a pro se complaint “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Haines vy, Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), The Court is obligated to construe pro se claims
liberally and afford pro se plaintiffs the benefit of every doubt. Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924,

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper “through sworn affidavits or
other competent evidence”; reliance on pleadings and allegations alone is insufficient. Patterson
v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 893 '.2d 595, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Time Share Vacation
Club vy. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 67 n.9 (d Cir. 1984)) (noting Rule 12(b)(2) is
“inherently a matter which requires resolution of factual issues outside the pleadings”). When a
court “resolves the jurisdictional issue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and without the
benefit of discovery, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.”
Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 461 (D.N.J. 2015). In such cases, a court
“take[s] the allegations of the complaint as true.” Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287,
1302 (3d Cir. 1996).
DISCUSSION
The School Defendants and Defendant Prescott argue that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them. The Court agrees.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A federal court sitting in New Jersey “has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided
under New Jersey state law.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 Gd Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted). “New Jersey’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the
due process requirements of the United States Constitution.” /d. (citing N.J. Court R. 4:4—4(c)).
This Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over a party that has “constitutionally sufficient
“minimum contacts’” with New Jersey. /d. (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d
141, 149 (3d Cir. 1992)).

926 (3d Cir. 2005). “Liberal construction does not, however, require the Court to credit a pro se plaintiff's
‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

A non-resident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum based on one
of two types of personal jurisdiction: “general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and
specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s “affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”
Daimler AG vy. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Only a “limited set of affiliations” with a forum can give rise
to general jurisdiction, such that a court may find the defendant essentially at home in the forum.
Id. at 137. Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, arises when a defendant “purposefully avail|s]” itself
of a forum and the plaintiffs claims arise from a defendant’s contacts with the forum. /ord Motor
Co., 592 U.S. at 358 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). “The
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State .. . it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v, Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958).
a. School Defendants
Turning first to the School Defendants, Judge Quraishi previously found that the Court did
not have general jurisdiction over them. (MTD Op. at 5.) Nothing in the Third Amended Complaint
affects the Court’s general jurisdiction analysis. The Third Amended Complaint identifies each of
the School Defendants as residing in Alleghany County, Pennsylvania and lists addresses for the
School Defendants in Pittsburgh. (Def. MTD at 8; TAC at *3.) There is no basis in the Third
Amended Complaint to find that the School Defendants have any significant contacts in New

Jersey—let alone affiliations with New Jersey that are so continuous and systematic as to render
them essentially at home in New Jersey.’
With respect to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his
claims arise out of or relate to Defendants’ contacts with New Jersey. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is
based on the alleged transfer of his child to a different school in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
Plaintiff's objection to the transfer, and the transferor school’s alleged refusal to provide
information to Plaintiff about his child, resulting in the separation of Plaintiff from his child.
Plaintiff also complains that the School Defendants conspired to submit false allegations about
him—presumably pertaining to his treatment of his child. None of these allegations appear to arise
in New Jersey.
Plaintiff appears to attempt to cure the jurisdictional deficiencies identified by Judge
Quraishi by including a “Jurisdiction and Venue” section in his Third Amended Complaint. (TAC
at *9.) In it, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Pittsburg[h] [P]Jublic [S]chool [] communicate[d] many times by phone and sen[t]
numerous mails to [his] address and had a police officer contact [his] home
threatening plaintiff outside of his jurisdiction so [he] would question any
qualified] immunity. Therefore[,] New Jersey as well as NJ Long arm
requirements and minimum contact Rules should apply.

> The Third Amended Complaint states that “defendant is a government employee and employers which
allow the jurisdiction of Government agency Defendant [and] [a]s such gives Jurisdiction to the United
States Court in the district of New Jersey.” (TAC at *9.) Local public school boards are generally considered
state agencies. Camden Cnty. Recovery Coal. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ, For Pub, Sch, Sys., 262 F. Supp.
2d 446, 449 (D.N.J. 2003). They are not United States agencies. Nor does that fact that PPS is a state agency
provide a basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the School Defendants. See, ¢.g., Boone
v. Thompson, No, 2-1580, 2002 WL 31478834, at *4-5 GE.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2002) (finding that the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did not have personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey
state agency when there were no “continuous and systematic” contacts between the state agency and
Pennsylvania); Marshall v. Labor & Indus., State of Wash., 89 F Supp.2d 4, 8-10 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding
that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant,
a Washington state agency, when the allegedly illegal conduct occurred in the state of Washington).

