# Alfred v. Duhe

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · October 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649009

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649009

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, when granting absolute immunity to prosecutors, Louisiana courts do not distinguish between personal and official capacity suits against district attorneys who have acted within the scope of their prosecutorial duties

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

TAYJHA ALFRED CIVIL DOCKET NO. 6:24-CV-00274

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

BO DUHE, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.
WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (“R&R”) of the
Magistrate Judge previously filed herein. [Doc. 42]. The R&R makes
recommendations as to the disposition of a MOTION TO DISMISS pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1 (the “Motion”) filed by Defendants, Bo Duhe and
Alister Charrier (collectively, the “DA Defendants”). [Doc. 28]. Both Alfred and the
Defendants timely filed Objections, [Docs. 45 & 46, respectively], as well as responses
to the Objections [Docs. 48 & 47, respectively].
After conducting an independent review of the record, and upon careful
consideration of the R&R and the parties’ Objections to same, Defendants’ MOTION
TO DISMISS [Doc. 28] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as described
herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In her Amended Complaint, Alfred alleges that in August 2019, she picked up
a friend from a home in Iberia Parish, drove him to complete an errand and, when

1 Because Defendants’ Motion also asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity and lack of
standing, this Motion was also brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
she returned to drop her friend off, found yellow tape and flashing police lights in the
area. [Doc. 6, ¶¶ 48-51]. According to Alfred, unbeknownst to her, Garon Lewis
(“Lewis”) had been murdered in the area while she and her friend had been on their

errand. But Alfred contends that she did not witness the shooting. [Id., ¶¶ 52; 54].
A few days later, police officers went to Alfred’s home. Though she was not home at
the time, Alfred later voluntarily went to the police department and provided two
interviews, stating that she was not present at the time of the crime and had limited
knowledge. [Id., ¶¶ 55-65].
In the following three years, Alfred alleges that she became a certified nursing

assistant (CNA) and worked as a nurse in Iberia Parish until the onset of the Covid-
19 pandemic, when she began working as a traveling nurse. Thereafter, she alleges
that she worked in nursing homes in various states until February of 2023. During
breaks, she regularly returned to her mother’s house in Iberia Parish, which she
considered her home. Alfred alleges that she had planned to begin a Licensed
Practical Nursing (“LPN”) program in August 2023. [Id., ¶¶ 66-77].
Three years after Lewis’s murder, the DA’s Office requested and obtained from

a state district court judge a material witness warrant for Alfred’s arrest in advance
of the trial of Bryson JohnLewis, a suspect in Lewis’s murder.2 The motion for the
warrant was filed by Assistant District Attorney Charrier, who filed the request on
behalf of her boss, Bofill Duhe, the District Attorney for the 16th Judicial District of

Louisiana. Judge Roger P. Hamilton of the Iberia Parish district court granted the
motion; a warrant was issued, and Alfred was subsequently arrested. [Doc. 6-1]. At
a 72-hour hearing, Judge Hamilton ordered that Alfred be held without bond until
the DA could speak to her and notify the Court “what arrangement had been made.”
[Doc. 6-2]. The DA did not meet with Alfred, and she was held in custody by the state
court until completion of her testimony at JohnLewis’s trial, wherein JohnLewis was

found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.
The facts and circumstances preceding Alfred’s arrest are disputed by the
parties. Alfred alleges that the DA attempted only twice to serve her with a subpoena
for Bryson JohnLewis’s trial and knew that she had been working out of state as a
traveling nurse. But Alfred’s own arguments, and the uncontroverted allegations of
the Defendants, reveal a far more nuanced picture of the circumstances. In fact, prior

