# Guidry v. Cormier

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · July 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648843

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

MATTHEW JAMES GUIDRY CASE NO. 6:20-CV-01430

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

MARTIN CORMIER, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants, The City of
Breaux Bridge and Detective Martin Cormier [ECF No. 61]; a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Matthew James Guidry [ECF No. 64]; and a Motion for Summary
Judgment by Defendant, The Travelers Indemnity Company [ECF No. 70]. The only claim brought
against the City—i.e., that the City is vicariously liable for the state law tort of malicious
prosecution—was previously dismissed.1 Therefore, there are no live claims against the City for
which summary judgment could be granted. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Travelers
merely adopts the motion and supporting materials filed by the City and Cormier, as Travelers
contends its liability “is solely derivative of the City of Breaux Bridge and Detective Martin
Cormier.”2 Therefore, the Court does not independently address Travelers motion. Accordingly,
the only claim addressed in this Ruling is Guidry’s sole surviving claim asserted against Cormier—
that Cormier, in his individual capacity, violated Guidry’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Guidry contends “partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability” is warranted, arguing it cannot be disputed that probable cause did not exist for his arrest
for third degree rape. Detective Cormier contends summary judgment dismissing Guidry’s claim

1 See ECF No. 25; see also ECF No. 12 at 20.
2 ECF No. 70 at 1. Plaintiff does not contest Travelers’ assertion. See id.; see also ECF No. 70-1.
is warranted, because there can be no dispute that probable cause did exist for Guidry’s arrest.
Alternatively, Cormier asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, the
motions are DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2017, around midnight, Plaintiff Matthew Guidry attended a pool party at
Park Place Apartments in Lafayette, Louisiana, with two of his roommates, Patrick Guidry and
Tyree Mouton. Also attending the party was Joanelle Prejean, who arrived with Germaine Biggs.
Biggs was a friend of Plaintiff, Patrick Guidry, Mouton, and Ms. Prejean. Most of the party
attendees drank “copious amounts of alcoholic beverages.”3 Around 4:30 a.m., police officers
arrived due to noise complaints, and the party attendees began to leave. Around the same time,
Prejean and Biggs began arguing, and Biggs left the party without Prejean. Prejean ultimately
ended up at Guidry’s house in Breaux Bridge, along with Guidry’s roommates (Patrick Guidry,
Mouton, and Mouton’s wife and infant child), and two of the roommates’ friends (Chelsea Jones
and Carly Lacomb).
At around 7:05 a.m., Lafayette Police were flagged down by Prejean, who was on a
sidewalk on South College Road in Lafayette. According to police reports, Prejean was in distress.
She stated she had been raped at a residence in Breaux Bridge and was then returned to Lafayette
and thrown out of a car.4 The reports further note, “While speaking with Joanelle, it was hard to
understand her as statements were not clear to us.”5 Prejean was taken by ambulance to the

hospital, and officers continued investigating the matter. Initially, Prejean could not name the
person who allegedly raped her, but later that day, after reviewing Facebook, she named Matthew

3 ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 10; ECF No. 64-6 at 24-25.
4 ECF No. 64-5 at 9, 14.
5 Id. at 9.
Guidry as her assailant. Three days later, Lafayette Police contacted Detective Martin Cormier of
the Breaux Bridge Police Department and advised him of Prejean’s complaint that she had been
raped within the city limits of Breaux Bridge.6 Shortly thereafter, Cormier took over the
investigation.

On October 11, 2017, Cormier applied for an arrest warrant for Guidry on the charge of
third degree rape. Judge Anthony Thibodeaux, 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin,
Louisiana, signed the arrest warrant the same day. Guidry surrendered himself to Breaux Bridge
Police five days later, at which time he was arrested and detained until the following day when he
was released on bond. On February 4, 2019, Guidry was charged by Bill of Information by the St.
Martin Parish District Attorney’s Office with third degree rape. Following a two-day bench trial,
Judge Thibodeaux found Guidry not guilty of the charge. This suit followed, alleging Guidry’s
arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
II.
APPLICABLE LAW

A. Legal Standard
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”7
“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.”8 The movant “bears the initial responsibility of
demonstrating the absence of an issue of material fact with respect to those issues on which the

