# HADLEY v. CITY OF MEBANE

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · March 31, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653578

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 31, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653578

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the district court’s holding that an official-capacity § 1983 claim against a county school board superintendent is essentially a claim against the board and thus should be dismissed as duplicative
- holding that § 126-5 did not cover the plaintiff as a police officer

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MONTRENA HADLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:18CV366
)
CITY OF MEBANE, DAVID CHEEK, )
CHRISTOPHER ROLLINS, and )
ESTHER BENNETT, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
This matter comes before the court on Defendants City of
Mebane (“the City”), David Cheek, Christopher Rollins, and
Esther Bennett’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 18.)
Defendants filed a brief in support of their motion, (Doc. 19).
Plaintiff Montrena Hadley has responded, (Doc. 26), and
Defendants have replied, (Doc. 29). This matter is ripe for
resolution and for the following reasons, this court finds that
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s First Claim as to the
City or Plaintiff’s Third Claim to the extent that Plaintiff
alleges a violation of her right to equal protection from
discrimination based on race and/or sex. (Doc. 19.)
I. PARTIES AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint . . . .” Ray
v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing King v.
Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)). The facts, taken
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.
A. Parties
Plaintiff Montrena Hadley is an African-American female
employee of Defendant, City of Mebane, North Carolina (the

“City”). (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 2, 14, 16.) The City hired her
as a Planning Director in 2001. (Id. ¶ 16.)1 The Planning
Director is a supervisory position and serves as the head of the
City’s Planning and Zoning Department. (Id.) Plaintiff was the
City’s first and only black department head until 2006. (See id.
¶ 21.) She was the City’s only black female department head
until Defendants replaced her with a white male in 2017. (Id.
¶ 22.)
Defendant David Cheek is a white male whom the City has
employed since 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 40.) Cheek served as Assistant
City Manager until 2012 and has served as City Manager since

then. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 44.) Defendant Christopher Rollins is a white

1 Former City Manager, Robert Lee Wilson, hired Plaintiff.
(Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 16.)
male whom the City has employed as Assistant City Manager since
2013. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant Esther Bennett, (collectively with
Cheek and Rollins, “Individual Defendants”), is a white female
whom the City has employed as Human Resources Director and Risk
Manager since 2009. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff sues Individual
Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id.
¶¶ 4-6.)
B. Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Charge

A plaintiff “alleging discrimination in violation of Title
VII must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC
within a certain time of the alleged unlawful act.” Chacko v.
Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff
must “describe generally the action or practices complained of.”
Id. at 508 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2004)). A
plaintiff’s Title VII claims in court, however, may not “exceed
the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would
naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are
procedurally barred.” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Cty. of Fairfax, 55
F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995)). Because Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge
necessarily circumscribes what Plaintiff may now plead, the
court will begin with that Charge.
In her May 9, 2017 EEOC Charge, Plaintiff’s allegations
relate primarily to her not receiving a promotion. (Am. Compl.
(Doc. 13) Ex. 1, EEOC Charge (Doc. 13-1) at 1.) She alleges that
she was hired by the City as a Planning Director in 2001 and has
been reporting to a white male Assistant City Manager since
2013. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that in 2014, her “title
was changed to Planning Officer, but [she] retained the same
responsibilities and pay.” (Id.) Finally, she claims that in
2016, the Assistant City Manager notified her that the City was
hiring a Development Director, which was an external job
posting. (Id.) Plaintiff charges that she applied and was

interviewed for the position but was not selected. (Id.)
Instead, Defendants hired a white male who was “neither more
qualified nor more experienced” than Plaintiff. (Id.)
C. Plaintiff’s Job as Planning Director
In her position as Planning Director, Plaintiff had a
variety of responsibilities, including overseeing the Mebane
Planning Board, making recommendations about zoning and planning
proposals, and maintaining the daily operations of the Planning
and Zoning Department, among others. (Id. ¶¶ 23–25.)
In addition to those responsibilities, Plaintiff alleges
that she effectively performed the responsibilities of a Zoning

Administrator, regularly working fifty to sixty hours per week —
more than any other salaried City employee. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 30–31.)
During Plaintiff’s employment with the City, the City Council
had not allocated funds to the Planning Department for
additional hires to alleviate Plaintiff’s workload, despite
certain assurances from former-City Manager Wilson that it
would. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36–37.)
Wilson retired as City Manager in 2012, but the City did
not announce a job vacancy to recruit replacement candidates.
(Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Rather, in the months leading up to Wilson’s
retirement, Defendant Cheek was chosen to replace Wilson, in
turn creating a vacancy for Assistant City Manager. (Id. ¶ 44.)

The City did not post a vacancy for the Assistant City Manager
position either. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Before he retired, Wilson told Plaintiff not to pursue the
Assistant City Manager position. (See id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff
nevertheless informed Defendant Cheek of her interest in the
Assistant City Manager position. (Id. ¶ 47.) Cheek interviewed
Plaintiff but did not offer her the position, explaining that he
needed someone “more familiar with pump stations.” (Id. ¶ 47.)
Upon learning of Plaintiff’s interview with Defendant Cheek,
Wilson told Plaintiff that “she should only apply for positions
in cities where minorities or women are encouraged to apply.”

(Id. ¶ 48.) Defendant Cheek ultimately hired his long-time
friend, Defendant Rollins, as Assistant City Manager. (Id.
¶¶ 49-50.) Defendant Rollins previously served as the City
Manager for the City of Graham, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 49.)
Plaintiff alleges that no City employee ever formally
interviewed Defendant Rollins for the position. (Id. ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff asked Defendant Bennett, the City’s Human
Resources Director, if she could file a grievance or appeal of
Cheek’s denial of her application for Assistant City Manager.
(See id. ¶ 54.) The City had no related policy or procedure
outlining such an appeal. (Id.) Defendant Bennett told Plaintiff
that she could ask to discuss it later but took no other action.

(Id.)
In January 2013, Defendant Rollins started as Assistant
City Manager, overseeing Plaintiff as Planning Director. (Id.
¶ 55.) Defendant Cheek and/or Defendant Rollins allegedly
approached former-City Manager Wilson after he retired to
discuss replacing Plaintiff as head of the Planning Department.
(Id. ¶ 62.) Wilson allegedly told them to wait until Plaintiff
retired. (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rollins
did not want to work closely with Plaintiff due to her race
and/or sex, (id. ¶¶ 60–61), and subjected her to more scrutiny
than other employees under his supervision, who are all white,
(id. ¶ 58).2 Plaintiff alleges that she is the only City employee

2 Plaintiff still works for the City. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)
¶ 165.)
“who has been singled out and disparately treated to her
detriment in regards to performance evaluations and review
scores.” (Id. ¶ 59.)
D. Change in Job Title
In the spring of 2013, Defendants worked with the Piedmont
Triad Regional Council of Governments (“PTRC”) to conduct a
Classification and Pay Plan Study. (Id. ¶ 64.) The study
allegedly found that Plaintiff was performing the duties of a
Planning Officer, not a Planning Director. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) As a

result of the Classification and Pay Plan Study, Defendants
changed Plaintiff’s job title in 2014, from Planning Director to
Planning Officer. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff’s salary and
responsibilities did not change, and Plaintiff continued to act
in a “supervisory role as the sole-member of the Planning &
Zoning Department,” despite her new role being a nonsupervisory
position. (Id. ¶¶ 64-65, 77-78, 83.)3 Plaintiff alleges that she
continued to perform all the functions of the Planning Director
satisfactorily after her title change to Planning Officer. (Id.
¶ 81.) She also alleges that no grievance or appeal procedure
existed to allow her to challenge her job-title change. (Id.

