# Believe TGH LLC v. Pointe Coupee Parish

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · September 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648713

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BELIEVE TGH, LLC, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

versus
23-408-SDD-RLB
POINTE COUPEE PARISH

RULING
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by
Plaintiffs, Believe TGH, LLC, Believe Therapeutic Group Home, LLC, Perpetual
Properties, LLC, and Perpetual Properties II, LLC, (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”).
Defendant, Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana (the “Parish” or “Defendant”) filed an
Opposition.2 For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion for Reconsideration
of its Ruling denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
Plaintiffs operate a therapeutic group home (“TGH”) for minors with disabilities on
Bayou Run Road (the “Bayou Run Home”) in Pointe Coupee Parish (the “Parish”).3 In
2021, the Parish implemented a new zoning ordinance (the “Ordinance”), which prohibits
group homes in the Parish.4 The Bayou Run Home is a non-conforming use in the Parish;
it continued operating because it was established prior to the Ordinance’s effect.5 This
Ordinance defines “family” to mean “one or more person[s] related by blood within two (2)
generations and one degree of marriage living together and occupying a single dwelling

1 Rec. Doc. 63.
2 Rec. Doc. 64.
3 Rec. Doc. 6-1, pp. 3–4.
4 Id. at p. 4.
5 Rec. Doc. 6-8, p. 19.
with single culinary facilities or a group of not more than four (4) persons living together
by mutual agreement and occupying a single dwelling with [a] single culinary facility on a
nonprofit cost-sharing basis.”6 Therefore, single-family dwellings can be residences for
either an unlimited amount of blood relatives or four unrelated individuals.
The instant dispute arose because Plaintiffs seek to open a second TGH in the

Parish. This second TGH would operate in a single-family dwelling in Lettsworth,
Louisiana (the “Lettsworth Home”).7 The Lettsworth Home sits in the Rural Agricultural
district of the Parish (the “RA-G”).8 This district is primarily agricultural but single-family
residences are permitted.9 As a result, Plaintiffs sought a variance with the Parish’s
Planning and Zoning Commission to expand their definition of “family” to allow more than
four unrelated individuals to live together.10 As part of their variance request, Plaintiffs
argued that a variance was a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”), the American Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act.11 The
Commission denied Plaintiffs’ request and Plaintiffs appealed.12 The Parish Council then
affirmed the denial.13 Consequently, Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging the Parish violated

the FHA, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act,
and the Louisiana public accommodations law.14

6 Rec. Doc. 6-1, p. 4.
7 Id. at pp. 3–4.
8 Id. at p. 4.
9 Id. at pp. 4–5.
10 Rec. Doc. 6-3.
11 Rec. Doc. 6-1, pp. 5–6.
12 Id. at pp. 7–8.
13 Id. at p. 10.
14 Rec. Docs. 1, 45.
On June 6, 2023, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Title II of
the ADA, the FHA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.15 On September 4, 2023,
Defendant moved for summary judgment.16 Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial
summary judgment on September 5th and filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion on
September 25th.17

The Court denied the preliminary injunction and denied the motions for summary
judgment.18 Now, Plaintiffs request that the Court reconsider its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion
for partial summary judgment.
II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. Preliminary Matters
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs repeatedly cite materials they submitted via their
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Dispositive Motion and Statement of Material
Facts. However, as Plaintiffs correctly point out, the Court did not consider these materials
when deciding on the cross motions for summary judgment.19 The Court will also not

consider these materials for the purposes of reconsideration. The Scheduling Order was
issued on June 21, 2023.20 The deadline to file dispositive motions was September 4,
2023.21 Defendant timely moved for summary judgment.22 Plaintiffs failed to meet this
deadline, filing an out-of-time Motion for an Extension Time to File Dispositive Motions
and an out-of-time Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on September 5, 2023.23 On