Ud. at *9-10.) The fact that the School Defendants contacted Plaintiff in New Jersey or
that police officers contacted Plaintiff at his home does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise
specific jurisdiction over Defendants. Indecd, Judge Quraishi already rejected these exact same
jurisdictional allegations. (MTD Op. at 6.) In Plaintiff's brief in opposition to the School
Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
Plaintiff contended that Defendants “contact[cd] plaintiff by phone directly in New Jersey[,] had
police officers from Pittsburgh school public safety contact [Plaintiff at his home in New Jersey[, |
[and] email[ed] [P]laintiff while he is in New Jersey.” (ECF No. 34 at 6.) Judge Quraishi found
such contacts insufficient for specific jurisdiction: “Plaintiff merely claims that Defendants
contacted Plaintiff while he was located in the State of New Jersey . . . Plaintiff, however, does not
assert how his cause of action is related to or arises from these contacts to New Jersey.” (MTD.
Op. at 6.) This Court agrees and finds no basis to exercise specific jurisdiction over the School
Defendants.
b. Defendant Prescott
The Court next turns to Defendant Prescott, who also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Third
Amended Complaint based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Virst, the Court finds no basis to
exercise general jurisdiction. Like the School Defendants, the Third Amended Complaint identifies
Defendant Prescott as residing in Alleghany County, Pennsylvania and lists an address in
Pittsburgh. (LAC at *3.) Second, there are almost no facts alleged that even involve Prescott, let
alone facts that would provide a basis for the Court to find that Prescott purposefully availed herself
of New Jersey or that Plaintiff's claims arise from Prescott’s contacts with New Jersey. The only
mention of Prescott in the entire Third Amended Complaint is the following sentence: “Defendants

Patti Camper and Margaret Prescott Esq. [conspired] to plot this action® then make false
allegation[s] in court.” (TAC at *8.) Moreover, Prescott is not mentioned in the “Jurisdiction and
Venue” section of the Third Amended Complaint. (/d. at *9-10.) In short, this case concerns
Plaintiffs child’s enrollment at a school in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and child custody proceeding
that also appears to have taken place in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Court therefore finds that it
lacks specific jurisdiction over Prescott.
Accordingly, the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants
in this action.’ The Court therefore abstains from considering Defendants’ arguments that the Third
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. DISMISSAL IN LIEU OF TRANSFER
When a district court determines that it lacks personal jurisdiction, the court “must at least
consider a transfer.” Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 132 (3d
Cir. 2020). 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court... and that court finds that there is a
want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such
action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have
been brought at the time it was filed or noticed....

The action that Plaintiff refers to appears to be a child custody proceeding during which Plaintiff lost
custody of his daughter. (See TAC at *8 (alleging that his rights “to freely support [his] child” and make
“the best decision for her” was violated when “they remove[d] her”).) There are no facts alleged that suggest
this child custody proceeding took place in New Jersey. Rather, Plaintiff attaches to the Third Amended
Complaint a “Parenting Plan Order of Court” issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Alleghany County,
Pennsylvania, Family Division, suggesting that the action to which Plaintiff refers is this child custody
proceeding in Alleghany County. (TAC at *16.) The Court also notes that, in a separate action filed by
Plaintiff which is pending before the Undersigned, the complaint also appears to arise from a family court
matter that took place in Alleghany County, Pennsylvania, during which Plaintiff alleges that his child’s
mother made “false allegations of child abuse” against him. (See McLeod v. UPMC Children’s Hospital of
Pittsburgh, et al., No. 21-116, ECF No. 31.)
7 The Court also notes that New Jerscy is also likely an improper venue. “The district court of a district in
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if tt be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

