# Webber v. Leson Chevrolet Company, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648430

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NATHANIAL WEBBER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 22-910

LESON CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC. SECTION: “T” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

On May 29, 2024, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Plaintiff’s counsel, JP
Gorham, should not be sanctioned for repeatedly violating the orders of this Court by (1)
failing to appear at court-ordered proceedings and (2) unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplying these proceedings by virtue of the filing a motion for sanctions and through her
routine abuse of process in ignoring or otherwise failing to comply with court-ordered
deadlines. (Rec. doc. 100). The Court scheduled a hearing on the matter and provided that
Gorham could file a written brief addressing the issues raised in the show-cause order, which
1
she did. (Rec. doc. 104-2). Also, as permitted by the Court, Defendant, Leson Chevrolet, filed
a response to that brief. (Rec. doc. 106).
The Court held a hearing on June 20, 2024 and took the matter under advisement.
(Rec. doc. 107). After thoroughly considering the procedural history of the case, the parties’
briefs, and the argument of counsel, the Court rules as follows.
A. How We Got Here – The Tortured Procedural History of this Case

The story here begins with the scheduling of Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.
The entire saga was described by the Court in the Order setting the Rule to Show Cause and

it need not be repeated here. To summarize, a dispute arose over where the deposition
would take place – in the Middle or Eastern District of Louisiana. Despite receiving
numerous emails from Defense counsel (properly) insisting that the deposition go forward
in this District (the forum district where both parties also happen to be located), Gorham
noticed the deposition to take place in Baton Rouge, in the Middle District of Louisiana. (Rec.
doc. 51-3).
On the eve of that deposition, Defendant filed a motion for protective order, objecting
to appearing in Baton Rouge, and sought expedited review. (Rec. docs. 51, 52). Because the

deposition was set to take place the next day and the next day was the agreed-upon discovery
deadline, the Court convened a telephone conference with the hope of resolving the dispute
as expeditiously as possible.
At the conference, and as reflected in the Court’s Minute Entry, the Court directed that
the deposition proceed on April 10, 2024, at a mutually-agreeable location in the Eastern
District of Louisiana. (Rec. doc. 56). To provide Gorham a full opportunity to complete the
record in opposition to Leson’s motion, however, the Court also permitted her to file a brief
no later than FriIdda.y, April 12, 2024 to address the arguments made by Defendant in its

motion papers. ( ).
When Gorham filed that brief on behalf of Plaintiff, she accompanied it with an
altogether unexpected motion for sanctions (or something that purported to be a motion for
2
sanctions). (Rec. doc. 71). After being ordered to do so by the Clerk’s office, Gorham re-
filed the motion, which was ultimately set for oral argument on May 23, 2024. (Rec. doc. 83).
She then failed to appear at the May 23 hearing on her motion. (Rec. doc. 100).
As a result of her non-appearance, the Court issued its Order and Reasons and Rule
to Show Cause. As for the sanctions motion, the Court denied thaItd .motion, both owing to
counsel’s failure to appear at the oral argument and on the merits. ( at 5-9). On the merits,
the Court found that the deposition transcript attached to the motion failed to demoInds.trate
misconduct by Defense counsel, either in the nature or frequency of his objections. ( ). As
to the suggestion that Defense counsel be sanctioned for failing to attend the deposition that
Gorham had noticed to take place in the wrong district, the Court observed:
As wasteful and inefficient as it was for Plaintiff’s counsel to go
through the motions of convening a Baton Rouge deposition
under the circumstances, moving for sanctions against Leson
and its counsel for their failure to appear at this show
proceeding is more so, particularly given the fact that the Court
had already ruled on the impropriety of noticing that deposition
Id. in another District.

( at 7-8).
Finally, concerning Gorham’s complaints that she and her client had been subjected
to “surveillance” and confined against their will at Defense counsel’s office during a previous
deposition and that Defense counsel had verbally berated and yelled at her during the
30(b)(6) depIods.ition, the Court found these to be completely unsupported by any evidence in
the record. ( at 5-7).
2
That motion was enSetietled “Ex parte/Consent Motion for Sanctions” and was marked “deficient” by the Clerk’s
Coming out of all this, the Court issued its Order and Reasons and Rule to Show Cause
directing Gorham to appear and show cause why she should not be sanctioned for her third
nonB-a. pTpehaer aRnuclee itno t Shhiso cwa sCea aunsde faonr dfi lRinegla ttheed m Bortiieofnin fgor sanctions.

