# Smith v. North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · July 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653929

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653929

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that courts have applied Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims
- noting that courts have applied Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:23-cv-00218-GCM

S. SHANE SMITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )
OF ADULT CORRECTION, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Request for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.” [Doc. 42].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff S. Shane Smith (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina
currently housed at Foothills Correctional Institution (“Foothills”) in Morganton, North Carolina.
He originally filed this action in the Eastern District of North Carolina on November 16, 2022,
against Defendants North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (NCDAC); Todd Ishee, the
NCDAC Secretary; John/Jane Doe, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator; and
Teresa Jardon, the Foothills Warden, claiming that Defendants violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (“Rehab Act”). [Doc. 1]. On January 27, 2023, District Judge Terrence W. Boyle
ordered that this action be transferred to this Court because Foothills is in the Western District.1
[Doc. 9]. After failing this Court’s initial review, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint

1 For reasons unknown to the Court, this matter was not opened as a new case in this District until August
16, 2023. [See Doc. 12].
in which he named the following Defendants: (1) the NCDAC; (2) Todd Ishee, “Commissioner
of Prisons;” (3) Teresa Jardon, Foothills Warden; (4) John Coleman, Director of N.C.
Correctional Enterprise (NCCE)2; (5) Sophia Feaster, Division ADA Coordinator; (6) Monica
Teague, Region ADA Coordinator; and (7) Deorain Carson, Facility ADA Coordinator. [Docs.
14, 15]. Plaintiff purported to sue all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. [See

id. at 4-6].
Plaintiff alleged as follows. Plaintiff was born without fingers and toes and has
“extremely sensitive skin.” [Id. at 8]. He has no grip with his right hand and limited grip with
his left hand. [Id.]. On his left hand, Plaintiff has what some might mistakenly assume is a
thumb, but rather is “the root from which a thumb would extend.” [Id.]. Plaintiff is very limited
in how he performs manual tasks and even the slightest alteration in their performance causes
him “excruciating physical pain and great discomfort.” [Id.]. The appendage “that is often
misidentified as a thumb is [Plaintiff’s] primary tool” for feeding, dressing, and caring for
himself, “all only if appropriately accommodated.” [Id. at 8-9].

Once in NCDAC custody, in or around 1993, prison officials provided Plaintiff numerous
disability accommodations and allowed Plaintiff to receive numerous items from family
members that were necessary for Plaintiff to perform simple daily tasks. [Id. at 6, 11]. After
nearly 15 years of incarceration, Plaintiff was transferred to a facility where officials “arbitrarily
took it upon [themselves] to rescind all of [his] previously approved disability accommodations.”
[Id.]. In 2007, Plaintiff filed a civil action under the ADA and Rehab Act in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Smith v. Beck, No. 5:07-CT-3034-FL

2 Plaintiff alleges that, as Director of the NCCE, Defendant Coleman “is responsible for the
administration, operation, and supervision of all NCCE industry plants, staff and facilities; and the
promulgation and enforcement of laws, rules, regulations, policies, and practices relevant to them.” [Doc.
15 at 4-5].
(E.D.N.C.). [Id. at 11-12]. Ultimately, that action was resolved by a Settlement Agreement (the
“Agreement”) between the Plaintiff and the NCDAC whereby the NCDAC agreed, among other
things, to provide Plaintiff with “appropriate clothing and assistive devices” for his disabilities
and the opportunity to buy other identified items at his own expense. [See Doc. 15-2 at 114-22].
In reaching this agreement, it was determined that the NCCE could not provide the items that

Plaintiff needed and that they would need to be purchased from outside vendors, such as
Walmart. The items included bed linens, boxer shorts, shirt jackets, t-shirts, pants with sufficient
pockets, a belt, bath towels and face cloths, crew socks, a digital pocket radio, radio headphones,
a nylon zippered notebook, an analog watch, and rubber-gripped pens. [Doc. 15 at 13-17]. The
clothing and linen items were to be made of 100% cotton and washed only in special detergent.
[Doc. 15-2 at 115-16].
After filing another civil rights action, Smith v. Perry, 1:16-CV-396-TDS-LPA
(M.D.N.C.), prison officials “all but stopped providing clothing which met [Plaintiff’s] specific
disability accommodation needs and completely stopped permitting [him] to purchase at [his]

