# BONE v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · March 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653707

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653707

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding district court’s order approving settlement agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e
- holding that “Rule 68’s cost-shifting device does not apply to fees under the ADA,” as the statute “does not define costs to include fees”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JOHN BONE, TIMOTHY MILES, THE )
NATIONAL FEDERATON OF THE )
BLIND, INC., AND DISABILITY )
RIGHTS NORTH CAROLINA, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) 1:18CV994
v. )
)
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA )
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

Before the court are the parties’ post-judgment motions
requesting an award of attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs.
Plaintiffs move for a statutory award of attorneys’ fees, expenses,
and costs as prevailing parties. (Doc. 172.) Defendant University
of North Carolina Health Care System (“UNCHCS”) moves for an award
of costs based on a prior offer of judgment that was rejected.
(Doc. 171.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion
will be granted to the extent of the award noted herein, and
UNCHCS’s motion for costs will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This action involved challenges to UNCHCS’s practices for
providing medical care to sight-impaired patients of its health
care system. The court has written extensively on the background
of this case. (See Docs. 44, 98, 125, 143, 167.) The principal
facts as they relate to consideration of the pending motions are
set out below.
Plaintiff Timothy Miles is a constituent of Plaintiff
Disability Rights North Carolina (“DRNC”), which advocates for the
disabled. He is also a member of Plaintiff National Federation

for the Blind, Inc. (“NFB”), a non-profit corporation organized to
“promote[] the general welfare of the blind,” which claims some
50,000 members, the majority of whom are blind. (Doc. 18 ¶ 9;
Doc. 103-12 ¶ 4.) Miles has been a patient at UNCHCS for over
twenty years. (Doc. 103-4 ¶ 11.) During that time and the
pendency of this litigation, Miles visited multiple UNCHCS clinics
at least annually, with somewhere near 100 such trips in the past
four years alone. (Doc. 167 at 4.) He is legally blind and
suffers from a condition known as oculocutaneous albinism, an
extreme sensitivity to light. (Doc. 103-4 ¶ 6; Doc. 108-12 at
3.) As a result, he cannot read standard print documents on many

occasions. (Doc. 163-4 ¶ 4.) He has a computer configured with
JAWS1 Fusion, a screen access software that reads aloud the text
on a computer screen or iPhone and allows a user to edit documents
much like the voice-dictation feature on a cell phone. (Doc. 120-
2 at 13-14.) While he can use this software to access various

1 JAWS is an acronym for “Job Access with Speech.”
websites, he maintains he was unable to use it to access UNCHCS
records.
Like Miles, Plaintiff John Bone is a constituent of DRNC and a
member of NFB. (Doc. 18 ¶ 7.) He is also “blind and uses Braille
to make and receive written communications.” (Id.) Bone received
services from Nash General Hospital, an alleged affiliate of

UNCHCS, which failed to provide him Braille materials related to
his medical services. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 15-22.)
Similarly, Dr. Ricky Scott, a supplemental declarant in
support of the organizational Plaintiffs in this case, is legally
blind, a long-time patient of UNCHCS, and a DRNC constituent.
(Doc. 151-4 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 151-1 at 6; Doc. 103-14 ¶ 4.) Dr. Scott
routinely visits UNC Family Medicine West, “averaging two to three
visits each year.” (Doc. 151-4 ¶¶ 4-5.) He cannot “read printed
materials,” but he can “read documents in Braille or in accessible
electronic formats that [he] can access on [his] computer using
screen reader software, which converts written text to speech or

to Braille on a refreshable Braille display.” (Doc. 151-4 ¶ 3;
see also Doc. 163-5 ¶ 3.)
Defendant UNCHCS is an integrated not-for-profit health care
system owned by the state of North Carolina and established by
state law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-37. Its principal place of
business is Chapel Hill, North Carolina. (Doc. 18 ¶ 13.)
Currently, it “consists of UNC Hospitals and its provider network”
along with “eleven affiliate hospitals and hospital systems across
the state.” (Id.) UNCHCS also “employs and contracts with
numerous providers for the delivery of medical services in its
facilities.” (Id.) As the University of North Carolina website
explains, “UNC Health provides care to patients in all of the
state’s 100 counties through its 11 hospitals, 13 hospital

campuses, and hundreds of clinical practices” and “is one of the
nation's leading academic health care systems, a $5.4 billion
enterprise, with more than 33,000 employees from
Hendersonville to Jacksonville.” UNC Health, https://www.north
carolina.edu/institution/unc-health-care-system/ (last visited
March 7, 2024). UNCHCS, like many other hospital systems around
the nation, uses Epic System (“Epic”), a third-party platform, to
maintain its electronic medical records. (See Doc. 121-8 at 3;
Doc. 103-28 at 8; Doc. 152 at 5.)
This lawsuit arises out of problems that Bone,2 Miles, and
Dr. Scott encountered when receiving care at UNCHCS providers.

Because Miles is legally blind, he cannot read standard print
documents (font size 12-point or less), even with the help of
prescription glasses. (Doc. 163-4 ¶ 4.) Thus, years ago, Miles

2 Bone had similar experiences as Miles and Dr. Scott. (See Doc. 18
¶¶ 15-22.) However, Bone’s claims relate to his interactions with Nash
General Hospital, an alleged “affiliate” of UNCHCS that has been
dismissed from this lawsuit and is excluded from Plaintiffs’ motion for
attorneys’ fees. Bone’s claim for attorneys’ fees remains only to the
extent of his damages claim against UNCHCS as an alleged affiliate.
asked UNCHCS to provide him with large print versions of documents
commonly provided to patients during the course of a visit,
including, for example, after-visit summaries, general consent to
treatment forms, medical bills, and intake questionnaires. (Doc.
103-4 ¶ 13.) Yet for years - and despite Miles’s repeated
requests - UNCHCS providers regularly gave him standard print or

otherwise inaccessible documents. (Id.) By Miles’s calculation,
from January 2015 to September 2018, he visited a UNCHCS facility
more than 35 times, yet each time he was sent home with (or later
mailed) “at least one inaccessible standard print document.” (Id.
¶ 14; see Doc. 105-4 at 17-225 (copies of standard print documents
that Miles retained from this time period).) As reflected in the
record, the inaccessible standard print materials that Miles
received and retained from January 2015 to September 2018 total
approximately 200 pages. (See Doc. 105-4 at 21-225.) Such
documents include bills, physician reports, receipts, after-visit
summaries, discharge documents, medical records, appointment

reminders, feedback-request forms, welcome packets, and
instructions. (See id. at 18–20 (index of standard print documents
dated between January 6, 2015, and September 18, 2018).) According
to Miles, this number actually “under-represent[s]” how many
inaccessible documents he received from UNCHCS during this period,
as he was often required to review and sign standard print
documents “during the check in process for these visits, copies of
which [he] did not always receive and therefore do[es] not
possess.” (Doc. 103-4 ¶ 14.)
Like Miles, Dr. Scott activated a UNC MyChart account several
years ago with the understanding that it would allow him “to review
[his] after-visit summaries and lab results in an accessible
electronic format.” (Doc. 103-14 ¶ 9.) Although he “regularly

use[s]” a screen reader program (JAWS) “to access properly designed
electronic documents and websites[,] . . . the documents available
on [his] UNC MyChart account,” at least as of March 2021, “were
not readable by JAWS[,] and [he] could not access any of the
information in these documents.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Eventually, Dr.
Scott “asked UNC Family Medicine West to stop sending [him]
documents through UNC MyChart and [to] cancel [his] account because
it [was] inaccessible and useless to [him].” (Id. ¶ 11.) In
addition, Dr. Scott inconsistently received disability accessible
forms during his visits to UNCHCS providers, sometimes receiving
auxiliary services (Doc. 152-22 ¶¶ 5-6) and other times receiving

standard print forms that he could not read (Doc. 163-5 ¶ 4).
Though Plaintiffs reached out to UNCHCS to attempt to resolve
the repeated failures to provide Miles and Dr. Scott with
accessible documentation from medical visits, consistent lapses
led to the filing of this action in December 2018. (See Doc. 1.)
The amended complaint (Doc. 18) alleged that UNCHCS denied “blind
individuals an equal opportunity to access their health care
information” in violation of Titles II and III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134,
12181-12189; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (“Section 504”); and Section 1557 of the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (“Section
1557” of the “ACA”) (collectively, the “Acts”). (Doc. 1 ¶ 1;
accord Doc. 18 (amended complaint) ¶ 1). Even after the filing of
this action, Miles and Scott continued to receive, from time to
time, documents that failed to meet their disability needs.
UNCHCS (and former Defendant Nash Hospitals, Inc.) each moved
to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Docs. 20, 28.) The magistrate
judge recommended that the motions be granted in part and denied
in part. (Doc. 44 at 1.) As to the claims against UNCHCS, the
magistrate judge recommended that the court deny the motion to
dismiss entirely, concluding that Miles, Bone, NFB, and DRNC had

plausibly stated a claim. (Id. at 14-24, 40-46, 51.)3 On March
5, 2020, this court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
thereby allowing Plaintiffs’ claims against UNCHCS to

3 As to the claims against Nash, the magistrate judge recommended
dismissal of all but Bone’s claims for damages, concluding that neither
Bone, NFB, nor DRNC had standing to pursue future-looking injunctive
relief against Nash. (Doc. 44 at 32, 37-38, 50-51.)
proceed. (Doc. 57 at 1-3.)4
UNCHCS later moved for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 68),
relying in large part on arguments made in its motion to
dismiss. (See, e.g., Doc. 98 at 20-21 (comparing arguments).) The
magistrate judge recommended that that motion also be denied (id.
at 1), and this court adopted that recommendation (Doc. 106).5

Plaintiffs and UNCHCS subsequently filed cross-motions for
summary judgment (see Docs. 103, 107, 109, 111, 112), and the
magistrate judge issued a detailed 188-opinion recommending that
the court find that UNCHCS violated Bone’s and Miles’s rights and
that the parties’ motions therefore be granted in part and denied
in part “such that th[e] action shall proceed to trial on the
issues of deliberate indifference and damages” (Doc. 125 at
187).
Shortly thereafter, but before this court had reviewed the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the parties settled all
remaining damages claims in the case against UNCHCS during a court-

ordered mediation. (Doc. 146; Minute Entry 02/08/2022.) Pursuant
to the settlement, Miles and Bone stipulated to a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice of their claims for damages (Doc. 147 at
1), UNCHCS stipulated that “a violation of the ADA occurred during

4 The court dismissed all ADA Title III claims against Nash.

5 Bone, NFB, and DRNC thereafter settled all claims for damages against
Nash, resulting in Nash’s dismissal from this lawsuit. (See Docs. 96,
97.)
the period between October 2016 and October 2018” (Doc. 146 ¶ 7),
and UNCHCS agreed that “Plaintiffs to the Civil Action are entitled
to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as determined under the
ADA, for all claims resolved through settlement between UNCHCS and
Plaintiffs” (Docs. 139-2 at 10, 139-3 at 10). Because Bone settled
each of his remaining claims, he was voluntarily dismissed as a

party to the case. (See Docs. 145, 146, 147.)
On August 3, 2022, UNCHCS served an offer of judgment on
Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (Doc.
171-1.) The offer proposed a nine-page consent decree, the
principal relief of which included the following injunctive relief
across multiple UNCHCS healthcare providers and affiliates:
• Include blind individuals in all UNCHCS and UNC Physician
Network, LLC (“UNCPN”) clinics communications, programs,
and activities, unless doing so would cause an undue
burden.