15 Rec. Doc. 6.
16 Rec. Doc. 35.
17 Rec. Docs. 38, 59.
18 Rec. Doc. 62.
19 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 2, n.2.
20 Rec. Doc. 13.
21 Id.
22 Rec. Doc. 35.
23 Rec. Docs. 37, 38.
September 7th, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a supplemental dispositive motion and
statement of material facts.24 The next day, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
summary judgment motion as untimely.25 The motion for an extension of time was
referred to the Magistrate Judge and was denied as moot because Plaintiffs filed their
dispositive motion on September 5th.26 The Court then denied Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss solely on the grounds that the deadline fell on a federal holiday.27 Notably, the
Court ascertained that Plaintiffs’ counsel “ha[d] exhibited a lack of diligence throughout
this proceeding, missing other deadlines, deficient filings, and incorrect filings.”28 The
Court continued, “Plaintiffs’ counsel’s personal responsibilities and circumstances do not
excuse his obligation to abide by the Court’s deadlines, or at the very least, seek relief
from the deadline before it passes. While the Court will give leniency to Plaintiffs’ counsel
with respect to this deadline under these particular circumstances, such leniency in the
future should not be expected.”29
Considering the foregoing history, the Court will not consider the motion for leave

and the motion is denied. Plaintiffs moved for an extension of time because Plaintiffs did
not receive Defendant’s deposition transcript by the dispositive motion deadline.30 This is
irrelevant, however, because Plaintiffs had nearly two and a half months to timely depose
the Parish. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not suggest that this delay was caused by the
Defendant or difficulties in scheduling the deposition. The supplemental motion does not
merely seek to supplement the summary judgment record with the deposition transcript;

24 Rec. Doc. 50.
25 Rec. Doc. 51.
26 Rec. Doc. 48.
27 Rec. Doc. 61, p. 2.
28 Id.
29 Id. at pp. 2–3.
30 Rec. Doc. 50-1, p. 1.
it is a revised motion for partial summary judgment which adds citations, adds additional
exhibits, and sets forth new facts.31 Considering the lack of punctuality repeatedly
displayed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, it would be highly prejudicial to Defendant for the Court
to consider a revised motion for partial summary judgment that was submitted days after
the deadline. It is one thing for the Court to consider the one day-late motion for partial

summary judgment when the deadline fell on a holiday, it is another thing for the Court to
consider this revised motion, new facts, and new exhibits that were submitted days after
the deadline. This distinction is doubly warranted when the motion for an extension of
time to file the dispositive motion was also untimely.32
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Two Exhibits Conventionally33 is also denied.
Plaintiffs represent that the two exhibits are audio recordings of the August 18, 2022
Parish Planning and Zoning Commission Meeting and September 13, 2022 Parish
Council Meeting.34 Again, Defendant moved for summary judgment on September 4,
2023.35 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ deadline to file an opposition was September 25, 2023.36

Plaintiffs timely filed their opposition and some of their exhibits but did not seek to
conventionally file these recordings until September 27, 2023.37 For reasons already
stated, this motion is denied.

31 Id. at pp. 2–3.
32 The Motion for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions was filed on September 5, 2023, a day after
the Court’s dispositive motion deadline. Rec. Doc. 37.
33 Rec. Doc. 60.
34 Rec. Doc. 60-1, p. 1.
35 Rec. Doc. 35.
36 Local Rule 7(F).
37 Rec. Doc. 60.
B. Requirements for a Motion to Reconsider
When a motion for reconsideration “‘calls into question the correctness’ of the
judgment,” the Court considers it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).38 “Rule 59(e) motions serve
‘the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.’”39 “‘Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is

an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.’”40 “Accordingly, a motion for
reconsideration ‘is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or
arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.’”41 “Courts
have considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion.”42
Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
To prevail on summary judgment, Plaintiffs had to offer undisputed summary judgment
evidence which proved the following: (1) the prospective residents are handicapped or
disabled as the statute(s) define those terms; (2) Plaintiffs requested an accommodation
and Defendant refused that request; (3) the requested accommodation was reasonable

and defendant refused that request; and (4) the requested accommodation “may be
necessary to afford” the prospective residents with “equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the dwelling.”43 The Court found genuine disputes of material facts regarding the last two
prongs.44 Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider these findings only.45

38 Allen v. Envirogreen Landscape Prof'ls, Inc., 721 F. App'x 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004)).
39 Id. (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Calloway v. Pinkey, 2024 WL 1237056, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 14, 2024) (citing Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc.
v. The Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)).
43 Oxford House, Inc. v. Browning, 266 F. Supp. 3d 896, 907 (M.D. La. 2017).
44 Rec. Doc. 62, p. 20.
45 See Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 2, n.1 (Plaintiffs represent that the first two legal issues are not subject to their
motion and request that the Court not reconsider these rulings).
C. Analysis
1. Reasonableness of the Accommodation
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the reasonableness
prong for several reasons.46 First, they argue the Court erred by considering community
opposition under the reasonableness analysis.47 Plaintiffs rely on Oxford House, Inc. v.