2 The Material Witness Statute provides:
Except as provided in R.S. 15:257.1, whenever it shall appear, upon motion of
the district attorney or upon motion of a defendant supported by his affidavit,
that the testimony of any witness is essential to the prosecution or the defense,
as the case may be, and it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena, a judge, as defined in Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 931, shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the witness. The
witness shall be arrested and held in the parish jail, or such other suitable
place as shall be designated by the court, until he gives an appearance bond as
provided for defendants when admitted to bail, or until his testimony shall
have been given in the cause or dispensed with.
La. R.S. § 15:257.
to Alfred’s arrest, Defendants had been attempting to serve Alfred with a trial
subpoena for at least four months before she was ultimately arrested.
Also clear from the record is Alfred’s acknowledgment that the Defendants

tried to serve her on October 6, 2022. In her Amended Complaint, Alfred contends
that the service was attempted “at her mother’s home in Iberia Parish,” [Doc. 6, ⁋ 90],
which Alfred’s counsel argued was “[Alfred’s] home address where she’s lived since at
least 2011.” [Doc. 28-2, p. 6, ll. 21-25; p. 8, ll. 4-6]. Alfred does not deny that her
mother did not provide the DA’s Office with her out-of-state contact information.
[Doc. 6-1, ¶ 3]. Alfred also does not deny that ADA Charrier met with her mother in

December 2022 at the DA’s Office, and that at that time, Charrier explained “what a
material warrant was, [and] why [a warrant] was issued.” [Doc. 28-2, p. 5, ll. 12-20].
In her Amended Complaint, Alfred also acknowledges that she “was aware that the
State had come to her house” in January 2023, when “police surrounded Alfred’s
mother’s home at 3:00 a.m. … looking for Alfred a third time.” [Doc. 6, ¶ 126; Doc.
28-2, p. 8, ll. 20-23]. Finally, Alfred admits that in early February 2023, she finished
working as a traveling nurse in Indiana and “had several weeks off until she was

scheduled to begin her next post” and that she was in Iberia Parish for “weeks” prior
to February 24, 2023, the date she ultimately was arrested outside of a grocery store.
[Doc. 6, ⁋⁋ 129-132]. Thus, from this Court’s examination of the entirety of the record,
it is clear that Alfred: (i) knew police had been looking for her; (ii) knew the DA had
attempted to serve her with a trial subpoena on at least two occasions;3 but (iii) did
not contact law enforcement either while working out of town or upon her frequent
visits to her home in New Iberia.

At the time of her arrest on February 24, 2023, the JohnLewis trial was
scheduled to begin in late February or early March of that year. However, because
of several continuances, the trial did not begin until September 25, 2023, and Alfred
remained in the Iberia Parish jail for approximately six months until she testified on
September 29, 2023. [Doc. 6, ¶ 225].4 Alfred alleges that, in the meantime, she lost
her job and her position in a nursing degree program. Alfred filed the instant lawsuit

in February 2024, alleging that DA Duhe and ADA Charrier violated her due process
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and
under Article I, Sections 2 and 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, for alleged “prolonged
detention” and alleged “unlawful continuing seizure.” She also alleges a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law.5 Alfred seeks the
following relief: (i) a declaration that the Material Witness Statute is facially
unconstitutional or, alternatively, unconstitutional as applied to Alfred; (ii) an order

permanently enjoining Defendants from enforcing the Material Witness Statute “as

3 In the motion for the arrest warrant, Defendants also averred that they had attempted
service at 901 Graceland Ave. in Abbeville, LA, but that the service return came back
indicating Alfred did not reside there. [Doc. 6-1].
4 Before Alfred left the courtroom, Defendants personally served her with a subpoena
to testify “as a material witness in the prosecution of Travis Layne — JohnLewis’s co-
defendant.” [Doc. 6, ⁋ 231].
5 The claims are alleged against ADA Charrier in her individual capacity and against
DA Duhe in both his individual and official capacities.
applied to Alfred” or, alternatively, for an order permanently enjoining Defendants
from “incarcerating material witnesses … for an unnecessary and prolonged period
of time;” and (iii) general and compensatory damages for the alleged violations of

Alfred’s rights under federal and state law, including damages for alleged pain and
suffering, lost wages, lost earning capacity, lost educational opportunities,
reputational harm, and punitive damages.
In the pending Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Alfred’s federal
constitutional and state law claims on grounds they are absolutely immune from suit,
and on grounds Alfred lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from

