# VALENTINE v. MONROE TOWNSHIP

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10655732

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10655732

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in New Jersey is two years in accordance with New Jersey personal injury law

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

JOHN VALENTINE and
VALENTINE’S FARM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 22-4384 (RMB/MJS)
v.
Consolidated with Civil No. 22-5562
MONROE TOWNSHIP, a Municipal
Corporation for the State of New
Jersey; SALVATORE “SKIP”
TORMARCHIO; TARA PARK n/k/a OPINION
TARA NELMS; RICHARD
DILUCIA, Mayor of Monroe
Township; RALPH MANFREDI;
STEVEN D’AMICO; ROSEMARY
FLAHERTY, Fictitious defendants
John Does 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES
Andrew Joseph Karcich
The Law Offices of Andrew J. Karcich, LLC
1000 White Horse Road, Suite 703
Voorhees, New Jersey 08043

On behalf of Plaintiffs

Michael Vincent Madden
Madden & Madden, PA
108 Kings Highway East, Suite 200
P.O. Box 210
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033-0389

On behalf of Defendants Monroe Township, a Municipal Corporation for the State of
New Jersey; Tara Park n/k/a Tara Nelms; Richard Dilucia, Mayor of Monroe
Township; Steven D’Amico
Erin R. Thompson
Birchmeier & Powell, Esqs.
1891 State Highway 50
P.O. Box 582
Tuckahoe, New Jersey 08250-0582

On behalf of Defendants Salvatore “Skip” Tormarchio; Ralph Manfredi;
Rosemary Flaherty

BUMB, Chief District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon two motions for dismissal: the
Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Salvatore “Skip” Tormarchio (the “Fire
Marshal”), Ralph Manfredi, and Rosemary Flaherty (collectively referred to as the
“Individual Defendants”) filed on February 7, 2023 [Docket No. 28 (the “Ind. Br.”)];
and the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Monroe Township, Tara Park n/k/a Tara
Nelms (“Ms. Park”), Richard Dilucia (“Mayor Dilucia”), and Steven D’Amico
(collectively referred to as the “Monroe Defendants” and with the Individual
Defendants as “Defendants”) filed on February 8, 2023 [Docket No. 29, 29-3 (the
“Monroe Br.”)]. Plaintiffs John Valentine and Valentine’s Farm, LLC1 (collectively
referred to as “Plaintiffs”) have filed Briefs in Opposition to both pending motions.
[Docket Nos. 32 (the “Monroe Opp’n”), 33 (the “Ind. Opp’n”).] On March 13, 2023,
the Monroe Defendants submitted a Reply Brief. [Docket No. 34 (the “Monroe
Reply”).] Having been fully briefed, the motions are now ripe for adjudication.

1 Mr. Valentine is the principal owner, member, and manager of Valentine’s Farm,
LLC, which is a New Jersey LLC. [Compl. at 1 ¶¶ 3–4.]
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a multitude of land use issues and permit requests

made by Plaintiffs, which Plaintiffs allege were ultimately denied by the Township as
part of a conspiracy among local officials who harbored personal animus against
Plaintiffs and also allegedly issued erroneous code violations to Plaintiffs regarding
their property at 3524 South Black Horse Pike, in the Township of Monroe, in the
State of New Jersey (the “Farm”). The parties maintain different interpretations of

the facts, and importantly, each other’s motives. For purposes of this Opinion, the
Court assumes the facts alleged by Plaintiffs to be true and views the allegations in a
light most favorable to them.
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations of a Conspiracy Among Local Officials
In 2016, Plaintiff John Valentine purchased the Farm for the purposes of

operating Plaintiff Valentine’s Farm, LLC, a “farm and farm related business.”
[Docket No. 14 (the “Consolidated Complaint” or “Compl.”), at 4 ¶ 1.] Plaintiffs’
neighbor residing at 3546 South Black Horse Pike (referred to herein as the “Fire
Marshal’s son”) is the son of Defendant Skip Tormarchio, the Fire Marshal for
Monroe Township.2 [Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 13.] Plaintiffs state that the Fire Marshal “is and

claims to be ‘politically connected’ in Monroe Township,” having served as the
Monroe Township Fire Marshal for over 25 years. [Id. ¶ 4.] Plaintiffs allege that the

2 Per the Consolidated Complaint, the Fire Marshal has been employed by the Monroe
Township Department of Public Safety since at least 2016. [Compl. at 4 ¶ 2.]
Fire Marshal has known and worked with Defendant Ralph Manfredi, the Code
Enforcement Officer of Monroe Township, for over 20 years. [Id. ¶ 82.]
Beginning in 2018, Mr. Valentine and his neighbors, but primarily the Fire

Marshal’s son, “engaged in a series of disputes regarding various use issues and
development of their respective properties,” which persisted up until at least the filing
of the Consolidated Complaint. [Id. ¶¶ 6–7.] Plaintiffs claim that, in response, the
Fire Marshal leveraged his political standing to negatively impact how the Plaintiffs
were treated by the Township. [See Id. ¶¶ 34, 46, 58, 97, 150] Further, Plaintiffs allege

that the Township and its officials refused to enforce the Township Codes against
their neighbors while unreasonably enforcing it against them. [Id. ¶ 154.] The
Defendants’ acts, discussed below, are in reference to such alleged conspiracy by
Defendants to impede Plaintiffs’ usage and enjoyment of the Farm.

