# RIDLEY v. MRS BPO, LLC

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 18, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10654753

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 18, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FATIMA RIDLEY, individually,
and on behalf of all other

similarly situated consumers,
Civil No. 18-12696 (NLH/JS)

Plaintiff, OPINION

v.

MRS BPO, LLC,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
DANIEL ZEMEL
ZEMEL LAW LLC
1373 BROAD STREET
SUITE 203-C
CLIFTON, NJ 07013

On Behalf of Plaintiff Fatima Ridley.

ALEKSANDER P. POWIETRZYNSKI
WINSTON & WINSTON PC
750 THIRD AVENUE
SUITE 978
NEW YORK, NY 10017

On Behalf of Defendant MRS BPO, LLC.

HILLMAN, District Judge

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Fatima Ridley
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant MRS BPO, LLC (“Defendant”)
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”) when it incorrectly identified the
original creditor on “trade lines”1 placed on Plaintiff’s credit
report. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for class
certification (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff’s Motion

will be granted.
BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a one-count putative
class action complaint against Defendant for allegedly violating
the FDCPA (the “Complaint”). (ECF No. 1). The facts underlying
the Complaint are relatively straightforward.
At some unspecified time, Plaintiff incurred a private
student loan debt. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶6). In
furtherance of its debt collection efforts, Defendant, a debt
collector, placed a trade line2 on Plaintiff’s credit report in
October 2017, incorrectly listing Transworld Systems Inc.
(“Transworld” or “TSI”) as the purported original creditor.

(Compl. at ¶¶14-18). The parties appear to agree that
Transworld is not, in fact, the original creditor for

1 According to the Complaint, a trade line on a credit report
contains multiple fields of mandatory information relevant to a
debt, such as the balance owed, payment history, and the
identity of the original creditor. (Compl. at ¶¶8-12).

2 Plaintiff testified she first saw the information on her credit
report in 2016 raising issues as to whether her claim was barred
by the statute of limitations. However, it appears that
discovery from Defendant dates the initial trade line entry to
October 2017, placing Plaintiff’s action comfortably within the
one-year statute of limitations period.
Plaintiff’s debt, and that Defendant “improperly reported TSI in
some cases instead of the name that . . . should have been
[reported].” (ECF No. 30-1 (“Meyer Dep.”) at 1T22:1-5); see

(ECF No. 27 (“Def. Br.”) at 1) (“Transworld retained Defendant
to collect a student loan Plaintiff owed to NCSLT [(National
Collegiate Student Loans Trust)]”). In light of Defendant’s
error, Plaintiff alleges that she was unsure whether payment was
required and that the proverbial “least sophisticated debtor”
would be equally confused. (Compl. at ¶19).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant made similar errors
affecting other debtors and asks this Court to certify the
following class: “[a]ll consumers with a Pennsylvania address
for whom Defendant reported an incorrect original creditor to
the credit reporting agencies for personal, household, or family
debts originating within one year prior to the filing of this
complaint.”3 (Compl. at ¶22).

3 As drafted, Plaintiff’s proposed class definition appears too
broad. This action stems from Defendant incorrectly identifying
Transworld as an original creditor on Plaintiff’s credit report.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant similarly misidentified
Transworld as the original on the proposed absent class members’
credit reports. The proposed class definition, however, paints
with a broader stroke; it suggests that Plaintiff seeks
certification of a class in which Defendant reported any
incorrect original creditor on debtors’ credit reports. Based
upon the parties’ filings and the other information available to
this Court including the testimony of Defendant’s corporate
representative discussed infra, it appears Plaintiff does not,
in fact, seek to certify such a wide-reaching class. Instead,
it appears that the parties agree this case is limited to
Defendant offered the following discovery response relevant
to determining whether class certification would be appropriate:
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the number of persons,
their full names and full addresses of all persons
within the State of Pennsylvania for whom Defendant
reported an incorrect original creditor to the credit
reporting agencies for personal, household, or family
debts originating within the period of time beginning
one year prior to the filing of this initial action
and end 21 days after the service of the initial
complaint.