¶ 76.)

3 Despite the reclassification, the placard outside of
Plaintiff’s office continued to read, “Planning Director.” (Id.
¶ 79.)
When Defendants changed Plaintiff’s title, they contended
that she was not performing several of the Planning Director’s
job functions and that Defendant Rollins was himself performing
several of those functions. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) Plaintiff disputes
this contention, alleging that Defendants’ decision to change
her job title was not based on her job performance, but rather
because, as Defendant Rollins told her, “a couple of
knuckleheads” on the City Council did not think she could do the
job. (Id. ¶¶ 68-70.) The City Council for the City of Mebane is

all-white. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff alleges that one councilman
and/or his company has been subject to multiple complaints of
racial discrimination, one resulting in a monetary settlement.
(Id. ¶¶ 73-74.)
Plaintiff alleges that the job-title change was an
“arbitrary and capricious adverse employment action.” (Id.
¶ 84.) She alleges that she was subjected to disparate treatment
because of her race and/or sex. (Id. ¶ 86.)
E. Creation of the Development Director Position
A few years later, on or around October 28, 2016, Defendant
Rollins told Plaintiff that he was “thinking about going in

another direction” with the Planning Department and that
Defendants Cheek and Bennett were drafting a description for a
new “Director” or “Manager” position. (Id. ¶ 90.) On or around
November 1, 2016, Defendant Bennett posted on the City’s website
a job announcement for a “Development Director,” made up of
portions of other municipalities’ job descriptions for planning
director positions. (Id. ¶¶ 91-93; see also Ex. 3 (Doc. 13-3).)
The Development Director’s responsibilities were substantially
similar to those of the City’s Planning Director and Planning
Officer. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 97.)
Most job announcements are announced via the City’s
internal employee email listserv, but the Development Director

position was not. (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiff did not know if or when
she would be able to apply for the Development Director
position. (Id. ¶¶ 95-96.)
Defendant Cheek and/or Defendant Rollins allegedly
recruited a regional planner from the PTRC, who was a white
male, for the Development Director position. (Id. ¶ 98.) That
candidate declined but recommended Cy Stober, another white
male, for the position. (Id. ¶¶ 98-99.) Defendants Cheek and
Rollins encouraged Stober to apply, with Defendant Rollins
allegedly assuring Stober that Plaintiff would not be considered
seriously for the position. (Id. ¶¶ 101-02.) Plaintiff, Stober,

and three other white male candidates interviewed for the
position. (Id. ¶¶ 102-05.)
Defendants Rollins and Bennett interviewed Plaintiff. (Id.
¶ 103.) To obstruct Plaintiff’s candidacy, Rollins allegedly
asked Plaintiff questions from a list on his cell phone that
were not asked to other candidates, related to skills not
applicable to the position, and that Defendant Rollins knew that
Plaintiff could not perform, including her ability to create GIS
maps. (Id. ¶¶ 107-11.)
As the City’s Human Resources Director, Defendant Bennett
is allegedly responsible for ensuring equal opportunity to

employment candidates. (Id. ¶ 112.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Bennett knew or should have known that Rollins was
interfering with Plaintiff’s right to fundamental fairness in
the selection process. (Id. ¶ 113.)
Defendants Cheek and Rollins hired Stober as the
Development Director, which Defendant Cheek announced via email
on January 31, 2017, specifically noting that Stober was “well
versed in GIS mapping and grant writing.” (Id. ¶¶ 117, 125.)
Stober is highly educated and has experience with environmental
planning, but Plaintiff alleges that Stober had no experience in
zoning or other code-related issues, is not a certified zoning

officer, and is not qualified to be the Development Director.
(Id. ¶¶ 124-27, 131.) Defendants allegedly maintained that
Stober was more qualified for the Development Director position.
(See id. ¶ 132.) Among other things, Defendants said that Stober
had experience creating GIS maps, which they said Plaintiff had
not mastered, (id. ¶ 135); he was well versed in grant writing,
(id. ¶ 125); and had more supervisory and management experience,
(id. ¶ 132). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ proffered
reasons for denying her the job of Development Director and
hiring Stober are false. (Id. ¶¶ 156-57.) Specifically,
Plaintiff asserts that she received GIS certification in June
2014 and that the City continues to outsource the creation of

GIS maps following Stober’s hiring anyways, (id. ¶¶ 136-37);
that she supervised interns in the Planning and Zoning
Department, (id. ¶ 133); and she has more experience writing
grant proposals than Stober, (id. ¶¶ 141-42). Notably,
Defendants and Stober allegedly continue to rely on Plaintiff to
“perform all of the work related to zoning administration” and
other regulatory and planning issues. (Id. ¶¶ 128-29, 145-46,
150.) Plaintiff alleges that she performs some of Stober’s
duties as Development Director. (Id. ¶ 149.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants created the Development
Director position to head the Planning and Zoning Department and

that they never hired a Planning Director after reclassifying
Plaintiff to Planning Officer. (Id. ¶¶ 118-19.) Plaintiff also
alleges that a City councilman stated the City created the
Development Director position because the City thought Plaintiff
would “be gone by now.” (Id. ¶ 151.)
Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Development Director
position was created to intentionally and purposefully remove
her as the de facto head of the Planning and Zoning Department
because of her race and/or sex. (Id. ¶ 160.) She also alleges
that hiring Stober to supplant her as the de facto head of the
Planning and Zoning Department was an adverse employment action.
(Id. ¶¶ 120-21.) Defendants denied her an opportunity to be

heard after her constructive removal. (See id. ¶ 123.)
Plaintiff alleges that City of Mebane Employee Handbook,
implemented in July 2015, states in part that no job applicant
“shall be deprived of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affected as an employee because of such individual’s
race, color, . . . [or] sex . . . .” (Id. ¶ 161.)4 The Handbook
also provides that, following the successful completion of a
six-month probationary period after their hiring, an employee
“may be dismissed only as provided in this policy.” (Id. ¶ 162.)
Plaintiff therefore alleges that the City created an implied
employment contract protecting an employee from dismissal unless

4 The Handbook explicitly states that it should not be read
to form an express or implied contract. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)
¶ 161.)
it is done in accordance with the Handbook’s policy.5 (See id.
¶ 163.) Plaintiff alleges that the Handbook creates an implied
contract that in turn created a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued employment and protection from
dismissal unless in accordance with City policy. (Id. ¶¶ 163-
64.)
Plaintiff alleges that, rather than promoting equal
opportunities for employment, the City, through its agents,
arbitrarily and capriciously sought preselected white candidates

to fill vacancies to her detriment and the detriment of other
similarly situated minority candidates. (Id. ¶ 166.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants are knowingly engaging in employment
policies, practices, and patterns that impede equal access and
opportunity to minority candidates in violation of their due
process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 167-68.)
F. EEOC Charge of Discrimination
On May 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of
Discrimination, based on continuing race and sex discrimination
beginning on February 20, 2017, in violation of Title VII. (EEOC
Charge (Doc. 13-1) at 1.) Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge alleges that
the City hired a less qualified white male in January 2017 for a
new position, Development Director, for which Plaintiff had

