# Francis v. Lafayette Parish

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · July 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648940

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
BYRON FRANCIS, JR. CASE NO. 6:22-CV-06094
VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS
SHERIFF’S OFFICE LAFAYETTE PARISH MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or alternatively for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendant, Sheriff Mark Garber as Sheriff of the Lafayette Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”). Plaintiff Byron Francis, Jr. opposes the motion.! For the reasons that
follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
Byron Francis, Jr. brings this suit, alleging that on September 8, 2021, he and his girlfriend
were pulled over by an LPSO employee for having illegally tinted windows.” Francis asserts that
the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, which was denied, and so a second officer with
the canine unit was summoned.’ Thereafter, officers found a small amount of marijuana in
Francis’s girlfriend’s purse, whereupon they “began to arrest her, handcuffing her and treating her
roughly.“ Francis alleges that when he asked the officers why they were handling his girlfriend
so roughly, the officers handcuffed him, threw him to the ground and began to beat him, “slamming
his head into the pavement at least three times.”> According to Francis, he then informed the

ECF No. 23.
> ECF No. 1-1 at 4.
3 Id.
‘Td.
5 Td. at 4-5.

officers that the marijuana was his, whereupon he was arrested and brought to jail.° Francis alleges
that after he was jailed, “the officer who had arrived with the canine unit and another officer took
him out of the [holding] cell, telling him that he had a visitor.”’ The officers then brought Francis
(in handcuffs) to a different location, whereupon the officer with the canine unit “punched him in
the gut,” and the second officer “beat him with a nightstick.”®
On October 20, 2021, Francis was charged with nine offenses arising out of this incident.
On August 17, 2023, Francis pleaded nolo contendere to Count 5, which charged as follows:
COUNT 5: in that Byron Francis Jr., on or about September 8, 2021, while in the
Parish of Lafayette, did knowingly, intentionally and willfully use violence, force,
extortionate threats or true threats upon Agent Cpl. Lam Bui, a public official with
the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office, with the intent to influence the official’s
conduct in relation to the official’s position, employment or duty; or in retaliation
or retribution for actions taken by the elected official as part of the official’s official
duties, in violation of the provisions of La. R.S. 14:122 (Public Intimidation and
Retaliation — Felony).!°
The remaining eight counts were dismissed.!!
On September 2, 2022, Francis filed suit in state court solely against the “Lafayette Parish
Sheriff’s Office,” in its capacity as “a political body of the Parish of Lafayette.”!* Therein, Francis
asserted the LPSO was vicariously liable for the negligent and intentionally tortious conduct
committed by its officer-employees.'? He additionally asserted that the LPSO was independently

° Id. at 5.
Id.
8 Id.
° ECF No. 15-6.
10 Td. at 1; ECF No. 15-8 at 1.
ECF No. 15-8 at 1. The dismissed charges were: possession with intent to distribute marijuana (Count 1),
possession of marijuana while in a drug free zone (Count 2), resisting a police officer with force or violence
(Count 3), self-mutilation by a prisoner (Count 4), public intimidation and retaliation against Deputy
Sheriffs Alex Marks and Joshua Jones (Counts 6 and 7), attempted simple escape (Count 8), and possession
of drug paraphernalia (Count 9). ECF No. 15-6 at 1-2.
ECF No. 6 at 5.
3 Td. at 6, 10-11.

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liable for its failure to train, supervise and discipline its officers with respect to excessive use of
force, and for adopting “[a]dopting official policies, practices, and customs that provided for the
failure to properly train and supervise its officers.”!* On November 30, 2022, Sheriff Mark Garber,
in his capacity as Sheriff of the LPSO, removed the suit to this Court on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction.'>
On December 1, 2022, Francis filed a Supplemental and Amended Petition, which added
three fictitious defendants to this suit—Officers A, B and C.!° The supplemental and amended
pleading alleges it was Officer A who pulled Francis over for illegally tinted windows, Officer B
was the officer assigned to the canine unit, and Officer C was the employee who beat Francis with
a nightstick after he was arrested and jailed.!’ In addition to his previous causes of action, Francis
added claims against the individual officers for their negligent and intentionally tortious conduct,
and he added a claim against the officers for the violation of his “constitutional rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution to be secure in his person and free
from the unreasonable use of excessive force.”'® Only the LPSO, through Sheriff Garber, has
answered the suit.!? Francis has not sought leave to amend the Complaint to properly name the
individual officers Francis alleges are personally liable for the alleged conduct.*° The LPSO now
moves for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, for summary judgment, asserting “the
undisputed material facts do not establish any basis of liability for this governmental defendant

4 Td. at 6-7, § 12.
' ECF No. 1.
16 ECF No. 6 at 42.
Td. at 42-43.
18 Tq. at 43-44, [J 12-13.
ECF No. 7.
?° Tt is unclear why Francis did not name the forgoing officers, as three officers involved in Francis’s arrest
were named in the Bill of Information issued on October 20, 2021, and four officers are identified in the
affidavit of arrest created on September 8, 2021. ECF No. 15-6 at 2; ECF No. 26-2 at 1.