6 ECF No. 64-4 at 8.
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
8 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Roy
v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 254 (5th Cir. 2020) (“There exists a ‘genuine dispute’ about a material fact
. . . when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant.”).
movant bears the burden of proof at trial.”9 Typically, if the non-movant will bear the burden of
proof at trial, “the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-
movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue
of material fact warranting trial.”10 However, a qualified immunity defense “alters the usual

summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.”11
The defense of qualified immunity is “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability.”12 The doctrine operates to shield government officials “acting within their
discretionary authority from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.”13 Stated
differently, qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability only “when their
actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.”14 The court employs a standard of
“objective reasonableness” to define “the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request
for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.”15 To overcome a qualified immunity

defense, the movant must establish: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.16 Although the plaintiff bears

9 Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986)).
10 Id.
11 Roy at 254 (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)); see also Rogers v. Jarrett, 63
F.4th 971, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (“plaintiffs bear the ‘burden’ to ‘demonstrate the inapplicability of the
[qualified immunity] defense.’”) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir.
2002)).
12 Roy at 254 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
13 Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
14 King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th
Cir. 2011)).
15 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); see also Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2018).
16 Ford v. Anderson Cnty., Texas, 102 F.4th 292, 307 (5th Cir. 2024).
the burden of negating qualified immunity, all inferences must be drawn in his favor.17 If the
plaintiff satisfies this burden, the government official will not be shielded from liability on the
basis of qualified immunity.18
B. Fourth Amendment—Unreasonable Seizure Pursuant to Legal Process

Guidry alleges Det. Cormier violated his Fourth Amendment rights by failing to disclose
material and exculpatory information in order to secure a warrant for Guidry’s arrest.19 The
Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”20 While a warrant presumptively establishes
probable cause, that presumption can be attacked.21 Since Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978), it has been clearly established that an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated
“where a warrant affidavit (1) contains false statements or material omissions (2) made with at
least ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ that (3) were ‘necessary to the finding of probable cause.’”22
If an arrestee makes this showing, courts must conduct a “corrected affidavit” analysis, which
requires a determination of “whether the warrant affidavit would support probable cause if the
misstatements and material omissions were eliminated.”23 If the arrestee “makes the tripartite

Franks showing, then any arrest or prosecution lacked probable cause” thereby establishing a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.24

17 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010); Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir.
2020).
18 Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 981 (5th Cir. 2022).
19 ECF No. 1 at 42-43 ¶30.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.
21 Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 285 n.10 (5th Cir. 2021); Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir.
2024).
22 Hughes at 619 (quoting Franks at 155-56); see also Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494.
23 Id. at 620.
24 Id. at 620; see also Tervilliger, 4 F.4th at 285.
Probable cause is not a high bar and requires only “a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”25 It is a “practical and common-sensical
standard.”26 In assessing whether probable cause supported the issuance of an arrest warrant,
courts must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the facts presented to

the judicial officer would assure a person of reasonable caution that the suspect committed the
crime for which he is being arrested.27 Negligence alone is insufficient to defeat qualified
immunity.28 Rather, misstatements or omissions will “vitiate an affidavit” only if it is established
that the misstatements or omissions were the product “of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth.”29 “If the facts omitted from an affidavit are ‘clearly critical’ to a finding
of probable cause, then recklessness may be inferred from the proof of the omission itself.”30
III.
ANALYSIS

Guidry contends summary judgment is warranted against Det. Cormier “on the issue of
liability for violating Mr. Guidry’s Fourth Amendment rights” in connection with his arrest.31
According to Guidry, probable cause for his arrest did not exist because: (1) it was objectively
unreasonable for Det. Cormier to rely upon Ms. Prejean’s version of events to support his
application for an arrest warrant, and (2) Det. Cormier omitted material, exculpatory evidence from
his affidavit in support of the arrest warrant. Detective Cormier seeks dismissal of Guidry’s claim
on the merits, or alternatively, on immunity grounds, arguing: (1) the facts Guidry contends should