The Consolidated Complaint states that “[b]eginning in June 2018, Mr.
Valentine noticed a negative change in the way he was being treated by Township
officials . . . when conducting official business for permits, licenses and other
Township approvals for the use and development of the Property.” [Id. ¶ 9.] In
December 2018, the Fire Marshal’s son “began taunting” Mr. Valentine by saying,

“[my] father owns this town and you’re never going to get anything done.” [Id. ¶ 13.]
This confrontation occurred around the time when Defendants Tara Park and
Rosemary Flaherty, Township zoning officers, allegedly refused to deliver Mr.
Valentine his written livestock permit and charged him with a violation for not
having shelter for his animals; an offense Plaintiffs purport is not even regulated by
the Township Code. [Id. ¶¶ 11–12.]
Since that time, Plaintiffs argue that many of their dealings unfolded in a

similar fashion because of the alleged conspiracy among local officials. More
specifically, Mr. Valentine claims that he was either threatened with, or issued
violations for, additional conduct that was not regulated by the Township Code,
including failing to both fence and house his livestock [Id. ¶ 30], failing to remove cut
trees, [Id. ¶¶ 30, 53, 113–115], and using improper fencing materials and colors [Id.

¶¶ 39–40, 54–55, 57]. Furthermore, Mr. Valentine states he had his permits
erroneously revoked or denied, such as the permits for agricultural uses [Id. ¶¶ 45–46,
122–123, 128–129] and light poles [Id. ¶¶ 109–111, 113, 115].
Additionally, Mr. Valentine contends that when he reported code violations to

the Township, they were either ignored or met with animus. More specifically, when
Mr. Valentine reported Fire Marshal’s son for doing construction “beginning in
2018” without a permit, no action was taken by any Township official. [Id. ¶¶ 24–
25.] As a result, Plaintiffs claim the construction flooded the Farm and created a
pond, which Plaintiffs were subsequently issued a violation for. [Id. ¶¶ 59–61.] On

another occasion, Mr. Valentine reported another neighbor for storing potentially
hazardous vehicles, which the Township allegedly never acted to rectify. [Id. ¶¶ 133–
136.] Instead, within six hours of the report, Mr. D’Amico, the Township’s
Plumbing Sub-Code official, issued Plaintiffs two code violations that were unrelated
to plumbing. [Id. ¶¶ 137, 139.]
However, the most significant dispute regards the permit for a safety berm on
the Farm, a requirement imposed on Mr. Valentine because he uses his land for
firearms target practice. [Id. ¶¶ 16–20.] On the morning of July 22, 2019, Defendant

Manfredi purportedly led an unannounced “raid” on the Farm, along with
Defendants Ms. Park and Mr. D’Amico, as well as at least two armed police officers.
[Id. ¶¶ 62–64, 68.] The Farm was occupied by Mr. Valentine’s girlfriend, nine-year-
old son, and fourteen-year-old daughter, who Mr. Valentine asserts were terrified by
the raid. [Id. ¶¶ 76–77.] Without Mr. Valentine’s permission, the officials entered the

Farm and took photos, videos, and a voice recording, with the alleged purpose of
determining if the safety berm was constructed. [Id. ¶¶ 70, 73, 80, 81.] At the time,
Mr. Manfredi directly reported to Defendant Richard DiLucia, the Mayor of Monroe
Township, who Plaintiffs claim authorized the raid. [Id. ¶¶ 78–79.]

Three months prior to the raid, Mr. Valentine filed disorderly persons charges
against the Fire Marshal’s son in the Monroe Municipal Court, which Fire Marshal’s
son was subsequently arrested and charged for. [Id. ¶¶ 85–86.] Mr. Valentine was a
witness in this pending criminal matter at the time of the raid. [Id. ¶¶ 95–96.] While
Mr. Valentine was in the courthouse regarding the criminal matter, he alleges that

the Fire Marshal approached him and said, “he would wipe the smile off Mr.
Valentine’s face while holding his Fire Marshal badge in Mr. Valentine’s face.” [Id. ¶
116.] Prior to that confrontation, Mr. Valentine audio recorded the Fire Marshal’s
son who also verbally threatened him and avowed his father’s political connections.
[Id. ¶¶ 118.]
After the raid, Plaintiffs did not receive any citations or violations, despite
never constructing the safety berm. [Id. ¶¶ 67, 100.] Furthermore, Mr. Manfredi did
not include the voice recording of the raid in his report to the Township, and

allegedly did not tell Mayor DiLucia about the recording of the raid either. [Id. ¶¶
101–102.] Instead, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Manfredi gave a copy to the Fire
Marshal’s son and daughter-in-law, who Plaintiffs’ claim were already contemplating
civil litigation against them at such time. [Id. ¶¶ 103–104.] Plaintiffs also claim the

