# Murdock v. Gamewell

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · August 6, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10654051

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 6, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:24-cv-00170-KDB

AJANAKU MURDOCK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
FNU GAMEWELL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Doc. 1],
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis in this matter. [Docs. 2, 6].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Ajanaku Murdock (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina
currently incarcerated at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina. On July 26, 2024, he filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants Nurse Practitioner FNU Gamewell,
Neurologist FNU Patel, Nurse Supervisor FNU Chapman, and Nurse FNU Smithey, all identified
as employees of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction (NCDAC).1 [Doc. 1].
Plaintiff alleges that he has “received mediocre medical care” from Defendants. [Id. at 2].
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
[Defendants are] aware that I’ve suffered a traumatic brain injury
from a vehicular incident that also fractured my talus bone in my
ankle which requires ongoing physical therapy. These defendants
on many different occasions have failed to treat me, failed to see me,
have known the severity of my injuries but yet have misdiagnosed
me, have not kept up with my records, have failed to acknowledge

1 Plaintiff does not allege whether he sues these Defendants in their individual or official capacities. The
Court, therefore, will address both.
the mental anguish and cognitive degeneration my brain is going
thru with my behaviors. Patel has only focused on the pain instead
of the issues I was there to see her about, then told me she wouldn’t
see me til’ I come off the meds. Once I did, and suffered
excruciating migraines as a result, in order to see her, she refused to
see me by cancelling and having me placed back on the meds. I was
refused a physical by Chapman, and Gamewell as well as my cane.
Refused ADA accommodations in the cells.

[Id. at 4 (errors uncorrected)].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his “right to medical care” and were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs and his “pain and suffering.” [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff claims,
if not for Defendants’ conduct, his injuries could be “in better shape,” that his brain injury-related
cognitive skills “could and would be better,” and that the physical condition of his body overall
“would be better.” [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief only. [Id. at 7].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires
an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear
failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed

by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or inappropriate medical
treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the inmate. Id.
Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but does not require actual
purposeful intent. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092,
1096 (4th Cir. 1997). “It requires that a prison official actually know of and disregard an

objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.” Rish, 131 F.3d at 1096 (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must know of and
consciously or intentionally disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a prison doctor
is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional issue is raised absent
evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.” Stokes v. Hurdle, 393
F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's
serious medical needs and the related risks but nevertheless disregards them. DePaola v. Clarke,

884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018). The prison official “must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical malpractice claims
do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
“[E]ven if a prison doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional
issue is raised absent evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.”
Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
Further, the constitutional right is to medical care. No right exists to the type or scope of care

desired by the individual prisoner. Id. at 763. Therefore, a disagreement “between an inmate and
a physician over the inmate’s proper medical care [does] not state a § 1983 claim unless
exceptional circumstances are alleged.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable
inference, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state such a claim and fail
to satisfy the most basic pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900
F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material
fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader
must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim). At best, Plaintiff’s
allegations suggest that one or more Defendants may have been negligent in their care of Plaintiff
and/or that Plaintiff simply disagrees with Defendants over his proper medical care. This does not
amount to a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983. Moreover, Plaintiff’s general

reference to “Defendants” in his Complaint fails to meet “the burden of pleading a facially
plausible claim.” See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125-26 (4th Cir. 2023).
To the extent Plaintiff purports to sue the Defendants, who he alleges are state officials, for
money damages in their official capacities, he has failed. “[A] suit against a state official in his
or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person”
under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages
thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22,
2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State

of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th
Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities do not survive
initial review and are subject to dismissal.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sought to state a claim for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., by his single allegation that an unidentified
individual or individuals “[r]efused ADA accommodations in the cells,” he has failed. Other than
his allegation of having a traumatic brain injury, which may be a disability, Plaintiff has failed to
alleged facts supporting the elements of such an ADA claim. See Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x
901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise
qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his
disability.) (citations omitted).
The Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to state a claim for relief in

accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness
and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be
permitted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review
and will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend
his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted in
accordance with the terms of this Order. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in
accordance with this Order, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief and shall
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend
his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his
Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk is instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983 form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: August 5, 2024

Kenneth D. Bell □□□
United States District Judge \ i □

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10654051. Public record. Not legal advice.