5 The details of any dismissal policy are unalleged.
interviewed. (Id.) The EEOC Charge also describes the City
changing Plaintiff’s job title — with no corresponding changes
in her pay or responsibilities — from Planning Director to
Planning Officer in July 2014. (Id.) On December 1, 2017, the
EEOC mailed its Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Plaintiff,
which notified Plaintiff that the EEOC would not move forward
with her charge and informed Plaintiff that she had ninety days
to file suit. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) Ex. 2, Right to Sue Letter
(Doc. 13-2) at 1.) Assuming that Plaintiff received the Notice

of Rights on December 5, 2017, she had until March 6, 2018, to
file suit. (See id.)
G. Performance Review
Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge of Discrimination in May
2017. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 273.) In or around September 2017,
Stober conducted a performance review of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 274.)
Plaintiff alleges that at that time, Defendants were aware of
Plaintiff’s EEOC charges. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Rollins helped prepare her performance review, which “included
negative comments and criticisms regarding Plaintiff’s job
performance.” (Id.) The City Handbook states that “[t]he

evaluation determines if performance is satisfactory and is not
necessarily related to salary increases. Satisfactory
performance, which is documented in the evaluation process,
would be a component considered at budget time.” (Id. ¶ 275.)
Plaintiff confronted Stober about “her concerns that someone
else had written her performance evaluation,” and “Stober did
not argue and agreed to delete the negative comments from her
evaluation.” (Id. ¶ 276.)
H. Procedural History
On March 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed her complaint in North
Carolina state court. (Complaint (Doc. 2).) Shortly thereafter,
Defendants removed this action to this court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446, asserting that Plaintiff’s
complaint involves federal questions and that this court can
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (See Petition for
Removal (Doc. 1) at 1-3.)
On June 11, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
(Doc. 9.) On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint,
(Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)), mooting Defendants’ first motion to
dismiss, (see Order (Doc. 17)). On July 30, 2018, Defendants
moved to partially dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.” (Doc.
18.) Defendants filed a brief in support of their motion,
(Defs.’ Brief in Supp. of Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Br.”)
(Doc. 19)); Plaintiff responded, (Corrected Resp. in Opp’n to
Defs.’ Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 26)); and
Defendants replied, (Defs.’ Reply Brief in Supp. of Partial Mot.
to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”) (Doc. 29)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief
based upon disparate impact employment discrimination should be
dismissed for lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Defs.’ Mot. (Doc.
18) at 1.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s federal and state

due process claims – Claims Three, Four, Six, and Seven – should
be dismissed for failure to allege deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest. (Id.) Defendants also argue
that Plaintiff’s claims related to her reclassification as
Planning Officer are time-barred. (Id.) Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim. (Id. at 1-2.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s
official-capacity suits against Individual Defendants should be
dismissed as duplicative of those against the City. (Id. at 2.)
And finally, that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against
Individual Defendants should be dismissed because they are not

her employer. (Id.)
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s failure to respond
to several of Defendants’ arguments in Defendants’ Brief should
be treated as a concession of those arguments. (Defs.’ Reply
(Doc. 29) at 1–4.)
Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Claim
as to the City or Plaintiff’s Third Claim to the extent that
Plaintiff alleges a violation of her right to equal protection
from discrimination based on race and/or sex. (See Defs.’ Br.
(Doc. 19) at 2 n.1.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must
plead facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable” and must demonstrate
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the
complaint’s factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Further, “the complaint, including all reasonable inferences
therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Estate of Williams-Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc.,
335 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
Nevertheless, sufficient factual allegations must “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level” so as to “nudge[]
the[] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 500 U.S. at 555, 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
A court cannot “ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to
allege any facts which set forth a claim.” Estate of Williams-
Moore, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 646. Consequently, even given the

deferential standard allocated to pleadings at the motion to
dismiss stage, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as
true and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. ANALYSIS
The court will address each of Defendants’ arguments in
turn but will start with Defendants’ allegation that Plaintiff
conceded several arguments by failing to respond adequately to
Defendants’ Brief.
A. Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond to Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants allege that Plaintiff, in her response, failed
to respond adequately to several defense arguments raised in
Defendants’ Brief. (Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 29) at 1–4.)
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina (the
“Local Rules”) govern submissions to the court. Local Rule
7.3(k) states that “[t]he failure to file a brief or response
within the time specified in this rule shall constitute a waiver
of the right thereafter to file such brief or response, except
upon a showing of excusable neglect.” Local Rule 7.2(a) requires
that response briefs shall contain an “argument, which shall
refer to all statutes, rules and authorities relied upon.” This

court has construed these rules to cover unresponded-to
arguments as well. See Brand v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control &
Pub. Safety, 352 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617–18 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“In
Plaintiff’s brief in response to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiff does not address Defendants’[] motion
concerning his hostile work environment claim. By failing to
respond, Plaintiff concedes that he has not stated a hostile
work environment claim.”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec
Inc., No. 1:08CV00918, 2010 WL 1667285, at *7–8 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 23, 2010) (citing various courts’ holdings that failure to
address an issue concedes it). Indeed, other courts have

interpreted analogous local rules similarly. See United States
v. Real Prop. Identified as: Parcel 03179-005R, 287 F. Supp. 2d
45, 61 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that a similar local rule applies
to “specific arguments within a memorandum opposing a motion”);
Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries, 238 F.
Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“It is well understood in this
Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a motion to
dismiss addressing only certain arguments raised by the
defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff
failed to address as conceded.”).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to respond to the
following arguments: (1) that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring

her disparate impact claim; (2) that Plaintiff has an alleged
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; (3)
that Plaintiff stated inadequate facts to allege a retaliation
claim against the City; (4) that none of Individual Defendants
qualify as Plaintiff’s employer for the purposes of Title VII;
and (5) that Plaintiff failed to address the qualified immunity
argument as to her § 1983 claims against Individual Defendants.
(Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 29) at 1–4.)
Here, the court finds that Plaintiff did respond to
argument one, and therefore does not concede it. Plaintiff,
however, has failed to respond to the rest of Defendants’
arguments with anything but conclusory statements unsupported by
legal authority.6
The court therefore finds that Plaintiff failed to respond
to the following of Defendants’ arguments in Plaintiff’s
Corrected Response, (Doc. 26), in a manner conforming to the
Local Rules: that Plaintiff has an alleged constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest; that Plaintiff stated
inadequate facts to allege a retaliation claim against the City;
and that Plaintiff failed to address the qualified immunity

argument as to her § 1983 claims against Individual Defendants.
Plaintiff failed to include an “argument” per Local Rule 7.2(a),
and therefore failed to properly file a “brief” in accordance
with Local Rule 7.3(k). Due to these failures, the court will
deem Plaintiff’s arguments on these issues conceded, and
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss on these issues will be
granted.