Defendants’ alleged threats to re-incarcerate her until the trial of Travis Layne. The
Magistrate Judge conducted oral argument on Defendants’ Motion on August 23,
2024, and issued her R&R on August 28, 2024. Following the timely filing of
Objections by all parties, the issues are now ripe for de novo review.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Claims against Defendants in their Individual Capacities
The Magistrate Judge addressed Alfred’s § 1983 claims against Duhe and

Charrier, individually,6 in the context of Plaintiff’s allegations of two instances of
prosecutorial misconduct: (i) providing falsehoods and material omissions in the
motion for witness arrest warrant; and (ii) failure to comply with Judge Hamilton’s
February 27, 2023, Order. [Doc. 42, p. 16]. After characterizing the Defendants’

6 The doctrine of absolute immunity does not apply to official capacity claims. Turner
v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000).
actions in this manner, the R&R goes on to conclude, for the reasons cited therein,
that the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity in connection with their
conduct in obtaining the arrest warrant – to which Alfred objects – and that

Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity in connection with their conduct
after Judge Hamilton’s February 27, 2023, Order was issued – to which Defendants
object. [Doc. 42, pp. 17, 21]. The Court will maintain the R&R’s categorization of the
Defendants’ actions and analytical framework for the purpose of addressing the
parties’ objections.
A. Conduct in Obtaining the Arrest Warrant

Alfred challenges the R&R’s finding that absolute prosecutorial immunity bars
her individual claims against DA Duhe and ADA Charrier for their conduct related
to their application for the arrest warrant. Specifically, Alfred argues that the
warrant application included both a falsehood and material omissions, and that in
making that falsehood and omitting material facts, Defendants acted not as
advocates but rather as complaining witnesses, for which they cannot be immune
under Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122, 118 S. Ct. 5402 (1997).

Alfred’s objection is without merit. As the Magistrate Judge correctly
concluded, Defendants’ actions in preparing, filing, and arguing the motion for arrest
warrant clearly involved Defendants’ roles as advocates for the State, to which
immunity extends. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 96 S. Ct. 984, 989, 47
L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). See also Doe v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 751 F. App’x 545, 548 (5th
Cir. 2018) (detaining a witness in order to compel testimony at trial is prosecutorial

and any lawsuits arising out of a prosecutor’s performance of this function are
barred). Fifth Circuit precedent dictates a finding that DA Duhe and ADA Charrier
are immune from claims based on their averments in the motion for the arrest
warrant. See also Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying

absolute immunity to a prosecutor who allegedly provided false information in a
material-witness arrest warrant); and Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 172
(2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a prosecutor seeks a material witness warrant, he does so as
an advocate and is immune from suit, [such that] [a]ny alleged misstatements by [the
prosecutor] in his application for the material witness warrant therefore cannot form
the basis for liability.”).

Moreover, the primary case cited by Alfred, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
122, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997), is clearly distinguishable. In Kalina, the prosecutor was
acting as a witness when she made herself the affiant providing evidentiary support
for the issuance of an arrest warrant, which, under Washington state law, required
“sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.” Id. Thus, in
Kalina, the Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had violated the “tradition, as
well as the ethics of our profession, [that] generally instruct counsel to avoid the risks

associated with participating as both advocate and witness in the same proceeding.”
Id. at 130, 118 S. Ct. at 509. Put simply, the holding in Kalina was premised on the
fact that the prosecutor was not acting as an advocate, but rather as a fact witness,
when she personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in the certification
under penalty of perjury. 522 U.S. at 121.
But here, neither DA Duhe nor ADA Charrier personally attested to the truth

of the facts presented in the motion requesting an arrest warrant, nor does the
Louisiana Material Witness Statute require that they do so. Nor is there any
precedential support for Alfred’s contention that the Defendants are not immune
because they were the only source of facts for the judge’s decision. Of course, had