City of Baton Rouge.48 In that case, this Court considered neighbors’ complaints about
“too many people living [in the group home],” increased traffic and vehicles, and general
complaints about the home being illegal and “ruining the older neighborhoods of Baton
Rouge.”49 The distinguisher between this case and here, however, is that in Oxford
House, the Court found that the property next to the group home housed colleges
students, and neighbors similarly complained about that property.50 This Court’s own
precedent reveals community opposition is considered under the reasonableness
analysis.
The Court was also persuaded by Groome Resources, Ltd., v. Parish of Jefferson,

in which the Eastern District cited several reasons to deem the requested accommodation
reasonable and necessary, including the fact that “[t]he other homes operated by Groome
have been well received by their residential neighbors.”51 In the same paragraph of this
opinion, the Eastern District considered that other permitted uses in the zoning district
would cause more congestion and traffic problems than the group home and noted few

46 Rec. Doc. 63-1, pp. 3–6.
47 Id. at pp. 3–4.
48 Id. (citing as an example Oxford House, Inc. v. Baton Rouge, 932 F. Supp.2d 683, 692–93 (M.D. La
2013)).
49 Oxford House, Inc., 932 F. Supp.2d at 692–93.
50 Id. at 693.
51 52 F. Supp. 2d 721, 724 (E.D. La. 1999), aff'd, 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000).
automobiles, if any, would routinely be parked at the group home.52 Here, the Court
considered these same factors to find that there was not a factual dispute regarding the
group home’s “low likelihood” of obstructing traffic flow.53 In the instant motion, Plaintiffs
represent that they do not “challenge the Court’s determination” on that finding.54 The
case law suggests that the Court did not err when it considered community opposition to

the Lettsworth Home. Plaintiffs find no issue in the Court’s reasoning where it cites to the
same case law and its analysis tilts in Plaintiffs’ favor. The Court denies reconsideration.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Court improperly considered inadmissible
evidence and evidence not put forth by Defendant.55 Specifically, Plaintiffs take issue with
the consideration of a Parish councilperson’s testimony because it is inadmissible
hearsay.56 Plaintiffs contend that the Court credited the testimony of a councilperson who
“proclaimed. . .the existing house [] would bring crime into the neighborhood, based on
myths and hearsay, while ignoring the testimony of the police chief who refuted this rumor.
. . .”57 Whether the testimony is hearsay is not relevant in the summary judgment context.

The Fifth Circuit holds that at the summary judgment stage, whether materials are
admissible in their current form is not dispositive because “materials cited to support or
dispute a fact need only be capable of being ‘presented in a form that would be admissible
in evidence.’”58 Statements that would technically constitute hearsay at the summary

52 Id. at 724–25.
53 Rec. Doc, 62, pp. 16–17.
54 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 2, n.1.
55 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 7.
56 Id. at p. 8.
57 Id.
58 LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(2)) (emphasis removed).
judgment stage can oftentimes be reduced to admissible form later by having the
declarant testify to the matter at trial.
Nothing in the record suggests that the councilperson or the police chief are
unavailable to testify at trial. The Court did not “credit” one form of testimony for another,
but instead found disputed issues on a material fact.59 Plaintiffs further contend that the

Court erred by considering this testimony because Plaintiffs filed this evidence and
Defendant did not file an opposition.60 When deciding on cross motions for summary
judgment, “[b]oth motions must be denied if the court finds that there is a genuine dispute
of material fact.”61 The Court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
community opposition, so both motions were denied. Thus, reconsideration is denied.
The Court amends its Ruling to correct one factual error. Plaintiffs are correct that
the police chief—rather than Plaintiffs’ counsel—testified that the Bayou Run Home
experienced vehicle burglaries.62 The Court amends its Ruling to correct this error but will
not reconsider denying partial summary judgment.