25 Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 495 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)); see also Terwilliger,
4 F.4th at 282.
26 Winfrey at 495 (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)).
27 Id. (citing Harris, 568 U.S. at 243).
28 Id..
29 Id. (quoting United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980)).
30 Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Martin, 615 F.2d at 329).
31 ECF No. 64 at 2.
have been included in the warrant affidavit are either untrue, immaterial, or were not “knowingly
and maliciously omitted,”32 and (2) because Prejean named Guidry as the perpetrator of her alleged
sexual assault, probable cause existed for Guidry’s arrest.33
Resolution of the pending motions requires an examination of whether probable cause

existed for Plaintiff’s arrest. Under Louisiana law, third degree rape is defined as follows:
A. Third degree rape is a rape committed when the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a victim because it is
committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:

(1) When the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of
the act by reason of a stupor or abnormal condition of mind produced by an
intoxicating agent or any cause and the offender knew or should have known of
the victim’s incapacity.

(2) When the victim, through unsoundness of mind, is temporarily or
permanently incapable of understanding the nature of the act and the offender
knew or should have known of the victim's incapacity.

. . . .

(4) When the offender acts without the consent of the victim.34

32 ECF No. 61-4 at 3.
33 Id. at 3, 9. Detective Cormier additionally argues summary judgment in his favor is warranted because
Guidry has failed to show he acted with malice. Id. at 8. According to Cormier, Plaintiff’s claim is actually
a malicious prosecution claim under Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), and therefore Plaintiff must
prove malice. See e.g. Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023). Thompson “held that litigants
may bring a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.” Armstrong at 278 (citing
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 42). Fifth Circuit caselaw between 2003 and 2021 explicitly denied the existence of
a “freestanding constitutional right to be free of malicious prosecution.” Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d
939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 289 (5th Cir. 2023). For purposes of
qualified immunity, the Court must consider the law that was clearly established at the time of Det.
Cormier’s alleged misconduct. Guerra at 289; see also Wallace v. Taylor, 22-20342, 2023 WL 2964418, at
*6 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2023) (“While the Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest absent probable
cause has been clearly established for some time, there was no clearly established Fourth Amendment right
to be free from malicious prosecution at the time of Wallace's arrest.”). As such, the Court does not address
a constitutional malicious prosecution claim, beyond noting that in that context, malice typically will be
found where an officer conceals or fails to disclose exculpatory evidence. See e.g. Sanders v. English, 950
F.2d 1152, 1163 (5th Cir. 1992); Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Castellano
v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) and reinstated by Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 279.
34 La. R.S. 14:43.
Thus, third degree rape requires either (1) a lack of consent, or (2) a victim who is unable to
lawfully consent due to intoxication or unsoundness of mind, provided the offender knew or should
have known of the victim’s incapacity.
Detective Cormier’s warrant affidavit reads as follows:

On August 9, 2017, the Breaux Bridge Police Department was contacted by
Lafayette Police Department regarding a possibly rape that occurred within the city
limits of Breaux Bridge. Information obtained indicated the victim, Joanelle
Prejean be sexual assaulted while at a residence located in the city limits of Breaux
Bridge. Further information obtained indicated that Joanelle was scheduled to be
interviewed by Lafayette Police Detective, Larry Theriot @ approximately 10:00
a.m.

On the same date, I, Detective Sgt. Martin Cormier made contact with Detective
Larry Theriot via telephone and requested to observe the interview with Joanelle
Prejean so, that I would be able to adequately conduct an investigation into this
allegation. Once contact was made with Det. Larry Theriot, I was allowed to
observe the interview conducted by Det. Larry Theriot with Joanelle Prejean. Once
the interview was concluded I was able to make contact with Prejean and schedule
an appointment with her to come to the Breaux Bridge Police Department so that a
second interview could be conducted. I then was able to obtain copies of
handwritten statement obtained by Lafayette Police Department from Tyree
Mouton, Patrick Guidry, Jermain Biggs and Carly La Combs.

