# Orellana v. United States of America

> District Court, D. Maryland · September 25, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649483

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** September 25, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649483

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming a 29 jury verdict of ITED against the plaintiff's stepfather who had engaged in sexual abuse of the plaintiff during six years of her childhood
- holding that officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on claims of battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest where they had legal justification to arrest the plaintiff

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

EVY B. ORELLANA,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
UACMARSEAL CODEC. Civil Action No. TDC-20-0845
in his individual capacity, and
U.S. MARSHAL TRISTAN MARTIN,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Evy B. Orellana has filed a civil action against Defendants the United States of
America and Deputy United States Marshals Ryan Godec and Tristan Martin in which she asserts
federal constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2018), arising from a July 2018 incident in which Orellana was bitten
by a United States Marshals Service canine during the arrest of her boyfriend. Defendants have
filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, which is now fully briefed. Having reviewed
the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
In June 2018, the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County issued an arrest
warrant for Eric Arturo Trinidad on charges of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and

reckless endangerment arising out of allegations that Trinidad had engaged in domestic violence
against Orellana, including by twice grabbing her by the hair and slamming her head to the floor,
twice punching her in the head, and grabbing her by the throat and choking her. At that time,
Trinidad and Orellana lived together with their infant on Beacon Light Road in Riverdale,
Maryland in the basement of a townhouse owned by Yolanda Menendez, Trinidad’s mother (“the
Residence”). The portion of the basement in which Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived had a
separate entrance from the exterior of the Residence, and it was separated from the rest of the
basement by a door sealed with a spray-foam sealant. Menendez, her husband, Trinidad’s sister
Vanessa Menendez, and other relatives lived in the remainder of the Residence.
On July 3, 2018 at approximately 2:00 a.m., Deputy United States Marshal Ryan Godec
(“Deputy Godec”), Deputy United States Marshal Tristan Martin (“Deputy Martin”), and 11 law
enforcement officers from the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force (“CARFTF”), which
serves federal and state warrants issued to or adopted by the United States Marshals Service
(“USMS”), arrived at the Residence to arrest Trinidad pursuant to the arrest warrant. Luis
Rodriguez, a United States mintonioe and Customs Enforcement agent and Special Deputy U.S.
Marshal (“Deputy Rodriguez”), knocked on the door of the Residence, and Yolanda Menendez
opened the door. Deputy Rodriguez told her that the CARFTF officers were there to arrest
Trinidad and that everyone in the Residence needed to come outside. Yolanda Menendez stated
that Trinidad “was not there,” that she “didn’t know,” and that “he was working.” Joint Record
(“J.R.”) 113, ECF No. 69. According to Yolanda Menendez, she gave these responses because
Trinidad usually “worked in the evenings.” /d.
CARFTF officers then entered the Residence and searched the main and upstairs floors
without finding Trinidad. During the search, the CARFTF officers called out to Trinidad in both

English and Spanish. While doing so, a CARFTF officer, Larry Singleton, saw that Trinidad’s
name was appearing on his mother’s cell phone sitting on a nightstand.
During the search, the CARFTF officers knocked on a second-floor bedroom door and
woke up Vanessa Menendez, Trinidad’s sister. At that time, Vanessa Menendez was receiving an
incoming call on her cell phone from Trinidad. One officer asked Vanessa Menendez if Trinidad
was downstairs in the basement, and she nodded her head in the affirmative. According to
Vanessa Menendez, she also stated that “Evy, the baby, and Eric are downstairs.” J.R. 123.
Deputy Martin and Deputy Godec deny that anyone informed the CARFTF team that Orellana and
her baby were in the basement.
Once the CARFTF officers had everyone from the main residence outside, Deputy
Rodriguez asked them if Trinidad was in the basement. Most of them responded by saying no, but
Deputy Rodriguez and Deputy Martin saw Vanessa Menendez nod her head in the affirmative.
According to Deputy Rodriguez, “We had no indication that he was there with anybody else.” J.R.
86.
At that point, according to Deputy Martin, CARFTF officers called out to Trinidad from
the top of the interior stairs to the basement, but there was no response. The CARFTF officers
discussed how to proceed and jointly decided to use a USMS canine trained to bite the first person
encountered, out of concern that Trinidad could be waiting to ambush officers. Before the USMS
deploy such a canine, the standard procedure is to first give three announcements that explain who
the officers are, state what the officers are doing, and warn what will happen if the person sought
does not safely surrender, including that the canine will find and bite the person. If officers give
those announcements and the individual sought has not complied, the officers then release the