6 For example, Plaintiff writes, “It is well-established
that, in regard to claims against the individual Defendants in
their official capacities, the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to ‘persons’ does not act as a bar to the claims asserted, nor
are they duplicative in the purposes for which they are sought.”
(Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 26) at 9.) Plaintiff fails to cite any
relied-upon authority to support this assertion, thereby truly
nudging a toe over the line of violating Local Rule 7.2(a) in
failing to “refer to all statutes, rules and authorities relied
upon.” Because this court will still address each of Defendants’
arguments on the merits, the court merely draws Plaintiff’s
attention to the local rules for future purposes.
The court nevertheless “has an obligation to review the
motions to ensure that dismissal is proper.” Stevenson v. City
of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing
Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st
Cir. 2004))
When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the mere fact that a
motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the
district court of the obligation to examine the
complaint itself to see whether it is formally
sufficient to state a claim. This obligation means
that a court may not automatically treat a failure to
respond to a 12(b)(6) motion as a procedural default.
Pomerleau, 362 F.3d at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court will thus address each of Plaintiff’s claims
Defendants contest on the merits in turn.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individual Defendants in
Their Official Capacities — Claims One, Two, Three,
Four, Six, and Seven

Because the issue of whether Plaintiff’s claims against
Individual Defendants in their official capacities determines
the course of analysis for several of Plaintiff’s claims, the
court addresses this issue first.
This court finds that Claims One, Two, Three, Four, Six,
and Seven against Individual Defendants in their official
capacities are duplicative of the claims against Defendant City,
or should be construed as claims against Defendant City, for the
reasons set forth, and will thus be dismissed as against
Individual Defendants in their official capacities.
In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court noted that
“[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer [or employee] is an agent.’” 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978)); see also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th
Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s holding that an

official-capacity § 1983 claim against a county school board
superintendent is essentially a claim against the board and thus
should be dismissed as duplicative). Therefore, “[a]s long as
the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to
respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other
than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. Graham,
473 U.S. at 167; Victors v. Kronmiller, 553 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544
(D. Md. 2008) (treating official capacity suit against only
state-employee individuals as a suit against the State, even
though the State was not officially named as a defendant).
Further, in North Carolina, “in a suit where the plaintiff

asserts a claim against a government entity, a suit against
those individuals working in their official capacity for this
government entity is redundant.” May v. City of Durham, 136,
N.C. App. 578, 584, 525 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2000); see also Wright
v. Town of Zebulon, 202 N.C. App. 540, 543, 688 S.E.2d 786, 789
(2010).
Here, Plaintiff has sued her employer, the City of Mebane,
and the City received notice and responded to this suit.
Plaintiff does not appear to seriously dispute this issue. As
noted, the court will treat the § 1983 claims against Individual
Defendants in their official capacities as claims against the
City. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167. Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth

Claims brought against Individual Defendants in their official
capacities are therefore construed as claims against the City,
and Plaintiff’s First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh claims are
duplicative of their claims against the City.7
1. Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive Relief Against
Individual Defendants in their Official
Capacities

With regard to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief
against Individual Defendants in their official capacities,

7 Because the court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims against Individual Defendants in their official capacity
as duplicative, the court need not address Defendants’ argument
that Individual Defendants are not Plaintiff’s employer for
Title VII purposes. See Johnson v. North Carolina, 905 F. Supp.
2d 712, 721 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Title
VII official-capacity suit against supervisor as duplicative
under Graham). Further, Plaintiff did not respond to this
argument and this court sees no basis upon which to find that
Individual Defendants are Plaintiff’s employer.
Plaintiff argues that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908),
applies. (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 25) at 8–9.) Ex Parte Young is an
exception to the Eleventh Amendment, which “allows private
citizens, in proper cases, to petition a federal court to enjoin
State officials in their official capacities from engaging in
future conduct that would violate the Constitution or a federal
statute.” Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2002).
The court finds, however, that the Ex Parte Young doctrine
is inapplicable here. The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to

municipalities. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Cash v. Granville Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). It thus follows that
Ex Parte Young cannot apply when the Eleventh Amendment cannot
apply; the Eleventh Amendment must necessarily be implicated for
Ex Parte Young to apply. Here, there are no state actors; only
the City and its employees, to which the Eleventh Amendment
explicitly does not apply. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 429 U.S. at 280.
The court thus finds that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive
relief against Individual Defendants in their official capacity

are also duplicative for the same reasons stated above; the
court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief
against Individual Defendants in their official capacities.
2. Official Capacity Claims Conclusion
Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh claims, for damages and injunctive relief, against
Individual Defendants in their official capacities will be
dismissed.
C. Individual Defendants in Their Individual Capacities
and North Carolina Constitutional Claims

Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff sues
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for
violations of the North Carolina Constitution, those claims must
be dismissed. The court agrees.
“Claims brought under the North Carolina Constitution may
be asserted only against state officials acting in their
official capacities.” Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 789 (citing DeWitt
v. Mecklenburg Cty., 73 F. Supp. 2d 589, 605–06 (W.D.N.C. 1999);
Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 788, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293
(1992)). The court will therefore dismiss Claims Six and Seven
to the extent that they are alleged against Individual
Defendants in their individual capacities.
Given that the court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims against Individual Defendants in their official
capacities as duplicative, the court will consider Plaintiff’s
North Carolina constitutional claims only as against the City.
See Sheaffer v. Cty. of Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 709, 731
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (“While North Carolina does recognize claims
under the state constitution against officers named in their
official capacities, the claims against Clarke in her official
capacity are duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims against the
county and should be dismissed.” (internal citation omitted)).
The court will now address Plaintiff’s remaining claims on
the merits.
D. Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact Claim – Claim Two

Plaintiff brings a Title VII disparate impact claim under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e against Defendant City and Individual
Defendants in their official capacities. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)
¶¶ 191-223.) Because the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Individual Defendants in their official capacities as
duplicative, the court will consider this claim as solely
against Defendant City.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate
impact claim on the basis of race and/or sex discrimination for
lack of standing and failure to exhaust administrative remedies
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or, alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 4.) For
the reasons set forth, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Title
VII Disparate Impact claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).8
1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants allege that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies for her disparate impact claim prior to
bringing this suit. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 11–13.) The court
agrees and will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Defendants move to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(1).
(Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 18) at 1.) Historically, when a defendant

sought to dismiss a complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, courts evaluated the motion to
dismiss under the Rule 12(b)(1) standard, which challenges
subject matter jurisdiction. See Kobraei v. Alexander, 521 F.
App’x 117, 118 (4th Cir. 2013); Collins v. Wash. Suburban
Sanitary Comm’n, Civil No. TJS-17-1530, 2017 WL 5187738, at *1
(D. Md. Nov. 19, 2017) (“Motions to dismiss employment
discrimination claims based on a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies are typically construed as motions to

8 The Supreme Court recently clarified that Title VII’s
charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional and therefore a
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
must be brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis,
587 U.S. ____, ____, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019).
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”). The
Supreme Court, however, recently held that “Title VII’s charge-
filing instruction is not jurisdictional,” but is “properly
ranked among the array of claim-processing rules that must be
timely raised to come into play.” Fort Bend Cty., 587 U.S. at
___, 139 S. Ct. at 1846. Title VII’s requirement that Plaintiff
file a charge with the EEOC prior to filing a complaint in
federal court nevertheless applies. See id. at ___, 139 S. Ct.
at 1851 (“Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a processing

rule, albeit a mandatory one . . . .”). Thus, Defendants’ motion
will be evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lee v. Mkt. Am.,
Inc., No. 1:18CV1046, 2020 WL 1274226, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 17,
2020); Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., Civil Action No. ADC-
19-2565, 2020 WL 551913, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2020); EEOC v.
1618 Concepts, Inc., No. 19-cv-672, 2020 WL 87994, at *3
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2020).
Under the EEOC administrative framework, “an individual
alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII must first
file an administrative charge with the EEOC within a certain
time of the alleged unlawful act.” Chacko, 429 F.3d at 508.