• Provide all blind individuals an equal opportunity to
participate in or benefit from aid, benefits, or services,
unless doing so would cause an undue burden or fundamental
alteration to UNCHCS’s Covered Affiliates’ programs or
services.

• Ensure the furnishing of “accessible formats” (defined to
include Braille, large print, audio, or digitally navigable
formats) where necessary to afford blind individuals an
equal opportunity to participate in and enjoy the benefits
of UNCHCS and UNCPN services, unless doing so would cause
an undue burden.

• Not discriminate against blind individuals because they
oppose any unlawful practice or coerce or interfere with
their right to enjoyment of any protected practice.
• Provide policies and training to UNCHCS, UNCPN, and all
entities managed or wholly-owned by UNCHCS.

• Designate an employee Accessibility Coordinator, who shall
report directly to the Chief Audit and Compliance Officer
of UNCHCS, to oversee and monitor compliance with the
consent decree.

• Confirm that applicable practices and policies for
providing print communications in “accessible formats”
address the following provisions:

o Upon oral or written request of a blind person, all
clinics in the UNC Faculty Practice, UNC Hospitals,
and UNCPN shall use a uniform process to “flag” in
the electronic health record system and any other
relevant databases/software systems the requested
accessible format as that person’s default format.

o Provide the default accessible format to all blind
individuals for all communications (including
notices, forms, questionnaires, visit summaries,
follow-up instructions, prescriptions instructions,
invoices, billing, and other correspondence.

o Confirm that MyChart is fully compatible with commonly
used screen reader software (such as JAWS) and that
the font size for text and documents within UNC
MyChart can be enlarged by blind individuals using
generally available computer functionalities.

o Upon initial request of a blind person, mail any
outstanding large print (otherwise offered in regular
print) or Braille (where applicable) invoices or bills
within one week after the invoices/bills were
prepared, and those blind patients shall have the same
time (from date of mailing) as non-blind patients
before the account is sent to collections.

o Provide large print general patient materials to blind
patients within one week of the date they would have
been provided in regular print.

o Provide Braille materials to blind patients within
two to five weeks of when such materials would have
been provided in regular print.
o Provide the above policies and training to facilities
wholly-owned or managed by UNCHCS and encourage their
use of the same.

• Conduct manual accessibility audits of the UNCHCS websites,
www.unchealthcare.org, www.uncmedicalcenter.org, and
www.uncpn.com; www.findadoc.unchealthcare.org;
www.rexhealth.com; www.uncchildrens.org; and
www.chathamhospital.org.

• Implement training and monitoring for the consent decree.

• Provide guidance and assistance to facilities managed or
wholly-owned by UNCHCS on how to comply with obligations
to blind patients.

• Maintain information on websites notifying the public that
accessible formats are provided free of charge in a timely
manner.

• Provide a mechanism for requiring UNCHCS to address any
alleged violation of the consent decree within 30 days,
then court enforcement can be sought.

• Provide for the court’s continuing jurisdiction over
enforcement of the consent decree.

(See Doc. 171-1.) Plaintiffs did not accept the offer of judgment
within the deadline of the rule.
Instead, on August 12, 2022, the remaining Plaintiffs, Miles,
NFB, and DRNC, filed a motion for a permanent injunction. (Doc.
151.) Plaintiffs argued that UNCHCS was unwilling to adopt
policies and procedures to provide effective communication to
blind patients and urged the court to do the following across the
UNCHCS network: (1) establish a process for collecting information
from patients at registration on their needs; (2) provide
accessible formats to patients in a timely manner; (3) ensure that
alternate document formats comply with certain guidelines,
documents on MyChart contain proper metadata tagging and conform
to Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”), and Braille
transcribers are certified; and (4) engage in monitoring and
training. (Doc. 151-1.) UNCHCS responded in opposition (Doc.
152), and Plaintiffs replied (Doc. 153). On November 18, 2023,

UNCHCS moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ proposed experts, whose
reports were relied upon in Plaintiffs’ motion for permanent
injunction, even though the time for such challenges had passed.
(Doc. 158.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition. (Doc. 160.)
On December 13, 2022, the day before the scheduled hearing on
the motion for permanent injunction and to support its contention
that no injunctive relief should be granted, UNCHCS disclosed
additional steps it had recently taken and planned to implement to
better provide equally effective access to sight-impaired
patients. (Doc. 162.)
On December 14, 2022, the court heard oral argument on

Plaintiffs’ motion. (Minute Entry 12/14/2022.) In light of the
changes to certain policies and practices that UNCHCS reported it
made in its filing the day before the hearing, the court instructed
the parties to meet and confer and file a joint status report
outlining their respective positions as to whether they contended
that a permanent injunction was still warranted, and if so, then
on what grounds. (Id.)
On January 30, 2023, the parties reported they were unable to
come to any agreement and set out their respective positions in
light of the then-current record. (Doc. 163.) After reviewing
the parties’ submissions, the court scheduled another hearing for
May 1, 2023, and raised several concerns it directed the parties
to be prepared to address in order for the court to better

understand the parties’ respective positions on injunctive relief.
(Doc. 165.) The court held a hearing on May 1, 2023, but because
the parties could not agree on the propriety of the court hearing
evidence or testimony from their proposed experts, the court only
heard argument, and the parties submitted the case on the written
record, which all parties agreed was sufficient for the court to
enter a final judgment. (Minute Entry 05/01/2023.)
On June 22, 2023, the court issued its memorandum opinion and
order, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunction in
part, and denying it in part. (Doc. 167.) The court entered a
final judgment imposing a three-year permanent injunction against

UNCHCS as follows:
Defendant UNCHCS, its officers, agents, servants, and
employees, and other persons acting on behalf of or in
concert with it who receive actual notice of this
Permanent Injunction by personal service or otherwise,
shall:

Provide Plaintiff Timothy Miles, upon his request, with
equally effective access to all material information
UNCHCS provides its patients, which shall include, upon
his request, large print documents in an accessible
format; provided, however, that where such documents are
not available at the time of the clinical encounter and
upon Miles’s request, UNCHCS shall provide an
alternative method of communication, such as by reading
the communication to Miles in a private location that
best maintains Miles’s privacy and independence until
UNCHCS can provide, as soon as practicable, large print
copies.

Provide DRNC constituent Dr. Ricky Scott, upon his
request, equally effective access to all material
information that UNCHCS provides its patients, which
shall include, upon his request, accessible electronic
documents configured for use by screen reading devices
such as JAWS to the extent UNCHCS has control over such
documents for manipulation for use by screen readers,
or, upon Dr. Scott’s request, in Braille; provided,
however, that where such documents are not available at
the time of the clinical encounter and upon Dr. Scott’s
request, UNCHCS shall provide an alternative method of
communication, such as by reading the communication to
Dr. Scott in a private location that best maintains Dr.
Scott’s privacy and independence until UNCHCS can
provide, as soon as practicable, electronic or Braille
copies.

(Doc. 168 at 2.) The court otherwise denied Plaintiffs’ requests
for injunctive relief either because it was overbroad or had
already been implemented by UNCHCS.
Plaintiffs now seek a total award of $2,144,284.11 as a
prevailing party under the ADA, Section 504, and the ACA. (See
Doc. 178-1 at 8.) This is composed of an award of $1,211,841.50
for 2,318.9 hours by attorneys and paralegals of the law firm of
Brown, Goldstein & Levy, LLP, (“BGL”), $818,368 for 2,766.7 hours
for DRNC attorneys and paralegals, and $114,074.61 in total
expenses. (Id.) UNCHCS seeks an award of $2,396.22 in costs
pursuant to Plaintiffs’ rejection of its offer of judgment pursuant
to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 171.)
Each motion will be addressed in turn.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
All three relevant federal laws in this action under which some
form of relief was awarded - the ADA, Section 504, and Section

1557 - allow a “prevailing party” to recover reasonable attorneys’
fees and expenses. 42 U.S.C. 12205 (ADA) (allowing reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs); 29
U.S.C. 794a(b) (Section 504) (allowing reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of costs); 42 U.S.C. 18116(a) (Section 1557) (making relief
coextensive with 29 U.S.C. § 794). “[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when
actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). Put
another way, litigants are “a prevailing party for purposes of an

attorneys’ fees award if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought
in bringing suit.” Cone v. Randolph Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 657
F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (M.D.N.C. 2009) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). That standard is satisfied by a “judgment
for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or
nominal.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. It is also satisfied by an
injunction in favor of the party seeking fees. Cf. Mercer v. Duke
Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the role of
injunctive relief in the scope inquiry of a fees award and assuming
its applicability in the prevailing party inquiry). The fee-
shifting provisions of civil rights statutes encourage competent
counsel to take on cases that will vindicate civil rights and

discourage future violations. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 429 (1983); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-
75 (1986).
In considering an award to a prevailing party, the court
engages in a three-step process. See Mercer, 401 F.3d at 203.
First, it calculates the “lodestar” rate, which is simply the
number of hours reasonably worked multiplied by a reasonable rate.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The lodestar provides “an objective
basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a
lawyer’s services.” Id. To determine what is reasonable in terms
of hours expended and rate charged, the court applies the twelve

factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81,
88 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit has articulated these
factors as follows:
(1) the time and labor required in the case, (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, (3)
the skill required to perform the necessary legal
services, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
lawyer due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary
fee for similar work, (6) the contingency of a fee, (7)
the time pressures imposed in the case, (8) the award
involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the lawyer, (10) the
undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length
of the professional relationship between the lawyer and
the client, and (12) the fee awards made in similar
cases.

In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2010).
Second, the court subtracts any fees incurred on unsuccessful
claims that are unrelated to successful ones. Robinson v. Equifax
Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009). Third, it
considers adjusting the lodestar rate upward or downward based on
the measure of success achieved by the Plaintiffs. Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434. While the court has discretion in calculating an
award, “a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an
attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.” Id. at 429 (internal citation and quotations
omitted). In that sense, therefore, the court’s discretion is
“narrow.” N.Y. Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980).
This narrowing serves the important public policy of “facilitating
access to judicial process for the redress of civil rights
grievances.” Brandon v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 921 F.3d
194, 198 (4th Cir. 2019).
With this framework in mind, the court turns to each step in
the analysis.
1. Prevailing Party
UNCHCS concedes that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties.
(Doc. 177 at 2.) It argues, however, that Plaintiffs are only
“technical[ly]” so, are only “‘eligible for, rather than entitled
to,’ attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs,” and therefore should
not be “entitl[ed] to an unreasonable award. (Id. at 2, 5.)