canine off its leash to search for and apprehend the person sought. At that point, the canine will
bite the first person it sees.
First, the CARFTF officers went to the top of the interior stairs leading down to the
basement. Deputy Godec has asserted that he called out a warning in which he stated, “Eric
Trinidad, any other occupants, this is the police with K9, come out now or [we will] send a dog to
find you and bite you.” J.R. 208. According to Deputy Martin, he also called out the same warning
three times from the top of the basement stairs, and Deputy Rodriguez gave the same warning in
Spanish multiple times. Deputy Godec asserts that from the top of the stairs, he made three
announcements in English and Deputy Rodriguez made three announcements in Spanish. Deputy
Godec, the canine’s handler, then twice released the canine off-leash into the basement from the
top of the stairs, but the dog returned each time without finding Trinidad.
At that point, the CARFTF officers realized that the basement was divided into at least two
sections and suspected that Trinidad was in the separate section of the basement. Several CARFTF
officers, including Deputy Godec and Deputy Martin, went downstairs into the basement and saw
the sealed door that led to the separate living space. Deputy Martin and others knocked on the
door, announced that they were there and knew that Trinidad was inside, but received no response.
The officers then used tools to pry open the door partially. Deputy Martin asserts that with the
door partially open, the officers again called out to Trinidad, stating that they were the police and
knew that he was inside and asking him to surrender.
According to Deputy Martin, Deputy Godec gave the same warning as before about the
presence of the canine in English, and Deputy Rodriguez gave the same warning in Spanish.
Deputy Godec has testified that the announcement was made but does not recall who made it.
Deputy Rodriguez, however, states that after he gave the warning in Spanish at the top of the stairs

leading into the basement, he came back out of the Residence to talk to the family members
outside, at which time he told them that they should confirm that Trinidad was in the basement
unit and ask him to come out because the officers were going to send in a police dog and Trinidad
would get bitten.
When no one responded to the warnings, Deputy Godec then released the canine through
the partially open door into the basement living area. Based on its training to bite the first person
encountered, the canine went to Orellana, bit her, and pulled her to the ground, in the course of
which the dog took out a piece of flesh from her leg with his teeth. Upon hearing Orellana scream,
the CARFTF officers entered the basement living area and saw the canine biting Orellana, as well
as Trinidad hiding behind the bed. Deputy Godec took the canine “off the bite” and removed it
from the room. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts § 35, ECF No. 61. CARFTF officers then
gave Orellana medical aid and brought her outside to an ambulance.
At the same time, officers arrested Trinidad, who was not resisting at that point. Trinidad
claims that during the arrest, one officer put his knee on his back and put his other knee near the
right side of his face and was striking his face with his knee. J.R. 164. According to Trinidad,
when he complained about that treatment, the officer called him a “little bitch.” Jd.
Both Orellana and Trinidad have stated that although they heard banging and footsteps
upstairs while law enforcement was searching the rest of the Residence, they never heard voices
or warnings before the canine entered their living area and bit Orellana. Trinidad asserts that no
warnings were given because he would have heard any such warnings given from the basement.
As a result of the dog bite, Orellana suffered deep lacerations on her left thigh, requiring more 40
stitches. She also sought psychiatric treatment.

>

On March 31, 2020, Orellana filed the present civil action. The presently operative
Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action. In Count 1, Orellana asserts claims
against Deputy Godec and Deputy Martin that she was unlawfully seized and subjected to
excessive force, in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). In Counts 2 through 6, Orellana alleges tort claims against the United States under
the FTCA in the following numbered courts: (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) negligence;
(5) gross negligence; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ITED”). On April 5,
2021, the Court (Chasanow, J.) granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the negligence and gross negligence claims in Counts 4 and 5 because sovereign
immunity has not been waived for such claims. Orellana v. United States, No. 20-0845, 2021 WL
1251888, at *4, *7 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 2021) (“Orellana I’).
DISCUSSION
Following discovery, Defendants have now filed a second dispositive motion, a Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, in which they argue that: (1) Orellana’s Bivens claim is
foreclosed by recent United States Supreme Court precedent; (2) even if the Bivens claim is viable,
Deputy Godec and Deputy Martin are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Orellana has failed to
demonstrate the “actual malice” necessary to sustain her FTCA claims, Mot. at 26, ECF No. 62-1;
and (4) Orellana’s FTCA claims otherwise fail on their merits.
1. Legal Standards
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d Legal
conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Jd. The Court must examine the complaint
as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994);
Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in
the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine”
only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a
verdict for that party. /d. at 248-49.
II. Bivens Claim
At the outset, Defendants argue that the Bivens claim in Count | must be dismissed based
on the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022),
because the claim arises in a new Bivens context and special factors counsel against extending
Bivens to this context.
In Bivens, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered the plaintiff's apartment
and arrested him, handcuffed him in front of his wife and children, threatened to arrest his entire

family, and searched his apartment. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The agents then took the plaintiff to
a courthouse “where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.” Jd. The
plaintiff sued the agents, alleging that the warrantless arrest and search were improper and that
they used unreasonable force in arresting him. /d. at 389. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
had a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for damages. /d. at 397. The Court expanded
the scope of such implied causes of action for constitutional violations in two subsequent cases.
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a former congressional
staff member who asserted a sex discrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment had an implied
cause of action for damages. /d. at 231, 248-49. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that the estate of a federal prisoner who died in custody had an implied cause
of action for damages under the Eighth Amendment based on alleged deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. /d. at 16 & n.1, 18-19, 25.
In Egbert, the owner of a hotel in Washington state immediately adjacent to the Canadian
border asserted federal constitutional claims against a United States Border Patrol agent who lifted
the hotel owner off the ground, threw him against a vehicle, and threw him to the ground, then
allegedly retaliated against him by reporting his license plate “SMUGLER?” for referencing illegal
conduct and by contacting the Internal Revenue Service and prompting an audit of the hotel
owner’s tax returns. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1801-02. The plaintiff asserted claims under Bivens for
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and retaliation under the First Amendment. /d. at
1802. In declining to permit these Bivens claims to proceed, the Supreme Court noted that it has
frequently declined to extend Bivens to other alleged constitutional violations and now views
“[rjecognizing a cause of action under Bivens” to be “a disfavored judicial activity” because of its
view that Congress, not the courts, should establish causes of actions for damages arising under

