# Brown v. Butler County Sheriff's Department

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · October 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10652356

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** October 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10652356

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

HOWARD BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
) No. 1:24-cv-00153 SEP
BUTLER COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT., )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Howard Brown’s application to proceed in the district court
without prepaying fees or costs. Doc. [2]. The Court will grant the motion and assess an initial
partial filing fee of $8.13. Furthermore, having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, the Court
will dismiss this action without prejudice.
MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
A prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of
the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account
to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing
fee of 20% of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment
of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to his account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency
having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each
time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
A review of Plaintiff’s account from the relevant six-month period shows an average
monthly deposit of $40.66 and an average monthly balance of $5.05, indicating that Plaintiff has
insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial
filing fee of $8.13, which is 20% of Plaintiff’s average monthly deposit.
LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must
“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have
formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be
“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Howard Brown, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at Butler County Jail,
is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Butler County Sheriff’s Department. Doc. [1].
Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully accused of armed criminal action in February of
2023, when he was merely “defending himself.” Id. at 3. He asserts that he was threatened by
an individual named Marcus Hyde1 on February 8, 2023, while walking to the gas station. Hyde

1 The Complaint refers to Hyde as “Hide,” but the same individual’s name is spelled “Hyde” in Butler
County Circuit Court filings. The Court will follow the Butler County Circuit Court record.
allegedly pointed a gun containing “100 rounds,” at Plaintiff, after which Plaintiff claims he “ran
home.” Id. at 4. Later that day, he went back to the store and was followed by Hyde and his
friends. Id. This time, Plaintiff “had [his] weapon with [him] consealed [sic].” Id. Plaintiff
claims that Hyde pulled up beside him and threatened him, but Plaintiff does not indicate what
occurred after these events. Id.
In both the Complaint and his supplemental filings, Docs. [6], [8], Plaintiff asserts that
his public defender had a conflict of interest. He also states in conclusory fashion that the Butler
County Jail has several unlawful conditions of confinement, including: (1) open wires hanging
from ceilings; (2) a lack of emergency buttons in many of the cells; (3) mold in some cells; and
(4) rusty bunks and tables. See Docs. [6] at 6-7, [8] at 3-4. Plaintiff does not allege that he
sought a change from a corrections officer or that he was denied services by an officer or
administrator at the Jail. He also does not state what relief he seeks.
STATE COURT BACKGROUND
A review of Missouri Case.net2 indicates that on January 13, 2023, Plaintiff was charged
with two counts of felony assault in the first degree, two counts of felony armed criminal action
and three counts of felony unlawful use of a weapon. See State v. Brown, No. 23BT-CR00079-
01 (36th Jud. Cir., Butler County Court).
On February 17, 2023, an Information was filed charging Plaintiff with two counts of
felony assault in the first degree, two counts of felony armed criminal action and three counts of
felony unlawful use of a weapon. See State v. Brown, No. 23BT-CR00079-01 (36th Jud. Cir.,
Butler County Court). On February 7, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mental exam, and
the court granted the motion on February 27, 2024. A copy of the psychiatric report was filed
with the court on August 22, 2024, and Plaintiff’s counsel filed a proposed order on September
5, 2024, seeking to have Plaintiff held incompetent to proceed. A second order for mental
examination was entered by the Court on September 13, 2024. The matter was set for status
conference on October 3, 2024, and on that date the conference was rescheduled for January 9,
2025.

2 Plaintiff’s underlying state court cases were reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management
system. The Court takes judicial notice of the public state records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991
(8th Cir. 2007); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2005).
DISCUSSION
Municipal departments like jails, sheriff’s offices and police departments are not legal
entities that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d
81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff’s claims against Butler County Sheriff’s Department are
therefore subject to dismissal. And Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Butler County.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), the Supreme Court
held that a municipality or local governing body can be held directly liable under § 1983. Such
liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy,
(2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v.
Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 751
(8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those
based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”).
Plaintiff fails to make any assertions against Butler County in his Complaint. None of his
allegations could be construed as Monell claims. There are no claims of a constitutional
violation by Butler County resulting from any policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent failure
to train or supervise. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–92 (describing a municipal liability claim).
Although Plaintiff alleges unlawful conditions of confinement at the Butler County Jail, he fails
to indicate how those conditions affected him. He also fails to allege that he sought a change in
the conditions from a corrections officer or that he was denied services by an officer or
administrator at the Jail. Liability under § 1983 is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873
F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). “Government officials are personally liable only for their own
misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, § 1983
liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”
Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909
F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff’s failure to identify an individual who denied him a
change in the allegedly unconstitutional conditions is fatal to his request for relief.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in the district court
without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. [2], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this
order, Plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $8.13. Plaintiff is instructed to make his
remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name;
(2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance
is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. See
28 ULS.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Doc.
[3] is DENIED AS MOOT.
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 31st day of October, 2024. ot ite
SARAH E. PITLYK □
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10652356. Public record. Not legal advice.