expense the non-clothing and linen items [he] used as accommodation assistive devices.” [Id.;
see id. at 17-24]. “The change of [Plaintiff’s] clothing which accommodated [his] disability
served absolutely no penological purpose other than to harass, belittle, intimidate, and retaliate
against [Plaintiff] for the expression of [his] grievances and for [his] previous civil rights
litigation.” [Id. at 24-25].
After discussing his disability needs with his housing unit’s supervisory staff, supervisory
staff informed Plaintiff that Defendant Jardon had rejected his request for accommodation. [Id.
at 25]. On June 30, 2022, after discussing his disability needs with the Foothills medical
department and obtaining a referral, Plaintiff was assessed by an occupational therapist. [Id.]. It
was determined that “the requested and previously provided items were the most appropriate
accommodation for [Plaintiff’s] unique disability.” [Id.]. Shortly after his appointment with the
occupational therapist, prison officials told Plaintiff that they were not going to implement the
occupational therapist’s recommendations. [Id.]. Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted an official
NCDAC Offender Reasonable Request for Accommodation (“ADA Request”), “pleading prison

officials to provide the various items which accommodated [Plaintiff’s] disability.” [Id.].
Defendants Teague, Feaster, and Carson denied Plaintiff’s numerous ADA Requests. [Id.].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ acts and omissions have violated his rights under the
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADA and Rehab Act. [Id. at 28-30]. Plaintiff
also purported to state a claim against Defendants Ishee, Coleman, Feaster, Teague, and Jardon
for the “failure to train and/or supervise employees,” which the Court construed under the Eighth
Amendment. [Id. at 30-31]. For injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered “physical harm,
severe emotional trauma, and loss of liberty.” [Id. at 31]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory
judgment; monetary relief, including punitive damages; and injunctive relief, including the

provision of various clothing items, linens, personal care items, and permission to purchase other
items at his own expense, all as reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA.
[Id. at 32-33]. Relevant here, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehab Act claims against
Defendant NCDAC to proceed on initial review.3 [Doc. 16].
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. [Doc. 42].
Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendants to provide him at least six (6) pairs of 100% cotton
hunter green pants “identical in structure” to Wrangler pants previously provided to Plaintiff by

3 Plaintiff’s individual capacity First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Feaster, Teague,
Jardon, and Carson also survived initial review. Plaintiff’s remaining claims and Defendants Ishee and
Carson were dismissed for the reasons stated in the Court’s initial review Order. [Doc. 16].
prison officials and at least four (4) long-sleeve 100% cotton hunter green “shirt jackets” to
“properly accommodate his disability.” [Doc. 42 at 1-2]. Alternatively, Plaintiff asks that he be
permitted to purchase the required clothing items until a hearing can be held. [Id. at 1].
In support of his motion, Plaintiff attests as follows. The NCCE manufactures the
standard clothing issued to general population inmates in North Carolina. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶ 4].

The clothing items provided by the NCCE do not accommodate Plaintiff’s most basic daily
needs. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s 2007 lawsuit in the Eastern District, in which he alleged violations of the
ADA, was resolved through the Agreement pursuant to which prison officials agreed to provide
clothing that accommodated Plaintiff’s disability. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶¶ 5-7]. Under the Agreement,
officials were to provide Plaintiff with clothing made of 100% cotton. After learning Plaintiff’s
specific needs, officials informed Plaintiff they would be acquiring his clothes through an outside
supplier. The pants purchased from the outside supplier, usually Walmart, were 100% cotton
with zippers and equipped with two front and back pockets and appropriate belt loops. These
pants met Plaintiff’s accommodation needs.4 [Id. at ¶ 8].

“At some point,” without Plaintiff’s input, prison officials changed Plaintiff’s clothing to
items that did not accommodate his disability. [Id. at ¶ 13]. The newly issued pants had no
front or back pockets, only cargo pockets that Plaintiff is physically unable to use or reach. [Id.
at ¶ 15]. Plaintiff is unable to functionally dress or undress with the NCCE-designed pants. [Id.