the Constitution. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1802-03 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135
(2017)). The Court stated that “[i]f there is a rational reason to think” that Congress and not the
courts should “decide whether to provide for a damages remedy,” then “no Bivens action may lie.”
Id. at 1803 (citations omitted). The Court then described its two-step inquiry for whether a Bivens
claim may proceed. /d. First, a court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context” in
that it is “meaningful[ly]’ different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages
action.” /d. at 1803 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139). Among the potential differences to be
considered are:
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or
specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer
should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other
legal mandate under which the officer was operating: the risk of disruptive intrusion
by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139-40 (2017). A new context can also arise in a case involving
a “new category of defendants.” Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. Second, “if a claim arises in a new
context, a Bivens remedy is unavailable if there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the Judiciary
is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a
damages action to proceed.”” /d. (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136). Such special factors can
include whether there is uncertainty over the “systemwide consequences of recognizing a cause of
action under Bivens” and whether “Congress has already provided, or authorized the Executive
[Branch] to provide, ‘an alternative remedial structure,” either of which alone could foreclose
relief. /d. at 1804. The Court further observed that “those steps often resolve to a single question:
whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages
remedy.” /d. at 1803.

Under these principles, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment claim failed because
while Bivens had recognized a Fourth Amendment excessive force cause of action, the Court of
Appeals had already “conceded” that the plaintiffs claim “presented a new context for Bivens
purposes,” id. at 1804, and there were special factors weighing against recognizing a new cause of
action, specifically, (1) that the claim was brought against a Border Patrol agent and occurred at
or near the international border, and “Congress is better positioned to create remedies in the border-
security context”; and (2) the Government had “already provided alternative remedies that protect
plaintiffs” consisting of a statutory requirement that the Border Patrol control, direct, and supervise
all employees, as well as regulations that the Border Patrol investigate alleged violations of the
standards for enforcement activities and accept grievances from anyone who wishes to lodge a
complaint. /d. at 1804, 1806-07. It also held that the First Amendment retaliation claim failed
because that claim plainly sought to extend Bivens to the new context of First Amendment claims.
Id. at 1807. *
A. New Context
Defendants argue that based on the principles set forth in Egbert, the Court should find that
Orellana’s constitutional claim arises in a new Bivens context because: (1) Bivens involved a
warrantless search, while here Defendants had a warrant for Trinidad’s arrest; (2) Orellana’s
injuries from the dog bite differed from the injuries in Bivens, in which the plaintiff was handcuffed
in front of his family, agents threatened to arrest his family, and he was detained and subjected to
a visual strip search, Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389; (3) the defendants in this case are Deputy United
States Marshals rather than members of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, as in Bivens; and (4) this
case presents unique questions involving the application of the Fourth Amendment to the
deployment of police dogs.

10

As to the argument that this case presents a new Bivens context because it involved a
warrant, Defendants rely primarily on Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2021),
which states that “[w]hat Bivens involved was the Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures; this case, by contrast, involves searches and
seizures conducted with a warrant,” and that as a result the “right at issue” was “meaningfully
different from the one at issue in Bivens itself.” Jd. at 135. In Annappareddy, however, there was
no claim of excessive force in the execution of a search or arrest warrant; rather the claim against
federal investigators was for knowingly submitting false information to secure search warrants and
for using similar false evidence to secure an indictment and an arrest warrant against the plaintiff.
Id. at 130. Thus, the presence of warrants in Annappareddy was relevant to establish a new Bivens
context because the plaintiff was challenging the issuance of those warrants based on the
““information-gathering and case-building activities’ that represent[ed] ‘a different part of police
work than the apprehension, detention, and physical searches at issue in Bivens.” Jd. at 136
(quoting Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 498 (8th Cir. 2019)). Indeed, the court distinguished a
Supreme Court case in which the Court had considered a Bivens claim involving a search warrant
in part based on the fact that the claim did not require any “inquiry into probable cause.” /d. at
136 n.9,
Here, unlike in Annappareddy, Orellana’s Bivens claims do not challenge the means by
which information was gathered for the warrant or the validity of the warrant, do not require any
application of the probable cause standard, and do not even allege a violation based on the taking
of actions that exceeded the scope of the warrant. Instead, the existence of the warrant is largely
incidental to the claim, which “seeks to hold accountable line-level agents of a federal criminal
law enforcement agency, for violations of the Fourth Amendment” involving excessive force