“The district court does, however, have ‘broad discretion’ not to transfer.” Danziger & De
Llano, LLP, 948 F.3d at 132 (quoting Jumara y. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir.
1995)). The Third Circuit has stated that dismissal in lieu of transfer best serves “the interests of
justice” where it is clear that transfer would be “a futile waste of judicial and party resources.”
United States v. Foy, 803 F.3d 128, 136 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015).
The Court finds dismissal in licu of transfer best serves the interest of justicc in this case.
First, the operative pleading in this case was Plaintiff's third pleading. Plaintiff was warned by
Judge Quraishi that failure to remedy the jurisdictional defects in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
may result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Plaintiff did not remedy the defects in
his Third Amended Complaint nor did Plaintiff respond to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, which
have been pending for approximately nine (9) months. Plaintiffs failure to oppose Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss alone could result in dismissal of this case. See Rapid Models & Prototypes,
Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d at 506.
Second, a brief survey of Plaintiff's litigation history in this District demonstrates that
Plaintiff has filed a deluge of other cases challenging the same underlying child custody
procecding which forms the basis of this case.’ For example, Plaintiff sued Defendant Prescott and
the Women’s Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh along with a number of Alleghany County
defendants in 2019 contending that his child was transferred to a different school without his
consent and that his child visitation rights were violated. (See McLeod v, Fifth Judicial District et
al., No. 19-12893, ECF Nos. 1, 7.) This case was transferred sua sponte to the Western District of
Pennsylvania where Plaintiff voluntary dismissed the case. (See McLeod v. Fifth Judicial District

Judicial proceedings are public records of which courts may take judicial notice. See Sands v. McCormick,
$02 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir, 2007).

10

et al., No. 20-224, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff again sued Defendant Prescott and a number of other
defendants in 2020 challenging the Alleghany County child custody and child support proceedings.
(See McLeod y. Fifth Judicial District of Pennsylvania et al., No. 20-1362.) After filing three
pleadings, the Honorable Michael A. Shipp sua sponte dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Ud., ECF No. 24 (“Because McLeod had three bites at the apple to
adequately plead a claim, the Court dismisses his third attempt with prejudice.”).)? Moreover, as
the Court noted above, there is a separate action currently pending before the Undersigned which
appears to arise from the same underlying family court proceeding, wherein Plaintiff complains
that his minor child is receiving mental health treatment without his consent. (See McLeod v.
UPMC Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh et al., No. 21-116, ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff has had
numerous opportunities in this case and in others to challenge the Alleghany County child custody
proceedings. The interests of justice counsel against allowing this case to continue any further in
another District.

* Plaintiff brought yet another suit in 2020 against the Fifth Judicial District of Pennsylvania, an Alleghany
County judge, other Alleghany County defendants, and the New Jersey Department of Human Services.
(See McLeod v, Fifth Judicial District of PA, et al., No. 20-20475.) Judge Quraishi ordered Plaintiff to show
cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ud., ECF No. 58.)
Rather than respond to Judge Quraishi’s order, Plaintiff requested a six-month adjournment and thereafter
filed a proposed Amended Complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos.
59, 62, 64.) The case was subsequently reassigned to this Court; Plaintiff's pending IFP in that matter will
be addressed in a separate order.
In September, 2022, Plaintiff also sued the Brick Township Police Department for allegedly failing to
provide Plaintiff with police reports and other communications between them and the Pittsburgh Sheriff's
department, which allegedly resulted in Plaintiffs “loss of relationship” with his daughter and for which
Plaintiff also sought one million dollars in damages. (See McLeod y, Brick Township Police Department,
No. 22-5704, ECF No. 1.) After Plaintiff failed to respond to the Judge Quraishi’s Order to Show Cause as
to why the case should not be consolidated with others pending before the Court, the case was
administratively terminated. (/d., ECF No. 5.)
And in May, 2023, Plaintiff sued the same Defendants that are named in the present action; after Plaintiff
failed to pay the filing fee or submit an application to proceed IFP, the Clerk of Court was ordered to close
the case. (See McLeod v. Camper, et al., No. 23-2374, ECF No. 4.)