ANSWER: Defendant objects. . . . Notwithstanding
and without waiving these objections, Defendant
estimates that there are 73 individuals for whom
Defendant furnished information to a consumer
reporting agency suggesting that Transworld Systems
Inc. was the creditor of an account within the
described time period.

(ECF No. 17-5 at ¶3).
Also before the Court is a portion of Michael Meyer’s
(“Meyer”) deposition.4 The parties elected to submit only
narrow portions of Meyer’s deposition transcript for the
Court’s review, and the portions submitted fail to fully
clarify Meyer’s role in this action. Plaintiff represents
in her briefing that Meyer testified as Defendant’s
corporate representative, which does not appear to be

Defendant’s incorrect listing of Transworld as a creditor. The
Court adopts this narrower view of the proposed class in
deciding the present motion.

4 Plaintiff submits portions of Meyer’s deposition transcript for
the first time along with her reply brief. Because Defendant
does not object to Plaintiff’s reliance on such material, the
Court will consider it in deciding the Motion.
disputed. Meyer’s deposition includes the following
testimony:
Q. Do you know what name it was and what name it
should have been?

A. I believe we improperly reported TSI in some cases
instead of the name that it should have been.

* * * *
Q. Okay. Over the course of the litigation, I have
asked MRS to explain or to identify the number of
people this happened to. Were you a part of that
investigation?

A. Recently, yes.

Q. And do you know how many people were affected by
this interface issue?

A. It’s not an interface issue.

Q. What would you call it?

A. I would call it a client code setting.

Q. Okay. Do you know how many people were affected by
the client code setting?

A. Yes.

Q. And how many people were affected?

A. 94.

Q. And how did you come to that determination?

A. We looked at the period of time. We looked at the
specific criteria based upon the suit. And based upon
those criteria, we looked at various queries and we
had to go back in time through all of the reporting
files that we have received to undertake and examine
which ones they were.
Q. And how do you identify in the course of your
investigation that one of these 94 people belong in
this list?

A. Based on the criteria that we were provided in the
suit based on the class action, we looked at what
constituted the class.

Q. Okay. Do you collect for TSI debts outside of
Pennsylvania?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you look to see whether consumers outside of
Pennsylvania have also been affected by the client
code setting issue?

A. No.

Q. Is it possible today that the client code setting
that affected Miss Ridley is affecting consumers in
different states outside of Pennsylvania?

A. During that time period, yes.

(Meyer Dep. at 1T22:1-5; 1T40:9 to 1T41:25).
Plaintiff’s Motion is fully briefed. See (ECF No. 17).
Defendant has opposed. (ECF No. 27). As such, the Motion is
ripe for adjudication.
ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
II. Class Certification: Standard and Analysis
“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
348, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d
176 (1979)). In order to justify a departure from the general

rule that each litigant proceeds with their own action, “a class
representative must be part of the class and possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” Id.
at 348-49 (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 52 L. Ed. 2d 453
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Every putative class action must satisfy the four
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. City Select
Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 438
(3d Cir. 2017) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 613, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997)). In more

detail, Rule 23(a) requires the movant to establish that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Beneli v. Bca Fin. Servs., 324 F.R.D. 89,
95 (D.N.J. 2018).
The party “seeking class certification bear[s] the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met.” In re NFL Players

Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia Mortg. Lending
Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 391 (3d Cir. 2015)).
In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, a class action
must be maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).
Plaintiff focuses exclusively on Rule 23(b)(3), which requires
Plaintiff to meet the additional requirements of predominance
and superiority. City Select, 867 F.3d at 438-39 (citing
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615). Under that subsection, a class must
also be “currently and readily ascertainable based on objective
criteria.” Id. at 439 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687
F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). To satisfy this standard,