11

which, as in Bivens, was “committed in the course of a routine law-enforcement action.” Hicks v.
Ferreyra, 965 F.3d 302, 306, 311 (4th Cir. 2020). Indeed, courts have found viable Bivens claims
within the context of the original Bivens Fourth Amendment claim based on alleged excessive
force in the precise context at issue here—during an entry into a residence to execute an arrest
warrant. For example, in Jacobs y. Alam, 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019), the court found that a
Bivens claim did not arise in a new context when it was based on a U.S. Marshals Service search
of a home for a fugitive and the firing of shots at the plaintiff, and it was instead a “run-of-the-
mill” challenge to “standard law enforcement operations that fall well within Bivens itself.” Jd at
1033-34, 1038-39. See also Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
a viable Bivens claim for excessive force arising from the shooting of the plaintiff during an entry
to his house to execute an arrest warrant). Thus, while the presence of a warrant can establish a
new context under certain circumstances, it does not do so here.
Next, the Court does not find that the articulated factual differences from Bivens itself, such
as the federal law enforcement agency for which Defendants work, or the specific conduct and
injuries at issue, establish a new Bivens context. Although Bivens involved a claim against agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for improperly handcuffing, detaining, and strip searching the
plaintiff, Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
found Bivens applicable to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims involving different agencies
and different forms of alleged misconduct. See Hicks v. Ferreyra, 965 F.3d 302, 306, 311 (4th
Cir. 2020) (although declining to consider the claim that there was a new Bivens context because
that argument was not preserved for appeal, stating that case was effectively a “replay” of Bivens
even though the defendants were United States Park Police Officers and the misconduct involved
twice conducting traffic stops of the plaintiff, a United States Secret Service special agent, without

12

probable cause or reasonable suspicion); cf Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 472-73, 479 (4th Cir.
2006) (permitting a Bivens excessive force claim to proceed where the defendant was a special
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the alleged misconduct was shooting the plaintiff
during an operation to arrest him out of his vehicle).
Although the Egbert Court highlighted the fact that the defendant was a Border Patrol
agent, it did so as part of its conclusion that the case presented issues relating to border security
that set it apart from the typical Fourth Amendment excessive force claims permitted by Bivens.
Egbert specifically referenced Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 747 (2020), another case in
which the Court declined to extend Bivens to apply to a claim against a Border Patrol agent with
national security and border security implications. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1804-05 (emphasizing
that the Border Patrol agent was investigating illegal entries by individuals and goods near the
United States-Canada international border and thus engaged in matters implicating foreign policy
and national security); Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 739, 747 (declining to extend Bivens to a case
involving a shooting across the United States-Mexico international border because the
circumstances of the case implicated foreign relations and national security, areas into which
judicial inquiry would raise specific separation of powers concerns). Indeed, to the extent that
Defendants argue that separation-of-powers concerns could cause Orellana’s claim to present a
new Bivens context such that “Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy,”
Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140), the instances in which the Supreme
Court has invoked such concerns have typically involved specific considerations that clearly
implicated the prerogatives of another branch of government. See, e.g., Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at
739, 747; Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140-41 (declining to extend Bivens to a new context where the
plaintiffs challenged conditions of confinement imposed on undocumented immigrants “pursuant

13

to a high-level executive policy created in the wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil”
for which a Bivens claim “would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive
functions of the Executive Branch”). Challenges to high-level executive branch decisions and
foreign relations and national security issues are not present here. Rather, the mission of the U.S.
Marshals Service in executing arrest warrants does not implicate such specialized interests in a
way that sets Orellana’s claim apart from those involving standard federal law enforcement
activities by other federal agencies such as the drug investigation at issue in Bivens.
Finally, although Defendants argue that this case presents unique questions involving the
application of the Fourth Amendment to the deployment of police canines, they do not explain
how these specific facts establish that this case “is different in a meaningful way” warranting a
finding of a new Bivens context, other than their claim, which the Court finds to be incorrect under
controlling authority, that the dog’s biting of Orellana did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139; see infra part III.B. Though Defendants argue that law
enforcement officers have less control over police dogs once released than they have over the law
enforcement conduct in encounters such as the physical arrest, detention, and search in Bivens
itself, Bivens excessive force claims have been permitted even when the law enforcement officers
took actions for which they did not have complete control over the result, such as the firing of a
shot. See Schultz, 455 F.3d at 472-73, 479: Jacobs 915 F.3d at 1033-34, 1038-39; Ting, 927 F.2d
1504 at 1513.
Ultimately, while the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have found that certain factual
differences can result in a new Bivens context, those cases involve more distinctly different
contexts. See, e.g., Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1806 (emphasizing border security and national security
issues); Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140-41 (finding that a Bivens claim based on confinement conditions

14

imposed on undocumented immigrants pursuant to a “high-level executive policy created in the
wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil” implicated national security, separation of
powers, and terrorism issues and thus involved a new Bivens context); Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th
839, 845-46 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding that a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim involved a new Bivens context different from that of the Eighth Amendment
inadequate medical care claim in Carlson); Dyer v. Smith, 56 F.4th 271, 275-76, 278 (4th Cir.
2022) (finding that First and Fourth Amendment Bivens claims arose in a new context when they
derived from an airport search by the Transportation Security Administration, which has different
legal authorities from traditional law enforcement agencies, and included an effort by the plaintiff
to record the encounter); Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 136 (finding a new Bivens context arising
from a Fourth Amendment challenge to the validity of a warrant based on the fact-gathering
process leading to a warrant, which was “never contemplated” by Bivens). Under the
considerations set forth in Ziglar, the present case is similar to Bivens itself in that it involves
officers of similar rank, the same constitutional right, the same specificity of action in that it relates
to a discrete encounter with a citizen, and no articulable risk of disruptive intrusion on the
functioning of other branches of government. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140. Though the presence of an
arrest warrant arguably establishes some difference in the “extent of judicial guidance” on how to
respond to the problem and in the legal mandate under which the officer was operating, where the
issue here was not the basis or scope of the warrant, but the permissible conduct in effectuating an
arrest, such differences are not meaningful for purposes of the analysis. See id. at 140. Thus, the
Court finds that the present Bivens claim involves the same right at issue in Bivens—freedom from
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment—and does not involve a new Bivens context. See
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389; Schultz, 455 F.3d at 479; Jacobs 915 F.3d at 1033-34, 1038-39.