Fire Marshal directed Mr. Manfredi to provide the recording to his daughter-in-law
to conceal his role in the raid. [Id. ¶ 105.] However, when questioned under oath,
Mr. Manfredi said the Fire Marshal never directly asked him to write violations
against Plaintiffs, a fact Plaintiffs dispute. [Id. ¶¶ 98–99.]
Plaintiffs experienced further confrontation with the Fire Marshal and

disparate treatment from the Township. On March 10, 2021, while in his official
vehicle, Fire Marshal chased an individual unrelated to Plaintiffs’ property and into
their driveway. [Id. ¶¶ 141–142.] The Fire Marshal allegedly trespassed and engaged
in a violent altercation with the individual in front of Mr. Valentine’s young son. [Id.
¶ 144.] The individual stopped by the Fire Marshal on Plaintiffs’ property was

allegedly in litigation against the Fire Marshal’s son. [Id. ¶ 140.] Furthermore,
starting in late 2021, a police officer for Monroe Township began issuing Mr.
Valentine’s girlfriend numerous traffic citations. [Id. ¶ 145.] The officer was a
volunteer fireman in Monroe Township, and he allegedly admitted he issued the
citations in an attempt to get a position as a paid fireman. [Id. ¶ 147, 149, 151.]
Plaintiffs also allege that Monroe Township has not taken any steps to correct or
punish the Fire Marshal for any improper conduct. [Id. ¶ 152.]
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Concerning Land Use Issues

In addition to the alleged conspiracy described above, the Consolidated
Complaint describes several issues pertaining to Plaintiffs’ land use on the farm,
including Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain land use permits from the Township as well as
Plaintiffs’ interests in not being unfairly assessed for land use violations. The first

land use issue concerns Mr. Valentine’s request for a livestock permit submitted on
or around June 4, 2018, to Ms. Flaherty. [Id. ¶ 10.] Ms. Flaherty allegedly gave
Plaintiff verbal approval, however she “refused” to deliver the written permit. [Id. ¶
11.] Then, on December 12, 2018, Ms. Park purportedly issued erroneous violation
notices for Plaintiffs’ failure to both fence and house livestock. [Id. ¶ 30.] Plaintiffs

claim the violation was erroneous since the Township Code distinguishes between
livestock and poultry, and they only possessed poultry at the time. [Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.]
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue they could not have constructed a fence regardless, as
the Fire Marshal’s son “erected a fence and installed plantings on [Plaintiffs’]
property which [the Fire Marshal’s son] would not timely remove.” [Id. ¶ 35.]

In April 2019, Mr. Valentine was issued a permit for a “chain link” fence, but
after construction was finished, he received a violation for using other fencing
materials, which he claims is not even regulated by the Township Code. [Id. ¶¶ 38–
40.] On April 30, 2019, he requested a second permit for a wire fence. [Id. ¶ 41.] The
Township officials allegedly responded to Mr. Valentine by: (1) requesting he submit
pictures of the materials to be used, (2) refusing the request due to an alleged open
permit violation, and (3) claiming that he was “not permitted to have an agricultural

‘use’ within 50 feet of his property line.” [Id. ¶¶ 42–43, 45.] Plaintiffs assert the
refusal was erroneous, as the alleged permit violation had already been remedied,
and “agricultural uses,” as opposed to “agricultural structures,” are permitted
anywhere on the property. [Id. ¶¶ 44, 46.]
In May 2019, after constructing the fence, Mr. Valentine painted it red, white,

and blue. [Id. ¶¶ 54.] In response, Ms. Park sent an unsigned letter to Plaintiffs and
their neighbors “suggesting” that Plaintiffs should paint their fence white or brown,
although Plaintiff maintains that the Township Code does not regulate fence color.
[Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 57.]

As discussed above, another issue concerns the construction of the “safety
berm” on the Farm. As a lawful gun owner, and in accordance with the Monroe
ordinance,3 Mr. Valentine would conduct firearms target practice on the Farm,
which induced numerous police complaints from his neighbors. [Id. ¶¶ 14–16.] In
response, Monroe officials “encouraged [Plaintiffs] to construct a ‘Berm’ to fire into

during target practice,” despite the lack of any Township Code requiring such. [Id. ¶¶
17, 19.] Nevertheless, Ms. Flaherty “required the permit for and ordered Mr.
Valentine to construct the safety Berm,” and on July 3, 2018, she issued the permit.

3 Mr. Valentine asserts he did not discharge any firearm within 450 feet of a residence
as mandated by applicable Monroe ordinance. [Compl. ¶¶ 15–16.]
[Id. ¶¶ 18, 22.] As discussed, Monroe officials conducted a raid on the Farm with the
alleged purpose of determining if the safety berm was constructed on July 22, 2019,
and accordingly, they confirmed that it was not. [Id. ¶¶ 62, 66–67.]

Plaintiffs contend the Fire Marshal’s son further interfered with their property
by causing flooding on their farm, which killed their trees and formed a pond. [Id. ¶¶
26–27.] According to Plaintiffs, the Fire Marshal’s son “commenced various building
and construction activities . . . includ[ing] clearing, grading, filling, and construction

of a road behind their residence without having obtained all appropriate approvals
and permits, and in violation of the Township Code.” [Id. ¶¶ 23–24.] Plaintiffs assert
this unapproved construction caused flooding on their farm, which led their trees to
become diseased and hazardous, and ultimately forced Mr. Valentine to chop some
of them down. [Id. ¶¶ 26–28.] Plaintiffs claim that “neither [Ms. Flaherty] nor any

other Township officials” took action when they reported the construction projects.
[Id. ¶ 25.] Contrarily, Ms. Flaherty issued Mr. Valentine a violation for failing to
remove the cut trees. [Id. ¶30.] Still, none of Plaintiffs’ neighbors are named as a
party to this suit.
In May 2019, Plaintiffs hired an arborist who confirmed that the trees in the