Plaintiff must show that “(1) the class is ‘defined with
reference to objective criteria’; and (2) there is ‘a reliable
and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether
putative class members fall within the class definition.’” Id.
(quoting Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir.
2015)); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir.
2013). The district court must “undertake a rigorous analysis
of the evidence to determine if the standard is met.” Id.
(quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306).
A. Rule 23(a) Analysis
Plaintiff has satisfied the Rule 23(a) factors by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.” In re NFL Players
Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at 426 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(1)). “There is no magic number of class members needed
for a suit to proceed as a class action.” Id. That said,
numerosity is generally satisfied if there are more than forty
(40) class members. Id. (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
687 F.3d at 595; Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s discovery responses
establish that numerosity is satisfied. See (ECF No. 17-1 (“Pl.

Br.”) at 6). Defendant disagrees, arguing that any finding of
numerosity would “rest only on speculation[.]” (ECF No. 27
(“Def. Br.”) at 5).
The limited evidence before the Court suggests numerosity
has been met. Meyer explains that based upon a searching
inquiry guided by “the criteria that [Defendant was] provided in
the suit based on the class action, [Defendant] looked at what
constituted the class” and was able to identify 94 people
meeting the class definition.5 Taking Meyer’s testimony at face
value – including the representation that Defendant considered
the contours of the proposed class definition and, based upon a

reasoned analysis, concluded that 94 individuals fit within that
definition – the record contains sufficient evidence to
establish numerosity. Defendant’s suggestion otherwise
overlooks the testimony of its own corporate representative.
Based upon Defendant’s unequivocal testimony, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has met her burden as to this factor.
2. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there [be] questions of law or
fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[O]nly
one question of law or fact in common is necessary to satisfy
the commonality requirement, despite the use of the plural
‘questions’ in the language of Rule 23(a)(2).” In re Schering

Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 597 n.10 (3d Cir.
2009); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359.
Thus, there is a “low threshold for satisfying this
requirement.” Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 97 (first citing Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 183

5 Plaintiff considers Meyer’s testimony of 94 potential class
members to “correct” Defendant’s interrogatory answer suggesting
the number is 73 people. Either number is sufficient to
establish numerosity. In re NFL Players Concussion Injury
Litig., 821 F.3d at 426.
(3d Cir. 2001) and then citing In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789
F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986)) (highlighting the low threshold
for commonality).

Moreover, this requirement does not mandate that all
putative class members share identical claims. Hassine v.
Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1988). “Even where
individual facts and circumstances do become important to the
resolution, class treatment is not precluded.” Beneli, 324
F.R.D. at 97 (quoting Baby Neal, et al. v. Casey, et al., 43
F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff posits that this action presents questions of
fact and law common to the class. Among those common inquiries
are: (1) whether “Defendant report[ed] an incorrect original
creditor to credit reporting agencies” and (2) whether such an
error “violated the FDCPA[.]” (Pl. Br. at 7).

Defendant argues that “determining whether Defendant
furnished incorrect original creditor information to ‘credit
reporting agencies’ with respect to a putative class member will
not resolve the issue of whether Defendant violated the FDCPA
with respect to that class member.”6 (Def. Br. at 6). Defendant

6 Defendant cites to precedent regarding Article III standing
although the standing argument Defendant pursues in the context
of this case is unclear. Defendant does not appear to argue
that Plaintiff herself lacks injury-in-fact sufficient to confer
Article III standing, and to the extent Defendant argues that
Plaintiff must separately show that absent members of the
suggests that, in order for liability to attach, members of the
class had to have “notice that incorrect original credit
information had been furnished[.]” (Def. Br. at 7). Because

that question remains unique to each individual class member,
Defendant argues that certification would be inappropriate.
This view of the facts raises a legal question: must an
absent class member know that Defendant conveyed false
information on its credit report in order to proceed?7 A review
of Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest they contain a
“knowledge requirement[,]” as Defendant argues.