15

B. Special Factors
Because Orellana’s Bivens claim does not present a new Bivens context, it is unnecessary
to proceed to the “special factors” second step of the inquiry. See Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. In
Dyer, the Fourth Circuit, in applying Egbert, specifically stated that “[i]f the context is nof new . .
. then a Bivens remedy continues to be available.” Dyer, 56 F.4th at 277 (stating that “if the claim
arises in a new Bivens context,” the court “must next evaluate whether there are special factors
counselling hesitation in expanding Bivens’). Defendants, in fact, acknowledge that the special
factors inquiry is conducted to identify a basis to avoid “extending Bivens to [a] new context.”
Mot. Dismiss at 17, ECF No. 62-1. Thus, the Court need not and does not address Orellana’s
arguments relating to special factors.
Because the Court finds that Orellana’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim does not
present a new Bivens context, the Motion to Dismiss will therefore be denied as to the argument
that the claim in Count 1 constitutes an improper extension of Bivens.
III. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that Deputy Godec and Deputy Martin are entitled to qualified
immunity because (1) they intended to seize Trinidad, not Orellana, and therefore could not have
seized Orellana under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) their actions did not violate a clearly
established constitutional right.
Government officials sued in their individual capacities may invoke the protection of
qualified immunity to bar a claim for civil damages. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982); Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2007). When qualified immunity is
asserted, a court must consider two questions: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) “whether the

16

right was clearly established,” that is, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02
(2001); Henry, 501 F.3d at 377. For qualified immunity to apply, only one of the questions has to
be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Henry, 501 F.3d at 377. Courts may address the
questions in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Notably, “qualified
immunity does not ‘override the ordinary rules applicable to summary judgment proceedings.’”
Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (quoting Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir.
2005)). Asa result, “a genuine question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly
violative of the right actually occurred . . . must be reserved for trial.” /d. (quoting Willingham v.
Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005)).
A. Seizure
In invoking qualified immunity, Defendants primarily argue that the evidence does not
establish that the biting of Orellana constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because
she was not the intended target of the CARFTF officers when they released the canine into the
basement living area. This argument fails based on controlling precedent that establishes that
when a police dog is released off-leash to apprehend a suspect, the apprehension of a different
person still constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In Vathekan vy. Prince George’s
County, 154 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff, Esther Vathekan, owned a house and rented
out the basement to two tenants. /d. at 175-76. One day, one of the tenants noticed that someone
had broken into the basement unit, so he called the police. /d. at 176. When the responding police
officer asked if anyone else should rightfully be in the house, the tenant said, “there shouldn’t be.”
Id. The officer then called for a canine unit, and the canine officer released the dog into the
basement unit. Jd. The dog then went up the stairs to the door to the main house and detected a

17

human presence behind the door. /d. Without announcing the presence of the dog or giving any
warning, the officer then opened the door to the main house and released the dog, which then went
to Vathekan, who was sleeping, and bit her in the head and face. Jd. at 176-77. The district court
held that because Vathekan was an innocent bystander, she had not stated a valid claim that her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during a seizure had been violated
because the intended object of the released dog was a burglar, not Vathekan. /d. at 177-78. The
Fourth Circuit, however, reversed and held that Vathekan had been subjected to a Fourth
Amendment seizure, which “occurs whenever ‘there is a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.” Id. at 178 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 597 (1989)). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the officer knew that someone
was behind the door, thought the person was a burglar, and released the dog with the intent “that
the dog find and bite that person,” the seizure of Vathekan was “therefore purposeful, even if [the
officer] would not have seized her had he known she was innocent,” and thus constituted a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. /d.
The present case is strikingly similar. Here, Deputy Godec released the canine into the
basement unit with the belief that Trinidad was there and specifically intended for the dog to find
and bite the first person encountered, but that person ended up being Orellana instead. Under
Vathekan, the Court must reject Defendants’ argument that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation because the biting of Orellana did not constitute a seizure.
The cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable. In Maney v. Garrison, 681 F. App’x
210 (4th Cir. 2017), an unpublished case, after a police officer and his police canine tracked a
robbery suspect to an apparently abandoned house, the dog, while still on leash, suddenly “sprang
into action, biting an individual crouched behind a nearby bush,” who proved to be an innocent

18

homeless person. /d. at 212. The court held that there was no seizure under the Fourth Amendment
and specifically distinguished Vathekan on the grounds that while in that case the officer released
the dog from its leash with the intent that it seize a person, the officer in Maney still had the dog
on a leash to exercise control over its movements, had not directed the dog to seize anyone or
intended for it to do so, and did not expect the dog to lunge into the bushes. /d. at 216, 219.
In Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991), which predates Vathekan,
police officers responded to a report about someone driving recklessly, and when the driver drove
into a cornfield, the officers surrounded the area. /d. at 280. When an officer confronted the
driver, the driver accelerated, and officers shot at the driver’s tires as he tried to escape. /d. One
shot hit the plaintiff, another motorist who had previously been told to leave the area but had
apparently come back to the area on foot without the police’s knowledge and was lying on an
embankment in the vicinity of the shooting when it occurred. /d. The court held that the plaintiff
was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because he was not “the intended
object of the specific act of physical restraint,” which was the vehicle to be stopped by shooting
its tires. /d. at 281. Here, in contrast, as in Vathekan, the intended object of the specific act of
physical restraint was the first person encountered by the dog sent into the basement living area,
which proved to be Orellana.
Thus, under Vathekan, the Court finds that because the CARFTF officers specifically
intended to seize a person when they released the canine, Orellana was subjected to a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, even though she was not the specific person they sought. Vathekan, 154
F.3d at 178.