UNCHCS also argues that the case involves “little or no damages,”
requiring the court to determine whether Plaintiffs’ victory is
sufficiently material to warrant an award and, if so, what is
reasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiffs Miles, NFB, and DRNC are indeed prevailing
parties. Each benefitted from the equitable relief obtained as a
result of the court’s entry of a permanent injunction against
UNCHCS. Plaintiff Miles and Plaintiff DRNC, on behalf of Dr.
Scott, its constituent, secured the entry of a three-year permanent
injunction as to both individuals regarding UNCHCS’s provision of
compliant disability services. This plainly constitutes a

judicially sanctioned judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. Mercer, 401
F.3d at 203.
The parties have also represented their agreement that the
settlements Plaintiffs Bone and Miles obtained with UNCHCS entitle
them to prevailing party status. They have not briefed this point,
however, and because this relief resulted from a settlement, the
court must examine the authority for this position on these facts
before awarding statutory attorneys’ fees and expenses, as the
parties cannot confer statutory authority for a fee award by mere
agreement.
Bone and Miles reached their settlements during a court-
ordered mediation conducted by the magistrate judge as part of the
court’s pretrial procedures. (Minute Entry 2/8/22.) UNCHCS agreed

to pay both Bone and Miles damages to settle their individual
claims, and the parties agreed that each would be “entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as determined under the ADA.”
(Doc. 139-1 at 3.) The parties agreed at that time that the court
retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the terms of
the settlement agreement for Bone through December 31, 2022. (Id.
at 5.) Thereafter, however, the parties disagreed on certain terms
of the final documentation, and the magistrate judge entered an
order setting a deadline for any motion to enforce settlement.
(Minute Entry 3/15/22.) Plaintiffs Bone and Miles moved to enforce
the court-mediated settlement and filed a supporting brief (Docs.

139, 140), UNCHCS filed a response in opposition (Doc. 141), and
Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. 142). The magistrate judge entered
a Recommendation that the court enforce the mediated agreement as
urged by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 143.) This court adopted the
Recommendation with an order that concluded that “UNCHCS shall
perform its obligations under the February Settlement Agreement.”
(Doc. 145.)
The filed settlement agreements reveal that UNCHCS agreed to
pay Miles $95,000.00 and Bone $30,000.00 to settle their damages
claims. (Docs. 174-11 at 2, 174-12 at 2.) In the settlement
agreements, UNCHCS acknowledged Plaintiffs’ prevailing party
status with the following provision: “UNCHCS agrees that
Plaintiffs to the Civil Action are entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs, as determined under the ADA, for all
claims resolved through settlement between UNCHCS and Plaintiffs.”
(Docs. 174—11 at 5 (emphasis added), 174-12 at 5 (emphasis added).)
The settlement agreements also provided that in the event of any
action to enforce the agreements, the parties agreed to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Orange County, North Carolina Superior
Court for Miles and the Edgecombe County, North Carolina Superior
Court for Bone, reserving the parties’ right to remove an action
to this federal district court. (Doc. 174-11 at 7-8; Doc. 174-12
at 6.) Thereafter, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal
of all claims for damages by Bone and Miles, specifically

acknowledging the following:
The Parties have agreed in their Settlement Agreement
and Release that all Plaintiffs in the above-captioned
action are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs, as determined under the ADA, for all claims
resolved through settlement between the Parties, and
that University of North Carolina Health Care System
retains the right to make any challenges to Plaintiffs’
recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs aside
from a challenge to Plaintiffs’ entitlement as defined
under the ADA.
(Doc. 147 at 1.)
Finally, in its briefing on these motions, UNCHCS presently
acknowledges that Bone and Miles are prevailing parties based on
their monetary payments. (Doc. 177 at 2 n.1.)
The Supreme Court’s last pronouncement on the standard for
determining prevailing party status where a settlement is

mentioned was Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
There, the Court rejected the “catalyst” theory whereby a plaintiff
could recover fees so long as he had succeeded on a significant
issue in the litigation that achieved some of the benefit sought
in the action, even though it was not as a result of any formal
court order.6 The Court concluded that a “defendant’s voluntary
change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the
plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary
judicial imprimatur on the change.” Id. at 605 (emphasis in
original). To allow an award of fees in that circumstance would

impermissibly “allow[] an award where there is no judicially
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id.
at 605. Rather, the Court stated, a plaintiff could be a
“prevailing party” only if he was “awarded some relief” by the

6 The Fourth Circuit had previously rejected the catalyst theory. See
S-1 By and Through P-1 and P-2 v. State Bd of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49,
51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
court and achieved an “alteration in the legal relationship of the
parties.” Id. at 603-05. The Court observed that “some relief”
included nominal damages and could be contained in a judgment on
the merits or a signed settlement agreement “enforced through a
consent decree.” Id. at 603-04 (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S.
122 (1980)). Moreover, the Court in a footnote gave the following

admonition:
We have subsequently characterized the Maher opinion as
also allowing for an award of attorney’s fees for private
settlements. See Farrar v. Hobby, supra, at 111, 113 S.
Ct 566; Hewitt v. Helms, supra, at 760, 107 S. Ct. 2672.
But this dictum ignores that Maher only “held that fees
may be assessed . . . after a case has been settled by
the entry of a consent decree.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475
U.S. 717, 720, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986).
Private settlements do not entail the judicial approval
and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal
jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement
will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement
are incorporated into the order of dismissal.

532 U.S. at 604 n.7.
Some courts have concluded that Buckhannon did not intend to
restrict the analysis to a consent decree. In American Disability
Association, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir.
2002), for example, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the Court’s
requirement that there be some “judicially sanctioned change in
the legal relationship of the parties,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at
605, and concluded that “even absent the entry of a formal consent
decree, if the district court either incorporates the terms of a
settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce
the terms of the parties’ agreement.” Am. Disability Ass’n, Inc.,
289 F.3d at 1320. Because the parties’ settlement agreement
provided substantive injunctive relief sought in the lawsuit and
the court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the
injunctive terms, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was

a prevailing party. Id. at 1321.
In National Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush,
173 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2001), the parties entered
into a settlement after the defendants filed motions for summary
judgment and sought court approval. Eventually, the court entered
a judgment that dismissed all claims, directed the parties to abide
by their settlement agreement, reserved jurisdiction to enforce
the order, and required the parties “to abide by their settlement
agreement.” Id. at 1275. The court held that “the judgment
requiring the parties to abide by and retaining jurisdiction to
enforce the Settlement Agreement” was, “as a practical matter,”

legally indistinguishable from a consent decree. Id. at 1276-78.
The order, the court concluded, was sufficient to constitute a
“change in the [parties’] legal relationship” within the meaning
of Buckhannon. Id. at 1279.
A similar result was reached in Barrios v. California
Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 & n.5 (9th Cir.
2002). In that ADA case, the court noted the Ninth Circuit’s rule
that “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when he or she enters into a legally
enforceable settlement agreement against the defendant.” Id. at
1134 (citing Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2000), which in turn quoted Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12).
Because the parties had settled their claims, the court concluded
that the plaintiff was a prevailing party.

Other courts are more demanding, however. In New York State
Federation of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi &
Limousine Commission, 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2002), for
example, the court determined that the plaintiff was not prevailing
because it resolved its claim with the defendant without any court
involvement. The court noted that Buckhannon rejected the catalyst
theory and interpreted the rule to require a “judicially sanctioned
change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 159.
See also Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 9–11 (1st Cir.
2011) (holding district court’s order approving settlement
agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)

functionally equivalent to a consent decree because it altered the
parties’ legal relationship, reflected a “sufficient appraisal of
the merits of the purposes of the imprimatur requirement,” and
indicated that the district court “expressly retained jurisdiction
over the case”); id. at 11 n. 3 (“[T]he mere fact that a settlement
is subject to court approval does not in itself supply the
necessary ingredients for prevailing party status. It is the
presence of continuing judicial oversight that pushes the ball
across the goal line and thus suffices to give a settlement the
required judicial imprimatur.”); Bell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 451
F.3d 1097, 1103 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f a court does not
incorporate a private settlement into an order, does not sign or
otherwise provide written approval of the settlement’s terms, and

does not retain jurisdiction to enforce performance of the
obligations assumed by the settling parties, the settlement ‘does
not bear any of the marks of a consent decree’ and does not confer
prevailing party status on the party whose claims have been
compromised.” (quoting T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349
F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2003))); T.D., 349 F.3d at 478–79 (agreeing
that “some settlement agreements, even though not explicitly
labeled as a ‘consent decree[,]’ may confer ‘prevailing party’
status[ ] if they are sufficiently analogous to a consent decree,”
but holding that the settlement agreement at issue was not
sufficiently analogous because it was not “embodied in a court

order or judgment,” it did not bear “the district court judge's
signature,” and the district court did not retain jurisdiction to
enforce it); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that court order that (1) “contains
mandatory language,” (2) “is entitled ‘Order,’ ” (3) “bears the
signature of the District Court judge,” and (4) gives the plaintiff
“the right to request judicial enforcement of the settlement
against” the defendant rendered the plaintiff a prevailing
party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 285 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
judicial approval and oversight identified by the Supreme Court as
involved in consent decrees are lacking where, as here, a
settlement agreement . . . is neither incorporated explicitly in
the terms of the district court’s dismissal order nor the subject

of a provision retaining jurisdiction.”); Christina A. v.
Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993–94 (8th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
Buckhannon as requiring “either an enforceable judgment on the
merits or a consent decree”; holding that the approval of a class
action settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 23(e) “fails to
impose the necessary ‘imprimatur’ on the agreement,” that “the
district court's approval of the settlement agreement [did] not,
by itself, create a consent decree,” and that the district court's
express retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement “alone is not enough to establish a judicial ‘imprimatur’
on the settlement contract”).

Finally, some courts do not require a consent decree to confer
prevailing party status if there has been some equivalent judicial
action. In Sabo v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 606 (2016), the
court defined a consent decree as an agreement of the parties that
is contractual in nature but one that “the parties desire and
expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial
decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other
judgments and decrees.” Id. at 623. It noted that such an
equivalent exists where the lawsuit “results in a court order in
which the court expressly approves the parties’ settlement
agreement and retains jurisdiction to ensure the settlement’s
implementation.” Id. at 625. See also Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9–
11 (finding a judicial imprimatur exists where the court retains

jurisdiction to enforce a settlement and exercised continuing
judicial oversight); Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (finding court order “functionally a settlement agreement
enforced through a consent decree” because it contained mandatory
language, was entitled “ORDER,” and bore “the district judge's
signature, not those of the parties’ counsel”).
In the Fourth Circuit, there appears to be no decision
directly on point. In S-1 By and Through P-1 and P-2 v. State
Board of Education of N.C., the full court, in rejecting the
catalyst theory, held that a person may not become a prevailing
party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “except by virtue of having obtained

an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some
of the legal relief sought.” 21 F.3d at 51 (emphasis added). The
court adopted Judge Wilkinson’s dissent to the previous panel
opinion in which he stated that a “plaintiff securing such a
settlement can certainly be deemed to have prevailed in the absence
of a formal judgment” because “Farrar merely clarified Hewitt by
stressing that a voluntary change in conduct must be formalized in
a legally enforceable settlement agreement to transform a
plaintiff into a prevailing party.” S-1 By and Through P-1 and P-
2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 6 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1993)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The court has since extended
prevailing party status to one who has obtained a preliminary
injunction, even though the relief could be ephemeral, if the case

is mooted by compliance as a result. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F.4th
200, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2023) (en banc). In such a case, the
plaintiff has been provided “concrete and irreversible relief on
the merits” which was “as the result of a judicially ordered change
in the parties’ relationship.” Id. at 214.
Here, the question is a close one. Under the unique
circumstances of this case, the court accepts that Plaintiffs Bone
and Miles are prevailing parties as to their damages settlements.7
First, their settlement was reached during the parties’
participation in a court-ordered mediation conducted by the
magistrate judge. Second, their settlement agreement reflects an

irreversible alteration in the parties’ relationship, as both
Plaintiffs obtained relief on the merits - the right, by contract,
to damages that they sought in the lawsuit. Third, because the
parties disagreed on whether they had reached a complete agreement,