4 Given the nature of Plaintiff’s disability, he regularly relies on pants pockets because he cannot carry
items in his hands like people with fingers. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶ 10]. Because of his disability, Plaintiff needs
to carry flex knuckle bandages, tweezers to manipulate smaller, more intricate items, and nail clippers to
open food packages and perform other small tasks. [Id. at ¶ 17]. When dressing himself, Plaintiff relies
on belt loops to pull up his pants and to pull together the fly to zip his pants because he cannot otherwise
grasp the pants as necessary to accomplish these tasks. [Id. at ¶ 11]. Without belt loops, it is very
difficult and sometimes painful for Plaintiff to dress and undress or use the bathroom. [Id.]. In his
unsworn memorandum, Plaintiff acknowledges that at Foothills he is allowed to wear athletic shorts while
on facility grounds. [Doc. 42-4 at 2]. He states, however, that he will not be permitted to wear these
shorts at Rutherford CC “where Plaintiff is slated to transfer.” [Id.].
at ¶ 16]. In May 2021, officials purchased Plaintiff two pairs of pants from Walmart that
accommodated Plaintiff’s disability. Additional pants were to be purchased, but never were. [Id.
at ¶¶ 19, 21]. (Presumably later) in 2021, officials confiscated those pants. [Id. at ¶ 21]. In
October 2021, NCDAC’s in-house legal counsel informed Plaintiff that he would be allowed to
keep the clothing and linen items purchased for him from Walmart, but that when these items

need to be replaced, NCDAC would utilize approved-vendor NCCE. [Id. at ¶ 21]. In-house
counsel also informed Plaintiff that the Warden acquired the items from Walmart “out of an
abundance of caution and to ensure the settlement agreements were complied with[.]” [Id.].
Every prisoner is issued shirt jackets, which are long-sleeved button-up shirts, at no cost
to the prisoner. Shirt jackets are necessary for warmth and protection from the elements.
Plaintiff has none. [Id. at ¶¶ 23-24]. Non-disabled prisoners are provided clothing appropriate to
meet theirs to participate in their respective assigned jobs and/or program assignments at no cost
to the prisoner. [Id. at ¶ 28]. Plaintiff seeks the same opportunity. [Id.].
On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff was awarded participation in the Mutual Agreement Parole

Program (MAPP). Under the MAPP, Plaintiff’s parole date is now June 1, 2027. [Id. at ¶¶ 29,
31]. The MAPP first allows Plaintiff to leave the correctional facility with a community
volunteer several times weekly to attend various community events. [Id. at ¶¶ 29-30, 33]. For
this purpose, Plaintiff is permitted to purchase clothing items at his own expense and have them
mailed or delivered to him at his facility. [Id. at ¶ 34]. If Plaintiff were to fail to meet the terms
of the MAPP, his release date could be extended or his chance at parole lost.5 [Id. at ¶ 32].

5 In his unsworn memorandum, Plaintiff also contends that, as part of his MAPP, he is being immediately
assigned to a job that requires him to leave the facility each day and that he currently has “only two pairs
of pants which adequately meet his disability needs.” [Doc. 42-4 at 2]. It is unclear if these are the same
two pairs of pants that were confiscated in 2021 or different pants subsequently obtained for the Plaintiff.
Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion. [Docs. 46, 46-1 to 46-7]. In addition to their
memorandum, Defendants provided the sworn testimony of Ladonna Browning, the NCDAC
Western Region Director; Sharon Jones, the General Manager of Manufacturing at NCCE; Mary
Stevens, the Chief Administrator for the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole
Commission (“Parole Commission”); and Aaron Clarke, a Parole Case Analyst with the Parole

Commission, as well as filings from and the final decision in a lawsuit Plaintiff filed in the
Superior Court of Rutherford County to enforce the terms of the Agreement (the “Rutherford
County lawsuit”). [Docs. 46-4 to 46-7]. Defendants paint a somewhat different picture of events
bringing us to the present motion: Plaintiff’s 2007 Eastern District lawsuit which, in 2011,
resulted in the Agreement whereby the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS)6
agreed to provide Plaintiff 100% cotton clothing. [Doc. 46 at 2 (citing Doc. 46-1 at 14-22)]. In
2020, Plaintiff filed the Rutherford County lawsuit alleging breach of the Agreement. [Id. (citing
Doc. 46-1 at 5-8)]. In that action, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction asking the court to
order the NCDPS to provide Plaintiff with Wrangler Jeans and other clothing items. [Id. at 3