Plaintiff must “describe generally the action or practices
complained of.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2004)). The
Fourth Circuit construes EEOC charges “liberally.” Id. at 509.
If a plaintiff’s claims raised under Title VII, however, “exceed
the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would
naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are
procedurally barred.” Id. (quoting Dennis, 55 F.3d at 156).
“[A] plaintiff fails to exhaust [her] administrative
remedies where . . . [her] administrative charges reference
different time frames, actors, and discriminatory conduct than
the central factual allegations in [her] formal suit.” Id. at
506. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has “held that the allegation of

a discrete act or acts in an administrative charge is
insufficient when the plaintiff subsequently alleges a broader
pattern of misconduct.” Id. at 509.
Here, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge, (EEOC Charge (Doc.
13-1)), in which she discussed the job interview at issue, as
well as the change in her job and pay classifications. (Id.) She
also stated that “the Assistant City Manager notified me that
the City was hiring a Development Director . . . . This was an
external, not internal, job posting.” (Id.) Rather than allege
any facially neutral practice, Plaintiff alleges specific,
discrete acts of discrimination in her EEOC Charge specifically
directed toward her, allegedly because she is an African-
American woman.9
A disparate impact claim under Title VII involves
“employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977).
As noted, Plaintiff fails to include any facts of a

facially neutral employment practice in the EEOC Charge. The
only fact Plaintiff includes which might be construed as an
employment practice is that the job posting was posted
externally. However, this fact hardly supports her present
claim, and is in fact inconsistent with a claim that Defendants
rely on “word-of-mouth hiring.” Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge
therefore “reference[s] different . . . discriminatory conduct

9 The parties have not addressed the issue of what activity
was timely complained of to the EEOC, but it appears the only
claim timely filed in the EEOC Charge is the failure to
hire/promote charge arising in 2017. As a result, at this stage
of the proceedings, the complained of activity in 2014 and
before may be considered as evidence of discriminatory intent,
but does not appear to be directly actionable. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (holding
that Title VII plaintiffs may use “prior acts [of
discrimination] as background evidence in support of a timely
claim.”). Any timeliness or related issues may be resolved at
the summary judgment stage or at trial.
than the central factual allegations in [her] formal suit.”
Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506. Further, her “allegation of a discrete
act or acts in [her] administrative charge is insufficient when
[Plaintiff] subsequently alleges a broader pattern of
misconduct.” Id. at 509. Plaintiff thus failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to her disparate impact
claim.
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have dealt with similar
situations and determined that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust

their administrative remedies. In Abdus-Shahid v. Mayor and City
Council of Balt., 674 F. App’x 267, 274–76 (4th Cir. 2017), the
plaintiff, in his EEOC Charge, only alleged instances of
discrimination against him personally. Id. at 275. When he
brought a Title VII claim, however, he asserted a disparate
impact claim. Id. at 274–75. The Fourth Circuit observed,
“Critically, the EEOC charge does not identify any policy
(neutral or otherwise) being challenged as discriminatory in its
effect . . . . [The plaintiff] also did not assert any facts
that would allow a conclusion that Muslims were being
disproportionately impacted by the City’s actions.” Id. at 275.

The court concluded that “[t]he problem is that the words used
in the EEOC charge do not correlate to the sort of assertions
and facts from which a future cause of action based on disparate
impact can be discerned,” and therefore the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies for a disparate impact
claim under Title VII. Id. at 276.
The Seventh Circuit likewise held that a group of
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with
regards to one part of their disparate impact complaint. Chaidez
v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2019). There,
the plaintiffs filed an EEOC Charge focused on discrimination in
connection with a basic skills test and the post-test hiring

process. Id. When the plaintiffs filed a disparate impact Title
VII complaint concerning the test and post-test hiring process,
however, they also alleged that the unemployment office from
which the defendant hired engaged in discriminatory misconduct.
Id. The EEOC Charge did not contain any allegations of
misconduct on the unemployment office’s part. Id. The Seventh
Circuit held that the claims concerning the unemployment office
were not “like or reasonably related to the claims in the EEOC
charges,” and were thus properly dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1006 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

These cases reinforce this court’s conclusion that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with
respect to her disparate impact claim. The court will grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6) as
against Defendant City.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Alternatively, Defendants allege Plaintiff fails to state a
disparate impact claim. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 7–10.) Because
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for a
disparate impact claim, the court will not reach the issue of
whether or not Plaintiff sufficiently pled a disparate impact
claim.

E. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims – Claims Three, Four, and Five
Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Claims allege § 1983 claims
against Individual Defendants, in their individual and official
capacities, for deprivation of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest and a constitutionally protected property
interest, respectively. This court will construe Claims Three
and Four against Individual Defendants in their official
capacity as claims against Defendant City. See Graham, 473 U.S.
at 167.
Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim is a § 1983 claim against Defendant
City, alleging that the City, through the acts of Defendant
Rollins as Assistant City Manager, retaliated against Plaintiff

for filing an EEOC charge, in violation of the United States
Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution. (Am. Compl.
(Doc. 13) ¶¶ 283, 285, 288.)
Regarding Claims Three and Four, to the extent that
Plaintiff might be able to allege a claim based on her
reclassification, Defendants argue those § 1983 claims are time-
barred. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 4, 14.) As there is no federal
statute of limitation for a § 1983 claim, the court must look to
analogous state law for a statute of limitations. See Nat’l
Advert. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir.

1991) (“Because there is no federal statute of limitations
applicable to suits under § 1983, it is the rule that the
applicable provision limiting the time in which an action [under
§ 1983] must be brought, must be borrowed from the analogous
state statute of limitations.” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The statute of limitations
in North Carolina for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions is three years.
Id. at 1162. The cause of action accrues when a plaintiff “knows
or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the
action.” Id. (quoting Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.
1975)).