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under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state law.””! The Court finds the pending motion is appropriately
analyzed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”
Il.
LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “is the same as that
for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”” To survive such a motion, the
complaint must set forth sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”*4 The plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.””° “A pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements” will not suffice, nor will a complaint that
merely tenders “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.””’ When deciding such a
motion, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.”’® However, this tenet does not apply to conclusory allegations, unwarranted
deductions, or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, as such assertions do not constitute

ECF No. 15 at 1.
The parties identify very few facts beyond those asserted in the pleadings, none of which would change
the result of the ruling under Rule 12(c). See e.g. ECF Nos. 21-1 and 23-1.
3 Johnson vy. Miller, 98 F.4th 580, 583 (Sth Cir. 2024) (quoting Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796
F.3d 435, 439 (Sth Cir. 2015)).
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Twombly at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and not merely create “a suspicion [of] a legally
cognizable right of action.”) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).
Iqbal at 678.
27 Td, (internal quotation marks, alterations omitted) (quoting Twombly at 555, 557).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Iqbal at 679 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).

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“well-pleaded facts.””? The court generally “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings,
including attachments thereto.”2° One exception to this rule is that district courts “may permissibly
refer to matters of public record.”?!
Il.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability.
LPSO argues Francis’s complaint fails to “sufficiently establish any municipal liability,”
because: (1) vicarious liability will not support a municipal liability claim under Section 1983, and
(2) Francis’s complaint fails to allege “any unconstitutional policy or procedure of the LPSO.”°?
Francis contends he has adequately pleaded a claim of municipal liability.*? Francis’s claim against
the LPSO under § 1983 states as follows:
The Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office was negligent and/or otherwise at fault
in the following respects:
A. Failing to properly train its officers regarding the use of excessive force;
B. Failing to properly supervise and discipline its officers with respect to their
use of excessive force;
C. Adopting official policies, practices, and customs that provided for the
failure to properly train and supervise its officers.*4
It is well-established that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory
of respondeat superior.*> Rather, a municipality will be liable only when the municipality itself

Twombly at 555.
3° Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
31 Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (Sth Cir. 1994); see also Test Masters Educational Services,
Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 n.2 (Sth Cir. 2005).
3? ECF No. 15-2 at 2.
33 ECF No. 23 at 6-8.
34 ECF No. 6 at 44, 14.
35 Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Peterson v. City
of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (Sth Cir. 2009).

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causes the constitutional violation through the execution of its policies or customs.*® To establish
municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify either an official policy promulgated
by a municipal policy maker, or a custom so widespread and common that it fairly represents
municipal policy. The plaintiff must then show that the policy or custom was the moving force
behind the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right.*’ “To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a
complaint’s ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’”>8 Here, Francis fails to identify in
his complaint (or in his opposition memorandum) any policy or custom adopted by the LPSO that
led to the alleged use of excessive force against him. Nor has Francis pleaded (or even argued) any
facts showing a causal relationship between any policy or custom adopted by the LPSO and the
alleged constitutional violation. As such, Francis has failed to state a claim for liability based on
policy or custom.°?
Francis additionally alleges that the LPSO failed to properly train, supervise, and discipline
its employees with respect to the use of excessive force. A claim asserting a municipality failed to
train, supervise or discipline its employees is a type of Monell claim.*° To establish such a claim,

36 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)
(under § 1983, “local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Peterson at 847 (a municipality “is liable only for acts directly attributable to it ‘through some
official action or imprimatur’”) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001)).
37 Hutcheson v. Dallas County, Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pineda v. City of Hous.,
291 F.3d 325, 328 (Sth Cir. 2002)); Henderson v. Harris County, Texas, 51 FAth 125, 130 (Sth Cir. 2022);
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-79.
38 Pefia y. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting Spiller
v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)).
° See e.g. Pefia at 622 (“To proceed beyond the pleading state, a complaint’s ‘description of a policy or
custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must
contain specific facts.’”) (quoting Spiller at 167); Verastique v. City of Dallas, Texas, 106 F.4th 427, 431
(5th Cir. 2024) (The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face; legal conclusions, mere labels, threadbare recitals of the elements of the
claim, conclusory statements, and naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice).
40 Henderson, 51 F Ath at 130; Verastique, 106 F.4th at 432.