flooded portion of the Farm were either dead or dying from disease and were a safety
and property risk that would need to be removed. [Id. ¶¶ 47–48.] Mr. Valentine
consulted Ms. Park about removing them, and she advised him that he needed to get
approval from the New Jersey Pinelands Commission. [Id. ¶ 49.] Although the
Pinelands Commission instructed Mr. Valentine that he did not need its approval,
Ms. Park continued to insist otherwise, and further instructed him to submit a plan
for the tree removal, despite no such requirement in the Township Code. [Id. ¶¶ 51–
53, ¶ 114.] Mr. Valentine asserts that he submitted a tree removal plan, but

nevertheless was repeatedly threatened with legal action for failing to submit a plan
in subsequent letters from the zoning officer. [Id. ¶¶ 112, 113, 115.] Beyond
damaging Plaintiffs’ trees, the flooding also created a pond on the Farm. [Id. ¶ 60.] In
July 2019, Ms. Park “accused Mr. Valentine of clearing his [p]roperty and creating a

pond in violation of the Township Code,” although Plaintiffs argue the pond would
have never formed if the Township intervened when the Fire Marshal’s son’s
construction was initially reported. [Id. ¶¶ 59, 61.]
Mr. Valentine also claims that he was harassed by the Township regarding the
installation of three light poles on the Farm, which he had already received a permit

for. [Id. ¶¶ 106, 109–110.] On August 14, 2019, Mr. Valentine received a letter from
the zoning officer revoking the permit and directing him to seek a variance. [Id. ¶
111.] In two subsequent letters, Ms. Park “threatened legal action against Mr.
Valentine for not obtaining a variance for the light poles installed with the permit
issued by the Township . . . .” [Id. ¶¶ 113, 115.]

Starting in July 2020, Plaintiffs claim that there were various additional issues,
violations, and threats. First, on July 21, 2020, Ms. Park sent Mr. Valentine a letter
threatening a violation for the location of his chicken coop claiming that the property
was not a farm,4 despite the fact that: (1) the Township zoning map shows the
property is in an agricultural use district, (2) Mr. Valentine operated the property as a
farm since June 2018, and (3) Ms. Park had previously issued him a poultry license,

which is an agricultural use. [Id. ¶¶ 119, 122–123.] Second, on August 13, 2020, Ms.
Park sent Mr. Valentine a letter that withdrew some violations, but still insisted
there was a fence violation.5 [Id. ¶ 124.] Nevertheless, one-week later Ms. Park
reinstated some of the previously withdrawn violations. [Id. ¶ 125.] Third, on

October 16, 2020, Mr. Valentine applied for a farm accessory structures permit,
which was subsequently denied and accompanied with a citation “for the
construction of a feed shed structure of improvement which was never built.” [Id. ¶¶
128–129.] Over a year later, on March 24, 2022, Ms. Park “finally relented and
reluctantly issued the Zoning Permit for farm accessory structures.” [Id. ¶ 130.]

Plaintiffs also claim they have experienced disparate treatment from the
Township as compared to their neighbors. [Id. ¶ 132.] Around September 2021, Mr.
Valentine became concerned that one of his neighbors6 was storing hundreds of
damaged vehicles that were leaking harmful pollutants into the soil and
groundwater. [Id. ¶¶ 133–134.] Mr. Valentine alleges he reported the issue to Ms.

4 Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Park initially argued that the Farm violated the
“International Property Maintenance Code”, although the IPMC was never adopted
into the Township Code. [Compl. ¶¶ 119, 121.]
5 On September 3, 2020, Mr. Valentine “applied for an ‘additional’ fence permit”
which was granted. [Compl. ¶¶ 126–127.]
6 This neighbor’s property is located at 1398 South Black Horse Pike, Williamstown,
New Jersey. [Compl. ¶ 133.]
Park, but “Township officials had either condoned or turned a blind eye to the
improper creation of a junk yard in the Township and did not want action taken.”
[Id. ¶ 135–136.] Furthermore, within six hours of reporting the issue, Mr. Valentine

received two code violations from Steven D’Amico, the Township’s Plumbing Sub-
code official, who Mr. Valentine assert “had no authority to issue the violations
which had nothing to do with plumbing.” [Id. ¶¶ 137, 139.]
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2022, Plaintiffs initiated separate actions against Defendants in this
Court and the New Jersey Superior Court, Gloucester County, Law Division;
subsequently, the state court action was removed, and the two actions were
consolidated pursuant to an Order by this Court dated November 28, 2022. [Docket
No. 13.] On December 6, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Consolidated Complaint. [Docket

No. 14.]
As an initial matter, the Consolidated Complaint is unclear in terms of which
specific causes of action Plaintiffs have brought against Defendants. Counts I and III
both allege Violations of Equal Protection against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§1983; Counts II and IV also allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, asserting

Violations of Substantive Due Process since the course of conduct taken by
Defendants was pursuant to a Township policy (Count II), as well as Violations of
Procedural and Substantive Due Process, asserting a theory of vicarious liability for
acts taken by Defendants within the scope of their employment with the Township
(Count IV); Count V arises under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, but contains a caption that Plaintiffs were denied equal protection
under the laws of the State of New Jersey; Count VI asserts Violations of Due
Process under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”); Count VII asserts