The original complaint was filed on March 5, 2018, and
Defendants reclassified Plaintiff in 2014, (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)
¶ 65), over three years before this lawsuit was filed. Because
Plaintiff clearly knew of this injury when it originally
occurred in 2014, Plaintiff’s claims deriving from this action
under § 1983 are time-barred.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently
allege a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest
regarding Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Claims. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc.
19) at 16, 18.) The court finds Plaintiff failed to respond to
this argument in her response brief and has thus conceded these
issues. This court also agrees with Defendants on the merits

that Plaintiff had no constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest for the reasons stated herein.
After addressing Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Claims, the
court will then address Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim.
1. Plaintiff’s Deprivation of Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interest — Claim Three

In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges equal protection
violations as well as due process violations depriving her of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. (Am. Compl. (Doc.
13) ¶¶ 231, 233, 238, 246, 248.)
Because Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third
Claim to the extent that Plaintiff alleges a violation of her
right to equal protection from discrimination based on race
and/or sex, (see Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 2 n.1.), the court
focuses only on the alleged due process violations resulting in
a liberty interest deprivation.
A plaintiff may plead a due process violation when
“governmental action threatens [her] liberty interest in [her]
reputation and choice of occupation.” Ridpath v. Bd. of
Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 307 (4th Cir. 2006). A
plaintiff may only succeed in pleading a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest when her employer
“make[s] any charge against [her] that might seriously damage

[her] standing and associations in [her] community,” or “imposed
on [her] a stigma or other disability that foreclosed [her]
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.”
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). Further, “an
injury to reputation alone does not deprive an individual of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Tigrett v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 2002)
(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991)). “Instead,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that h[er] reputational injury was
accompanied by a state action that ‘distinctly altered or
extinguished’ h[er] legal status if [s]he wants to succeed.”

Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 315 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)).
As noted, Plaintiff’s reclassification from director to
officer is time-barred as a source for § 1983 claims and
therefore cannot serve as a basis for this claim.
Alternatively, Plaintiff does not plead facts plausibly
indicating Defendants imposed a stigma foreclosing her freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities on Plaintiff
when they interviewed her for the Development Director position,
nor does Plaintiff plead facts that her legal status changed due
to her not getting the Development Director position sufficient

to establish a liberty interest. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573;
Shirvinski, 673 F.3d at 315.
Further, regarding the City’s liability, the Supreme Court
has recognized that “municipal liability may be imposed for a
single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate
circumstances.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480
(1986)). Here, Plaintiff alleges Individual Defendants committed
arbitrary and capricious acts “in their official capacities as
municipal policy makers.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 230.)
Nevertheless, the court has already found that Plaintiff has not
submitted sufficient facts to plausibly allege a liberty

deprivation at the hands of Individual Defendants in their
individual capacities; Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege
municipal liability on the same deficient set of facts.
Plaintiff’s claim for a constitutionally protected liberty
interest will therefore be dismissed as against Individual
Defendants in their individual capacities and as against the
City pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
2. Plaintiff’s Deprivation of Constitutionally
Protected Property Interest — Claim Four

Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim alleging due process violations
resulting in a property interest deprivation is similarly
without merit.10 The court will treat this claim as against
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities and as
against the City.
A plaintiff may have a property interest in employment
protected by procedural due process. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576.
State law creates the property interest when it creates a
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to certain employment
benefits. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 9 (1978). The state creates the claim of entitlement, but the
Federal Constitution protects against the arbitrary deprivation

10 While Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim alleges a property
interest deprivation, much of Plaintiff’s discussion of the
interest at issue for her Fourth Claim for Relief is dedicated
to her liberty interests, (see Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 253–55),
and thus is inapplicable to her claim for a property interest
deprivation. Indeed, Plaintiff only specifically mentions her
property interests once in her Fourth Claim. (Id. ¶ 252.)
of benefits included in the state-created property interest. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
“[W]here a property interest . . . is claimed to be derived
from state law sources, it is obviously necessary to look to
those sources to determine the general nature of the interest,
for the process constitutionally due is dependent upon that.”
Siu v. Johnson, 748 F.2d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
North Carolina law does not provide Plaintiff with the

property interest entitlement she seeks. “At-will employees have
no property interests in their employment cognizable under the
due process clause.” Privette v. Univ. of N.C., 96 N.C. App.
124, 137, 385 S.E.2d 185, 192 (1989). “[A]bsent a contractual
agreement specifying a definite period of employment, only ‘a
statute or ordinance may create a property interest in continued
employment.’” Wilkins v. Guilford Cty., 158 N.C. App. 661, 668,
582 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2003) (quoting Kearney v. Cty. of Durham, 99
N.C. App. 349, 351, 393 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1990)).
Plaintiff does not allege that she signed an employment
contract nor does she allege the existence of a statute or

ordinance creating a property interest. Any property interest
would therefore have to be based in another contract.
Plaintiff alleges that the City’s employee handbook created
an implied contract which created her property interest. (Am.
Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 164, 252.) “Employee handbooks may form the
basis of a property right if they are included in the employee’s
employment contract, or in the case of local government, enacted
as ordinances.” Hinton v. Conner, 366 F. Supp. 2d 297, 311
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (citing Wuchte v. McNeil, 130 N.C. App. 738,
741, 505 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1998)); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (“A property interest in employment can, of

course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.”).
However, “unilaterally promulgated employee manuals or personnel
memoranda do not create a property interest in continued
employment.” Wuchte, 130 N.C. App. at 741, 505 S.E.2d at 144-45.
Plaintiff neither alleges that the City’s employee handbook
was included as part of her contract nor that the handbook was
enacted as an ordinance. Indeed, the employee handbook
explicitly states that “[t]his handbook . . . should not be read
as . . . forming an . . . implied contract.” (Am. Compl. (Doc.
13) ¶ 161.) Plaintiff therefore cannot successfully make out a
claim for the deprivation of a liberty interest created by the
employee handbook.11
Plaintiff also alleges that “the City’s established
patterns and practices” gave rise to an implied contract
creating her property interest. (Id. ¶ 252.) This contention is
a stronger argument, but Plaintiff’s claim still fails for
failure to adequately plead sufficient facts.
A “person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest
for due process purposes if there are . . . rules or mutually

explicit understandings that support [her] claim of entitlement
to the benefit and that [she] may invoke at a hearing.” Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). Plaintiff, in pleading the
creation of an implied contract out of “the City’s established
patterns and practices,” fails to elaborate on what those
patterns and practices are. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 252.)
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Here, there are

11 Even if the City’s employee handbook did create some type
of implied contract, at most that contract would protect a
person in their current position. Plaintiff does not
persuasively argue that the handbook creates a liberty interest
in obtaining a prospective position.
insufficient facts pled to allow the court to determine (1)
which patterns and practices gave rise to an implied contract,
and (2) that these patterns and practices alleged did indeed
create an implied contract for the purposes of assessing
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). Indeed, Plaintiff even alleges that “[w]hen Plaintiff
was denied the Assistant City Manager position, she asked
Bennett if she could file a grievance or appeal of the decision;
no such policy or procedure existed.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)

¶ 54) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff thus fails to allege sufficient factual
allegations of other patterns or policies creating an implied
contract to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” so as to “nudge[] the[] claim[] across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 500 U.S. at 555, 570; see
also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for a
violation of her constitutionally guaranteed property interest
will be dismissed as against Individual Defendants in their
individual capacities and as against the City pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).