On August 11, 2017 Tyree Mouton and Patrick Guidry came into the Breaux Bridge
Police Department. Voluntary s statements were obtained from both subjects. In a
statement obtained from Tyree Mouton information obtained indicated the night of
the incident, Prejean along with other party goers were consuming alcohol. Mouton
advised he even share a shot with Prejean another female subject name Chelsea
Jones. Mouton advised he was informed by Mathew Guidry that while at the party
Prejean made moves on him. Mouton stated he heard when Prejean kept telling
everybody at the party she doesn’t like white guys and that she like black guys.
Mouton advised once at his residence he went in the room to tend to his child when
he heard Chelsea yell “ What the fuck”. Mouton when he entered the room Mathew
pants was up and Joanelle was on the couch. Mouton advised the Chelsea possible
gave zanix or a bar. Mouton advised that Prejean was brought to his residence due
to her being left at the party by Jermaine. Mouton advised he drove Prejean to his
residence while Mathew drove Patrick. Mouton advised he then took Joanelle away
from his residence due to her behavior such hitting the wall and disturbing his
daughter. Mouton advised he asked Joanelle the location of residence. Mouton
advised he was unable to get an answer from Joanelle. Mouton advised once he was
unable to determine her residence location it was decided to bring her to the
hospital. Mouton advised once near the Girard Park area Prejean was dropped off.
On the same date, a statement was obtained from Patrick Guidry. In his statement
Patrick was only able to provide limited information due to him being highly
intoxicated and passed out on the floor of his residence.

On August 14, 2017 Joanelle Prejean came into him Breaux Bridge Police
Department. A second interview was conduct with Joanell Prejean. In her statement
Prejean advised she attend a pool party at Park Place Apartments in the Lafayette
area with a male subject who she identified as Germaine Biggs. Prejean advised
while at the party she consumed several alcoholic beverages (shots of fire ball), but
indicated she does not normally drink. Prejean advised she met two female subjects
named Areille (unknown last name) and Ashley (unknown last name) at the party.
Prejean advised she asked them who they were able to obtain success at such a
young age. Prejean advised a male subject named Chris Bernard came up to her
while talking to Areille and Ashley and told her they went to the same school and
was involved in a relationship online. Prejean advised this was the first time she
met Chris Bernard. Prejean advised while she continued to speak with the Ashley
and Areille Chris told her “you tripping” and kept pushing drinks on her. Prejean
advised Patrick came up and said she was “Crazy”. Prejean advised she mentioned
to them that she recently got out of Vermillion Hospital for attempting suicide and
that she need to be around positive people. Prejean advised even the two female she
was talking to was telling her to calm down. Prejean admitted she was getting upset
and said “ya’ll need to stop calling me Crazy” and “she just want to be normal”.
Prejean advised they just kept calling her “Crazy”. Prejean advised by that time she
was yelling. Prejean advised she believed the females she was talking to earlier
contacted the police due to her being. Prejean advised the police did come to the
party but did not say anyone was being belligerent. Prejean advised all the police
advised they were being a little too loud. Prejean advised she and Jermaine argued
because he accused her of ruining Patrick’s birthday party and that he treating to
punch her in the face. Prejean advised she pushed Jermaine due to the comments
he was making about hitting her. Prejean advised Jermaine removed all her items
from his vehicle and gave it to Matt Guidry and he left. Prejean advised Matt walked
up with all her items and them to her. Prejean indicated she began to cry due to
Jermaine leaving her and that the police was not far by. Prejean stated she was
pushed inside a vehicle by Matt Guidry, Chelsea Jones and Tyree Mouton. Prejean
advised that Tyree was the driver Matt was in the back seat with her and Chelsea
was in the front passenger seat. Prejean advised while in the vehicle she remembers
then talking about taking her to her residence but somehow they went to Tyree’s
residence. Prejean advised she did tell them the location of her residence but did
not tell how to get to her residence. Prejean advised they were attempting to dodge
the police and that they rode around in a plaza area. Prejean advised while in the
vehicle they started switching positions in the vehicle. Prejean advised at some
point Tyree asked her “Do you understand what’s going on” and she respond “I just
wanted to be normal”. Prejean advised she began to yell out the vehicle and was
pulled back inside the vehicle. Prejean advised she began to yelling “help me” “help
me” “help me” out the window. Prejean advised when she arrived to the residence
m Breaux Bridge she believed the residence was an apartment due to the front end
of the residence being rocky. Prejean advised she was drugged out the vehicle into
the residence. Prejean advised she remember it was like a hall. Prejean remembered
seen like a table, a couch, a smaller table and a TV. Prejean advised someone was
on the ground and she believed it was Patrick. Prejean advised the couch was a dark
color and was Nettie. Prejean advised she believed the light was on in the kitchen
area. Prejean advised she was placed on the couch next to Matt. Prejean advised at
the time she was spitting and vomiting from the side of her mouth. Prejean advised
she was told to be quite and lie down and go to sleep. Prejean advised Tyree told
her you can’t be loud due to his wife and kids. Prejean advised she seen when
Chelsea and Tyree went into the hallway area of the residence. Prejean advised
that’s when the sexual assault occurred. Prejean advised she felt when her shorts
were pulled to the side and someone placing their fingers inside of her. Prejean
advised when she tried to pick her head up, her head was pushed back down to the
side. I then asked Prejean at anytime did she them to stop. Prejean indicated she
stated “NO”. Prejean identified her assailant as Matt Guidry. Prejean advised she
seen his face but could not tell the color of eyes but seen the dark color around his
eyes. Prejean advised at the time of the attack she was going in and out of
consciousness. Prejean advised she was able to feel his hair and describe his hair as
being “porcupine”. Prejean advised Mathew place in his penis inside of her and
every time she would make a sound it was like she was attempting to vomit. Prejean
advised Mathew kept her face on the side and that she was unable to breath causing
her to black out. Prejean advised she remembered Mathew kissing her. Prejean
advised she was unable push him off due to her going in and out of consciousness.
Prejean advised she remembers it was not long until he ejaculated inside of her.
Prejean stated afterward he whispered to her it was going to be alright.