putative class meet the test for Article III standing, it is
incorrect. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig.
Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 307 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d,
482 U.S. 656, 107 S. Ct. 2617, 96 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1987)) (“the
named plaintiffs satisfy Article III. The absentee class
members are not required to make a similar showing, because once
the named parties have demonstrated they are properly before the
court, ‘the issue [becomes] one of compliance with the
provisions of Rule 23, not one of Article III standing’”); In re
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,
634 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357,
116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996)) (“[N]amed plaintiffs
who represent a class must allege and show that they personally
have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which
they purport to represent.”).

7 Defendant did not provide an analysis of this issue in its
briefing. Nonetheless, the Court construes Defendant’s
argument, at least in part, as one challenging whether the
absent class members must show injury-in-fact in order to
proceed. As explained in footnote five, supra, to the extent
that is in fact what Defendant argues, that argument lacks
merit.
Plaintiff advances claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), (8),
and (10). (Compl. at ¶40). Those portions of the FDCPA
provide, in relevant part:

A debt collector may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section:

(2) The false representation of—

(A) the character, amount, or legal status
of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation
which may be lawfully received by any
debt collector for the collection of a
debt.
. . . .

(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate
to any person credit information which is known
or which should be known to be false, including
the failure to communicate that a disputed debt
is disputed.

. . . .

(10) The use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt or to obtain information concerning a
consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), (8), and (10). The plain text of the
statute suggests no “knowledge” component is required before a
claim becomes viable. Available precedent supports that
reading.
A “specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually
confused or misled.” Id. (quoting Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419)
(emphasis in original). “Instead, the focus is on whether the
objective least sophisticated debtor would be deceived or misled
by a debt collector’s statement in a communication.” Id.

(citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419-20). “To determine whether a
representation giving rise to a FDCPA claim is false, deceptive,
or misleading, courts in the Third Circuit view the
communication at issue ‘from the perspective of the least
sophisticated debtor.’” Hochberg v. Lenox, Socey, Formidoni,
Giordano, Cooley, Lang & Casey, P.C., No. 16-5307, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43105, *6 (D.N.J. March 24, 2017) (quoting Kaymark
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015)); Knight
v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 755 Fed. Appx. 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 (3d
Cir. 2015)) (courts analyze FDCPA claims under the “least
sophisticated debtor” standard).

That said, for “a debt collector’s statement to be
actionable, it must be material.” Id. (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d
at 421). A statement is material if it has “the potential to
affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated
debtor.” Knight v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 755 Fed. Appx. at 174
(citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421). This, though, “is not a
particularly high bar.” Id. (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421).
Because the least sophisticated consumer test focuses not
on whether a particular individual would be confused or misled
by Defendant’s error but rather on whether the error has the
“potential” to confuse or mislead the least sophisticated
consumer, the relevant inquiry and any resulting conclusion is

common amongst all class members. See Id.
In light of the applicable law, Plaintiff has sufficiently
demonstrated that relevant, common questions predominate. Those
questions include: (1) whether Defendant improperly listed
Transworld as the original creditor on trade lines placed on the
proposed class members’ credit reports, and (2) whether such
errors would confuse or mislead the objectively judged least
sophisticated consumer. These inquiries are at the very heart
of this action, despite Defendant’s suggestion otherwise.
Plaintiff has met her burden under this factor.
3. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality
“Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class representatives’

claims be ‘typical of the claims . . . of the class.’” In re
NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at 427 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)). This requirement “ensures the
interests of the class and the class representatives are aligned
‘so that the latter will work to benefit the entire class
through the pursuit of their own goals.’” Id. at 427-28
(quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 182-83). Slight factual
differences will generally not preclude a finding of typicality
where there is a “strong similarity of legal theories or where
the claim arises from the same practice or course of conduct.”
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent
Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations

omitted).
“[T]he typicality requirement is satisfied as long as
representatives and the class claims arise from the same event
or practice or course of conduct and are based on the same legal
theory.” Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 97 (citing Brosious v.
Children’s Place Retail Stores, 189 F.R.D. 138, 146 (D.N.J.
1999); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923
(3d Cir. 1992) (“Factual differences will not render a claim
atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice of
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class
members, and it is based on the same legal theory.”). Cases
challenging the same unlawful conduct which affects both the

named plaintiffs and the putative class usually satisfy the
typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns
underlying the individual claims. See, e.g., Grubb v. Green
Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 13-7421, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117465,
*58 (D.N.J. July 27, 2017).
In the FDCPA context, courts have found claims typical of
the greater class when they arise from the routine and
repetitive practices of debt collectors:
Plaintiff’s allegations, in this matter, are
typical of the claims of the class — that is, they
pertain to debt communications from Defendant, which
are similar in form and substance. To that end, the
reasons as to why the . . . letters are allegedly
confusing or misleading under the least sophisticated
debtor standard, are equally applicable to the letters
which the potential class members received. And,
Plaintiff’s claims and those of the potential class
member share the same theories of liability, i.e., §§
1692g and 1692e of the FDCPA.

The typicality requirement, therefore, has also
been met.

Grubb v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117465, at *60; Nyby v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 15-cv-
886, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122056, *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2017)
(“Here, Nyby alleges the same claims and injury as the
Settlement Class Members — i.e., receiving the same [l]etter
that allegedly violates the FDCPA. Accordingly, typicality is
satisfied.”); Weissman v. Philip C. Gutworth, P.A., No. 14-cv-
666, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67477, *6-7 (D.N.J. May 26, 2015)
(“Plaintiff’s claims are identical to the class claims. They
are predicated on the same legal and factual circumstances:
Defendants’ alleged practice of mailing collection letters with
legally deficient language.”).
Defendant argues that typicality cannot be established
because each individual Plaintiff is subject to a unique
materiality defense. See (Def. Br. at 8). Defendant’s argument
lacks merit. True, for “a debt collector’s statement to be
actionable, it must be material[,]” Knight v. Midland Credit
Mgmt., 755 Fed. Appx. at 174 (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421),
but a statement is material if it has “the potential to affect

the decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor.”
Id. (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421). As noted above, it is
irrelevant whether a particular plaintiff was actually confused
or misled; all that matters is that the proverbial “least
sophisticated debtor” would have been misled. See Knight v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., 755 Fed. Appx. at 174 (quoting Jensen, 791
F.3d at 419) (a “specific plaintiff need not prove that she was
actually confused or misled.”).8
The law makes clear that the analysis focuses not on the
subjective perception of the individual, but rather on the
objectively assessed perception of the “least sophisticated
consumer.” With such a broad test of materiality, there does

not appear to be any requirement, therefore, that each
individual debtor have actual knowledge of the erroneous trade
line, and Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition

8 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States recently
issued its decision in Rotkiske v. Klemm, No. 18-328, 2019 WL
6703563 (2019) affirming the Third Circuit’s en banc decision at
890 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2018), determining that the statute
of limitations period for FDCPA actions begins to run from the
date of violation, as opposed to the date on which a victim
learns of the violation. Such a conclusion generally supports a
finding that knowledge of the violation is not a perquisite to
the viability of an action.
that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim arising from these facts contains
such an element.
It follows then that Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the

greater putative class. Specifically, Plaintiff and the
putative class allege that Defendant committed a mechanical
error affecting the class, namely, placing a trade line on their
credit reports improperly listing Transworld as the original
creditor. As instructed by Grubb, Nyby, and Weissman, such
routine practices in the FDCPA context regularly satisfy the
typicality requirement. Because Plaintiff’s claims arise from
the same course of conduct underlying the claims of the greater
putative class and arise under the same legal theory, the
typicality requirement is satisfied. See Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at
97 (finding typicality requirement satisfied where claims arise
from the same event, practice, or course of conduct).
4. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy

A class may not be certified unless the representative
class members “will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at
98. “Class representatives ‘must be part of the class and
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the
class members.’” In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d
333, 343 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
The adequacy analysis requires a two-pronged inquiry:
first, the named-plaintiff’s interests must be sufficiently
aligned with the interests of the absentee class members; and

second, the plaintiff’s counsel must be qualified to represent
the class. Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 98 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d at
187); In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 312 (a named
plaintiff is “adequate” if its interests align with those of the
class).
a. Adequacy Of The Proposed Class Representative
A class representative must represent a class capably and
diligently. “[A] minimal degree of knowledge” about the
litigation is adequate. In re NFL Players Concussion Injury
Litig., 821 F.3d at 430 (quoting New Directions Treatment Servs.
v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The adequacy inquiry under Rule

23(a)(4) [also] serves to uncover conflicts of interest between
named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Id. at 431
(quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625). “The ‘linchpin of the
adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and
incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of
the class.’” Id. (quoting Dewey v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 2012).
There has been no showing that any conflict exists between
Plaintiff’s interests and those of the absent class members.
Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she understood her
role as “to make sure that myself and the other members of the
[class]” obtain relief. (ECF No. 27-1 (“Pl. Dep.”) at 1T21:1-

7). Plaintiff further testified that she understood her role as
potential class representative and was actively involved in
reviewing documents and engaging with counsel in litigating this
action. See (Pl. Dep. at 1T21:1-25).
Defendant has not produced evidence contradicting
Plaintiff’s testimony or otherwise tending to disprove it. As
such, Plaintiff satisfies this portion of the inquiry.
b. Adequacy of Proposed Class Counsel
Rules 23(a)(4) and 23(g) require a court to assess the
adequacy of proposed class counsel. This court must consider
the following: (1) the work counsel has done in identifying or
investigating potential claims in the action; (2) counsel’s

experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation,
and claims of the type asserted in the action; (3) counsel’s
knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources counsel
will commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(g)(1)(A); Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 98 (citing Nafar v. Hollywood
Tanning Sys., Inc., No. 06-cv-3826, 2008 WL 3821776, *7 (D.N.J.
Aug. 12, 2008)).
The Court finds that proposed class counsel – Daniel Zemel
and Nicholas Linker of Zemel Law LLC - are adequate.
i. The Work Counsel Has Done In Identifying Or
Investigating Potential Claims In The Action

Based upon the declarations of Zemel and Linker and the
record before the Court, it appears that counsel has undertaken
the following efforts to identify and investigate potential
claims in this action:
- interviewed Plaintiff to obtain information
necessary to filing the present action;

- reviewed documents associated with this action as
provided by Plaintiff;

- conducted legal research into the claims at issue so
as to make a sound legal judgment as to which claims
to bring;

- drafted and reviewed all necessary pleadings in this
action, including the Complaint and present Motion;

- engaged in the discovery process, including by
participating in written discovery and deposition
practice.

See (ECF No. 17-2 (“Zemel Decl.” at ¶8). The Court also
recognizes that counsel has appeared for various conferences
with the Court. In light of these efforts, this factor weighs
in favor of finding counsel adequate.
ii. Counsel’s Experience In Handling Class Actions,
Other Complex Litigation, And Claims Of The Type
Asserted In The Action & Counsel’s Knowledge Of The
Applicable Law

According to Zemel’s declaration, he has appeared in more
than 400 FDCPA cases in courts throughout the United States and
has been appointed class counsel in six (6) FDCPA actions:
- Rincon-Marin v. Credit Control, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-
00007, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29312 (D. Conn. 2018);

- O’Dell v. National Recovery Agency, No. 5:16-cv-
05211, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36099 (E.D. Pa. 2018);

- Del Carmen v. R.A. Rogers, No. 5:16-cv-00971, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224754 (W.D. Tx. 2018);

- Williams v. Global Credit & Collections et al., No.
1:17-cv-03323 (N.D. Ill. 2018);

- Gibson v. McCarthy Burgess & Wolff, No. 18-02181
(Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, 2018);

- Knight v. Midland Credit Mgmt., No. 17-cv-3118, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59794 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2019).