3. Individual Defendants in Their Individual
Capacities and Qualified Immunity

Individual Defendants sued in their individual capacity
allege they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s
Third and Fourth Claims alleging constitutional deprivations
under § 1983. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 19–20.) The court finds
Plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in her response
brief and has thus conceded this issue. The court will still
address the issue on the merits.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must aver that
a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a
constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United
States.” Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599,

615 (4th Cir. 2009).
State officials sued in their individual capacities are
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and are not absolutely
immune from suit. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). A
government official sued in their individual capacity under
§ 1983 may, however, be entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
25 (“[O]fficials sued in their personal capacities . . . may
assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable
reliance on existing law.”).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Defendant
officials have the burden of pleading and proving qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v.
McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 332 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009); Wilson v.
Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
In determining whether qualified immunity applies, courts
must engage in a two-step test “that asks first whether a
constitutional violation occurred and second whether the right
violated was clearly established.” Gregg v. Ham, 678 F.3d 333,

338–39 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524,
531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). This test, however, need not
proceed in this sequence; “[t]he judges of the district courts
and the courts of appeals [may] exercise their sound discretion
in deciding which of the two prongs . . . should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional
violation in either Claim Three or Claim Four, Individual
Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to
qualified immunity.12
4. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim for Retaliation — Claim
Five

This court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation
against the City under § 1983 fails.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rollins’ negative comments
on Plaintiff’s performance review after Defendant Rollins had
learned of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint were retaliatory. (Am.
Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 278–88.) Plaintiff alleges that “as
Assistant City Manager, employment acts of Rollins constitute
City policy.” (Id. ¶ 283.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are
insufficient to impose municipal liability on the City under
Monell. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19 at 24.) Plaintiff failed to respond
to this argument in her response brief and has thus conceded
this issue. The court also finds Plaintiff fails to plausibly
allege a claim for retaliation under § 1983 on the merits.

12 “There is support for the position that in the absence of
a constitutional violation, a defendant prevails not because of
qualified immunity but because the plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate an essential element of a section 1983 claim. In any
event, the result is the same here.” Swick v. Wilde, No. 1:10-
cv-303, 2012 WL 3780350, at *9 n.15 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2012)
(citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 378 n.3 (4th Cir.
2007)).
“[A] municipality may be subject to liability under section
1983 if the alleged injury was caused by an identifiable
municipal policy or custom.” Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of Portsmouth,
238 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 2000). When “individuals ‘whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy’”
create an alleged constitutional deprivation, the municipality
may be subject to liability under § 1983. Id. at 523 (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Municipal liability attaches only
where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur,
475 U.S. at 482. “To qualify as a final policymaking official, a
municipal official must have the responsibility and authority to
implement final municipal policy with respect to a particular
course of action.” Riddick, 238 F.3d at 523 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“The question of who possesses final policymaking authority
is one of state law.” Id. The court must look to “relevant legal
materials, including state and local positive law, as well as
custom or usage having the force of law.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).

“[I]t is true that a municipality may delegate its final
policymaking authority to other officials or governing bodies,
we must never “assum[e] that municipal policymaking authority
lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to
put it.” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, 555 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (quoting City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988)). “When an official’s
discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that
official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s
departures from them, are the act of the municipality.” City of
St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127.
Plaintiff therefore must demonstrate that Defendant Rollins

qualifies as a final policymaking official in order to defeat a
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence at
all that Defendant Rollins’ decisions qualify as “final
municipal policy,” or that Defendant Rollins is himself a final
policymaking official.
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ccording to the City Handbook,
performance evaluations are conducted for all probationary and
full-time status employees and should be performed by the
employee’s immediate supervisor who is most familiar with the
employee’s work.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶ 275.) Further, the
policy as set out in the City Handbook states that “[t]he

evaluation session is intended to provide an opportunity for the
employee to receive the supervisor’s assessment of the
employee’s work performance,” and that “[t]he evaluation
determines if performance is satisfactory. (Id.) Here, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Rollins “provided false negative feedback
on Plaintiff’s evaluation,” and “the negative comments and
criticism removed by Stober were not intended to provide
Plaintiff an opportunity for her to receive her supervisor’s
assessment of her work performance.” (Id. ¶¶ 278, 280.)
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true reveals that the
City Handbook policy concerning performance evaluations is the
“act of the municipality,” not Defendant Rollins’ “departure[]

from” the City Handbook policy; Defendant Rollins meant for his
performance evaluation to punish Plaintiff, not to determine
whether Plaintiff’s performance was satisfactory. This act thus
departs from the purpose of the policy and no longer qualifies
as an act of the City.
Plaintiff further alleges no facts to support the notion
that the City delegated to Defendant Rollins the authority to
create and implement policy concerning performance evaluations.
Defendant Rollins was therefore “constrained by policies not of
[his] making.” City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127. Instead,
Plaintiff states that “[a]s Assistant City Manager, employment

acts committed by Rollins constitute City policy.” (Am. Compl.
(Doc. 13) ¶ 283.) This is the sort of “‘naked assertion[]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” that Twombly and Iqbal
sought to eradicate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
This is a situation where an “official’s discretionary
decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s
making,” and therefore, “the subordinate’s departures from”
those polices do not constitute the acts of the municipality.
City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127.
Because Plaintiff fails to provide “further factual
enhancement” for her claim that Defendant Rollins is a final

policymaking official, her retaliation claims under § 1983 must
fail.
F. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims under North Carolina
Constitution — Claims Six and Seven

Plaintiff pleads analogous liberty and property
deprivations under Article 1, §§ 1, 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 291–322.) Plaintiff’s
Sixth and Seventh Claims are analogous to Claims Three and Four
but are brought under N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 19. (Id. ¶¶ 225–
27, 252–54, 291, 312–14.) Defendants move to dismiss these
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff alleges
no violation of a property or liberty interest protected by due
process. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 4, 13–18.) The court finds
Plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in her response
brief and has thus conceded these issues. The court will
nevertheless address Plaintiff’s North Carolina Constitution
claims on the merits.
1. Article 1, § 1 — Claim Six
Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest under § 1. Defendants argue that this
claim should be dismissed for failure to allege a violation of a
“clear, established rule.” (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 21.) The
court finds Plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in her
response brief and has thus conceded this issue.

Article 1, § 1 of the North Carolina Constitution states
that “all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own
labor, and the pursuit of happiness.” Generally, the provision
protects “the right of the individual to be free to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, to live
and work where he will, to earn his livelihoo[d] by [any] lawful
calling, and to pursue any legitimate business, trade or
vocation.” State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 693, 114 S.E.2d 660,
663 (1960).

The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted § 1 to
create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Tully v.
City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 534–35, 810 S.E.2d 208, 214–15
(2018). Further, “Article 1, Section 1 also applies when a
governmental entity acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner
towards one of its employees by failing to abide by promotional
procedures that the employer itself put in place.” Id. at 535–
36, 810 S.E.2d at 215 (collecting cases) (noting “that other
courts have recognized the impropriety of government agencies
ignoring their own regulations”). To succeed on a § 1 claim, the
court in Tully held:
a public employee must show that no other state law
remedy is available and plead facts establishing three
elements: (1) a clear, established rule or policy
existed regarding the employment promotional process
that furthered a legitimate governmental interest; (2)
the employer violated that policy; and (3) the
plaintiff was injured as a result of that violation.
If a public employee alleges these elements, he has
adequately stated a claim that his employer
unconstitutionally burdened his right to the enjoyment
of the fruits of his labor.