Judge Hamilton found it necessary, he could have ordered an evidentiary hearing or
otherwise required evidentiary support prior to the issuance of the material witness
warrant. But he did not and there is no evidence that the DA Defendants ever left
their role as advocates in the process of obtaining the material witness warrant. As
such, under the facts of this case, Kalina clearly holds that absolute immunity
protects Defendants’ conduct in presenting the motion for arrest warrant. 522 U.S.

at 130-31 (advocatory work that is integral to the initiation of prosecution includes
prosecutor’s drafting of the certification; determination that the evidence was
sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding; decision to file charges; and
presentation of the information and the motion to the court).
B. Conduct After the Arrest Warrant was Obtained

The R&R next found that DA Duhe and ADA Charrier are not entitled to
prosecutorial immunity for their conduct after the Plaintiff was arrested, concluding
that the Defendants had a “constitutional duty, independent of a court’s order” to
ensure that Alfred did not remain in jail for a lengthy period. Characterizing the
events that transpired in this matter as “gross administrative failures,” [Doc. 42, p.
18], the R&R concluded that, under Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008) and
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011), Defendants are not entitled to
immunity for their “alleged failures to make arrangements with Alfred or to take any

steps to prevent an innocent witness’s prolonged and unreasonable detention.” Id.
While recognizing the Magistrate Judge’s frustration with the events alleged,
the Court finds that the law of absolute prosecutorial immunity requires a different
result. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271-73, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d

209 (1993), the Supreme Court, examining what claims, if any, fall outside the scope
of a prosecutor’s absolute immunity, reaffirmed the Imbler approach, “which focuses
on the conduct for which immunity is claimed, not on the harm that the conduct may
have caused or the question [of] whether it was lawful.” In other words, the focus of
this Court’s inquiry is on the nature of the conduct of DA Duhe and ADA Charrier –
not on the length of time that Alfred remained incarcerated under the warrant, and

not on whether the actions of Duhe and Charrier were proper or lawful. Because it
is well-established that Defendants’ conduct in advocating for Alfred’s detention
pending the JohnLewis trial was advocatory, their conduct is protected by absolute
immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at Id. at 272-73 (an out-of-court “effort to control the
presentation of [a] witness’ testimony” is entitled to absolute immunity because it is
“fairly within [the prosecutor’s] function as an advocate.”).
Furthermore, the cases cited in the R&R, Odd and Schneyder, are

distinguishable and, in any event, are not binding on this Court. In Odd, the court
addressed the claims of two reluctant but essential witnesses in separate murder
cases; both had been detained as material witnesses for trials. Odd, 538 F.3d at 205-
06. With respect to Schneyder, the judge directed the ADA to notify him of any delays
in the trial. Odd, 538 F.3d at 205-06. After the trial was continued, the ADA failed
to notify the judge of the continuance, and Schneyder remained incarcerated. Id.

Similarly, through a series of oversights, Odd, who had been detained to testify in a
separate matter, remained incarcerated after that matter was dismissed. Id. at 206.
Both plaintiffs remained incarcerated for more than 50 days because of the ADAs’
failures to keep the courts informed of the progress of the criminal proceedings and

the custodial status of the witnesses. In both cases, the courts held that the ADAs
had a duty of disclosure that was neither discretionary nor advocative, but was
instead a purely administrative act not entitled to the shield of immunity. Odd, 538
F.3d at 217, aff’d, Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 334 (3d Cir. 2011). They were,
therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity.
The facts alleged in this case are distinguishable. This is not a case where the

state court was unaware of a witness’s continued detention because the prosecutor
failed to comply with a court order nor is it a case where a witness remained detained
after a trial was no longer being prosecuted. Rather, here, each of the actions taken
by the DA Defendants in advocating for Alfred’s continued detention were deliberate
and intimately associated with the DA Defendants’ preparation of the Bryson
JohnLewis murder trial. Moreover, the state court judge was at all relevant times
aware that Alfred remained detained and of the date the JohnLewis case was set for

trial, making Odd and Schneyder inapposite. Thus, while the Odd and Schneyder
courts characterized the actions of the ADAs as purely administrative in function,
here, the actions of the DA Defendants were undoubtedly advocatory. Further, this
Court specifically finds that, given the unique evidentiary and procedural
requirements faced by the government in prosecuting a criminal trial – including,
among other things, the potential application of the Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy clause in the event
a witness fails to appear – there is hardly a more integral part of a district attorney’s
advocatory role than securing the appearance of witnesses at trial. And, at bottom,
at no time during course of events giving rise to this lawsuit were the actions of the