(Zemel Decl. at ¶9). According to Linker’s declaration, he has
appeared as counsel in more than 60 FDCPA cases since graduating
law school in 2015 and has been appointed class counsel in one
such matter, Gibson v. McCarthy Burgess & Wolff, No. 18-02181
(Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, 2018). (ECF No. 17-3
(“Linker Decl.”) at ¶7).
While Defendant argues that Zemel and Linker lack the
requisite experience to be deemed adequate, the Court disagrees.
Based upon their experience in this specialized type of legal
claim, the relatively small size of the putative class, and the
relative simplicity of the alleged legal claim, the Court is
satisfied that Zemel and Linker are adequate class counsel.
iii. Counsel’s Knowledge Of The Applicable Law
This Court has no reason to question counsel’s knowledge of
the applicable law. In light of counsel’s experience in FDCPA
litigation, as outlined above, the Court is satisfied that this

factor weighs in favor of finding counsel adequate.
iv. The Resources Counsel Will Commit To Representing
The Class

Zemel and Linker declare that they will continue to commit
to this litigation and will provide the resources necessary to
litigating this matter through completion. (Linker Decl. at ¶9;
Zemel Decl. at ¶11). Defendant presents no competing evidence,
and this Court has no reason to question counsel’s
representation. As such, all of the relevant factors weigh in
favor of deeming counsel adequate.
B. Rule 23(b)(3)
After Rule 23(a) is satisfied, a plaintiff must establish
that the proposed class also satisfies Rule 23(b). For class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find that (1)
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members,” and (2)
that a “class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 99. In this case,
both considerations favor class certification.
1. Predominance
Predominance requires “that questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

In determining whether common questions predominate, courts have
focused on the claims of liability alleged against defendants.
See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d Cir.
1977). Predominance “tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.” In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig.,
821 F.3d at 434 (citation omitted).
As discussed more thoroughly in section II.A.2., supra,
factually, Plaintiff and the putative class allege that
Defendant placed a trade line on their credit report improperly
listing Transworld as the original creditor. That factual
inquiry predominates over any other. Likewise, a common issue

of law — whether Defendant’s action would confuse or mislead the
least sophisticated consumer — predominates over any individual
issues relating to each absent class member. Therefore, the
predominance requirement is satisfied.
2. Superiority
To satisfy superiority, Plaintiff must demonstrate that “a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). This inquiry requires the Court to “balance, in terms
of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against
those of alternative available methods of adjudication.” In re
Tropicana Orange Juice Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. MDL 2353,

No. 11-cv-07382, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566, *40 (D.N.J. June
18, 2019) (quoting Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d
141, 149 (3d Cir. 2008)). The Court examines “(1) the interest
of individual members of the class in controlling the
prosecution of the action, (2) the extent of litigation
commenced elsewhere by class members, (3) the desirability of
concentrating claims in a given forum, and (4) the management
difficulties likely to be encountered in pursuing the class
action.” Danvers Motor Co., 543 F.3d at 149-50.
Defendant contends that the availability of statutory
damages and the ability to recover counsel fees provides
incentive to pursue these actions individually, as opposed to

collectively, rendering use of the class action method
unnecessary in this action. (Def. Br. at 11). Defendant’s
argument suggests that FDCPA actions are – as a general rule –
best left to individualized litigation.
Plaintiff responds by arguing that the relatively small
amount of statutory damages available to each individual
plaintiff in FDCPA actions militates in favor of proceeding as a
class. The Court agrees.
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the FDCPA specifically
contemplates class action practice and recovery under
appropriate circumstances, see 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(2)(B),