7 Parties seeking to preserve a plaintiff’s prevailing party status are
nevertheless best advised to seek the court’s entry of a consent judgment
that retains jurisdiction over enforcement.
they submitted their disagreement to the court which, exercising
its inherent supervisory authority and implementing that portion
of the parties’ agreement that the court retain jurisdiction for
the purpose of enforcing the terms of their settlement agreement
as to Bone (Doc. 139-1 at 5), entered an order requiring that they
abide by the terms of their agreement. (Doc. 143.) The Fourth

Circuit has described this exercise of a district court’s power to
enforce a settlement agreement as one that “has the ‘practical
effect’ of entering a judgment by consent.” Hensley, 277 F.3d at
540 (quoting Millner v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1009
(4th Cir. 1981)). The order thus bears a significant imprimatur
of the court. Fourth, the parties’ settlement agreement came on
the heels of the magistrate judge’s Recommendation on Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment finding that UNCHCS had violated these
two Plaintiffs’ statutory rights. (Doc. 125.) And fifth, this is
not a case where a defendant may be caught unaware it is subject
to liability for attorneys’ fees and expenses, as UNCHCS stipulated

to these Plaintiffs’ entitlement in the settlement agreements and
represented the same to the court in the stipulation dismissing
these Plaintiffs’ damages claims.
Though all Plaintiffs therefore qualify as prevailing
parties, the full nature of the relief, which matters for the scope
of the fees and expenses to which Plaintiffs are entitled as
prevailing parties, is more complicated. The court’s final
injunction was limited in scope, applying only to Miles and Dr.
Scott, a non-party. The court refrained from ordering certain
requested equitable relief, but for separate reasons. Some of the
relief, especially as to so-called “best practices” for sight-
impaired individuals, exceeded the requirements of the applicable
laws under which the claims were brought, and Plaintiffs’ requests

in that regard were clearly overbroad. Other relief, such as
upgrades to UNCHCS’s intake system for sight-impaired patients,
was not included as part of the injunction only because UNCHCS had
implemented it during the course of the litigation – though UNCHCS
offered, and Plaintiffs rejected, it as part of the proposed Rule
68 offer of judgment, resulting in additional litigation costs.
But while none of the relief was novel or ground-breaking, it
ultimately inured to the benefit of all sight-impaired patients of
the UNCHCS system, which serves an important public purpose.
Mercer, 401 F.3d at 207. Thus, all Plaintiffs clearly obtained
some important measure of equitable relief, not only for the

individual Plaintiffs, but also for all sight-impaired patients of
the UNCHCS system, the scope of which will be addressed further
below.
2. Calculating the Lodestar Fee Award
Plaintiffs have submitted the time entries for the lawyers in
Plaintiff DRNC, a non-profit advocacy group, and the BGL law firm
located in Baltimore, Maryland. UNCHCS challenges the fees on
multiple grounds, including the claimed unreasonableness of the
hourly rates and what it argues are excessive, redundant, and
unnecessary hours resulting from overstaffing, block billing, and
excessive/duplicative/unnecessary work. (Doc. 177 at 17-20.)
Plaintiffs support their application with detailed time entries
and affidavits of counsel. Plaintiffs contend they have excluded

from their fee request all hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary. (Doc. 174 at 7.) They also excluded all
fees related to claims against Defendant Nash Hospitals, Inc.,
with whom Plaintiffs settled their claims, and as related to
Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful objection to the magistrate judge’s
ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Id.) Plaintiffs report
they have further discounted their time by excluding fees for any
timekeeper who worked 10 hours or less. (Id.) In total, this
reportedly results in a reduction of 326 hours at a value of
$170,189.00 at BGL’s current rates. (Id.) DRNC also reports it
reduced its fees by 716.7 hours, for a value of $218,935.00 at its

current rates. (Id. at 7-8.) Thus, the total reduction is claimed
to be $389,124.00.
a. Time and labor required in the case
Plaintiffs are claiming a total of 5,085.6 hours in time and
labor in this case, with 2,318.9 hours expended by attorneys and
paralegals of the BGL law firm and 2,766.7 hours expended by DRNC
attorneys and paralegals for both the merits case and the
preparation of the present motion for fees and expenses. As to
the merits case, the following hours are claimed:8
BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Eve Hill 29.3
Jessica Weber 620.9
Chelsea Crawford 58.2
James Strawbridge 1,173.7
Angela Lima 177.6
Samantha Duckworth 68.5
Shana Fischer 15.6

DRNC
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Holy Stiles 953.5
Christopher Hodgson 1,474.1
Lisa Grafstein 28.4
Nicholas Lett 255.8

(Doc. 174-2 at 11; Doc. 174-8 at 11). As to the preparation of
the present motion for fees and expenses, the following hours are
claimed:
BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Jessica Weber 54.7
James Strawbridge 112.8
Angela Lima 21.7

(Doc. 178-1 at 5.)
Plaintiffs argue that a substantial portion of their
counsels’ time related to responding to the multiple legal
challenges UNCHCS mounted, which Plaintiffs argue were “overly

8 All hours are rounded to the nearest tenth of the hour (every six
minutes).
aggressive litigation tactics” that drove up the fees. (Doc. 178
at 8.) Plaintiffs also note that UNCHCS rejected their offer to
enter into a tolling agreement to allow time to try to negotiate
a resolution of their claims, which would have avoided litigation
altogether. (Doc. 174-2 at 14.) UNCHCS, by contrast,
characterizes Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as an attempt to effect “top-

down,” system-wide relief well beyond what the law required or
what could feasibly be accomplished, and contend that Plaintiffs
rejected its repeated attempts to compromise and “find cooperative
solutions.” (Doc. 177 at 3-5.) There is some truth in each
contention.
Plaintiffs are correct that they had to respond to UNCHCS’s
motion to dismiss, UNCHCS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(which the magistrate judge characterized as “largely
repackage[d]” versions of UNCHCS’s arguments he rejected on motion
to dismiss (Doc. 98 at 20)), UNCHCS’s unsuccessful motion to stay
discovery (Doc. 70), and four summary judgment motions and

accompanying briefs filed against each Plaintiff separately.
(Docs. 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114.) Plaintiffs
required an expanded word limit to respond. (Doc. 118.) Plaintiff
also moved for partial summary judgment on liability. (Doc. 105.)
After the magistrate judge concluded that UNCHCS had violated the
ADA, Section 504, and Section 1556 with respect to Miles and Bone,
UNCHCS filed objections to the Recommendation (Docs. 129, 130), to
which Plaintiffs had to respond (Doc. 136).
Thereafter, the parties prepared for a March 7, 2022 trial,
filing the requisite pretrial disclosures, motions in limine, and
proposed jury instructions and trial brief. (Docs. 134, 135.)
Fourteen depositions were taken, and Plaintiffs retained two
expert witnesses, Megan Morris and Dennis Quon. (Doc. 174 at 6,

22-23.)
At the February 8, 2022 settlement conference, UNCHCS
stipulated that it had violated the ADA as to Miles and Dr. Scott,
agreed to pay Plaintiffs damages, and agreed that Plaintiffs were
prevailing parties. (Doc. 139-1.) Though the parties signed a
term sheet, UNCHCS attempted to add other terms to the deal, and
Plaintiffs were forced to move to enforce the settlement agreement
at the direction of the magistrate judge. (Doc. 139, 140.) The
court granted the motion, and the parties executed their settlement
agreement. (Docs. 174-11, 174-12.) The settlement agreement left
open the issue of equitable relief.

On August 3, 2022, UNCHCS served its offer of judgment (Doc.
177-3), which Plaintiffs rejected.
Following that, the parties briefed Plaintiffs’ request for
a permanent injunction (Docs. 151, 152, 153), and the court
scheduled a hearing (Doc. 154). Plaintiffs prepared their
witnesses for possible testimony at the hearing in response to
this court’s order that the parties be prepared to demonstrate
“how and why Plaintiffs contend [UNCHCS’s new] remedies are
inadequate.” (Doc. 156 at 1.) One month before the hearing,
however, UNCHCS moved to preclude Plaintiffs’ experts (whose
declarations were long part of the summary judgment record) under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. (Docs. 157-59.) The court denied
the motion, finding that the time for such a motion “ha[d] long

passed.” (Doc. 161 at 2.)
On December 13, 2022, UNCHCS filed evidence of new measures
it claimed to have implemented and others which it planned to
implement in a further effort to meet and thus moot the challenges
Plaintiffs brought in their motion for permanent injunction. (Doc.
162.) After the hearing the next day, the court directed the
parties to meet and confer to determine whether in fact UNCHCS’s
recently disclosed efforts negated or mitigated Plaintiffs’
concerns and to report to the court by January 30, 2023. (Minute
Entry 12/14/22.) Plaintiffs contend they tried to meet but that
UNCHCS rebuffed their attempt to include Plaintiffs’ retained

experts in any discussion, so any effort to resolve their
differences fell apart. (Doc. 163.) Each side set out its version
of where things stood at that point. (Id.)
In light of the parties’ conflicting claims as to compliance
with the relevant civil rights laws, the court scheduled another
hearing for May 1, 2023, to attempt to resolve them. (Doc. 164.)
The court posed specific questions to the parties so they could be
prepared to address them at the hearing. (Doc. 165.) The court
also directed them to have their “technical people” available to
answer any technical questions the court may have as to operation
of the relevant Epic electronic medical records system. (Id. at
1.) Plaintiffs brought their experts to the hearing; UNCHCS had
no retained expert but also did not bring its technical personnel.

On June 23, 2023, the court issued a 109-page memorandum
opinion and order, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for permanent
injunction in part and denying it in part. (Doc. 167.) The court
found that Miles and Dr. Scott would suffer irreparable harm absent
an injunction. (Id. at 63.) The court also found that Plaintiffs
sought “‘top-down’ system-wide relief meant to ‘apply across the
UNCHCS Network.’” (Id. at 66.) Consequently, the injunction
Plaintiffs sought was “in myriad ways, plainly overbroad,” and
Plaintiffs sought to impose in some instances the types of “best
practices” that the law does not require. (Id.) The court,
therefore, decided to craft a more limited injunction properly

suited to the circumstances of the case, explaining:
Accordingly, the court will enter an injunction to order
UNCHCS to do what it has failed consistently to do so
far: provide Miles and Dr. Scott with equally effective
access to all material information that UNCHCS provides
its patients. For Miles, of course, that means providing
him with accessible large-print documents. For Dr.
Scott, that means providing electronic documents
configured for use by screen reading devices (such as
JAWS) to the extent UNCHCS has control over such
documents in Epic or, upon Dr. Scott's request, Braille
documents. However, as to both individuals, where such
documents are not immediately available at the time of
the clinical encounter, UNCHCS shall provide an
alternative method of communication that provides each
with equally effective access to his healthcare
information, such as by reading the documents. This
injunction – fully set forth in the separate Judgment
and Permanent Injunction - is narrowly tailored to
remedy the harm established in this case. It also best
comports with the proper scope of a federal district
court's remedial power.