ll

Furthermore, although the Court abstains from ruling on the merits of Defendants’ 12(b)(6)
arguments as the Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court may consider whether
transfer would be futile: the Court finds that transfer would be a futile and a waste of judicial and
party resources, Foy, 803 F.3d at 136 n.7. Although the Court is cognizant of Plaintiffs pro se
status, even a “cursory examination” of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint demonstrates that
Plaintiff's claims are without merit. Sciore v. Phung, No. CV 19-13775, 2022 WL 950261, at *18
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022) (dismissing a case where transfer “will only prolong the inevitable, namely
dismissal of [p]laintiff’s frivolous claims”); see also Qayyum vy. Tillerson, No. 17-6780, 2018 WL
2095603, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7, 2018) (dismissing a pro se plaintiffs case in licu of transfer).
For example, Plaintiff alleges that he is bringing claims for “assault, libel, and slander.”
(TAC at *1.) These claims appear to be based solely on allegedly false accusations levied during
Plaintiff's underlying family court proceeding. (See id. at *4 (“Patti [C]amper further came to
custody case on [JJune 24, 2020 and made false case of the 12/20/2022 ... [she| ma[d]e [a] false
allfe]gation that [I] harass[ed] her.”)) In both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, statements made
during the course of judicial proceedings “are absolutely privileged and, therefore, cannot form
the basis for liability for defamation.” See Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 779, 784 (P.A. Super
2012) (collecting cases); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 804 (N.J. 1990).
Plaintiff also attempts to state claims under 18 US.C. §§ 241, 242, 1505, 1519, 2340, each of which
is a criminal statute and therefore does not provide a private cause of action. See, e.g., Graf v. ora,
No. 23-01375, 2023 WL 7031544, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023) (collecting cases).'° Moreover,

Plaintiff also cites 31 U.S.C. § 3729, a provision of the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act imposes
civil liability upon “[a|ny person” who, inter alia, “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). First, nothing in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint relates to claims for
payment or approval submitted to the United States Government. Second, Plaintiff has not followed the
procedures set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3703(b) for bringing a qui tam action. Third, the False Claims Act does □
12

.as the Court noted in its Memorandum Order in Plaintiff’s other action pending before this Court,
while the Supreme Court has recognized “the rights of parents to care for and guide their children,”
parental liberty interests are “not absolute.” (See McLeod y. UPMC Children's Hospital of
Pittsburgh et al., No. 21-116, ECF No. 55 at 6-7. (quoting Anspach ex r el. Anspach y. City of
Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2007) (collecting cases)).) A
parent’s right does not “impose a constifutional obligation on state actors to contact parents of a
minor.” Anspach, 503 }'.3d at 262 (emphasis in original). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate
“manipulative, cocrcive, or restraining conduct by the State.” /d. at 266. A statc actor has no
obligation “to act affirmatively in support of a plaintiff’s parental rights.” Weidow v. Scranton Sch.
Dist., No. 08-1978, 2009 WL 2588856, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2009). Thus, to the extent that
Plaintiff is attempting to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the School Defendants
failure to contact him regarding the transfer of his child’s school, his child’s graduation, or his
child’s extracurricular activities, this claim is not actionable. Morcover, nothing in the Third
Amended Complaint appears to implicate the Fifth Amendment, which protects against compelled
self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V. Accordingly, because transfer of this case “will only
prolong the inevitable, namely dismissal of Plaintiff's frivolous claims,” Sciore, 2022 WL 950261,
at *18, the Court finds dismissal in lieu of transfer serves the interest of justice.

not subject a state (or state agency) to liability for suits brought by private individuals. Vermont Agency of
Nat. Res. y. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000).

13

C. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiff
was warned that failure to remedy jurisdictional defects may result in dismissal of Plaintiff's
claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint did not cure the defects identified in
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs claims are thus DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs
Motion to Vacate is therefore DENIED as moot. An ee) accompanigethis Opinion.
fo ZL iY
ROBERT KIRSCH SS
_ UNTTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 19, 2024

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10655997. Public record. Not legal advice.