Third, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not have considered the group home’s
economic impact when completing the reasonableness analysis.63 The Court did err by
considering the group home’s financial situation under this analysis. Instead, it should
have considered whether there were any undue financial or administrative burdens on
the Parish.64 On summary judgment, Defendant did not present any evidence showing

59 Plaintiffs reiterate that the issue of community opposition, or rather whether the accommodation would
be well received by the community is an immaterial issue. Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 9. For the reasons stated on
pgs. 7–8 of this Ruling, the Court rejects this argument.
60 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 9.
61 Rec. Doc. 62, p. 10.
62 Rec. Doc. 39-5, p. 10, Dep. Transcript, 10: 15–19.
63 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 5.
64 See Oxford House, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (the Court considers whether the accommodation would
cause an undue financial or administrative burden on Baton Rouge).
that the accommodation would impose an undue financial burden or an administrative
hardship on the Parish. However, Plaintiffs did not present contrary summary judgment
evidence, and in the instant motion Plaintiffs rely on evidence that the Court will not
consider.65 Neither party presented arguments on summary judgment, so the Court
should not have addressed this factor in its analysis.66 The Court amends its Ruling to

retract the consideration of economic impact. Absent this consideration, genuine issues
of fact still exist. Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its Ruling denying partial
summary judgment.67
Fourth, Plaintiffs request that the Court reconsider finding that the Lettsworth
Home differed from the permitted uses and structures allowed in the district.68 The Court
was persuaded by the undisputed fact that the district in question is “overwhelmingly
agricultural.”69 Plaintiffs rely on analogous facts found in Groome and Oxford House but
ignore the facts in those cases that the Court found distinct from the facts herein.70

65 See Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 5 (stating that “[i]n light of the Parish’s admissions in deposition, inter alia, Plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment on reasonableness”), but see id. at p. 6, n.4 (stating that the admissions
“come from the transcript of the Parish’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that was part of Plaintiffs’ supplemental
motion and statement of facts that make this argument.”). As further explained on pgs. 4–5 of this Ruling,
the Court will not consider the materials submitted with the supplemental motion for the purposes of
reconsideration.
66 See Oxford House, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (The Court concluding it will not address the economic
impact factor because neither party argued that the group home accommodation would impose an undue
financial burden or an administrative hardship on Baton Rouge, nor did the Court find anything in the record
to support that finding.).
67 In subsequent paragraphs, Plaintiffs reiterate that the Court should not have considered the economic
impact on the group home in its reasonableness analysis. Rec. Doc. 63-1, pp. 13–14. To clarify, Plaintiffs
are correct that the Court should not have considered the economic impact on the group home but should
have considered the economic impact on the Parish. However, as explained above, neither party submitted
evidence properly before the Court on this issue.
68 Rec. Doc. 63-1, pp. 10–12.
69 Rec. Doc. 62, p. 18.
70 Id. at pp. 17–18.
Plaintiffs seek to rehash evidence; this is not the purpose of a motion for
reconsideration.71 Reconsideration is denied.72
2. Necessity for the Accommodation
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the necessity prong
because the Court found no genuine issue of fact regarding the Lettsworth Home’s

financial viability.73 The Court disagrees. A dispute exists regarding whether the
accommodation is “essential.”74 The group homes owner, Cornell Dukes (“Dukes”),
testified that the Bayou Run Home, which sits in the Parish as a non-conforming use, had
been operating under capacity for the past year.75 This “raise[d] a question of the
necessity for a second group home in the parish.”76 Thus, the Court found a reasonable
jury, as opposed to this Court, should have the opportunity to consider these facts.77
Plaintiffs ignore this finding in their instant motion and instead focus on Defendant’s lack
of opposition to partial summary judgment.78 As the Court explained above, when
deciding on cross motions for summary judgment, “[b]oth motions must be denied if the
court finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.”79 The Court found that the