On August 15, 2017, Mathew Guidry accompanied by his attorney, Bill Goode
came into the Breaux Bridge Police Department to provide a statement. Under his
own admission, Guidry advised he did have sex with Prejean, but claimed it was
consensual. Guidry advised Joanelle was taken to the residence due to her being
left at the party in Lafayette. Guidry advised him and Tyree spoke and it was decide
to bring her to their residence for her to crash on the couch and to sober up. Guidry
advised that Prejean was attempting to kiss him and rubbed on him when they made
it the residence. Guidry advised he said “no” and helped her into the residence.
Guidry advised eventual he and Prejean were alone in the living room on the couch
and that they were able to calm Prejean down from being all irate. Guidry advised
him and Prejean was talking and that she was telling how rough her life was and
things and then she kept making moves on him. Guidry advised eventually he and
Prejean had sex. Guidry advised he was told by Prejean that Jermaine would never
know of their sexual encounter.

On October 9, 2017 I was able to obtain a statement from Carly Lacombe. In her
statement Lacombe advised on the night of the incident she went to Patrick Guidry
residence due a phone she received from Tyree Mouton. Lacombe advised she was
informed Mouton that she need to come see about Patrick. Lacombe advised upon
arriving at Patrick’s residence she observed the Patrick being helped out the vehicle
by Tyree, Matthew, a heavy statue female possibly red hair and other thinner
female(Joanelle Prejean). Lacombe advised the thinner female appeared too
intoxicated and frustrated with being at the residence. Lacombe advised she attend
to Patrick and brought into his bedroom which is the first room in the hallway.
Lacombe advised while in the bedroom she could hear moaning noise come from
the living room area where Matthew and the thinner female were located.35

As evidenced by the affidavit, whether probable cause existed for Guidry’s arrest turns upon
whether Prejean’s version of events “would assure a person of reasonable caution” that Guidry
committed the crime of third degree rape.36 Cormier contends it was entirely reasonable for him
to rely solely on Prejean’s statements as his basis for probable cause, because he had no reason to
believe Prejean had provided false information, and because the omitted information has no
bearing on whether or not Prejean consented to sexual intercourse.37 Under the present facts, the
Court disagrees.
Generally, a victim’s accusation that identifies an individual as the perpetrator of an offense
is sufficient to establish probable cause.38 However, this general rule is “subject to the qualification
of objective reasonableness,” and police may not rely on a victim’s veracity to establish probable
cause if circumstances or actual knowledge reveal that the victim has provided false information,
did not accurately describe what was seen, was in some fashion mistaken regarding his or her
recollection, or there is some other indication that the information is not reliable.39 In this matter,
the Court finds at the time of arrest, Cormier was aware of information that undercut his reliance
on Ms. Prejean’s version of events.