DA Defendants ever directed at anything other than securing the presence of a
government witness to testify at a murder trial.
Moreover, and just as importantly, the Louisiana Material Witness Statute
assigns responsibility for determining the propriety, scope, and appropriate
protections for material witness warrants to the courts, not the prosecutors. That is,
the statute provides that “when it appears … that the testimony of any witness is

essential to the prosecution or the defense, as the case may be, and it is shown that
it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judge
… shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the witness … [who shall be] held in the
parish jail, or such other suitable place as shall be designated by the court” La. R.S.
§ 15:257 (emphasis added). The statute then gives the judge the discretion to issue
an appearance bond for the material witness or keep the witness detained through
trial. Id.; see also Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir. 2011) (while it was

the DA’s job to present information about witnesses to the court, where material
witness was arrested pursuant to a signed order from the trial judge, it was the
court’s duty to respond with appropriate protections; whether or not the
constitutional rights of the detained witness were violated, the DA’s acts are
protected by absolute immunity). Thus, the statutory scheme of the material witness
statute expressly prescribes oversight of material witness incarcerations to Louisiana

state court judges.
On this point, the record shows that the sufficiency of the evidence justifying
the Plaintiff’s continued detention was tested – and affirmed – twice by the state
judiciary after Alfred’s arrest. First, on September 6, 2023, a hearing was held before

Judge Anthony Thibodeaux of the 16ᵗʰ Judicial District Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Release. After the hearing, Judge Thibodeaux ruled:
…It is undoubted that the witness is essential to the prosecution of this
case. Considering the risk of witness tampering, the fact that the
witness had knowledge that the State of Louisiana was trying to obtain
her cooperation and need to speak to her … I find it was appropriate to
issue the warrant for the arrest of the witness. Nonetheless that has
been done by another judge. …And she has already been arrested. The
Judge was compelled to order that she be held in the parish jail, or such
other suitable place as shall be designated by the court until she would
give an appearance bond or until her testimony would be given in the
cause of the case. So it’s of no moment that Judge ordered that she be
held until the district attorney’s office could interview her. Okay. He
had no authority to do that. He could only order that she be held until
the case was tried … So the law hasn’t been violated. Okay --- or until
bail was provided as it would in a defendant in a criminal case. That’s
what the law says and that's what I'm bound to follow. So, in accordance
with Article 570, I’m sorry 257, 15:257 she’s to be held until the trial
on the merits which is scheduled for September 25, 2023. Thank
you.

[Doc. 28-2, p. 15, ll. 26-32; p. 16, ll. 1-22] (emphasis added). Second, Alfred sought
supervisory relief with the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which was
denied.7 Thus, the record clearly shows that the state courts were aware that Alfred
was detained; the length of time that she had been detained; and the fact that she

7 The Third Circuit ruled:
Based on the scant record properly before this Court, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in its September 6, 2023, ruling regarding the material
witness warrant against Tayjha Alfred.
[Doc. 38-1].
would not be released until after she testified at the JohnLewis trial. Whether or not
this Court agrees with how this matter was handled by the DA Defendants and the
state judiciary is of no consequence.8 The pre-trial procedure that was undertaken

by the District Attorney’s Office and the state court judiciary to secure the Plaintiff’s
presence at trial was not administrative in nature. It was unequivocally a critical
part of the advocatory process.
Finally, the Court addresses the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the DA
Defendants had a “constitutional duty, independent of a court’s order” to ensure that
Alfred did not remain in jail for a lengthy period of time. Though, of course,

prosecutors have many special obligations and responsibilities to the public and the
criminally accused,9 the alleged breach of any of these duties do not operate to negate
absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages suits under § 1983 for advocatory
conduct. For example, in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 1194,1196-97, 83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated an accused’s due process, yet