Id. at 537, 810 S.E.2d at 216.
Plaintiff argues two violations of the two allegedly
established policies as the bases for her § 1 claim. First that
“Defendants failed to make the appointment and/or promotion to
the Development Director position on the basis of each
candidate’s merit and fitness,” and second that “Plaintiff was
deprived of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affected as an employee because of her race, color, and/or sex.”
(Am. Compl. (Doc. 13) ¶¶ 295, 297.) The court will address each
alleged violation, starting with the alleged discrimination
based on her race, color, and/or sex.
a. Deprivation Due to Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the City’s
policy, which states that “[n]o applicant for City employment or
employee shall be deprived of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affected as an employee because of such
individual’s race, color . . . [or] genetic information . . . .”
(Id. ¶ 293.)

Before reaching the three Tully elements, Plaintiff must
first show that “no other state law remedy is available.” Tully,
370 N.C. at 537, 810 S.E.2d at 216. Plaintiff alleges that “[n]o
adequate state remedy exists for these state constitutional
violations and damages suffered by Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. (Doc.
13) ¶ 307.) The court disagrees.
The court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1 claim based on
discrimination is essentially an equal protection claim that is
more properly brought under N.C. Const. art. I, § 19. § 19
provides that:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the
land. No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to
discrimination by the State because of race, color,
religion, or national origin.
N.C. Const. art. I, § 19. While Plaintiff’s claim may seem to
address the violation of a policy regarding the employment
promotional process, upon closer inspection, the policy
addresses a situation § 19 contemplates: When an employee is
deprived of employment opportunities due to racial
discrimination in the employment setting.13 See Sheaffer, 337
F. Supp. 2d at 730 (examining disability discrimination in the
employment context under N.C. Const. art. I, § 19); Disher v.
Weaver, 308 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626–27 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (considering
racial discrimination in the employment setting under N.C.
Const. art. I, § 19).
Thus, because Plaintiff’s § 1 claim could be brought under
§ 19, Plaintiff may not base her § 1 claim upon charges of

13 The court acknowledges that even if Plaintiff brought an
equal protection claim under § 19, she would still need to
demonstrate a lack of an adequate state law remedy. See
Sheaffer, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 730. The court notes that neither
of North Carolina’s employment discrimination statutes, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 nor N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-16, would
likely apply to Plaintiff, because she was not wrongfully
terminated, see McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 720
(4th Cir. 2003) (noting that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 only
applies to common law wrongful discharge suits), nor does her
employment with the Planning & Zoning Department for the City
qualify her for the protection of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-16, see
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5; Conran v. New Bern Police Dep’t, 122
N.C. App. 116, 118–19, 468 S.E.2d 258, 259–60 (1996) (holding
that § 126-5 did not cover the plaintiff as a police officer).
racial discrimination. The court will turn to the City’s alleged
violation of its policy to promote based on merit and fitness.
b. Deprivation Due to Failure to Hire
Based on Merit and Fitness
Plaintiff argues that “Equal employment policies such as
[the merit and fitness policy] set forth in the Handbook serve a
legitimate government interest of providing a fair procedure
that ensures qualified candidates are advanced throughout the
hiring and/or promotional process.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 13)
¶ 294.)
The court first finds that there is no other state law
remedy available. For the first prong, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants violated the “established policy” set forth in the
handbook stating that “‘[a]ll appointments and promotions shall
be made on the basis of merit and fitness.’” (Id. ¶ 293.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege a

violation of “a clear, established rule or policy.” (Defs.’ Br.
(Doc. 19) at 21.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 1 claim
“asks the Court to determine whether she should have received
the promotion on the merits, on the basis that she had a
protected interest in receiving it.” (Id.)
The court in Tully observed that the existing authority in
this area is “admittedly sparse.” Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810
S.E.2d at 216. The court thus finds that, in light of the sparse
precedent on this issue and absent any argument by Plaintiff
explaining why that rule is sufficiently clear to permit
enforcement under § 1 as interpreted by Tully, the court must
find that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a “clear,
established rule,” and the court will dismiss this claim.
2. Article 1, § 19 — Claim Seven
Plaintiff alleges both liberty and property deprivations
under § 19, which fail. (Id. ¶¶ 312, 314.) Defendants argue that
Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege constitutionally protected

liberty or property interest. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 19) at 13–14,
23.) Plaintiff failed to respond to this argument and has
therefore conceded these issues. Further, the court finds that
Plaintiff’s claim also fails on the merits.
Article 1, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution provides
for equal protection and due process. The North Carolina Supreme
Court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and Article 1, § 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution conterminously. See Tri-Cty. Paving, Inc. v. Ashe
Cty., 281 F.3d 430, 436 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002); State v. Bryant,
359 N.C. 554, 563, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (2005); Rhyne v. K-Mart

Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180, 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004).
Plaintiff’s liberty and property deprivation claims fail
under § 19. Because the North Carolina Constitution and the
Federal Constitution are interpreted conterminously, see Tri-
Cty. Paving, 281 F.3d at 436 n.6, and Plaintiff’s claims for
deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty and property
interests fail under the Federal Constitution, Plaintiff’s
claims must fail here for the aforementioned reasons. See supra
Part III.E.1–2; see also Munn-Goins v. Bd. of Trs. of Bladen
Cmty. Coll., 658 F. Supp. 2d 713, 731 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
The court also notes that, even if Plaintiff had not
brought Federal Constitution claims, the North Carolina Supreme

Court has held that there is no constitutionally protected
property interest in a promotion under § 19 and thus Plaintiff
could not state a claim under § 19 for a property interest for
failing to be promoted.14 Tully, 370 N.C. at 539, 810 S.E.2d at
219.
The court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s § 19 claim
against the City under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is granted or denied
as to each of the claims and parties as set forth
hereinabove. Neither party has addressed the Eighth or Ninth

Claims for relief in these briefs. However, Plaintiff’s Eighth

14 The court also notes that Plaintiff has not alleged a
discrimination claim under § 19.
and Ninth claims for relief are requests for attorney’s fees
under applicable federal and state law. Those requests are not
separate claims for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) but are
instead demands for relief under 8(a)(3). Relief under either of
those designated claims is not ripe until the conclusion of the
case and only upon motion by a prevailing party. Those claims
are construed as prayers for relief rather than independent
claims and not addressed at this time.
The following claims remain for resolution at summary

judgment or trial: Plaintiff’s First Claim against Defendant
City of Mebane; and Plaintiff’s Third Claim against the
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities and
Defendant City of Mebane, regarding an equal protection
violation from discrimination based on race and/or sex.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to
Dismiss, (Doc. 18), is GRANTED as to Claims One, Two, Three,
Four, Six, and Seven as to David Cheek, Christopher Rollins, and
Esther Bennett (“Individual Defendants”) in their official
capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. 18), is GRANTED as to Claim Three as to a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
and Claims Four, Six, and Seven as to Individual Defendants in
their individual capacities under Rule 12(b) (6). Plaintiff’s
Third Claim regarding an egual protection violation as to
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities remains for
resolution.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to
Dismiss, (Doc. 18), is GRANTED as to Claim Three as toa
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
and Claims Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven as to Defendant City
of Mebane under Rule 12 (b) (6). Plaintiff’s Third Claim regarding
an equal protection violation as to Defendant City of Mebane
remains for resolution.
This the 31st day of March, 2020.

*
LS Wi rn L. abun. □
‘United States District Ju

- 5 9 □□

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10653578. Public record. Not legal advice.