Violations of the New Jersey Civil RICO Act under N.J.S.A. 2C: 41-2(c); Count VIII
asserts Official Misconduct by New Jersey Township Employees under N.J.S.A. 2C:
30-2, N.J.S.A. 2C: 30-6 and N.J.S.A. 2C: 30-7; finally, the Consolidated Complaint
asserts Claim IX against John/Jane Does 1-5. [Compl. ¶¶ 348–452.]
On January 18, 2023, this Court Ordered that Count VII of the Consolidated

Complaint (violations of New Jersey Civil RICO Act) as asserted against Monroe
Township and Count VIII of the Consolidated Complaint (official misconduct by
New Jersey Township employees) dismissed with prejudice [Docket No. 27],
following Plaintiffs’ pre-motion letter conceding that those specific causes of action

fail to state a claim as a matter of law [Docket No. 23].
III. JURISDICTION
The Court exercises original subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff alleges causes of action arising under the
laws of the United States.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir.
2005). It is well-settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)

(first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); then citing Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of
Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three
steps. First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations
that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009)). A court may
“generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached
to the complaint and matters of public record.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249
(3d Cir. 2014) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “not whether a plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded
the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in the coffin for the ‘no
set of facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints before Twombly.”). “A

motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Further, may prevail on the statute of limitations at the
motion to dismiss stage ‘if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the
cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.’” Demetro v.

Police Dep't, City of Cherry Hill, N.J., 2011 WL 5873063, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011)
(quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir.2002)).
V. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs assert various claims against Defendants based on the parties’ long
history. First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants denied them equal protection under

the law by unfairly enforcing the Township Code against Plaintiffs and interfering
with their use of the Farm. [Compl. ¶¶ 326, 351–352, 372–377.] Second, Plaintiffs
contend that Defendants violated their right to procedural and substantive due
process because Defendants revoked and denied Plaintiffs’ land use permits, insisted
on compliance with nonexistent Township Codes, and raided Plaintiffs’ property.
[Id. ¶¶ 357–358, 362–363, 383–393.] Finally, Plaintiffs argue Defendants violated the
New Jersey Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“NJ RICO”)

because Defendants acted in concert to intimidate Plaintiffs and obstruct their
property rights in order to benefit the Fire Marshal and his family. [See Id. ¶¶ 396–
398, 402–404, 409, 411, 428–429.]
Defendants argue that most of Plaintiffs’ allegations are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations because the conduct alleged by Defendants consisted

of discrete acts that put Plaintiffs on notice of their claims. [Monroe Br. at 16–17, 22–
23; Ind. Motion at 8.] Second, Defendants contend Plaintiffs cannot maintain any
equal protection claims because the Complaint fails to allege that “the [D]efendants
treated [P]laintiffs differently from another similarly situated individual . . . based

upon any unjustifiable standard.” [Monroe Br. at 1–2; Ind. Motion at 13–14.] Third,
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims should be
dismissed because “[a]t most, the facts allege disagreements over enforcement of
municipal ordinances,” which does not shock the conscience. [Monroe Br. at 30.]
Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims fail because

the Complaint does not allege “that the Township had no, or inadequate, procedures
in place to address [the] issues or that [P]laintiffs were denied access to these
procedures.” [Id. at 33.] Finally, Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ NJ RICO claim,
arguing that the facts alleged by Plaintiffs “fail to constitute a ‘pattern of
racketeering’, or even a single RICO predicate offense.” [Monroe Opp’n at 15; Ind.
Motion at 10.]
A. Most of Plaintiffs’ Allegations Are Time-Barred

First, the Court considers the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’
claims. Title 42, U.S. Code, Section 1983 provides the federal cause of action,
however, state law “determines when the claim accrues.” Dique v. New Jersey State
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). This is because Section 1983 claims are

characterized as personal injury claims, and thus, adopt the applicable state statute of
limitations for such claims. Id. Therefore, in New Jersey, Section 1983 claims are
subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Id. (holding the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in
New Jersey is two years in accordance with New Jersey personal injury law);

Williams v. Borough of Highland Park, 707 F. App'x 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2017). Claims
brought under the NJCRA are also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. Further, the parties do not dispute that two-years is the
applicable statute of limitations for such claims. [Monroe Opp’n at 5–6; Monroe Br.
at 16; Ind. Br. at 8.]

A Section 1983 claim accrues, “and the statute of limitations begins to run,
‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is
based.’” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sameric Corp. v. City
of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998)). The Kach Court explained the
justification for this rule:
[t]he cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is
not then known or predictable. Were it otherwise, the statute would
begin to run only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been
harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands
of the party seeking relief.

Id. at 634–635 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1097, 166
L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007)). Here, the Complaint filed first-in-time by Plaintiffs was that in
this federal court action on July 1, 2022. [Docket No. 1.] Thus, any claims arising
under Section 1983 or the NJCRA that Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of
prior to July 1, 2020, are time-barred.
Defendants correctly point out that “virtually all the defendants’ alleged acts
upon which Plaintiffs base their constitutional claims” occurred before the statute of
limitations period. [Monroe Br. at 16–17.] More specifically, Defendants assert that
each of the alleged acts committed before the statute ran were discrete and actionable
at the time they occurred, and that Plaintiffs knew, or at least should have known, of
their alleged injuries when they occurred. [Monroe Reply 3–4.] Plaintiffs do not
dispute the fact that many of their allegations fall outside the statute of limitations
period, but nonetheless, argue that such conduct is actionable as part of a continuing
practice of unlawful acts by Defendants and since “the last act evidencing the
practice falls within the limitations period.” [Monroe Opp’n at 8 (quoting Cibula v.