(citing Doc. 46-2)]. Defendants in that action provided that, when Plaintiff was housed at
Rutherford Correctional Center (“Rutherford CC”), he had managed to obtain Wrangler Jeans
and other retail items, but that he was unable to obtain these items at Foothills. [Id. (citing Doc.
46-3)]. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants in that matter, finding as
a matter of law that defendants had satisfied the terms of the Agreement. [Id. (citing Doc. 46-
3)].
Ladonna Browning, NCDAC Western Region Director, generally oversees all prison
facilities in the Western Region. [Doc. 46-4 at ¶ 2: Browning Dec.]. Browning is familiar with

6 The relevant arm of the NCDPS is now known as the NCDAC.
the Plaintiff and with prison operations. [Id.]. Browning attests that while Plaintiff was assigned
to Rutherford CC he was able to obtain Wrangler Jeans and other retail clothing in error. This is
because, at the time, Rutherford CC did not have a copy of the Agreement. When Plaintiff was
transferred to Foothills, compliance with the Agreement was more carefully managed. [Id. at ¶
3]. There is currently no plan to transfer Plaintiff back to Rutherford CC and any such transfer

would have to be approved by Browning. While the MAPP includes a recommendation that
Plaintiff be transferred to Rutherford CC, such transfer depends on availability and is not
guaranteed. [Id. at ¶ 3].
NCCE provides prisoner clothing. [Doc. 46-4 at ¶ 4]. The provision of prisoner clothing
by NCCE allows for “the security of knowing where clothing is sourced and its design, for the
orderly operations of procurement, and maintaining uniformity among the prison population.”
[Id.]. Offenders are not allowed to shop for retail clothing. When offenders are assigned to work
release jobs, they wear prison clothes. If alternative clothing is required by the employer, NCCE
can provide the clothing and there is no need for an outside purchase. [Id.]. This is also true for

community passes. Nearly 100% of community passes are to attend community church services
or NA or AA meetings. Offenders usually wear prison clothes to these activities. If Plaintiff
were to need civilian style clothing or special work clothing due to the preferences of a church or
employer, the clothing items would be made by special order through the NCCE. [Id. at ¶ 5].
The only opportunity immediately available to the Plaintiff is a Community Volunteer pass,
which depends on availability and finding a sponsor. [Id. at ¶ 6]. Plaintiff has no community
passes set up at this time. [Id. at ¶ 5]. Although Plaintiff has been approved for immediate work
assignments offside, he is not eligible for work release until June 2025 and his home leave does
not begin until June 2026. [Id.; Doc. 46-6 at ¶ 10: Stevens Dec.]. According to Mary Stevens,
Chief Administrator for the Parole Commission, Plaintiff’s MAPP agreement does not specify
any clothing requirements for his MAPP program participation. [Doc. 46-6 at ¶¶ 1, 11].
Moreover, Aaron Clarke, Plaintiff’s Parole Case Analyst, testifies that he is unaware of any
special clothing requirements with the MAPP agreements. He further testifies that if any
offender were unable to comply with their MAPP agreement through no fault of their own, they

would not be considered noncompliant. [Doc. 46-7 at ¶¶ 2-3: Clarke Dec.].
According to Sharon Jones, NCCE General Manager of Manufacturing, NCCE can
manufacture any clothing necessary to meet Plaintiff’s needs. [Doc. 46-5 at ¶ 2: Jones Dec.].
While prison clothing uses buttons, not zippers, NCCE can modify clothes for the Plaintiff to use
Velcro instead. Pants can also be made with additional belt loops with pockets in various places
or with elastic waists. In short, NCCE can design and make any garment necessary. [Id. at ¶ 3].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before the entry of a final judgment, a court may enter a preliminary injunction. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(a). “The traditional office of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and

to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court’s
ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” United States v. South Carolina, 720
F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary
remedy” that “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.E.2d 249
(2008). Preliminary injunctions are afforded before trial at the discretion of the district court. In
re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th Cir. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish (1) that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in
the public interest. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346
(4th Cir. 2009); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. When the constitutional violation is “likely,” several
of these factors are satisfied. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330,