35 ECF No. 64-4 at 23-25 (grammatical and typographical errors in original).
36 Winfrey at 495.
37 ECF No. 76 at 4.
38 Johnson v. Bryant, 46 F.3d 66, *3 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Roy, 950 F.3d at 255-56.
39 Johnson, supra; see also United States v. Burbridge, 252 F.3d 775, 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Hale, 899 F.2d at
399.
Prior to execution of the warrant affidavit, Cormier was aware that Ms. Prejean had recently
been hospitalized at Vermilion Behavioral Health Systems (“Vermilion Hospital”) for attempted
suicide.40 He was aware Prejean was prescribed Seroquel, Depakote and Lexapro (which Prejean
described as a “mood stabilizer”), and that (according to Prejean) she had not taken her psychiatric
medications for three days prior to the alleged rape.41 Cormier was aware that several persons who

were at the Breaux Bridge residence at the time of the alleged events advised Lafayette Police that
they attempted to bring Prejean to Lafayette General Hospital on the day of the incident due to the
very troubling behavior Prejean exhibited after the sexual encounter.42 However, they ultimately
left Prejean at Girard Park because as they neared the hospital, Prejean began kicking and punching
occupants of the vehicle.43 Cormier was also aware that Prejean’s date and friend, Germaine Biggs,
told police that he had known Prejean “for over 2 years and ha[d] never seen her like this, she’s
been suicidal and she really needs help.”44
Detective Cormier’s investigation notes indicate that at some point prior to September 25,
2017, someone with the District Attorney’s office advised him “a good idea would be to obtain
[Prejean’s] medical records for Vermilion Hospital.”45 Cormier’s notes reflect that Prejean’s

“capacity” would be an issue in the investigation.46 On September 27, 2017, Cormier obtained
Prejean’s medical records from Vermilion Hospital.47 Those records reflect that Prejean was

40 See e.g. ECF No. 64-6 at 6.
41 See ECF No. 64-5 at 9; ECF No. 64-6 at 13, 25, 48-49.
42 ECF No. 64-6 at 93, 97; ECF No. 64-7 at 22 (Prejean “sounded possessed”), ECF No. 64-6 at 84-85
(Prejean urinated on the sofa; Prejean was kicking and screaming “someone raping me,” with her legs “in
the air as if someone was really raping her”; when asked for her home address, Prejean would scream “John
Wayne is raping me and he broke my heart”); see also ECF No. 64-4 at 9; ECF No. 64-5 at 14.
43 ECF No. 64-6 at 97.
44 Id. at 83.
45 ECF No. 64-4 at 13.
46 Id. at 16; ECF No. 64-8 at 39.
47 ECF No. 64-1 at 4, ¶ 9; ECF No. 76-1 at 2, ¶ 9.
admitted on July 20, 2017 pursuant to a Physician’s Emergency Certificate “for depression and
suicidal ideation with a plan to kill herself by car accident.”48 The records further indicate Prejean
was suffering from obsessive thoughts and auditory and visual hallucinations.49 Prejean was
discharged on July 27, 2017 (ten days before the alleged rape), with diagnoses of schizoaffective
disorder (bipolar type), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.50

Prejean’s discharge instructions were to “follow up with Cognitive Development on 08/01/17 at
10:00 a.m. for mental health therapy and psychiatric medication management, and to continue
taking Seroquel “for psychosis,” and Depakote and Lexapro “for mood.”51 Her prognosis upon
discharge was “fair with compliance.”52
While the arrest affidavit does state that Prejean advised people at the pool party that she
had recently been discharged from Vermilion Hospital for attempting suicide, it makes no mention
of the serious diagnoses and behaviors set forth in Prejean’s medical records, nor of her alleged
troubling behavior exhibited after the sexual encounter.53 More importantly, the affidavit makes
no mention of the fact that Prejean advised Cormier that she had failed to take her anti-psychotic

and mood stabilizing medications for three days before the incident, and that the medical records
reflect that Prejean suffers from obsessive thoughts and auditory and visual hallucinations when
she is not stabilized with psychiatric medications. The Court finds these omissions are material, as