Fox, 570 F. App’x 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2014)).]
Plaintiffs cite Bennett v. Susquehanna Cty. Children and Youth Servs., 592 Fed.
App’x 81, 85 (3d Cir. 2014) as support for their argument that the continuing
violations doctrine may apply in the context of a Section 1983 claim. In Bennett, the
Third Circuit expressly acknowledged that the limitations exceptions under the
doctrine “is most often applied in employment discrimination cases,” and depends
on two factors: “(1) whether the violations were related in subject matter, and (2)

whether the acts were recurring.” Id. at 84 (quoting Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d
286, 292 (3d Cir.2001)). The Third Circuit found that a mother who had lost custody
of her children could not maintain a time-barred claim of duress against caseworkers
who had removed the children. The claim was based on only four occasions where
the mother was told her children could be taken away from her while reviewing and

signing child safety plans. Although these acts all related to the same subject matter
regarding custody of her children, the court found that “the frequency of the
defendants' alleged coercion does not rise to the level required by the continuing
violations doctrine.” Id. at 85.

After all, “the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon
the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Williams, 707 F.
App'x at 76 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Williams, the plaintiffs
received notices in 2012 that they were not in compliance with a sidewalk
maintenance ordinance and were subsequently issued summonses in 2014 and 2015

for noncompliance. Id. at 73–74. The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that the summonses should be considered separate events that reset the limitations
period because there is a distinction between “continual unlawful acts” and
“continual ill effects from an original violation.” Id. at 76 (quoting Cowell v. Palmer
Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2001)). Williams held that the plaintiffs “were aware
of the consequences of the ordinance as applied to them when they received the 2012
notices,” and therefore, should have “brought their § 1983 claims within the
applicable limitations period instead of waiting until after they experienced

additional consequences….” Id.
Like in Williams, here, the Court finds that the alleged unlawful acts by
Defendants were discrete acts that put Plaintiffs on notice of their alleged injuries at
the time they occurred. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs were not prevented from
asserting their claims “as a result of extraordinary circumstances that would warrant

equitable tolling.” Bennett, 592 F. App’x at 84. The allegations set forth in the
Consolidated Complaint clearly establish that the alleged unlawful acts by
Defendants were recurring, which satisfies the second prong of the continuing
violations doctrine. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead the

first prong for the continuing doctrine to apply, namely, that the alleged unlawful
acts relate to the same subject matter. Bennett, 592 Fed. App’x at 84. Indeed, the
Consolidated Complaint makes clear that Defendants’ acts pertain to a multitude of
different subject matter regarding Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ neighbors’ land use,
including construction of the safety berm, having and housing livestock, tree

removal, fencing construction and painting, flooding and pond creation, a raid of
Plaintiffs’ property, light poles, and the neighbors’ permits and land use, among
others.
In any event, the Court finds that based on the pleadings, it is incontrovertible
that Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of their alleged injuries before the expiration of
the limitations period. Indeed, Paragraph 9 of the Consolidated Complaint admits as
much:
Beginning in June 2018, [Plaintiffs] noticed a negative change in the
way [they were] being treated by Township officials in dealings with the
Township when conducting official business for permits, licenses and
other Township approvals for the use and development of the property.

[Compl. ¶ 9.] The Court finds that the various compliance notices and permit denial
Plaintiffs received, as well as the raid by the Defendants on Plaintiffs’ land, were
discrete events that put Plaintiffs on notice of their purported injuries. Accordingly,
for purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims arising under Section 1983 and the NJCRA, the
Court finds that allegations occurring prior to July 1, 2020, are time-barred.7
B. Plaintiffs’ Timely-Asserted Allegations and Various Theories of
Liability under Section 1983 and the NJCRA

Plaintiffs’ remaining allegations timely-asserted for purposes of their claims
arising under Section 1983 and the NJCRA concern the following events: Ms.
Park’s letter in July 2020 that the location of Plaintiffs’ chicken coop violated the
Township code, Ms. Park’s letter in August 2020 that withdrew some violations but
insisted on a fence violation (followed by reinstatement of the withdrawn violations),
denial of Mr. Valentine’s farm accessory structures permit accompanied with a

7 Plaintiffs also assert violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in conjunction with their section
1983 claims. [Compl. ¶¶ 355, 359, 363.] The Court agrees with Defendants that, to
the extent that the Section 1983 claims are not timely, such claims are also not
properly before the Court under Section 1988. [Monroe Motion 17, n.3 (citing Fox v.
Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832–833 (2011) (Section 1988 provides for the award of
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a Section 1983 case).]
citation regarding construction of a feed shed structure, the Fire Marshal chasing
another individual onto Plaintiffs driveway resulting in a violent altercation in March
2021, the volunteer fireman who confessed to issuing citations to Mr. Valentine’s

girlfriend to get a paid position (which the Fire Marshal did not correct), reporting
his neighbor storing hundreds of damaged vehicles that were potentially polluting in
September 2021 (reported to Ms. Park but never looked into), and the plumbing code
violations issued by Defendant D’Amico (which allegedly had nothing to do with
plumbing and were issued six hours after reporting the neighbor’s vehicles). [Compl.

