# BYRD v. GUILFORD COUNTY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · March 1, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653698

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 1, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653698

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that official capacity suits actually target employing entity

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
AUSTIN WAYNE BYRD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23CV872
)
GUILFORD COUNTY, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the
“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint
(Docket Entry 2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending
dismissal of this action.
RELEVANT STANDARDS
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To
address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that
“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]Jourt
determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii).
A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id.’

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
(continued...)

BACKGROUND
Asserting claims (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1701, “HIP[A]A Privacy [Rule],”2 and “[o]ther laws that protect
the confidentiality of legal, medical mail, and financial mail”
(Docket Entry 2 at 3),3 Plaintiff initiated this action against
three defendants: (1) Guilford County, (2) Guilford County
Detention Center, and (3) Guilford County Sheriff’s Department
(collectively, the “Defendants”) (see id. at 2). According to
Plaintiff’s Complaint:
Guilford County Detention Center illegally withheld a
piece of mail . . . that was delivered to the G[uilford
]C[ounty ]D[etention ]C[enter] front desk, reception
area, or mail room at 10:00 am on June 14, 2023 in
Greensboro, NC[,] with legal documents that contained
confidential medical mail. Item never made it to
inmate . . . . [Mail] tamper[ing ] violated
[Plaintiff’s] 4th [A]mendment rights . . . . 1st mailed
1(...continued)
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
2 For legibility reasons, this Memorandum Opinion uses
standardized capitalization in all quotations from Plaintiff’s
materials.
3 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
3
package was mail theft, the 2nd package [was] mail
tampering[;] both falling under 18 USC 1701... .
(Id. at 4.)
The Complaint requests relief, in the form of, inter alia,
“$100,000 for mental suffering,” and “[a]l officers involved
fired.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must
allege factual matter showing “that [he was] deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that
the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
(1999); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir.
2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but rather provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional
and statutory rights.”).
I. Guilford County
To begin, the Complaint names Guilford County as a defendant
(see Docket Entry 2 at 2), but contains no allegations against
Guilford County specifically (see id. at 1-16). Rather, the
Complaint contains vague allegations against various individuals
and entities. (See, e.g., id. at 4 (asking for “Agent T. Harrelson
to be “fired or suspended” without developing further factual
allegations against him).) Although “Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom [Section] 1983 applies,” Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (emphasis
omitted), to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Guilford
County (either directly or via an official capacity claim against
it/employee(s)), “it must be shown that the actions of [persons
employed by Guilford County] were unconstitutional and were taken
pursuant to a custom or policy of [Guilford County],” Giancola v.
State of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir.
1987) (observing that official capacity suits actually target
employing entity) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92). See Board
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)
(“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] required a plaintiff seeking to impose
liability on a [local governmental body] under [Section] 1983 to
identify a [local governmental] ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused
the plaintiff’s injury.”). Importantly, “‘a municipality cannot be
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory.’” Avery v. Burke Cnty., 660 F.2d
111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
Therefore, Section 1983 liability can only attach to Guilford
County if “execution of [its] policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show that a
“constitutional injury [wa]s proximately caused by a written policy
or ordinance, or by a widespread practice that is ‘so permanent and
well settled as to constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of
law.’” McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 954 (M.D.N.C.
2011) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127
(1988)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir.
2012). However, the Complaint does not allege that any policy or
custom of Guilford County or its officials caused any of the
challenged events or otherwise harmed Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry
2 at 1-16.)
Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim against Guilford
County, necessitating dismissal of any such claims under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Guilford County Detention Center & Sheriff’s Department
Additionally, the Complaint names Guilford County Detention
Center and Guilford County Sheriff’s Department as defendants.

(See Docket Entry 2 at 2.) However, they do not qualify as legal
entities subject to suit and/or persons within the meaning of
Section 1983.
“State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the
capacity to be sued in federal court. There is no North Carolina
statute authorizing suit against a county’s sheriff’s department.”
Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
6
(internal citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Jail
Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:15cv91, 2016 WL 5417399, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 19, 2016) (concluding that Orange County Jail and Orange
County Sheriff’s Department do not qualify as “entit[ies] capable
of being sued in federal court”), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
5415755 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016); Capers v. Durham Cnty. Sheriff
Dept., No. 1:07cv825, 2009 WL 798924, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 23,
2009) (holding that “Durham County Sheriff Department is not a
legal entity capable of being sued”); Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F.
Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (dismissing Section 1983 claims
against Bladen County Sheriff’s Department because it “lacks legal
capacity to be sued,” as no North Carolina “statute authoriz[es]
suit against a North Carolina county’s sheriff’s department”). To
remedy that issue, Plaintiff could potentially name the Sheriff of
Guilford County as a defendant, but any such claim would still fail
to state any claim for relief. The Complaint describes no personal
involvement by the Sheriff in the alleged violations and theories
of respondeat superior or liability predicated solely on a
defendant’s identity as a supervisor do not exist under Section

1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
Claims against Guilford County Detention Center suffer from a
similar flaw. Section 1983 imposes liability only on “persons” who
violate a plaintiff’s federally protected civil rights, but
Guilford County Detention Center “is a building and not a person.”
7
Allen v. Correct Care Sols., No. 1:21cv146, 2021 WL 954624, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2021), recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 949633
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2021), aff’d, 853 F. App’x 858 (4th Cir. 2021);
see also Allen v. Durham Cnty. Magis. Off., No. 1:20cv90, 2021 WL
6755021, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Durham County Detention
Facility do[es] not qualify as [a] legal entit[y] subject to
suit.”), recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 286817 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 5,
2022), aff’d, 2022 WL 2987941 (4th Cir. July 28, 2022). Even if
Plaintiff substituted the Guilford County Sheriff, as the person
responsible for Guilford County Detention Center, the Complaint
contains no factual matter showing any conduct by the Sheriff in
the operation of Guilford County Detention Center which violated
Plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. (See
Docket Entry 2 at 1-16.)
Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
as to these two Defendants, warranting dismissal under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. Mail Theft, Tampering, and Confidentiality-Related Claims

For reasons stated in the preceding sections, the Complaint
fails to state any claim against Defendants. Assuming for the
purposes of discussion each Defendant qualified as a person subject
to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff’s claims regarding mail theft and
tampering or other confidentiality rules/laws remain deficient.
The Complaint does not develop factual allegations against
8
Defendants other than the “1st mailed package was mail theft[ and]
the 2nd package [was] mail tampering.” (Docket Entry 2 at 4; see
id. at 1-16.) “As such, Plaintiff’s allegations [of mail theft and
tampering or confidentiality violations] do not rise above the
level of mere speculation.” Studivent v. Lankford, No. 1:10cv144,
2010 WL 1568451, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2010), recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 1205722 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2012).
Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
CONCLUSION
This action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1913(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket

Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT
TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
March 1, 2024

9

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653698. Public record. Not legal advice.