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a plaintiff show: (1) the municipality failed to train, supervise or discipline the officers involved;
(2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise, train or discipline and the
alleged violation of constitutional rights; and (3) the failure to train, supervise or discipline
constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.4! To show deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff ordinarily must show a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees.”** However, in a very narrow range of circumstances, a plaintiff can
establish deliberate indifference through the “single-incident exception.”* “A municipality’s
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train.” Here, Francis’s complaint is wholly devoid of any factual allegations indicating that the
LPSO failed to train, supervise or discipline its employees with respect to the use of excessive
force, that there is a causal connection between such failures and the officers’ alleged use of
excessive force, or that the LPSO’s failures constitute deliberate indifference to Francis’s
constitutional right to be free of excessive force.*? Accordingly, Francis has failed to state a claim
on this theory of municipal liability. In sum, because Francis has not alleged an official policy
promulgated by the LPSO caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights, nor pleaded factual

“| Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482; Verastique at 432.
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.
‘3 Henderson at 131; see also Hutcheson at 482-83 (The single-incident exception is generally reserved for
situations in which there is no training whatsoever; it requires proving that a “highly predictable
consequence” of the lack of training would be the specific constitutional injury sued upon); see also Connick
at 63.
“4 Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)); see also Connick
at 70 (“[P]roving that a municipality itself actually caused a constitutional violation by failing to train the
offending employee presents ‘difficult problems of proof,’ and we must adhere to a ‘stringent standard of
fault,’ lest municipal liability under § 1983 collapse into respondeat superior.”) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., OKI. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 410 (1997)).
See e.g. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (Sth Cir. 2011) (the complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (the plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”); Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 483.

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allegations supporting a failure-to-train theory of municipal liability, Francis’s § 1983 claims
against the LPSO will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim of Excessive Force.
The Court finds Francis’s claim of excessive force against the fictitious officers should be
dismissed for failure to prosecute. In the Fifth Circuit, “the mere naming of a person through use
of a fictitious name does not make that person a party absent voluntary appearance or proper
service of process.’“° Here, Officers A, B and C have neither been served with process, nor have
they made an appearance. Because Francis has never amended his Complaint to properly name the
defendant officers, and because the LPSO does not represent the unidentified officers, they are not
parties to this suit.*” Further, while Francis has not sought leave to amend his pleadings to properly
name the officers, even were the Court to grant leave sua sponte, amendment here would be futile.
The statute of limitations on this claim expired almost two years ago, and any amendment to
substitute named officials for the fictitious defendants would not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c).*8 Accordingly, Francis’s claim of excessive force against the fictitious officer-defendants is
dismissed with prejudice.*”
C. Remaining State Law Claims
Having granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on all of Francis’s federal claims,
only Francis's state law claims remain for resolution. A district court may decline to exercise

46 Nagle v. Lee, 807 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1987).
47 See ECF No. 7 at 1, § 1; ECF No. 13 at 2, no. 5. The Court notes that in the parties’ Rule 26(f) report,
filed on December 8, 2023, counsel for Francis stated he “anticipates amending the Petition for Damages
herein to name the officers involved in the alleged incident,” but he has not done so as of this date. ECF
No. 13 at 4. The deadline for joinder of parties and amendment of pleadings passed on June 21, 2024. ECF
Seceg Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 470-71 (Sth Cir. 2019); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d
315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 242-43 (5 Cir. 1993).

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supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if all claims over which it had original jurisdiction
have been dismissed.’ The general rule in this Circuit is that district courts should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in such circumstances.*! After an
examination of the statutory and common law factors, the Court finds no reason to depart from the
general rule here.*” Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims, and those claims will be remanded to state court.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Ruling, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or
alternatively for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendant, Sheriff Mark Garber as
Sheriff of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”), is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s §
1983 claims asserted against the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office and the fictitious officer-
defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and his remaining state law claims are
REMANDED to state court. . .
THUS DONE in Chambers on this 2G, of July, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO

50 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
>! See e.g. Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 161, 163 (5™ Cir. 2011); Brookshire Bros. Holding,
Inc. v. Dayco Products, Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5 Cir. 2009).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Enochs at 161.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648940. Public record. Not legal advice.