(b)(2), and courts across the country – including within this
District – routinely certify FDCPA classes, finding them to be a
superior method for proceeding with this type of litigation.
See, e.g., Beneli, 324 F.R.D. at 99; Barkouras v. Hecker, No.
06-cv-366, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88998, *11-12 (D.N.J. Dec. 8,
2006); Grubb v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117465, at *73; Nyby, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122056, at *11;
Weissman, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67477, at *6-7.
Turning to the factors set forth in Danvers, the Court
finds that resolving this matter by way of class action appears
to be the superior method for bringing the present class
members’ claims to resolution. Class litigation offers prompt

relief and avoids the undue costs class members would incur in
individually prosecuting their claims. Furthermore, there is no
indication (and the Court has no reason to believe) that any
individual class member has filed a complaint against Defendant
elsewhere; given the size of the class, such information seems
readily available to the parties and neither has presented any
information supporting such a finding to this Court. The Court
envisions no management difficulties in proceeding with this
matter as a class action. As such, in weighing the Danvers
factors, the Court concludes class litigation is a superior
method for handling this matter.
3. Ascertainability

“Many courts and commentators have recognized that an
essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect
to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class must be
currently and readily ascertainable based on objective
criteria.” Grubb v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117465, at *47 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687
F.3d at 592-93) (internal citations omitted). The Third
Circuit, for example, has held that this requirement serves
significant objectives. See Id. “First, it eliminates serious
administrative burdens that are incongruous with the
efficiencies expected in a class action by insisting on the easy
identification of class members.” Id. at *48 (quoting Marcus v.

BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d at 592-93). Second, “it protects
absent class members by facilitating the best notice practicable
under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) action.” Id. (quoting
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d at 592-93) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, an
ascertainable class “protects defendants by ensuring that those
persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly
identifiable.” Id. (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687
F.3d at 592-93).
To demonstrate ascertainability, the Third Circuit requires
a plaintiff to show: (1) the class is defined with reference to
objective criteria, and (2) there is a reliable and

administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether
putative class members fall within the class definition. Id.
(citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015)).
A plaintiff need not identify every class member at the class
certification stage but must simply show that “class members can
be identified.” Id. (quoting Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163).
Plaintiff’s proposed class definition is comprised of
objective criteria that render it capable of being ascertained.
Those criteria are: (1) Defendant reported an “incorrect
original creditor to [a] credit reporting agenc[y,]” namely,
Transworld; (2) the consumers affected by such reporting
maintained a “Pennsylvania address[;]” and (3) such events

occurred within the temporal limitation outlined by the class
definition.
Meyer’s deposition testimony confirms the Court’s
conclusion that the class is ascertainable. Meyer explained
that – after reviewing the class definition in conjunction with
Defendant’s records – Defendant was able to identify 94
individuals falling within Plaintiff’s proposed class
definition. Such testimony not only establishes that the class
is ascertainable, but suggests it has already been ascertained.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF
No. 17) will be granted.9

While Plaintiff submitted a proposed order for the Court’s
consideration, the form of the proposed order is not entirely
consistent with this Opinion. As such, the Court will Order
Plaintiff to draft and submit a revised proposed order
consistent with this Opinion. In that revised order, among
other things, Plaintiff shall refine the proposed class
definition in a manner consistent this Court’s analysis in
footnote three, supra. Once submitted, Defendant shall have an
opportunity to object to the proposed form. Any objections
shall be made within seven (7) days of the proposed order being
filed.
An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: December 18, 2019 s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

9 On May 1, 2019, the Court stayed discovery pending resolution
of the motion for class certification. (ECF No. 20).
Magistrate Judge Schneider may lift the discovery stay and
discovery should proceed in due course.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10654753. Public record. Not legal advice.