346 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc). That is, when “there is a likely constitutional violation, the
irreparable harm factor is satisfied” because “the loss of constitutional freedoms, ‘for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitute irreparable injury.’” Id. (quoting Mills v.
District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted)). The
final two factors are satisfied when there is a likely constitutional violation because “the public
interest favors protecting constitutional rights” and “a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a
preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found
unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th
Cir. 2013)). Thus, where a constitutional violation is “likely,” the inquiry collapses into the first

factor, the likelihood of success on the merits. See Mahmoud v. McKnight, 2023 WL 5487218,
at *14 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2023), affirmed 102 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2024).
In his Amended Complaint in this matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated
his rights under the ADA and the Rehab Act by refusing to provide (and/or to allow him to
purchase at his own expense) various clothing items, linens, and personal care items that have, at
least at one time or another during Plaintiff’s incarceration, been provided to and/or accessible
by him to accommodate his disability. [See Doc. 15]. In the pending motion, Plaintiff asks the
Court to order Defendants to provide him with at least six (6) pairs of Wrangler pants or their
structural equivalent and at least four (4) shirt-jackets. [Doc. 42]. Plaintiff advises these items
can be purchased at outside retailers like Walmart, J.C. Penney’s, or Cabela’s. [Id. at 2].
A. Shirt-Jackets
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion as to the shirt-jackets. Plaintiff’s request for this
item has nothing to do with the action before the Court. Plaintiff did not allege and has not now

shown that shirt-jackets are necessary to accommodate his disability. Rather, he alleges that they
are provided to all prisoners for warmth and to protect from the elements and that he currently
has none. The implication from Plaintiff’s materials is that he now needs shirt-jackets because
his MAPP agreement allows for additional opportunities to leave the facility. While Plaintiff
may be entitled to shirt-jackets as a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, their alleged denial is
unrelated to his disability or to the pending action. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s
motion on this issue.
B. Wrangler pants
In the pending motion, Plaintiff contends that his disability requires Wrangler pants,

which can be purchased from outside retailers. [Doc. 42]. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
similarly alleges the need for retail clothing to accommodate his disability. [Doc. 15]. To be
awarded injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, “[a] plaintiff need not establish a
certainty of success, but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” Di
Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).
Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “public entity”
to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, … or other
instrumentality of a State.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)). “[T]his term includes state prisons.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998)).
To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and
(3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Miller v.
Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). States are obligated to
make “reasonable modifications” to enable the disabled person to receive the services or
participate in programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The duty of reasonable
accommodation, however, must also consider whether the institution’s actions are related to
legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987);
Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (noting that courts have applied

Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims). A plaintiff must also establish an actual injury from any
alleged ADA or Rehab Act violation. See Rosen v. Montgomery Cty. Md., 121 F.3d 154, 158
(4th Cir. 1997).
The Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability
… shall, solely by reason of [his] disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The analysis under the Rehab Act is generally the
same as under the ADA. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th Cir.
2002). Claims under the Rehab Act, however, require a showing of discrimination “solely by
reason of” disability, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), while under the ADA, a plaintiff must only show
discrimination “by reason of” disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As such, the causation standards are
“significantly dissimilar.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d
474, 498 n.17 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Here, while the Court deemed Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the low frivolity

bar, he has not shown that because of his disability he was denied the benefits of services of state
prisons or participation in programs or activities for which he was otherwise qualified. That is,
while Plaintiff alleges that his life is made more difficult and complicated by standard-issue
prison clothing that does not accommodate his disability, he has not shown that he has been
unable to participate in prison programs or receive the benefit of services non-disabled prisoners
receive.7 Rather, in the pending motion, Plaintiff alleges in essence that he is fearful that he will
be unable to meet the specifications or requirements of his MAPP agreement because he does not
have Wrangler pants with the appropriate pockets. Plaintiff, however, does not connect this
accommodation with any requirement of the MAPP program. Moreover, Defendants’ evidence

establishes that Plaintiff will not be deemed noncompliant with his MAPP agreement if he is
unable to comply because of something outside of his control. [Doc. 46-7 at ¶ 3]. Defendants’
evidence also shows that NCCE can design and manufacture clothing to meet Plaintiff’s
particular needs, whether for everyday wear inside prison walls or on work release assignments.
[Doc. 46-5 at ¶ 3]. As such, clothing from outside retailers is unnecessary to meet Plaintiff’s