8 Under the principles of federalism, this Court’s role is not to review the decisions of
the state trial and appellate courts to decide whether such decisions are correct or well-
supported.
9 See, e.g., In re White, 355 So. 3d 1085, 1092 (La. 2/24/23) (recognizing duties owed by
attorneys to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession and imposing
sanctions, including suspension or disbarment, for conduct that causes actual and potential
harm); In re Andry, 59 F.4th 203, 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Andry v. Law.
Disciplinary Comm. of the United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Louisiana, 144 S. Ct. 77,
217 L.Ed.2d 14 (2023) (a federal court may hold attorneys accountable to the state code of
professional conduct).
a prosecutor who withholds Brady material is still entitled to absolute immunity from
civil suit. See Imbler, supra.; Knapper, infra.
Make no mistake: this Court is sympathetic to Alfred’s plight as alleged. But

the Supreme Court has recognized that application of the doctrine of absolute
immunity may even sometimes “leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil
redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of
liberty.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; Holmes v. White, 2024 WL 758384, at *12 (E.D. La.
Feb. 23, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 4415060 (5th Cir. May 15, 2024). The
doctrine of absolute immunity is a policy compromise, the Supreme Court having

determined that “the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity would
disserve the broader public interest.” Id. This Court agrees and, in any event, is
bound by law to apply it in this case.
Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that the DA Defendants are
entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity in connection with their actions both
before and after the material witness arrest warrant was obtained.
II. State Law Claims

Alfred alleges claims under Article I, Sections 2 and 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution for alleged “prolonged detention” and alleged “unlawful continuing
seizure,” as well as a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In their
Motion, the DA Defendants move for dismissal of all state law claims against them
on grounds they are absolutely immune from suit under Louisiana law. In her R&R,
the Magistrate Judge addressed only Alfred’s tort claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, finding that the claim survives Rule 12(b)(6). The R&R did not
address Alfred’s claims under the Louisiana Constitution.
In Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. 1996), the Louisiana Supreme

Court, following Imbler, held that Louisiana prosecutors have absolute immunity
from state law claims of prosecutorial misconduct that are intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently re-
affirmed the Knapper doctrine in Jameson v. Montgomer, 366 So. 3d 1210 (La. May
5, 2023), rehearing denied, 364 So. 3d 1153 (La. June 27, 2023). See Singleton, supra,
at 405–06 (the Louisiana Supreme Court in Knapper cited heavily to federal law in

its decision and adopted the functional approach that federal courts employ when
analyzing prosecutorial absolute immunity issues, therefore, any conduct for which
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity in this case will apply equally to Plaintiffs’
federal and state law claims). Louisiana Courts have applied absolute immunity
whether or not such claims are brought against the prosecutor in his alleged official
capacity or individual capacity. Spikes v. Phelps, 131 F. App’x 47, 49 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that, when granting absolute immunity to prosecutors, Louisiana courts do

not distinguish between personal and official capacity suits against district attorneys
who have acted within the scope of their prosecutorial duties), citing Sinclair v.
Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 769 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2000) and Connor v. Reeves, 649 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995). Considering the
foregoing, for the same reasons Alfred’s federal claims are barred by absolute
immunity; her state law claims are barred as well.
III. Official Capacity Claims Against DA Duhe
A. Eleventh Amendment
Alfred alleges claims against DA Duhe in his official capacity for violations of

her federal and state constitutional rights. The Magistrate Judge found that Duhe
is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment, which shields state actors from civil
liability in federal court. Defendants object.
Official capacity suits against district attorneys are generally regarded as suits
against the local government entity. Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677,
680 (5th Cir. 1999). In Hudson, the Fifth Circuit specifically addressed whether the

Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 lawsuits against Louisiana district attorneys in
their official capacities. “The Hudson court applied the six-factor test from Clark v.
Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 1986), and found that Louisiana
district attorney offices (and therefore the district attorneys in their official
capacities) were not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.”10 Jason, 2017 WL
993152, at *4. See also Spikes v. Phelps, 131 F. App’x 47, 49 (5th Cir. 2005) (contrary

10 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, courts should look to the following six factors in
determining if a governmental body acts for the state: (i) whether the state statutes and case
law view the agency as an arm of the state; (ii) the source of the entity’s funding; (iii) the
entity’s degree of local autonomy; (iv) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local as
opposed to statewide problems; (v) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued
in its own name; and (vi) whether the entity has the right to hold and use property. Hudson,
174 F.3d at 681. The Magistrate Judge applied these factors in her R&R and determined
that they weigh against a finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Alfred’s
official capacity claims against DA Duhe. The Magistrate Judge particularly noted that the
DA Defendants acknowledge the funding for the district attorney remains as it was at the
time of Hudson. See also La. R.S. § 13:5108.1, providing that the state is obligated to defend
and indemnify “covered individuals,” the definition of which explicitly excludes district
attorneys. La. R.S. § 13:5108.1(E)(3).
to Esteves, and based on Louisiana law, a parish district attorney is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Holmes v. White, 2024 WL 758384, at *12 (E.D. La.
Feb. 23, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 4415060 (5th Cir. May 15, 2024). Thus,

the Magistrate Judge correctly rejected Duhe’s argument that the holding in Hudson
is distinguishable and finds that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude official
capacity suit against Louisiana district attorneys. See also Spikes, 131 F. App’x at 9;
Jason, 2017 WL 993152, at *5; Singleton, supra, at 778, citing Burge v. Par. of St.
Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The rule in this circuit is that a
Louisiana district attorney, sued in his or her official capacity, is a local government

official who is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Phillips v.
Whittington, 497 F.Supp.3d 122, 153 (W.D. La. 2020); Darden v. Vines, No. 6:22-CV-
00404, 2023 WL 11830304, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 10, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 6:22-CV-00404, 2023 WL 6178709 (W.D. La. Sept. 21,
2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-30700, 2024 WL 1433633 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2024).
Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s finding
that DA Duhe in his official capacity is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

B. Monell Claim

Having found that DA Duhe is not protected by Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Court next considers whether Alfred has stated a Monell claim against
DA Duhe in his official capacity. “A suit against a government officer ‘in his official
capacity’ is the same as a suit against the government entity of which he is an agent.”
Jason, 2017 WL 993152, at *5, citing Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452,
468 (5th Cir. 1999). “Section 1983 offers no respondeat superior liability.” Pineda v.
City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). However, municipal and local
offices, such as the office of the district attorney, may face § 1983 liability when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof of three elements: (1) a
policymaker, (2) an official policy or custom, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights
whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom. Jason, 2017 WL 993152, at *5, citing

Davis v. Tarrant Cty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 227 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, a plaintiff
seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must “identify a municipal
policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Id., quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
The R&R concluded that: (i) Duhe is a policymaker under well-established
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence;11 (ii) Alfred adequately alleged a violation of her Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights when she alleged she was incarcerated for six

months as an innocent witness without the opportunities for counsel, bail, or to
defend herself; and (iii) Alfred has sufficiently alleged that Duhe has a policy,
practice, or custom of applying for material witness arrest warrants without probable
cause and without first determining whether it may become impracticable to secure

11 See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 469 (5th Cir.1999) (“a district
attorney is the independent and final official policymaker for all of the administrative and
prosecutorial functions of his office.”)
the witnesses’ appearances by trial subpoena. The Magistrate Judge also concluded
that Alfred’s allegations support a claim for Monell liability based on Duhe’s alleged
personal involvement in the warrant application process.