71 See Allen, 721 F. App'x at 328 (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479) (explaining that a motion for
reconsideration “‘is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could
have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.’”).
72 In its Opposition to reconsideration, Defendant argues that the property is not in a “residential
community.” Rec. Doc. 64, p. 5. While the Court agrees, the Court asserts that it did not rely on the
Defendant’s Opposition for this finding because Defendant’s argument is primarily based on Plaintiffs’
arguments in their motion for preliminary injunction. Id. While the Court considered Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction in the same ruling as the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court clarified it
would not rely on evidence offered with the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment when it analyzed
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Rec. Doc. 62, p. 5. Accordingly, the Court will not rely on
arguments found in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to decide whether the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment should be reconsidered.
73 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 13.
74 Rec. Doc. 62, p. 20.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Rec. Doc. 63-1, pp. 13–14.
79 Rec. Doc. 62, p. 10.
facts aforementioned presented a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether
the group home is essential. Reconsideration is denied.
In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the Court “committed legal error [] by using an
incorrect standard to determine necessity” by considering the fact that the Bayou Run
Home does not necessarily house children from the Parish.80 Defendant counters that

Plaintiffs intend to have the Court ignore Plaintiffs’ prior claim that absent an
accommodation the children of Pointe Coupee Parish will be denied a place to live in their
community.81 Defendant is correct. Plaintiffs claim the following in their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment:
 “If Plaintiffs are unable to begin operating, the disabled children of
Pointe Coupee Parish will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy
the type of housing and services that the State has found effective
and necessary for them.”
 “Plaintiffs’ requested accommodations are necessary because
establishment of group homes within Pointe Coupee Parish will allow
children who need such services to remain near their communities,
rather than being placed in distant parishes or other states.”
 “[A]llowing Pointe Coupee Parish children with disabilities to live and
receive services in their communities benefits Pointe Coupee Parish
and its residents, as well.”82

The Court found conflicting facts on this issue. Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’
claims were disingenuous because (1) the Bayou Run Home had space available for
tenants and (2) Parish children were not guaranteed residency in the Lettsworth Home
because Plaintiffs anticipate being assigned children from “all across the state,” citing
Dukes’ testimony.83 Presumably because the Court did not find in Plaintiffs’ favor, they
move the Court to ignore their previous arguments; the Court declines. Plaintiffs also

80 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 17.
81 Rec. Doc. 64, p. 4.
82 Rec. Doc. 38-1, pp. 14–15.
83 Rec. Doc. 35-1, pp. 12–13.
claim the Court erred by “looking through the record and finding inadmissible evidence to
negate the necessity prong.”84 The Court wholly rejects this argument. When Defendant
argued that the “group home is intended to accept the assignment of children ‘from all
across the state[],” Defendant cited Dukes’ deposition.85 The Court reviewed the
deposition transcript, in which Dukes made this statement,86 and he testified as follows:

Q: Are they all kids here from Pointe Coupee Parish?
A: Not—not that I know of. Not that I am aware of. We get kids from all
across the state. We serve the state, just not Pointe Coupee. This is a state
license that I am going after, not a parish license.87
---
Q: So correct me if I am misunderstanding. My understanding from your
prior testimony was that the State decides who they send to you.
A: Correct.88
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court’s review was limited to the single line cited by

Defendant, even though Defendant refers the Court to Dukes’ deposition transcript, and
the above testimony is in the same exhibit.89 Certainly, the Court is not obligated to seek
out material issues of fact sua sponte, but it is also not obligated to consider evidence in
a vacuum.
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that Dukes “does not have firsthand knowledge” of
whether residents have a choice in where they live is puzzling.90 Dukes testified that he

84 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 18.
85 Rec. Doc. 35-1, p. 13.
86 Rec. Doc. 35-8, p. 2, Dep. Transcript, 86:15.
87 Rec. Doc 35-8, p. 2, Dep. Transcript, 86:12–18.
88 Rec. Doc. 35-8, p. 3, Dep. Transcript, 108: 9–12.
89 Rec. Doc. 35-8.
90 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 19.
owns the plaintiff-companies in this matter, and states, “I am the plaintiff. All of these
companies are owned by aliases other than myself.”91 Whether or not Dukes is the “true
plaintiff,” Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dukes owns the companies. Thus, at the very least,
his purported “firsthand knowledge” of the group home’s operations is an inquiry for the
jury to consider. When reviewing the evidentiary record, a genuine dispute of material fact

exists. Reconsideration is denied.
3. Reasonable Accommodation Requests for Delta Place
and Russell Lane Group Homes