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B. Excessive Force
As for whether the record provides sufficient evidence to establish that Defendants’ use of
the canine to seize Orellana violated a constitutional right, controlling precedent establishes that
the Fourth Amendment would be violated if the CARFTF officers failed to give a warning that
they would release the dog before they did so. In Vathekan, the court reversed a grant of summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds even though the officer asserted that he had given a “very
loud” warning before releasing the dog into the house, and other officers stated that they heard the
warning, because both Vathekan, who was inside the house, and the tenant, who was standing
outside the house, stated that they did not hear any such warning. /d. at 180. The court found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the warning was given,
because in its absence the use of the police canine would have violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
Here, there is a similar factual dispute over whether warnings were given. Deputy Martin
has testified in his deposition that he specifically gave multiple warnings that the officers had a
police canine, would release it, and Trinidad would be bitten if he did not surrender. Deputy
Rodriguez has testified that he gave the same warnings in Spanish. Deputy Martin and Deputy
Godec both state that the warnings were also given once the door to the basement living area was
breached. Orellana and Trinidad, in contrast, have stated in their depositions that although they
heard footsteps and banging from upstairs, they never heard any verbal warnings from the
CARFTF officers, whether about their presence generally or the specific intention to release a dog
that would bite the first person encountered. Trinidad has further stated that he would have heard
any such warnings if they were given after the sealed basement door was breached.

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In Vathekan, the court denied summary judgment even though the plaintiffs’ witnesses
could state only that they did not hear any warnings, not that they could confirm that no warning
was given, because “[a] juror could reasonably conclude that if certain witnesses did not hear a
warning, then no warning was given, even if other witnesses testify to a warning.” Vathekan, 154
F.3d at 180. Thus, regardless of the number of witnesses who testified that warnings were given,
or the number of warnings that they assert were given, the Court must conclude that there is a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether warnings were given that is sufficient to
preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See Vathekan, 154 F.3d at 180.
There is another material factual dispute over whether the CARFTF officers were aware
that Orellana and the baby were with Trinidad in the basement. Although Deputy Martin and
Deputy Rodriguez have testified that Vanessa Menendez nodded her head to acknowledge that
Trinidad was in the basement, they and Deputy Godec deny that she or anyone else ever told the
CARFTF officers that Orellana and the baby were with him. Deputy Rodriguez states that if they
had been told “that there were other people down there, including a newborn, we wouldn’t have
released the dog.” J.R. 84. Deputy Godec states that if he had known that Orellana and her baby
were downstairs, he “would not have released the dog.” J R 209. In contrast however, Vanessa
Menendez has testified in her deposition that when she was woken up and asked by an officer if
Trinidad was “downstairs,” she nodded her head and also stated that Trinidad was downstairs with
Orellana and their baby. J.R. 122. Thus, although the officers have strenuously asserted that their
course of conduct would have been different had they known that Orellana and the baby were
present, in doing so, they implicitly recognize that the reasonableness of their actions would be
undermined if, in fact, they had been told that another person and a baby were present in the area
in which they sent a police canine trained to bite the first person encountered. Thus, there is also

21

a genuine issue of material fact on whether the CARFTF officers were aware that Orellana and the
baby were in the basement living area with Trinidad. At this stage, the Court cannot engage in
credibility determinations, which are the province of the jury. Thus, the Court finds that there are
genuine issues of material fact on whether Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment.
Cc. Clearly Established Right
As for whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of this incident, in
considering whether a right is “clearly established,” the Court considers whether “the contours of
the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing
violates that right” and was thus “on notice” that the conduct violated established law. E.W. ex
rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321
(4th Cir. 2013)). Even if no court has found that the specific conduct in question violated an
individual’s rights, “if a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,” the right may be clearly established. /d.
(quoting Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017)). However, “courts must
not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’” Jd. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)); see White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam). A
court must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to
have violated the Fourth Amendment.” White, 580 U.S. at 79; Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 246
(4th Cir. 2017). Although the facts of such a case need not be “identical” to the present facts,
Safar, 859 F.3d at 248, it should be “obvious” that the case applies to the facts, White, 580 U.S. at
80.
In assessing this question, a court “first examine[s] ‘cases of controlling authority in [this]
jurisdiction,” here, the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, and the Maryland Supreme Court.