48 ECF No. 64-6 at 6.
49 Id. at 9.
50 Id. at 7.
51 Id. at 6, 7.
52 Id. at 6.
53 See n.42, supra.
they directly call into question whether the information provided by Prejean to Cormier was
reliable.54
Other inconsistencies, although alone not dispositive, bolster the need for further
corroboration of Prejean’s version of events. For example, the affidavit notes that Prejean advised

she had been pushed inside a vehicle by Matt Guidry, Chelsea Jones and Tyree Mouton, and that
the four of them travelled to the residence in Breaux Bridge in the same vehicle; the affidavit also
notes that Mouton stated he drove Prejean in one vehicle, and Plaintiff drove Patrick Guidry in a
separate vehicle. However, the affidavit does not mention that all other persons interviewed
confirmed Mouton’s version of how the parties travelled to Mouton’s residence.55 Additionally,
Prejean advised officers that once she arrived at the residence in Breaux Bridge, she fell out of the
car “on my forehead . . . face first” into dirt and gravel, that she would not use her feet so Chelsea
Jones and Matthew Guidry dragged her everywhere, and that she had cuts on her feet due to these
events.56 However, the photographs of Prejean taken on the day of the incident do not show any
kind of marks on her face, and show only a tiny circular mark on the top of her foot that does not
appear to be a drag wound or even a scrape.57 Detective Cormier admits he saw no marks on

Prejean’s face when he interviewed her on August 9, 2017.58 Further, Prejean originally advised
police officers that the sofa where the alleged rape occurred was either red or green. Five days later
she told Det. Cormier it was an “ugly tan, orangy brownish . . . Khaki color.”59 The affidavit merely
says Prejean advised the sofa was a “dark color.”

54 See Winfrey at 494 (A warrant affiant must include facts and circumstances “that concern the reliability
of the information and the credibility of the source to avoid deliberately or reckless false statements.”)
(internal quotation marks, alterations omitted).
55 ECF No. 64-6 at 66, 90, 91, 92, 106.
56 Id. at 20, 54.
57 ECF No. 64-7 at 1-12.
58 ECF No. 64-8 at 48, 53.
59 Compare ECF No. 64-5 at 9 with ECF No. 64-6 at 26.
Other responses of Prejean would cause a reasonable officer to question her ability to
accurately recall events. For example, when asked if the residence in Breaux Bridge was a house
or apartment, Prejean responded, “It was a house and then later on it turned into an apartment, so
I don’t know.”60 At her August 9, 2017 interview, when asked whether she was familiar with

Patrick Guidry, Prejean volunteered that she met him a week before when she and Biggs went to
a small swim party at the same apartment complex in Lafayette. Prejean continued:
Because um when me and Jermaine kind of snuck off and I needed money from
him that day um I would go have sex at his friend’s house and it was Patrick’s. . . .
And um I was actually babysitting that day and I brought my sister with me and I
bought, I put my sister in the baby and I put them in the room and I told my sister
watch him y’all watch her. Y’all watch this baby. . . . I have to do what I have to do
for a sec and get the money and I got the money and I fed that kid. . . . You know
and that was the only other time besides that me and Jermaine know each other
because I used to have a girlfriend. . . . And he used to be like our ride everywhere
we went and you know to party’s and other stuff like and other things like that and
I know I’ve heard of Patrick name only one other time because Kasha and him, my
girlfriend Kasha and him had sex and I didn’t know about that until later on.61

These responses, when coupled with the information in Prejean’s medical records, would cause a
person of reasonable caution to have concern with Prejean’s ability to accurately describe the
events of August 6, 2017.
Regardless of Prejean’s ability to accurately recall the events on the evening in question,
counsel for Cormier contends probable cause existed for Guidry’s arrest pursuant to La. R.S.
14:43(A)(1) (where a victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act due
to a stupor or abnormal condition of mind produced by an intoxicating agent and the offender knew
or should have known of the victim’s incapacity). Specifically, Cormier contends probable cause
existed because the information supplied to Cormier indicated most party attendees “were drinking
heavily,” Guidry advised Cormier that he was “highly intoxicated,” and “multiple witnesses . . .