Plaintiffs request that the Court reconsider its Ruling to address two additional
group homes, the Delta Place Home and the Russell Lane Home.92 Plaintiffs also ask the
Court to find that Defendant waived its right to seek summary judgment dismissal on
issues relating to these additional homes because Defendant did not address the
additional group homes in its dispositive motion.93 Plaintiffs explain that they are seeking
the same accommodation for three homes but only sought a variance request for the
Lettsworth Home.94 On summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that they were not required
to seek requests on these additional homes because “it would have been futile to do so.”95
The only controlling law Plaintiffs rely on is Oxford House, which is distinguishable. In
Oxford House, the plaintiff sought an accommodation request for two homes from the City
of Baton Rouge.96 The city’s accommodation procedure was unclear; therefore, the
plaintiff wrote letters to the defendant explaining its accommodation request for one group

91 Rec. Doc. 35-14, p. 2, Dep. Transcript, 65: 14–16.
92 Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 20.
93 Id.
94 Rec. Doc. 38-1, p. 8.
95 Id.
96 Oxford House, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
home.97 Per the city’s instructions, the plaintiff completed an “A-9 form” for the
accommodation.98 The city denied the accommodation request and denied the plaintiff’s
pleas for reconsideration.99 The plaintiff did not complete an A-9 form for the second
group home but did provide the defendant with the same letters explaining the
accommodation as it did for the first group home.100 Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure

to complete this second A-9 form, the Court found that the city refused the reasonable
accommodation requests for both homes because “it would have been futile” to complete
another A-9 form considering the previous denied request.101 In Oxford House, even
absent a formal application, the defendant still had notice of plaintiff’s accommodation
request for the second group home. Here, the summary judgment record is void of any
evidence that the Plaintiffs would seek zoning accommodations for the Russell Lane and
Delta Place Homes. Therefore, although Plaintiff represents the accommodations would
be identical to the Lettsworth Home,102 which is similar to Oxford House, Plaintiff’s notice,
or lack thereof, to Defendant is differentiated from this Court’s precedent. Only the

Lettsworth Home is before the Court and reconsideration is denied.
In summary, Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the reasonableness
or necessity prong of the reasonable accommodation test.103 The motion to reconsider
partial summary judgment is denied.

97 Id. at 691.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See 38-1, p. 8 (explaining that variance request seeking to expand the definition of “family” in the Zoning
Ordinance “matches exactly the change Plaintiffs need in order to open Delta Place and Russell Lane.”).
103 The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument contending that the “Court erred when it said congregate living
was an acceptable alternative to Rural Agricultural.” Rec. Doc. 63-1, p. 14. First, this statement
misconstrues the Ruling. The Court did not conclude that congregate housing was an acceptable alternative
in its entirety. The Court stated that “from a financial standpoint,” congregate living “may be” a reasonable
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Dispositive Motion and Statement of Material Facts104 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Leave to File Two Exhibits Conventionally105 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration106 is hereby DENIED. The Court amends its prior Ruling107 as set forth

herein however, reconsideration is DENIED in all other respects. The parties are hereby
referred to the Magistrate Judge for a scheduling order.108
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this 1 8 th day of September, 2024.

S
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

accommodation. Rec. Doc. 62, p. 19. The Court did not intend for the parties to interpret this as the Court
concluding that congregate living was an acceptable alternative as there are other factors beyond financial
concerns to consider. Second, the subsequent arguments on this point, and the argument that the Parish’s
alternative will illegally perpetuate segregation will not be considered by the Court. Plaintiffs rely on
evidence the Court stated it will not consider for the purposes of reconsideration. See pgs. 4–5 of this
Ruling. Reconsideration is denied.
104 Rec. Doc. 50.
105 Rec. Doc. 60.
106 Rec. Doc. 63.
107 Rec. Doc. 62.
108 The bench trial originally set for September 19, 2023 was continued without date. Rec. Doc. 36.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648713. Public record. Not legal advice.