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Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Amaechi v. West, 237
F.3d 356, 363 (4th Cir. 2001)). If that authority is not dispositive, the Court may still consider “‘a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ from other jurisdictions” as a basis to find that conduct
was barred by clearly established law. /d. at 539 (quoting Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d
267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004)). When considering whether there is such a “consensus,” a court considers
not only the broad holdings of those cases but also the specific requirements adopted by each court.
See Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004).
Here, under Vathekan, “Fourth Circuit precedent existing in 1995 clearly established that
failure to give a warning before releasing a police dog” to seize someone “is objectively
unreasonable in an excessive force context” and a “violation of the Fourth Amendment.”
Vathekan, 154 F.3d at 179. Because Vathekan is controlling authority and involves comparable
facts, the Court finds that there was clearly established law predating the events in question that
demonstrated that the release of a police canine to apprehend a suspect without first giving a
warning violates the Fourth Amendment. Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 185.
Where there are genuine issues of material fact whether Defendants violated Orellana’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force arising from a bite by a police canine
released without warning, and that right was clearly established at the time of this incident, the
Court must deny summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity,
IV. FTCA
Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Orellana’s FTCA
claims because: (1) Defendants did not act with actual malice; (2) the battery and □□□□□
imprisonment claims fail because Defendants’ actions were legally justified; and (3) Defendants’
conduct was not extreme or outrageous as required to establish a claim for IIED.

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The United States and its officers are immune from suit unless they have expressly waived
sovereign immunity. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The FTCA
provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to permit a suit for damages against the United
States, but not federal officers in their individual capacities, for “personal injury .. . caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission or any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. Such claims may include claims for assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution by federal law
enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In this instance, Orellana’s FTCA claims are governed
by the law of Maryland, the state in which the alleged tortious acts occurred. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b).
Under Maryland law, law enforcement officers are immune from tort liability for acts or omissions
committed within the scope of their employment unless committed with malice or gross
negligence. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5—522(b) (LexisNexis 2020).
A. Malice or Gross Negligence
Under Maryland law, malice is defined as “conduct characterized by evil or wrongful
motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud.” Lee v. Cline, 863
A.2d 297, 311 (Md. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Gross negligence, on the other hand, is “an
intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting
the life or property of another,” and “also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences
without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 717 (Md. 2007)
(quoting Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 495 A.2d 838, 846 (Md. 1985)). Gross negligence is
established only if the defendant “inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the

24

rights of others that he acts as if such rights do not exist.” Jd (quoting Liscombe v. Potomac
Edison Co., 495 A.2d 838, 846 (Md. 1985)).
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Orellana, as is required at this
stage, the Court finds little to no evidence of actual malice. Defendants were charged with
executing an arrest warrant on an individual charged with a crime that they did not personally
investigate. There is no evidence that Defendants had any prior contact with Trinidad. It is also
undisputed that upon arriving at the Residence, Defendants did not immediately seek to use the
canine and instead first knocked on the front door, arranged for the occupants of the main residence
to leave the premises, and searched the main house, all without the use of the canine. Even if. as
asserted by Vanessa Menendez, they were told that Orellana and her baby were in the basement
unit with Trinidad, there is no evidence as to why they would intentionally seek to injure Orellana,
who was understood to be the victim of Trinidad’s crime. Although Trinidad claims that while he
was being arrested, one of the CARFTF officers used his knee against his face and then used
profanity when he complained, this case involves no claim of excessive force against Trinidad,
and these facts, if true, would still provide only limited evidence of an “evil or wrongful motive”
or “ill-will” at the time that the canine was released. Lee, 863 A.2d at 311.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to establish malice, there
is sufficient evidence to support a finding of gross negligence if all material factual disputes are
resolved in Orellana’s favor. As discussed above, the two specific genuine disputes of material
fact are whether Defendants were told that Orellana and her baby were with Trinidad in the
basement unit and whether they gave verbal warnings that they would release the canine and that
it would bite the first person it encountered, before actually releasing the canine into the basement
unit. See supra part III.B. If both factual disputes are resolved in Orellana’s favor, a reasonable

25

jury could conclude that Defendants, in releasing the canine into a space with knowledge that an
innocent victim and an infant were present, with the knowledge that the canine was trained to bite
the first person encountered, and without giving any verbal warnings about the imminent use of
such a police canine, “acted with thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion
of any effort to avoid them.” Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 717 (Md. 2007) (quoting Liscombe,
495 A.2d at 846). While the Court recognizes that Defendants and other CARFTF officers have
disputed these facts in ehdindlepnditions on summary judgment the Court must draw all inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party and must leave all credibility determinations to the jury. Thus, it
cannot grant summary judgment on the FTCA claims based on the alleged lack of evidence of .
gross negligence.
B. Battery
Defendants seek summary judgment on the battery claim based on their claim that their
actions were legally justified. Under Maryland law, battery is the “unlawful application of force
to the person of another.” Snowden v. State, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (Md. 1991). A law enforcement
officer is not liable for battery for using a reasonable amount of force when effectuating a lawful
detention or arrest. See Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 471 n.24 (Md. 1995); Busch v. State, 426
A.2d 954, 958 (Md. 1981); Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1055-56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(holding that officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on claims of battery, false
imprisonment, and false arrest where they had legal justification to arrest the plaintiff). However.
if during a valid arrest “an officer uses excessive force, or force greater than is ‘seasciabiy
necessary under the circumstances, the officer may be liable” for battery. French v. Hines, 957
A.2d 1000, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).