The Magistrate Judge noted that Alfred’s Complaint alleges that DA Duhe
sought and/or was granted three material witness arrest warrants in 2021, four in
2022, and one in 2023. [Doc. 6, p. 27, n.5]. Alfred alleges that she sought details
regarding past material witness arrest warrants, but that the DA had not yet
provided the information. Id. at p. 28, n.6. She specifically alleges eight other alleged
incidents of unlawful material witness arrests and incarceration, including four

related to the JohnLewis/Layne trials. Alfred alleges that each witness was detained
as a material witness without an opportunity for counsel, adequate process, or the
opportunity to post bond. [Doc. 6, ¶¶ 270-306]. Alfred argues that her allegations
show that Defendants misused the material witness statute every time the statute
was invoked, translating to a proportion of eight out of eight, or 100%.
The Fifth Circuit has established three ways of establishing municipal policy:
First, a plaintiff can show “written policy statements, ordinances, or
regulations.” Second, a plaintiff can show “a widespread practice that is
so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.” Third, even a single decision may
constitute municipal policy in “rare circumstances” when the official or
entity possessing “final policymaking authority” for an action “performs
the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim.”

Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citations
omitted). After careful review of the record, the Court concludes that Alfred has
sufficiently stated a potential Monell claim and should be permitted to engage in
discovery on the issue of whether DA Duhe has a policy, practice, or custom of
applying for material witness arrest warrants improperly under the Louisiana
Material Witness Statute. Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim
will be denied, as will Defendants’ motion to dismiss Alfred’s official capacity claim

against DA Duhe for reputational damages.12
V. Alfred’s Standing for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Finally, Alfred seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendants’ alleged
threats to re-incarcerate her until the trial of Bryson JohnLewis’s co-defendant,
Travis Layne.13 The Magistrate Judge found that Alfred has standing under Article
III to assert claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, concluding Alfred’s alleged

intention to comply with the subpoena in the future does not “render the threat of
incarceration any less likely.” [Doc. 42, p.41].
Article III standing requires, at a minimum, that the plaintiff has a “personal
stake” in the claim. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they have “suffered
a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent.”

Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007).
Second, a plaintiff must show that there is a causal connection between the alleged
injury and the complained-of conduct – essentially, that “the injury is fairly traceable

12 Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 513–14 (5th Cir. 1980) (because “the injury
to reputation is simply an element of the damages suffered as a result of the violation of
appellants’ Fourth Amendment rights[,] damages for injury to reputation caused by [an]
unlawful search and seizure are recoverable.”).
13 See, e.g., [Doc. 6, ¶¶ 319, 346, 362, and PRAYER FOR RELIEF].
to the defendant.” Id. Finally, standing requires that it “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to
merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–
42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). With respect to the third factor, the threat
of future injury must be “certainly impending;” mere “[a]llegations of possible future
injury do not suffice.” Adams v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 2022 WL
2829756, at *3 (5th Cir. July 20, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), citing
Clapper, et al v. Amnesty International USA, et al, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1152-53, 85 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013). While “[p]ast wrongs … can be ‘evidence bearing on

whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,’ … alone they may
be insufficient to establish standing for prospective relief.” City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
Here, the alleged threat of a future arrest on a material witness warrant is
highly speculative and completely dependent on whether Alfred refuses to honor a
trial subpoena and whether the DA’s Office seeks another material witness warrant.
Alfred herself has indicated that she will appear at the Travis Layne trial and testify.

Therefore, the threat of future injury is far too attenuated at this juncture to establish
standing. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that there is no imminent
injury, and Alfred lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in
connection with Defendants’ alleged threats to re-incarcerate her until the trial of
Travis Layne.
CONCLUSION
Thus, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court OVERRULES the Plaintiffs
Objections to the R&R [Doc. 45] and SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN
PART the Defendants’ Objections to the R&R [Doc. 46].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
OVERRULES IN PART the R&R [Doc. 42] as stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ MOTION To DISMIss [Doc. 28] is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs individual claims against
DA Duhe and ADA Charrier are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on the
doctrine of absolute immunity. Plaintiffs claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing. Plaintiffs official
capacity claims against DA Duhe have been sufficiently pled and remain viable at
this stage of the proceeding.
THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 184 day of October 2024.
Choad C eats
DAVID C. JOSEPH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10649009. Public record. Not legal advice.