60 ECF No. 64-6 at 36.
61 Id. at 32-33.
recalled Ms. Prejean acting erratically at the party.”62 According to Cormier, because “the
partygoers were drinking heavily and they knew the others were doing so as well,” any argument
by Guidry that he was unaware that Prejean “was intoxicated after they left the party is not credible
for purposes of a probable cause determination.”63

The problem with this argument is that nothing in the record indicates that Guidry knew or
should have known Prejean was “incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act”
due to intoxication. According to Prejean, her first interaction with Guidry was when he and others
allegedly pushed her in a car to take her to the Breaux Bridge residence.64 According to Guidry,
shortly after he began drinking at the party, Prejean “tried to make a first move on [him],” but he
stopped her out of loyalty to his friend Biggs.65 Guidry advised Cormier that he next observed
Prejean when he overheard Prejean and Biggs fighting. The strongest evidence that Guidry knew
or should have known that Prejean was intoxicated was that Mouton then told Guidry that they
should bring Prejean to their house to sober up, since Biggs had left her without a ride home.66 But
being advised that a person needs to sober up does not equate to having knowledge that a person

is “incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of a stupor or abnormal
condition of mind produced by an intoxicating agent.”67 Guidry had only met Prejean that evening,
and by his own admission, he was highly intoxicated.68 Moreover, this argument does not negate
the fact that the only information Cormier had that Prejean did not consent to sexual intercourse
were Prejean’s statements to Cormier to that effect. As previously discussed, “police may not rely

62 ECF No. 61-4 at 10.
63 Id.
64 See e.g. ECF No. 64-6 at 52.
65 ECF No. 64-6 at 64.
66 ECF No. 64-6 at 66.
67 La. R.S. 14:43(A)(1).
68 See e.g. ECF No. 64-6 at 66, 75, 76.
on the veracity of a victim to establish probable cause if the circumstances or actual knowledge
reveals that the victim has provided false information,” or was in some fashion mistaken in his or
her recollection.69 In such cases, there must be additional corroboration before probable cause will
exist.70 Here, Cormier did not identify any information further corroborating Prejean’s version of

events.
In summary, the Court finds Det. Cormier’s omission of any details regarding Prejean’s
very recent hospitalization and diagnoses, his omission of Prejean’s statements that she had not
taken her psychiatric medications for three days prior to the incident, and her admission that she
drank at least five shots of alcohol that evening when she does not normally drink—particularly
when coupled with other inconsistencies and fantastical statements—were material omissions that
were necessary to the finding of probable cause.71 In other words, the Court finds that had the
omitted information been included in Cormier’s affidavit, a reasonable judicial officer would have
found further corroboration of Prejean’s claims was necessary before probable cause was
established. The Court further finds that for purposes of summary judgment, recklessness may be

inferred, because the omissions were clearly critical to a finding of probable cause, as they directly
bear on Prejean’s credibility.
As to qualified immunity, when the facts and inferences are construed in the light most
favorable to Guidry, Guidry has shown Cormier violated his right to be free from arrest without a
showing of probable cause, that it was objectively unreasonable for Cormier to omit material
information from his warrant affidavit, and that this right was clearly established at the time of the

69 Johnson, 46 F.3d at *3, n. 5; see also Burbridge, 252 F.3d at 778; Winfrey at 494 (affiant must include
facts concerning the reliability and credibility of the source).
70 Hale, 899 F.2d at 399; U.S. v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1984).
71 Id. at 24-25.
violation.’? As such, Guidry has carried his burden of negating the defense of qualified immunity.
However, partial summary judgment in Guidry’s favor will be denied, because whether Cormier
omitted material information “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally” is a decision for the trier of
fact.”
For the reasons set forth herein, the motions for summary judgment are DENIED, and
Guidry’s claim alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest absent a
good faith showing of probable cause may proceed to trial.
THUS DONE in Chambers on this 17th day of July, 2024.

ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

? See e.g. Hughes, 100 F.4th at 619 (“{U]nder Franks v. Delaware, it is equally obvious that no reasonable
competent officer would . .. make material omissions in a warrant application.”); Reitz v. Woods, 85 F.4th
780, 792-93 (Sth Cir. 2023) (the lack of exigent circumstances is a factor bearing upon whether an officer’s
omissions are objectively reasonable).
Winfrey at 496; see also Winfrey v. San Jacinto Cnty., 481 Fed.Appx. 969, 980 (Sth Cir. 2012) (“It may
be that these errors and omissions [in the warrant affidavit] resulted from carelessness or run-of-the-mill
negligence. . . . Yet, for qualified immunity purposes, it is also possible that they occurred out of
recklessness.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648843. Public record. Not legal advice.