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Although Orellana is correct that the arrest warrant did not authorize Defendants to arrest
or detain her, Defendants are correct that there are circumstances under which law enforcement
officers may physically touch and temporarily detain individuals in the vicinity of the execution
ofa valid arrest. See Cotton v. State, 872 A.2d 87, 92-93 (Md. 2005). Regardless, however, where
there are genuine disputes of material fact relating to whether Deputy Godec and Deputy Martin
used excessive force against Orellana in violation of the Fourth Amendment right by releasing a
police canine without warning, see supra part III.B, and the use of excessive force during otherwise
lawful law enforcement activity can establish a battery, the Court must deny the Motion as to the
battery claim.
Cc, False Imprisonment
Defendants seek summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim on the grounds that
they were legally justified in detaining Orellana as part of the effort to arrest Trinidad pursuant to
the warrant. Under Maryland law, to establish a false arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must
show (1) “the deprivation of the liberty of another”; (2) “without consent”; and (3) “without legal
justification.” Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000). “[W]here the basis of a false
imprisonment action is an arrest by a police officer, the liability of the police officer for false
imprisonment will ordinarily depend on whether or not the officer acted within his legal authority
to arrest.” Montgomery Ward y. Wilson, 664 A.2d 916, 926 (Md. 1995). Under certain
circumstances, law enforcement officers may detain individuals during the execution of a warrant
for safety purposes. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (permitting the
temporary detention of occupants of the premises during the execution of a search warrant);
Cotton, 872 A.2d at 92-93.

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Here, Orellana questions Defendants’ legal authority to execute the arrest warrant for
Trinidad because they were acting as part of a “fugitive task force” but Trinidad arguably was not
a “fugitive.” Opp’n at 9-10, ECF No. 65. However, “United States marshals [and] deputy
marshals . . . in executing the laws of the United States within a State, may exercise the same
powers which a sheriff of the State may exercise in executing the laws thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 564.
Because working on a task force such as CARFTF is part of the work of the USMS under federal
law, see 34 U.S.C. § 41503 (2018), and it is undisputed that the sheriff could execute the arrest
warrant for Trinidad, Defendants were authorized to do so as well.
As with the battery claim, the Court rejects the argument that just because Defendants had
the legal authority to arrest Trinidad pursuant to the warrant, they also had the authority to arrest
Orellana, but it recognizes that some brief detention of others at the scene was legally permissible
in order to secure Trinidad, particularly where the CARFTF officers were informed that Trinidad
was in the basement but did not voluntarily surrender, raising potential safety concerns. See
Summers, 452 U.S. 705; Cotton, 872 A.2d at 92-93. It is undisputed that Orellana was not actually
placed under arrest and that she was physically seized for only a very brief time before she was
released to go to the hospital for medical attention. Although the amount of force used in
conducting the seizure—being bitten and held by a police dog—was troubling and arguably
constituted excessive force, it is that use of force, rather than the fact and duration of the detention,
that constituted the arguably unjustified harm at issue. Those issues are more properly addressed
through the battery claim, for which excessive force during law enforcement action is a recognized
form of the tort. French, 957 A.2d at 1037. Where the evidence establishes that the CARFTF
officers had the authority to briefly detain Orellana during their execution of the arrest warrant
against Trinidad, and the duration of the detention was of very limited duration so as not to exceed

28

that authority, the Court finds that there is no viable false imprisonment claim. See Summers, 452
U.S. 705; Cotton, 872 A.2d at 92-93. The Motion will be granted as to Orellana’s false
imprisonment claim under the FTCA.
D. TIED
To establish an ITED claim under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show: (1) intentional or
reckless conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the plaintiff suffered
severe emotional distress; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the conduct and the
emotional distress. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977). In their Motion, Defendants
argue only that their conduct was not extreme and outrageous. A defendant is liable for ITED only
if the conduct is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” /d. at 614 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (American Law Inst.
1965)). Under this standard, Maryland courts have limited “extreme and outrageous” conduct to
only the most egregious conduct aimed at causing emotional pain and trauma. See, e.g., Young v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1285 (Md. 1985) (holding that where the
plaintiff's worker’s compensation insurer insisted that she submit to a psychiatric evaluation for
the “sole purpose” of harassing her and forcing her to drop her claim or commit suicide, such
conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous for purposes of I[ED); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d
1175, 1181 (Md. 1988) (sustaining an [IED claim when a physician with herpes had sex with a
nurse without informing her that he had the disease and infected her); Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel,
584 A.2d 69, 77 (Md. 1991) (finding that the claim that a psychologist engaged in sexual relations
with the plaintiff's wife while he was counseling the couple involved extreme and outrageous
conduct). Reagan v. Rider, 521 A.2d 1246, 1247, 1251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (affirming a

29

jury verdict of ITED against the plaintiff's stepfather who had engaged in sexual abuse of the
plaintiff during six years of her childhood).
As discussed above, the Court finds little to no evidence of actual malice by the CARFTF
officers. See supra part 1V.A. Under these circumstances, and where there is no dispute that the
CARFTF officers released the canine as part of a valid law enforcement action to execute an arrest
warrant for Trinidad, and there is no evidence that they were specifically targeting Orellana or
seeking to cause her emotional harm, the Court finds that the conduct did not reach the requisite
standard. Thus, the Court will grant the Motion as to the I[ED claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment will
be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion will be granted as to the false
imprisonment claim in Count 5 and the I[ED claim in Count 6 and will be otherwise denied. A
separate Order shall issue.

Date: September 25, 2023 =a
THEODORE D. CHUA
United States District Jud

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649483. Public record. Not legal advice.