(Id. at 67-68.) The court found the injuries alleged in the case
and demonstrated by the discovery were - and thus the remedies to
be imposed needed to be - individualized to Miles and Dr. Scott.
Indeed, although the association Plaintiffs sought relief for
its members, apart from Miles and Dr. Scott, Plaintiffs were unable
to provide any record support for the contention that any other
members and the potentially scores of blind patients of UNCHCS
suffered any similar harms – a fact established by the association
Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) depositions as early as February 16-17,
2021. (Doc. 108-16; Doc. 114-18; Doc. 171-2 at 3-4.) Although
Plaintiffs speculated that UNCHCS served more than 7,000 blind
patients, throughout the litigation UNCHCS had identified only 175
patients as sight-impaired and recorded only three requests for
large print documents and none for Braille documents. (Doc. 151-
1 at 19.) Thus, the court declined major areas of Plaintiffs’
requested relief, such as the following: a generalized mandate
ordering UNCHCS to comply with federal disability laws; “necessary
and timely steps to ensure that [UNCHCS] furnishes appropriate
auxiliary aids and services where necessary”; within six months,
broad accessible format relief to “[e]nsure that [UNCHCS] records
and complies with all requests by blind individual for print
communications,” “[e]nsure that the accessible formats [UNCHCS]
provides conform to established, recognized guidelines for
accessible document design,” and “[i]ssue or revise existing

policies to the extent necessary to implement prompt production of
standard print communications in the alternative format
requested”; within 12 months, substantial revisions to UNCHCS’s
electronic health record system (such as displaying the requested
accessible format for each patient) and mandated training of all
UNCHCS employees; and a requirement that all such changes be made
network-wide for each provider within the UNCHCS system (whether
or not owned or managed by UNCHCS), as well as all contractors
providing documents on their behalf. (Id. at 86-88, 91-97.) The
court rejected any “best practices” remedies as long as UNCHCS
provided accessibility (id. at 84, 93) and declined to become

entangled in any ongoing judicial oversight of a massive health
care system as to which courts are ill-equipped to deal.
While the court declined this extensive relief, it did note
that UNCHCS, as a result of the litigation, had already implemented
substantial changes, including the following: agreeing to extend
payment deadlines for sight-impaired individuals; agreeing to post
conspicuous notices on the UNCHCS webpage for accessible formats;
establishing a process for the fielding of complaints;
establishing an ADA Workgroup consisting of a multidisciplinary
team to evaluate policies on an ongoing basis and ensure effective
communication; and, importantly, establishing a uniform and
automatic process within the UNCHCS computer system for the intake
of patient information at reception to ensure that the patient’s

file would be flagged for the particular needs of the sight-
impaired patient by all providers who had access to the health
record. (Id. at 98-102.) This is addressed in more detail below
in the section on evaluating the degree of success.
The number of hours expended in this case, then, is a function
of three major, but related, factors. The first was Plaintiffs’
use of outside counsel, which had the effect of duplicating effort
by DRNC counsel. Plaintiffs argue that was reasonable because the
case was “unusually complex – factually and legally” because they
challenged practices of a statewide network. (Doc. 174 at 16.)
Plaintiffs cite the lack of precedent regarding healthcare

providers’ obligations to ensure effective communications for the
blind and point to their outside counsels’ “long history of
representing NFB and blind individuals in discrimination cases.”
(Id. at 17.) The second major factor is the alleged complexity of
the case in general, which affects the legal staffing by Plaintiff
DRNC and by their outside counsel. And the third factor was
Plaintiffs’ decision to pursue their full claims for relief even
though UNCHCS offered to implement extensive injunctive relief.9
Applicants bear the burden of documenting the appropriate
hours expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Courts are placed in
a difficult position when asked to determine whether attorney hours
were necessary to the relief obtained, and while a close and
careful review of the reasonableness is appropriate, “ex post facto

determination[s]” are improper. Stuart v. Walker-McGill, No.
1:11cv804, 2016 WL 320154, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2016).
As for Plaintiffs’ decision to associate the BGL firm, the
court finds it was reasonable under the circumstances. The
association Plaintiffs lacked the resources, expertise, and
bandwidth to effectively litigate this case to the extent it sought
relief involving the whole UNCHCS healthcare network. (Doc. 174-
8 at ¶ 10.) The BGL firm has the expertise, depth, and history
with Plaintiff NFB to be an appropriate selection as co-counsel.
UNCHCS’s objections to this extent are therefore rejected
although, as noted below, the court considers how the overreach of

Plaintiffs’ claims and duplicate staffing impacts the actual need
for some of these services.
Although there was not a robust development of case law on
the issue of a defendant’s legal burden to provide effective

9 For the reasons noted below, the court does not reduce any attorneys’
fees or expenses based on Plaintiffs’ failure to accept UNCHCS’s August
2022 offer of judgment.
communications in this context of sight-impaired patients of a
healthcare system, the general law applicable, as it turns out,
was not that complex. (See Doc. 167 at 46-51.) What complicated
the case was Plaintiffs’ attempt to impose “best practices” onto
the UNCHCS system (and all of its contractors), which interfaces
with the Epic medical records system operated by a third party, as

well as the MyChart records system. In as much as Epic is used
nationally by many healthcare providers, this case had all the
hallmarks of a test case to set a national standard to impose such
“best practices” on that system. Indeed, Plaintiffs contended
that this “was a case of regional, if not national, importance.”
(Doc. 174 at 15.) However, as the court found, this failed on two
fronts. First, the law sets a minimum bar and does not require
“best practices.” Second, Plaintiffs were unable to establish the
need for robust injunctive relief on behalf of members of the
association Plaintiffs. This was known to Plaintiffs at least by
the February 16 and 17, 2021 depositions of Virginia Knowlton

Marcus, chief executive officer of Plaintiff DRNC, and Mark
Riccobono, president of Plaintiff NFB, taken pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). (See Doc. 108-16; Doc. 114-18;
Doc. 171-2 at 3-4.) At no point did Plaintiffs identify a single
association member, other than Miles, Bone, and Dr. Scott, who
suffered similar alleged deprivations to justify a more robust
injunction. (Doc. 167 at 80-81.) From the court’s perspective,
this overreach stymied any real prospect of compromise.
Plaintiffs argue that even though the injunction was narrower
than what they requested, they would have had to expend the same
number of hours to prove entitlement to permanent relief. (Doc.
172-3 at 17-18.) The court is not convinced. The narrow nature
of the relief strongly suggests that it was Plaintiffs’ insistence

on “top-down” and extensive systemwide relief - especially the
imposition of “best practices” standards for blind patients that
included reconfiguring the medical records system (operated by a
third party) - which the court found exceeded the requirements of
the disability laws, that prevented the case from being resolved
earlier. As a result, the court cannot escape the conclusion that
a not insignificant portion of Plaintiffs’ work on the injunctive
relief phase of the case was motivated by a desire to obtain relief
that was not legally available and thus could have been avoided
had such overreach not been sought. The court will take this
factor into account, however, in assessing the degree of success

Plaintiffs achieved in Section 4 below.
UNCHCS does challenge specific portions of Plaintiffs’ fee
request as demonstrating overstaffing, block billing, and
excessive, duplicative, and unnecessary work such that the court
should make a reduction to the hours claimed. (Doc. 177 at 17-
18.) First, UNCHCS contends that Plaintiffs had four lawyers
involved in a deposition (Jeri Williams). (Doc. 174-3 at 44; Doc.
174-9 at 23.) However, to address this duplication, Plaintiffs
have already reduced all billing where more than two attorneys
attended a deposition, resulting in a reduction of 34.6 hours,
totaling $13,340.50 that Plaintiffs did not include in their fee
request.10 The court thus finds no need to reduce the time entries
further on this basis. (Doc. 178-4 at 2.)

That being said, Plaintiffs effectively had two law firms
pursuing the claims on their behalf: BGL and DRNC, who staffed a
combined total of eleven legal personnel for whom they seek
reimbursement. Ordinarily, such a case would be handled by one
law firm. While DRNC decided to use its own inside counsel for
portions of this matter and is entitled to be reimbursed for doing
so, the court in determining reasonableness nevertheless must
consider the extent to which having two teams of lawyers on the
case resulted in duplicative billing. Every time a new lawyer is
added to any team, there is a corresponding marginal increase in
duplicate time and effort. The record contains evidence that BGL

and DRNC engaged in some distribution of work (e.g., brief writing)
and some discounting of billable hours in an attempt to avoid
duplication. Nevertheless, overlap is apparent. Based on the
timesheets provided, a reasonable (but conservative) estimate of
the effect of having two law firms involved is a minimum 15 percent

10 Of this, $6,838.50 was discounted from BGL’s fees and $6,502.00 was
discounted from DRNC’s fees. (Doc. 178-4 at 2.)
increase in the billings. (See, e.g., Doc. 174-3 (billing for,
among other things, “Exchange emails with co-counsel,” “Review
email from [co-counsel],” “Save, label, log and e-mail documents
to co-counsel,” “Conference call with [co-counsel],” “Call with
co-counsel,” “Zoom conference with [co-counsel],” “Review draft
discovery plan from co-counsel,” “Edit discovery plan for 26(f)

conference written by co-counsel,” “Review motion to compel
drafted by co-counsel,” etc.); Doc. 174-9 (billing for, among other
things, “review [co-counsel] email re: . . .,” “respond to co-
counsel email,” “co-counsel meeting to discuss discovery next
steps,” “emails with co-counsel re: . . .,” “review [co-counsel]
edits and respond,” “debrief deposition with [co-counsel],”
etc.).) That Plaintiffs chose to staff the case with eleven
timekeepers should not require UNCHCS to pay for such duplication.
Thus, the court determines that a 15 percent reduction to the time
spent on the merits case11 is appropriate to better represent the
time reasonably expended on this case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–

37 (holding the court is required only to make a reasonable
estimate based on the record). The court will thus reduce the
hours claimed on the merits case to the following:

11 The court discerns no unreasonableness as to the time expended on the
present motion for fees and expenses and therefore declines to reduce
those totals.
BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Eve Hill 24.9
Jessica Weber 527.8
Chelsea Crawford 49.5
James Strawbridge 997.6
Angela Lima 151.0
Samantha Duckworth 58.2
Shana Fischer 13.3

DRNC
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Holy Stiles 810.5
Christopher Hodgson 1,253.0
Lisa Grafstein 24.1
Nicholas Lett 217.4

Second, as to so-called “block billing,” the court does not
discern any abuse that warrants a reduction. The entries describe
largely legal research and brief writing, and counsel in its
records provided more descriptive breakdowns within individual
entries where appropriate.
Third, as to excessive or unnecessary work, UNCHCS cites
multiple entries related to outlining and drafting briefing
related to motion to dismiss arguments. Given the extensive
briefing required by this case, the court cannot determine any
abuse on this record and therefore declines to make any deductions
on this basis. (Doc. 177 at 18.)
As to travel charges, which all occurred during the merits
phase of the case, Plaintiffs contend that BGL’s practice is to
charge for travel time but that attorneys attempt to work “to the
extent possible” while doing so. Travel presents an opportunity
cost in not being able to work at one’s office. It is also
reasonable, however, to consider that such travel time is not the
same as legal work and that, as a practical matter, lawyers cannot
work at all times while en route. Though a client may agree to
pay full rates for travel, it is not reasonable to impose such a

generous fee structure on an opponent, even for a prevailing party,
where counsel is incurring travel cost because Plaintiffs sought
an out-of-state firm to represent them. Therefore, the court will
reduce all time billed by BGL timekeepers purely for travel12 by
50 percent. A review of the submitted time entries indicates the
following reductions: attorney Jessica Weber’s hours billed for
travel will be reduced from 20.9 hours to 10.6 hours, attorney
James Strawbridge’s hours billed for travel will be reduced from
24.3 hours to 12.2 hours, and paralegal Angel Lima’s hours billed
for travel will be reduced from 1 hour to 0.5 hours. With those
additional subtractions, the totals per timekeeper are:

BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Eve Hill 24.9
Jessica Weber 517.5
Chelsea Crawford 49.5
James Strawbridge 985.6
Angela Lima 150.5
Samantha Duckworth 58.2
Shana Fischer 13.3

12 The court did not reduce travel where the time entries reflect
substantive work occurred. (See, e.g., Doc. 174-3 at 85; Doc. 174-9 at
70.)
DRNC’s hours are unaffected:
DRNC
TIMEKEEPER HOURS
Holy Stiles 810.5
Christopher Hodgson 1,253.0
Lisa Grafstein 24.1
Nicholas Lett 217.4

Finally, UNCHCS argues, albeit in a footnote, that “[a]ll of
the work Plaintiffs’ legal team performed . . . after UNCHCS
extended its August 3, 2022 Rule 68 Offer of Judgment” was
unnecessary because the relief UNCHCS proposed in the offer of
judgment exceeded the relief ordered by the court. (Doc. 177 at
18 n.7.) Plaintiffs concede that the offer of judgment would have
applied to patients other than Miles and Dr. Scott (who were the
only individuals to receive injunctive relief from the court), but
they argue that the offer was “extremely narrow” because it applied
only to “Covered Affiliates,” which excludes UNCHCS-owned or
UNCHCS-managed hospitals, whereas the court’s injunction applied
to all UNCHCS “officers, agents, servants, and employees, and other
persons acting on behalf of or in concert with it.” (Doc. 178 at
11-12.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(d) provides that “[i]f the
judgment the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than
the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the offer was made.” As recognized by the Supreme Court, Rule 68
acknowledges the longstanding historical designation of “costs”
such that “the term ‘costs’ in [that Rule] was intended to refer
to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive
statute or other authority.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9
(1985). As such, “absent congressional expressions to the
contrary, where the underlying statute defines ‘costs’ to include

attorney’s fees,” courts have interpreted attorney’s fees to be
included as costs for purposes of Rule 68 and thus subject to that
Rule’s limitations, including the limitation pertaining to prior
offers of judgment. Id.
However, not every statute incorporates an award of
attorney’s fees into the scope of costs. See id. at 8. Where a
statute does not specifically invoke a right to attorney’s fees
“as part of costs,” any entitlement to attorney’s fees is not
limited in the same way as Rule 68 costs may be. See id. at 8-9;
Wyatt v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 65 F. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2003).
Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (authorizing “a reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs”) with 42 U.S.C. § 12205
(authorizing “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation
expenses, and costs”).
While Section 504 and Section 1557 of the ACA both define
costs to include an award of attorney’s fees, see 29 U.S.C.
§794a(b) (authorizing attorney’s fees “as part of costs”); 42
U.S.C. § 18116 (making relief coextensive with 29 U.S.C. § 794),
the ADA does not. Instead, it provides that “a reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs” be
provided to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Neither party
has addressed this linguistic distinction, but federal courts have
been clear that the ADA right to attorney’s fees for a prevailing
party is not recoverable as a part of “costs” within the confines

of Rule 68. See, e.g., Wyatt, 65 F. App’x at 591 (holding that
“Rule 68’s cost-shifting device does not apply to fees under the
ADA,” as the statute “does not define costs to include fees”);
Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
the language of the ADA from other statutes where “costs were
defined to include attorney's fees” as in Marek); Smith v. RW’s
Bierstube, Inc., No. 17-CV-1866 (PJS/HB), 2019 WL 6464142, at *3
(D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2019) (refusing to award fees under Rule 68 as
they were not “part of costs”). Because Plaintiffs’ application
for fees is cognizable under the ADA, it is not limited by the
prior Rule 68 offer of judgment. A deduction on this basis is

therefore not warranted.
b. Novelty and difficulty of the questions
presented

The more complex case will generally support a greater number
of hours. Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169,
175 (4th Cir. 1994). For the reasons noted above, the novelty, if
any, of Plaintiffs’ claims was a function of their breadth, which
was not supported by the law and would have likely imposed immense
burdens on the UNCHCS healthcare system. It is true that the case
involved some complexity in understanding the Epic and MyChart
medical records and billing systems, but the extent of that
complexity related in material measure to Plaintiffs’ overbroad
proposed remedies. To the extent Plaintiffs also claim complexity

in understanding “the contractual relationships between UNCHCS
affiliates,” this again relates to Plaintiffs’ effort to impose
expansive system-wide remedies beyond the requirements of the law.
This factor does not favor Plaintiffs.
c. Skill required to perform the necessary
legal services

Plaintiffs’ claims involved several civil rights and health
laws. Plaintiffs characterize the legal issues as “cutting-edge”
with “little precedent” regarding a healthcare provider’s
obligation to ensure effective communication with the blind. (Doc.
174 at 16.) As noted, they portrayed the lawsuit as “a case of
regional, if not national, importance.” (Id. at 15.) UNCHCS
responds that the case established no novel or important precedent
and did not “break new ground in the body of law interpreting the
ADA, the Rehab Act or the Affordable Care Act.” (Doc. 177 at 8.)
As this court noted in its memorandum opinion and order
imposing a narrow permanent injunction, the rights of the sight-
impaired are indeed important, but Plaintiffs’ attempt to impose
extensive “best practices” under the current statutory structure
exceeded what the law reasonably required. As the court found,
the claims could easily be resolved within the confines of the
applicable law, which did not require such measures. This factor
does not favor Plaintiffs.
d. Preclusion of other employment by the
lawyer due to acceptance of the case

Plaintiffs do not argue that this factor is relevant in the
analysis, nor does the court so find.
e. Customary fee for similar work

Plaintiffs contend that the hourly rates of their lawyers are
reasonable. UNCHCS challenges the rates of the BGL firm as well
as those of the lawyers at DRNC as excessive and beyond what the
local market will bear. However, while Plaintiffs have filed
several declarations to support their attorney fee award, UNCHCS
has not filed any factual support in response.
The BGL firm handles disability rights cases nationally and
has obtained successful results. (Docs. 174-13, 174-15, 174-17.)
The firm is based in Baltimore, Maryland, and its rates for this
case, as well as the hours sought, are as follows: $485 an hour
for associate James Strawbridge, who Plaintiffs claim accounted
for 1,286.5 hours;13 $675 an hour for partner Jessica Weber, who

13 The hours for James Strawbridge, Jessica Weber, and Angel Lima include
additional time spent in preparation of Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’
Plaintiffs claim accounted for 675.6 hours; $625 an hour for
partner Chelsea Crawford, for whom Plaintiffs report 58.2 hours;
and $725 an hour for partner Eve Hill, for whom they report for
29.3 hours. (Doc. 174-2 at 11.) The firm charges $295 an hour
for paralegal Angela Lima, who billed 199.3 hours, and $265 an
hour for paralegals Samantha Duckworth and Shana Fischer, who

billed a total of 84.1 hours. (Id.) Plaintiffs offer support for
the conclusion that these rates are reasonable within the Baltimore
market and nationally. (Doc. 174 at 19-21.)
Plaintiff DRNC does not charge its clients for its services,
but as a public interest association, it is entitled to seek an
award for its attorneys and paralegals at the prevailing rates
within the North Carolina community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 894-95 (1984). DRNC seeks the following hourly rates and
accountable hours: $300 an hour for attorney Christopher Hodgson,
who graduated law school and joined DRNC in 2015 and reports
1,474.1 hours; $325 an hour for attorney Holly Stiles, a 2007 law

school graduate and former Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
trial attorney, who reports 953.5 hours; and $375 an hour for
attorney Lisa Grafstein, a 1995 law school graduate who reports
28.4 hours. (Doc. 174-19 at 8.) DRNC also charges $150 an hour
for its paralegal, who graduated from paralegal training in 2015

fees and expenses. (See Doc. 174-2 at 10 (initial hours spent); Doc.
178-2 at 5 (additional hours spent on the fees motion).)
and reports 255.8 hours. (Id.)
A reasonable rate is that which is “in line with those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum,
465 U.S. at 895 n.11. The community in which the court sits is
“the appropriate starting point for selecting the proper rate.”

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1988).
However, where services of like quality are not available in the
local community, and where a party acts reasonably in choosing
counsel elsewhere, such external rates can be considered. Id. A
reasonable rate can be demonstrated by evidence of what clients
are normally willing to pay or by a showing of what comparable
lawyers of skill can command under similar circumstances. Rum
Creek, 31 F.3d at 175. Here, Plaintiffs have offered declarations
of multiple lawyers to support the reasonableness of the hourly
rates they seek.
The court, having reviewed the hourly rates proposed by DRNC,

easily finds that they are well within the prevailing rates in
this legal community. As DRNC points out, its rates are “at or
below the rates that comparable firms charge for attorneys of
comparable experience and for paralegals.” (Doc. 174-8 at 8.)
However, to the extent the rates charged by BGL are justified
by reference to the rates charged by firms in the Baltimore (see
Docs. 174-24, 174-26, 174-27) and other national markets
(including the Bay Area of California (see Docs. 174-13, 174-15)
and Chicago, Illinois (see Doc. 174-17)), they are not as well
supported, as is implicit in DRNC’s statement of its rates. UNCHCS
points to the current guidelines for the District of Maryland Local
Rules, which provide for the following hourly rates based on years
of practice: $150-225 (< 5 years); $165-300 (5-8 years); $225-350

(9-14 years); $275-425 (15-19 years); and $300-475 (20+ years).
Local Rules, https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/local-rules (last
accessed Jan. 31, 2023.) These rates are not ceilings in the
Maryland federal courts, however, and BGL can obtain an hourly
rate in excess of that in the Baltimore market if it can justify
it. See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 2022 WL 4608331, at
*12 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2022); Whitaker v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,
2010 WL 3928616, at *6 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2010) (finding departure
from the District of Maryland guidelines justified). Moreover,
the court considers the prevailing market to be the Middle District
of North Carolina and will consider the Maryland local rule rates

as only one of several factors in determining reasonableness. BGL
also relies on reference to fee awards it received in other cases,
but those markets were California, and Chicago, Illinois, where
fees are traditionally higher, and which are not comparable legal
markets to the one here. (See Doc. 174 at 20.)
Here, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement at current rates for all
their lawyers’ time for the past five years. The law allows this;
but it also allows the court to account for the inflationary
reduction in a delay in payment. Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071,
1081 (4th Cir. 1986). The court should also consider each lawyer’s
experience and training throughout the five-year pendency of this
case. Reyazuddin, 2022 WL 4608331, at *12 (considering lawyers’
experience when they actually worked on the case).

Here, Mr. Strawbridge, who was admitted to practice law in
2016, had 4 to 7 years of experience during the pendency of this
case. Even under the high end of the Maryland fee guidelines, his
rate would be $225 to $300 an hour within that community. His
requested rate of $485 exceeds this by half or more. While he
graduated law school in 2016, he clerked for a federal district
judge and then clerked for a federal circuit judge. (Doc. 174-2
at 7.) So, he was a relatively new associate when he joined BGL
in 2020. (Id.) Plaintiffs also offer declarations that his rate
is reasonable for firms within the Middle District of North
Carolina that practice “sophisticated and complex litigation.”