¶¶ 119, 122–124, 128–139, 140–152.] Next, the Court considers whether the
Consolidated Complaint states a plausible claim for relief under the various theories
of liability and causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs.
1. Equal Protection under Section 1983 (Counts I and III) and the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count V)

“Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of ‘rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, the NJCRA
creates a private cause of action under state law for “the deprivation of any
substantive due process of equal protections rights, privileges or immunities” secured
by federal or state law. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2(a).
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands

that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1992); U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause “does not forbid
classifications . . . [i]t simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant aspects alike.” Id. (quoting F.S. Royster

Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920)).
Plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim requires them to show “(1) that [they were]
treated differently from other similarly situated [entities], and (2) that this selective
treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some
other arbitrary factor, ... or to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.” PG Pub.

Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 115 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs assert selective enforcement violations under Section 1983 and the
NJCRA, arguing “(1) that the [D]efendants used their powers to punish and harass
[P]laintiffs at the direction of politically connected individuals; and (2) that the

[D]efendants used selective enforcement to damage the Plaintiffs.” [Ind. Opp’n at 8;
Monroe Opp’n at 10.] Plaintiffs, citing Simmermon v. Gabbianelli, 932 F. Supp. 2d
626, 633 (D.N.J. 2013), also argue that the issue of “whether an individual is
similarly situated for Equal Protection claims is a question of fact for a jury to
determine.” [Ind. Opp’n at 8.] However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs reliance on

Simmermon is misplaced. There, the District Court explained that the plaintiffs’
selective enforcement claim survived summary judgment only if “a reasonable jury
could conclude that they were treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals and that a reasonable jury could conclude that this selective treatment
was based on an arbitrary factor or intended to prevent the exercise of a fundamental
right.” Simmermon, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 632. Here, Plaintiffs must first plead the
requisite elements of their claims before then showing that a reasonable jury could
find in their favor based on the evidence of record.

Conversely, Defendants assert two main arguments: first, that the
Consolidated Complaint does not identify any alleged instances of disparate
treatment which occurred after July 1, 2020; second, that Plaintiffs have not alleged
any facts from which it can be inferred that Plaintiffs’ neighbors are alike in all
relevant aspects. [Ind. Motion 8, 14; Monroe Br. at 25–26.] The Court does not agree

with Defendants’ first argument and finds that, read in context, the allegations
concerning the unwarranted plumbing code violations is an example of disparate
treatment timely asserted by Plaintiffs.
The Court finds convincing Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs have failed
to plead that their neighbors are “alike in all relevant aspects,” and that the Plaintiffs

have not even identified “a single specified Code violation or enforcement action
which was applied unevenly to plaintiffs’ [Farm] as compared to the Neighbors’
property.” [Monroe Br. at 26–27.] “An essential element of a claim of selective
treatment under the Equal Protection Clause is that the comparable parties were
‘similarly situated.’” Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)

(citing Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)). Indeed, Plaintiffs
have not pled that their property is similar to their neighbors in terms of land use.
For example, if the neighbors are not farmers, then they likely would have no need
for a livestock permit like Plaintiffs. And if they do not shoot firearms, they would
have no interactions with Township officials about the potential need for a safety
berm.
After careful review of the timely allegations set forth in Consolidated

Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff fail to specify any particular provision of the
Township code that was enforced against them relative to a similarly situated
neighbor in land use terms. Ms. Park’s letters regarding violations for Plaintiffs’
chicken coop, fence, and feed shed structure concern only Plaintiffs’ land. The same
is true regarding the Fire Marshal’s alleged altercation with another individual on the

Farm and the plumbing code violations issued by Defendant D’Amico. Plaintiffs’
remaining allegation that they reported a neighbor for storing hazardous vehicles not
investigated by Defendants (while Plaintiffs’ various violations were promptly looked
into) is a closer call. The U.S. Supreme Court found allegations that a municipal
requirement for a plaintiff to construct a 33-foot easement while requiring only a 15-

foot easement of similarly situated property owners as “irrational and wholly
arbitrary” were “sufficient to state a claim for relief under tradition equal protection
analysis.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000). Plaintiffs’ inference
that he was retaliated against with nonexistent plumbing code violations for
reporting a neighbor’s violation of a different provision of the Township code

regulating hazardous materials still does not make out a plausible claim of selective
enforcement because there are no allegations in the Consolidated Complaint that the
neighbors were similarly situated under the code in the first instance. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the Consolidated Complaint fails to state a plausible selective
enforcement claim.
2. Substantive Due Process under Section 1983 (Counts II and IV)
and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count VI)

The Monroe Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims
must be dismissed because the timely-asserted allegations in the Consolidated
Complaint do not rise to the heightened “shocks the conscience” standard required
of such claims. [Monroe Br. at 28–30.] The NJCRA was modelled after section 1983,
and thus New Jersey state courts apply the same “shocks the conscience” standard to
substantive due process claims arising from land use decisions. Rezem Fam. Assocs.,

LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 115, 30 A.3d 1061, 1067 (App. Div.
2011) (citations omitted).
The Monroe Defendants primarily rely upon United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v.
Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003), where in adopting the
standard, the Third Circuit explained that “[a]pplication of the ‘shocks the

conscience’ standard in this context also prevents us from being cast in the role of a
‘zoning board of appeals.’” United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA,
316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003). The Circuit acknowledged that its ruling brought it
into line with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of
Chesterfield, finding allegations that a city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance

insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and noting in dicta that even a
“bad-faith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law.” Id. (quoting
963 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1992)). In Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, the
Third Circuit clarified that United Artists “did not apply the ‘shocks the conscience’
standard to legislative action; rather, we clearly held in United Artists that “executive

action violates substantive due process only when it shocks the conscience.” 442 F.3d
159, 169 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United Artists, 316 F.3d at 399–400 (emphasis in
original).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ challenges regarding how Defendants

enforced the Township code against them relative to their neighbors concerns non-
legislative action. Like in Chesterfield Dev., the Court finds that the Consolidated
Complaint does not contain any timely allegations that Defendants engaged in the
kind of “truly irrational governmental actions” that shocks the conscience and gives
rise to a non-legislative substantive due process claim under federal or state law. 963

F.2d at 1104. Instead, the relevant, timely allegations in the Consolidated Complaint
concern the legitimacy of the plumbing code violations and other specific violations
cited in Ms. Park’s letters under the Township code. Such allegations seem “better
addressed to state courts and administrative bodies. Otherwise, every violation of
state law could be turned into a federal constitutional tort.” Id. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for violations of substantive
due process.
3. Procedural Due Process under Section 1983 (Count IV)
“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must
have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those
processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116
(3d Cir. 2000) “[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements
when it has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused

to avail himself of them.” Id. (quoting Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th
Cir.1982) (citations omitted). “If there is a process on the books that appears to
provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts
as a means to get back what he wants.” Id. (citing McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460

(3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). The Court finds that there are no timely-asserted
allegations in the Consolidated Complaint that Defendants had no, or inadequate,
procedures in place, or that Plaintiff was denied access to any of the Township’s
specific zoning procedures. Accordingly, the Consolidated Complaint states no
plausible violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process.

C. NJ RICO (Count VII)
In New Jersey, RICO claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.
See Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, Plaintiffs
allegations as stated in the Consolidated Complaint are timely for purposes of this
remaining claim. To state a claim under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c), a plaintiff must plead:

(1) The existence of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise engaged in or
its activities affected trade or commerce; (3) that the defendant was
employed by, or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he or she
participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that
he or she participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.

State v. Ball, 141 N.J. 142, 661 A.2d 251 (1995). NJ RICO defines “racketeering
activity” more expansively than the federal RICO statute and includes a list of crimes
constituting “racketeering activities” in addition to any “racketeering activities” set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), (B) and (D), such as murder, kidnapping, gambling,
extortion, fraud in the offering, sale or purchase of securities, and violation of

specific state statutes, among other things. N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-1(a). To establish a
“pattern of racketeering” a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant committed at
least two predicate acts, and (2) “the incidents of racketeering activity embrace
criminal conduct that has either the same or similar purposes, results, participants or
victims or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing

characteristics and are not isolated incidents.” See Ball, 141 N.J. at 163–164, 167–
169, 661 A. 2d 251 at 261–262, 264–265.
Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants denied them permits they otherwise
qualified for, issued unwarranted citations, and imposed nonexistent requirements.
However, it appears that Plaintiffs RICO claim is severely lacking in terms of what

prohibited “racketeering activity” was committed by any named Defendant, when
the alleged RICO conspiracy occurred, its scope, who participated in it, and to what
extent. Defendant Mayor DiLucia also makes a compelling argument that Plaintiffs
identify no instance of his personal involvement. [Monroe Br. at 38.]
In any event, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ NJ RICO claim. Having found that Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint
fails to state a plausible federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court
find that there are no circumstances warranting jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining
state law claim at this early stage of the litigation. See Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty.,
443 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). Still, it appears that Plaintiffs’ vague allegations of
“fraudulent” permit denials, citations, and personal animus fail to state a claim of
“racketeering activity” by Defendants prohibited under NJ RICO. NJ RICO

prohibits certain frauds, including mail and wire fraud, but the Consolidated
Complaint fails to plead, with specificity, any such prohibited frauds or other
conduct by Defendants that violated a particular subsection of prohibited
“racketeering activity” under the statute.
Further, the Court notes that in federal RICO cases the Court typically

requires a RICO Case Order, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1 and this
Court’s Individual Rules and Procedures. Such RICO Order calls for detailed factual
allegations by a plaintiff asserting such claim and is appended to the Local Rules as
Appendix O, which is based upon the “reasonable inquiry” requirement under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 that counsel conduct into the law and facts before signing pleadings.

Here, no such RICO Order was required since Plaintiffs’ claims arise under New
Jersey law, but the Court still has concerns regarding Rule 11’s “reasonable inquiry”
requirements in light of the causes of action asserted in Plaintiffs’ Consolidated
Complaint.
The Court is also mindful of Plaintiffs’ representation that their disputes with

Defendants “have continued into the present” and that they intend to seek leave to
further amend their pleadings “to include actions arising by defendants since the
filing of the last amended complaint.” [Monroe Opp’n at 8.] However, pursuant to
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1, Plaintiffs may only further amend their pleading
by filing a motion that complies with the requirements of the Rule. To date, Plaintiffs
have filed no such motion.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motions.
Plaintiffs’ federal claims (Counts I-VI) shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. An accompanying Order shall issue separately on today’s date.

August 31, 2023 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date Renée Marie Bumb
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10655732. Public record. Not legal advice.