7 In fact, in his memorandum, Plaintiff acknowledges that while inside prison walls he is allowed to wear
athletic shorts (presumably with the pockets he needs) to accommodate his disability. [Doc. 42-4 at 2].
While Plaintiff is concerned that he will be transferred to Rutherford CC where he will be unable to wear
these shorts or that he will be ill-equipped to meet the requirements of his MAPP agreement with his
current supply of clothing, the Defendants’ evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff can and will be provided
the clothing he needs to accommodate his disability outside of Foothills, whether at Rutherford CC or to
participate within the terms of the his MAPP agreement.
disability needs. While in the past, Plaintiff has been successful in his efforts to have prison
officials meet his needs by procuring specific clothing from outside retailers, these items are not
required by the Agreement, nor does the evidence before the Court now show they are required
to meet Plaintiff’s needs.
Plaintiff has also failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the

relief he seeks. To prove this element, Plaintiff must show that the irreparable harm is “neither
remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd. V. Breakthrough Med.
Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991). Without a clear showing that the plaintiff will suffer
imminent, irreparable harm, the Court cannot grant preliminary injunctive relief. Di Biase v.
SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (a “possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to
satisfy the movant’s burden). Here, Defendants have shown that no special clothing is required
for Plaintiff to perform work release functions or to participate in community passes. Rather,
standard-issue prison clothing is the norm. Defendants, again, have also shown that NCCE can
produce any clothing Plaintiff needs to perform these aspects of his MAPP agreement.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to meet the third element for preliminary injunctive
relief. That is, Plaintiff has not shown that the balance of equities tip in his favor. Plaintiff’s
stated need for Wrangler jeans and retail shirt-jackets that prison officials would have to
purchase from outside retailers is significantly offset by the prison facility’s need to maintain
order and security and provide consistent prison clothing to the prison population. While the
clothing Plaintiff requests would perhaps be the most suitable and desirable for him, prisons have
a strong interest in consistency among prisoners. Defendants can meet Plaintiff’s needs through
clothing designed and produced by NCCE specifically for the Plaintiff while still of the same
basic style, color, and material of the clothing of other prisoners.
Moreover, the equities further tip in Defendants’ favor because the primary purpose of
injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending trial. When a plaintiff seeks an order
altering the status quo before the case even begins, it is called “mandatory” injunction, which are
highly disfavored. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 235 (4th
Cir. 2014). Because mandatory preliminary injunctions do not preserve the status quo, they

“should be granted only in those circumstances when the exigencies of the situation demand such
relief.” Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Here, rather than maintain the
status quo, Plaintiff asks the Court to order prison officials to expend relatively substantial effort
and resources to purchase the requested clothing for Plaintiff. Given the absence of any
exigencies here, such relief is highly disfavored, and the Court will not order Defendants to
comply at this stage of the litigation.
Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that the injunction is in the public interest. In this regard,
Plaintiff alleges only that “it is always in the public interest for prison officials to obey the law,
especially the Constitution.” [Doc. 42-4 at 5 (citations omitted)]. While this is certainly true,

Plaintiff has not preliminarily shown that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights or
that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his ADA or Rehab Act claims. Moreover, “the
public interest is best served if courts do not get involved with the daily operations of a prison or
sheriff’s office, especially prior to the finding of a constitutional violation.” Bartlett v. Smith,
2019 WL 1051185, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5. 2019). See Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268
(4th Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that absent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal
courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons.”).
Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements for preliminary injunctive relief, the
Court will deny his motion. In making this ruling, however, Defendants are admonished that any
future failure to provide Plaintiff clothing he needs to accommodate his disability through special
order with the NCCE, particularly on his transfer to Rutherford CC and/or as needed to fulfill his
MAPP agreement outside prison walls, will be adversely viewed by the Court.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Request for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 42] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 18, 2024
y y
Graham C. Mullen ee
United States District Judge mt

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653929. Public record. Not legal advice.