(Doc. 174-19 at 8-9; see also Doc. 174-21 at 4 (stating rates
“appear reasonable and consistent with the rates charged by
attorneys of like experience”); Doc. 174-22 at 4 (same); Doc. 174-
23 at 5 (same).) However, the court finds that an hourly rate of
$485 for a young associate exceeds the comparable rate here for
this type of work, and his rate will be reduced to $375. This is
in line with the hourly rate of one of Plaintiffs’ North Carolina
declarant attorneys who has been licensed since 2015 and charged
between $350 and $400 an hour. (Doc. 174-23 ¶ 13.)
Ms. Weber, who was admitted to the bar in 2009, had 9 to 15
years of experience during the pendency of this case. (Doc. 174-
2 at 4-6.) The guidelines suggest a rate of $350 to $425 at the
high end. Her rate of $675 exceeds this amount. Ms. Weber is a

graduate of Yale Law School and Princeton University and also
served as a law clerk to a federal district judge. (Id.) She has
extensive experience in disability cases and is recognized by
Lawdragon 500 as a leading plaintiff civil rights lawyer. (Id. at
5-7.) As with Mr. Strawbridge, Plaintiffs offer the opinion of
North Carolina lawyers that this rate is comparable to a local
market rate. (Docs. 174-19 at 8-9, 174-21 at 4, 174-22 at 4, 174-
23 at 5). The court finds that her experience justifies a rate in
excess of the Maryland guidelines, but in the present market should
be reduced to $575.
Ms. Crawford graduated law school in 2013 and clerked for a

federal district judge, then for a federal circuit judge. (Doc.
174-2 at 8.) She worked on the motion to dismiss phase of the
case (from approximately 2019 to 2020) and in 2022 was listed in
Lawdragon 500 as a leading civil rights lawyer. (Id.) She would
have had 5 to 10 years of experience at the time of this case.
Her hourly rate of $625 exceeds the Baltimore local rules rate,
which, at the high end, is $300 to $350. While Plaintiffs offer
North Carolina-based declarations as to the reasonableness of this
rate as for the other timekeepers, the court finds that comparable
attorneys in North Carolina would charge approximately $425 an
hour for the nature of the work performed in this case. (See Doc.
174-23 ¶ 13 (noting 2015 graduate charging $350-$400 an hour);
Doc. 174-21 ¶ 4 (noting 2008 graduate charging $400 an hour).)

The court finds her rate should be reduced accordingly.
Ms. Hill, who was admitted to the bar in 1989, has over 30
years of experience as a disability rights attorney, having served
as Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. (Doc. 174-2 at 7.)
She served as supervising partner for six months while Ms. Weber
was on parental leave. (Id.) Her rate of $725 an hour exceeds
the $425 high end of the Baltimore rate. However, she is clearly
a highly credentialed attorney, and her many years of experience
justify a higher rate. The court cannot say that $725 an hour is
unreasonable for her experience and skill level, given the nature

of the work performed here, so it will leave that rate undisturbed.
Paralegals rates under the Maryland local rules range from
$95 an hour to $150 an hour. The court finds no basis to compensate
BGL paralegals higher than the $150 an hour charged by DRNC and at
the high end of the Maryland local rules rate. Therefore, BGL’s
paralegals’ time will be compensated at $150 an hour.
At these new rates, the following are the totals for the hours
spent on the merits case that the court has found to be
compensable:
BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS RATE TOTAL FEE
Eve Hill 24.9 $725 $18,052.50
Jessica Weber 517.5 $575 $297,562.50
Chelsea Crawford 49.5 $425 $21,037.50
James Strawbridge 985.6 $375 $369,600.00
Angela Lima 150.5 $150 $22,575.00
Samantha Duckworth 58.2 $150 $8,730.00
Shana Fischer 13.3 $150 $1,995.00
TOTAL FEE: $739,552.50

DRNC
TIMEKEEPER HOURS RATE TOTAL FEE
Holy Stiles 810.5 $325 $263,412.50
Christopher 1,253.0 $300 $375,900.00
Hodgson
Lisa Grafstein 24.1 $375 $9,037.50
Nicholas Lett 217.4 $150 $32,610.00
TOTAL FEE: $680,960.00

Also at these new rates, the following are the totals for the hours
spent on the present motion for fees and expenses, which includes
briefing on legal issues:
BGL Law Firm
TIMEKEEPER HOURS RATE TOTAL FEE
Jessica Weber 54.7 $575 $31,452.50
James Strawbridge 112.8 $375 $42,300.00
Angela Lima 21.7 $150 $3,255.00
TOTAL FEE: $77,007.50

f. Contingency of a fee

There is no contingency fee in this case, so this factor is
inapplicable to the lodestar calculation.
g. Time pressures imposed in the case

Plaintiffs do not argue the application of this factor, nor
can the court discern any urgency to the proceedings which in fact
carried on for almost five years. This factor is neutral.
h. Award involved and the results obtained

As noted above, Plaintiffs achieved significant success for
Plaintiffs Bone and Miles through their settlements and for the
court-ordered injunction issued for the benefit of both Miles and
Dr. Scott. In addition, Plaintiffs managed to effect meaningful
changes in the manner UNCHCS conducted its patient intake process
to ensure that UNCHCS’s medical records for sight-impaired
patients are tagged to avoid the types of deficiencies in providing
adequate medical information that plagued Miles’s and Dr. Scott’s
experiences. This litigation has also caused UNCHCS to create a
working group to continue to monitor and improve its services to
sight-impaired patients. In significant ways, therefore, as the
court noted in its permanent injunction opinion, “UNCHCS has
already implemented much of what Plaintiffs ask[ed] for in their
proposed injunction” (Doc. 167 at 99), which warrants some credit
to the Plaintiffs. See Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v.
Dickerson, 444 F. App’x 660, 662-664 (4th Cir. 2011) (considering
voluntary actions taken during the course of litigation when
considering the overall results obtained by the prevailing
party).14
Where Plaintiffs fell short was their attempt to impose on
UNCHCS’s healthcare system burdensome requirements based on “best
practices” that were not required by the law and to do so across
the UNCHCS network that included all contractors, and to persist
in this request even after UNCHCS offered to implement substantial

relief. Plaintiffs’ ultimate legal relief was undoubtedly far
narrower than the award they sought from the court, which likewise
requires consideration in the fee award. To avoid duplication in
its reductions, the court merely notes this factor here and
addresses it further in Section 4 below.
i. Experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyers

For the reasons noted above, Plaintiffs’ counsel are highly
credentialed and, as noted by their accomplishments and the
opinions of other outside counsel, enjoy a reputation for
excellence.
j. Undesirability of the case

Plaintiffs do not argue this factor. However, DRNC states in
its declaration of Holly Stiles that “most North Carolina attorneys
with relevant experience in the plaintiff’s bar would have been
reluctant or unable to take this case on a pro bono or contingency

14 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but
can be cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See
Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).
basis given the complexity and time-consuming nature of the
litigation” and that “most larger firms that offer pro bono
assistance within the state have conflicts due to current or past
work on behalf of state government and/or UNC Health Care System.”
(Doc. 174-8 at 7.) UNCHCS does not address this factor, but these
are logical, practical barriers to finding suitable counsel that

the court considers which weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
k. Nature and length of the professional
relationship between the lawyer and the
client

Plaintiff NFB notes that it has had a decades-long association
with the BGL firm. (Doc. 174 at 17; Doc. 174-20 ¶¶ 8-10.) While
Plaintiff DRNC did not have such a relationship, it sought out the
BGL firm because of that firm’s decades-long history of
successfully representing the disabled and the DRNC’s inability to
prosecute its claims alone. (Doc. 174-8 at 7-8.) This factor
thus weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.
l. Fee awards made in similar cases.

Plaintiffs do not offer any comparable fee awards from other
similar cases. Rather, they rely on their arguments that their
request is reasonable by pointing to the fact that a substantial
fee award has been made where the plaintiff’s recovery was nominal.
(Doc. 178 at 3-4 & n.1 (citing Mercer, 401 F.3d at 202, 204, 208-
09 (noting $350,000 in fees awarded despite “nominal” damages
award).)
* * *
Based on all of the above, the court calculates the following
lodestar award: $816,560.00 in fees allocated for work performed
by the BGL firm,15 and $680,960.00 in fees allocated for the work
performed by DRNC, for a total lodestar amount of $1,497,520.00.
3. Adjustment for unsuccessful claims

Once the lodestar award is determined, the court is next to
subtract any fees incurred on unsuccessful claims unrelated to
successful ones. Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244. Here, Plaintiffs
have already excluded any fees related to their unsuccessful
challenge to the magistrate judge’s recommendation on UNCHCS’s
motion to dismiss. (Docs. 172-3 ¶ 22, 172-9 ¶ 14.) The only claim
under which no relief was had was the ADA Claim against Nash
brought in Claim II, which sought injunctive relief against Nash
and was dismissed at an earlier stage for lack of standing. (Doc.
44 at 24, 32-38; Doc. 57 (adopting the recommendation of the
magistrate).)

UNCHCS contends that the extent of the injunctive relief
obtained was largely limited to two individuals for three years.
(Doc. 177 at 2.) This argument is more properly considered in the

15 As the prior charts indicate, $739,552.50 of this amount is
attributable to the merits portion of the case and $77,007.50 is
attributable to the present motion for fees and expenses. The court
separates them because any adjustment for success on the merits is not
made to amounts related to the preparation of the present motion for
fees and expenses.
section below on the ultimate measure of success achieved.
4. Adjustment for measure of success achieved
Finally, the court considers any adjustments in the lodestar
upward or downward based on the measure of success achieved by the
Plaintiffs. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Plaintiffs characterize
the results achieved as “excellent.” (Doc. 174 at 24.) UNCHCS

characterizes the victory as a “merely technical” one which “only
vindicated the rights of two people.” (Doc. 177 at 2.)
The court’s measuring point is a comparison of the relief
sought to the relief obtained. Mercer, 401 F.3d at 205. While in
a case seeking injunctive relief this is ordinarily a comparison
to the relief granted, id. at 205, a plaintiff can be deemed
successful even where the relief was agreed to as a result of the
litigation and thus not required to be ordered. See Project Vote,
444 F. App’x at 662-664 (limiting the scope of Buckhannon to the
prevailing party inquiry and noting that voluntary action
undertaken in connection with the litigation, even without a

judicial order, may be considered as part of the prevailing party’s
overall success).
As the court notes above, in addition to the monetary relief
granted Miles and Bone, the prosecution of this litigation prompted
UNCHCS to implement changes which, because UNCHCS had already
undertaken them, the court declined to include in a mandatory
order. They were addressed in detail in this court’s final
memorandum opinion and order but included the following principal
results: agreeing to extend payment deadlines for sight-impaired
individuals; agreeing to post conspicuous notices on the UNCHCS
webpage for accessible formats; establishing a process for the
fielding of complaints; improving written communications and
external webpage for sight-impaired individuals with formats that

comply with American Council of the Blind standards; establishing
an ADA Workgroup consisting of a multidisciplinary team to evaluate
policies on an ongoing basis and ensure effective communication;
and perhaps most importantly, establishing a uniform and automatic
process within the UNCHCS computer system for the intake of patient
information at reception to ensure that the patient’s file would
be flagged for the particular needs of the sight-impaired patient
by all providers who had access to the health record. (Doc. 167
at 24-30, 98-102.)
However, Plaintiffs failed to persuade the court to adopt the
extensive changes to the Epic and MyChart medical records

systems – and to adopt them across the large UNCHCS healthcare
system – that were the feature of their lawsuit. In many ways, it
is hard to parse some of this larger effort from Plaintiffs’
claims, as UNCHCS’s failures to provide Plaintiff Miles with
effective communications was related in part to the problems he
had accessing UNCHCS’s medical records online using his JAWS Fusion
and ZoomText screen reader programs. (Doc. 167 at 6-7.) Those
problems, in turn, related (at least in part) to the way Epic and
MyChart documents were uploaded and stored. Thus, Plaintiffs’
efforts to improve those systems identified potential problems.
But Miles and Dr. Scott were the only patients presented to the
court to have experienced such problems, and Miles declined
UNCHCS’s efforts to work with him to try to figure out why his

computer was unable to interface with the UNCHCS system.
What is clear to the court is that Plaintiffs’ efforts to
seek overbroad injunctive relief served as an impediment to
resolution of these claims. Complicating the case was the fact
that much of the important relief UNCHCS eventually implemented
was reported to the court very late in the day, even the day before
the court’s scheduled hearing on the motion on December 14, 2022.16
Because Plaintiffs’ efforts to impose overbroad changes to
the medical records system, the court concludes that a reduction
is appropriate as it relates to that relief. The court is directed
to make a reasoned calculation of the measure of success based on

the complete record. “There is no precise rule or formula for
making these determinations. [A] district court may attempt to
identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply
reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Hensley,

16 To the extent there was the need for further legal work and a hearing
after that date, UNCHCS is partly to blame as it chose to wait so late
to update the record with new information about its continuing efforts
to respond to Plaintiffs’ challenges.
461 U.S. at 436–37. Here, the court finds that a 25 percent
reduction in the fee award for the original merits portion of the
case is appropriate based on the relative success of Plaintiffs’
claims. An overall award valued at 75 percent of the adjusted
totals sought for the original merits portion fairly captures the
meaningful change that Plaintiffs were able to achieve through

their pursuit of this litigation, tempered by the overbroad scope
of the relief sought and the ultimately narrow scope of the relief
actually awarded. Based on that reduction, Plaintiffs are entitled
to a fee award for the original merits portion of $554,664.38 for
the fees sought by BGL and $510,720.00 for the fees sought by DRNC.
However, the court finds it would be unfair to similarly
reduce the fee award for the portion of fees accumulated during
the present motion for fees and expenses period. Thus, it declines
to make any reductions to those fees and preserves them at their
adjusted lodestar amount of $77,007.50 attributable to the BGL
firm. Thus, the final award for fees totals $1,142,391.88, with

$631,671.88 in fees for the BGL firm and $510,720.00 for DRNC.
5. Compensable Expenses and Costs
Plaintiffs seek $114,074.61 in litigation expenses and
costs.17 UNCHCS contends that this amount should be reduced
“because of Plaintiffs’ limited success and because parties are

17 Of these expenses and costs, BGL is seeking $97,563.58, including
$59,843.25 in expert witness fees, and DRNC is seeking $16,511.03.
not entitled to reimbursement for ‘questionable litigation
expenses.’” (Doc. 177 at 21.) UNCHCS points to what it contends
are vague expert time entries, charges in full or half-hour
increments, and full charges for travel time. (Id.) Plaintiffs
respond that UNCHCS “nitpicks” the expenses, never contests that
experts were essential to Plaintiffs’ success, and “ignores the

modest hours both experts billed.” (Doc. 178 at 12.)
“[A] prevailing plaintiff is entitled to compensation for
reasonable litigation expenses” along with the attorney’s fees
under the relevant statutes in this action. Daly, 790 F.2d at
1084. “Reasonable litigation expenses include such expenses as
‘secretarial costs, copying, telephone costs and necessary
travel.’” Certain v. Potter, 330 F. Supp. 2d 576, 591 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (quoting Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Va., 58 F.3d 68, 75
(4th Cir. 1995)). Most relevant here, reasonable litigation
expenses may include recovery for expert witness fees where
appropriate. See, e.g., Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058

(9th Cir. 2002); Hall v. Claussen, 6 F. App’x 655, 681–82 (10th
Cir. 2001).
While Plaintiffs point out that Dr. Morris, one of their
experts, tracked her time in 30-minute increments, that is slight
justification for the generic entries and suggests some overvalued
timekeeping. The court will therefore reduce reimbursement of Dr.
Morris’s time, which is valued at $17,134, by 20 percent, leading
to a reduced gross value of $13,707.20. Dr. Quon’s billing in
quarter-hour increments, while not ideal, will not be disturbed.
His work is valued at $42,709.25. However, for the same reasons
noted as to the award of attorneys’ fees, the court will reduce
the overall expert expense award for both experts by 25 percent to
reflect the level of success on the merits Plaintiffs achieved in

this litigation. Thus, the total expert award is $42,312.34.
Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2017
WL 4400754, at *8-*10 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2017) (reducing expert
reimbursement based on partial success on the merits); Favors v.
Cuomo, 39 F. Supp. 3d 276, 309 (E.D.N.Y 2014) (same).
Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for all other expenses incurred
for, among other things, electronic research, travel costs,
deposition transcripts, delivery and postage, electronic discovery
platform fees, a share of the mediation fee, the medical records
fee, and teleconference fees in a total amount of $54,231.36, with
BGL claiming an entitlement to $37,720.33 and DRNC claiming an

entitlement to $16,511.03. BGL’s expenses can be further broken
down, as $36,325.95 was spent on the merits portion of the case
and $1,394.38 was spent on the present motion for fees and
expenses. UNCHCS does not address these in specific. The court
will therefore award them, subject to a 25 percent reduction in
the expenses for the merits portion to account for the ultimate
degree of success obtained. Therefore, those expenses total
$28,638.84 for BGL and $12,383.27 for DRNC for a total award of
non-expert expenses of $41,022.11.
Costs are awardable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and they
are potentially subject to the offset provided by Plaintiffs’
failure to have accepted UNCHCS’s offer of judgment. However,
Plaintiffs have not identified any awardable costs in their

application. The court need not consider this factor further.
Thus, the overall compensable expenses are $83,334.45, with
BGL recovering $70,951.18 and DRNC recovering $12,383.27.
B. UNCHCS’s Motion for Costs
UNCHCS moves for an award of costs following its August 1,
2022 offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
68, which Plaintiffs did not accept. (Doc. 171-1.) UNCHCS argues
that it offered to accept a consent decree awarding Plaintiffs
more expansive relief than they obtained on their motion for
injunctive relief. (Doc. 171 at 2.) UNCHCS seeks an award of
$2,396.22 for costs of transcripts “necessarily obtained for use

in the case after communicating its August 3 [sic], 2022 Rule 68
Offer.” (Id.) Plaintiffs oppose the request, arguing that the
deposition transcript costs are not recoverable because the
depositions took place before the offer of judgment was made and,
in any event, the offer of judgment was not more favorable than
the court’s final judgment. (Doc. 175 at 1.) In reply, UNCHCS
contends that it necessarily incurred the costs of these
transcripts because it had to purchase them in order to respond to
Plaintiffs’ continued argument that system-wide relief was
necessary, and its proposed consent decree was clearly more
favorable. (Doc. 176.)
Rule 68 provides: “At least 14 days before the date set for
trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing

party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs
then accrued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). If the opposing party does
not accept the offer within 14 days and “the judgment that the
offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was
made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). For deposition costs to be
recoverable, they must have been “incurred after the offer was
made.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that because the depositions of
Virginia Knowlton Marcus, Chief Executive Officer of Plaintiff
DRNC, and Mark Riccobono, President of Plaintiff NFB, were

originally taken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6) on February 16 and 17, 2021, some 18 months before the
offer of judgment, they are ineligible as having been incurred
before the offer. (Doc. 175 at 1-3; Doc. 171-2 at 3-4.) Plaintiffs
note that UNCHCS received transcripts from the depositions within
the month of their taking and even attached transcript excerpts to
its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. (Docs.
108-16, 110-11, 113-17, 114-18; Doc. 122-14.) UNCHCS notes,
however, that while the depositions were taken before the offer of
judgment, the invoices were not received by its counsel until
November 5, 2022, and paid after that time. (Doc. 171-2.)
Plaintiffs are correct that these invoices were not “incurred
after the offer [of judgment] was made,” as required by Rule 68(d).

Rather, the depositions were taken by UNCHCS, and thus the
liability incurred, on February 16 and 17, 2021, nearly a year and
a half before the offer of judgment. While the cause for delay in
getting the invoices to UNCHCS is not entirely clear and is
irrelevant in this instance, it appears that the invoices were
initially sent to UNCHCS’s insurer and then refused as falling
within a self-insured retention. (See Doc. 171-2 at 3-4 (“Chubb
has advised Veritext [the court reporter] that there is an open
SIR on this claim. As the Insured has not paid the invoice your
office will need to resolve it.”).) For this reason, these costs
are not recoverable, and the court need not resolve whether the

offer of judgment was more favorable than the court’s judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
This case was brought to vindicate the rights of UNCHCS
patients who suffer from a sight-related disability. An obvious
purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to encourage meritorious
cases. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 574 (noting that
“[r]egardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a
successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social
benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small
damages awards,” which justifies fee-shifting). However, there is
something seriously amiss where after more than four and one-half
years of litigation, the prevailing parties’ request for
attorneys’ fees and expenses exceeds $2.1 million, which is nearly

seventeen times the amount of the compensation paid to two
Plaintiffs, and the three-year injunctive relief benefitted only
two individuals, one of whom is not even a Plaintiff. As set out
extensively above, this is largely because of three reasons. Here,
Plaintiffs sought to pursue a test case to remake the electronic
medical records system for a massive state healthcare provider by
imposing a national standard containing “best practices” for
sight-impaired patients that the law did not require. The
healthcare provider, UNCHCS, while logically resisting that
effort, nevertheless demonstrated repeatedly that it could not
ensure that a mere three individuals, Plaintiffs Bone and Miles,

as well as Dr. Scott, were provided access to their medical records
that was equally effective as that of other patients. Along the
way, however, UNCHCS did manage, voluntarily, to significantly
improve its practices for sight-impaired patients – changes that
will benefit Plaintiffs as well as other sight-impaired patients.
It did so, however, after Plaintiffs rejected UNCHCS’s offer to
consent to an extensive proposed judgment granting Plaintiffs much
of the relief they sought. Yet, the court cannot, and did not,
consider Plaintiffs’ rejection of that offer because one of the
three laws they sued under did not allow it.
For the reasons noted, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
Expenses, and Costs (Doc. 172), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART as follows:
1. As to work performed by the BGL law firm, UNCHCS shall
pay Plaintiffs $631,671.88 for attorneys’ fees and
$70,951.18 for litigation expenses, for a combined
amount of $702,623.06; and
2. As to work performed by DRNC, UNCHCS shall pay Plaintiffs
$510,720.00 for attorneys’ fees and $12,383.27 in
litigation expenses, for a combined amount of
$523,103.27.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNCHCS’s motion for costs (Doc.
171) is DENIED.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
March 8, 2024.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653707. Public record. Not legal advice.