In response to the aforementioned Order, Gorham filed a pleading entitled “Response
to the Court’s Order and Reason’s [sic] and Rule to Show Cause (Rec. doc. 100) and
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Objections.” (Rec. doc. 104-2). Apparently, Gorham
intended to both respond to the Court’s Order setting the Rule to Show on possible sanctions
and, simultaneously, object to that same Order. Based on the fact that the District Judge
referred the entire matter to me, and considering the substance and tenor of the brief, I
construed this pleading as a motion for reconsideration of the motion for sanctions,
3
combined with a response to the setting of the rule to show cause on the sanctions issue.
To be kind, Gorham’s brief was long on grievance and exceedingly short on self-
awareness – especially for a lawyer with what is very close to an unprecedented history of
failing to appear at court-mandated conferences and hearings. Employing exceedingly
pointed (if not inflammatory) language, Gorham objected repeatedly to the Court’s
suggestions that her latest affront to court orders might be sanctionable. To wit, she was
“profoundly offended” that I “manipulated” the record to portray her as “dishonest and
unprofessional.” (Rec. doc. 104-2 at 2). She accused the Court of “inequitable treatment”

because I insisted upon putting her to her proof (and actually showing up) in making various
scandalous allegations against co-counsel.

3
In sum (and without belaboring the issue), counsel took zero responsibility for failing
to appear for a third time in this one case.
Moreover, she continued to aggressively attack the professionalism of her opponent,

despite the Court having disposed of her motion for sanctions against him. For instance, she
wrote:
It is further deeply concerning and distressing to observe the
Court's portrayal and harsh characterization of my conduct as
Plaintiff's counsel, especially when juxtaposed against the
leniency shown towards the Defendant's counsel's clear and
Id. blatant unprofessional behavior.

( ). Predictably, then, Defense counsel felt compelled to file a response memorandum to
address these continuing broadsides. (Rec. doc. 106).
Following the filing of these pleadings, the hearing on the Rule to Show Cause went
forward.
At that hearing, the Court made a number of things clear. First, that the tone of
Gorham’s attacks on opposing counsel was beyond the pale, especially for a lawyer who was
being made to explain why she herself shouldn’t be sanctioned for missing multiple court-
ordered hearings and conferences:
THE COURT: I don't find that the language that you have used
in these briefs to describe the conduct of your opposing counsel
to be respectful in the least. It is the opposite of respectful.
. . . .
When you accuse a lawyer of that level of [un]professionalism,
you've got to come with proof, and you haven't done that.
. . . .
The other thing I want to suggest to you is that – I remember
somebody telling me this when I was a lawyer. Once you finish
writing your brief, put it to the side, and then reread it before
you file it. Because there's a lot of stuff in these briefs that
shouldn't be here. Particularly in a brief that's responding to a
rule to show cause why you shouldn't be sanctioned for
(Rec. doc. 113 at 9).
Second, the Court made clear (or thought it had) that it was not going to revisit the
merits of the previously denied motion for sanctions, both because Gorham had failed to
support her allegations in her briefs and had subsequently failed to appear at the hearing on
the motion:
THE COURT: . . . . But when you move to the next level and
somebody is screaming at you and yelling at you and hovering
over you and intimidating you, I need proof of that.
MS. GORHAM: I can provide you proof.
THE COURT: The ship has sailed. Okay? This is a motion for
reconsideration. The record is what the record is, and we're not
Id. going to keep relitigating this issue.

( at 15-16). And, while the Court took counsel to task for her rhetorical tone, I also advised
her that it would not sanction her for filing the motion in the first place.
As to the submission by Defendant of its request for reasonable fees and costs, the
Court permitted Gorham to file a supplemental memorandum addressing the
reasonableness of that request (which she had not done in a reply brief in advance of the
hearing). When the Court indicated at the hearing it would allow this briefing, Defense
counsel raised concerns that the supplemental briefing would continue Plaintiff’s counsel’s
pattern of engaging in ad hominem attacks on him. The Court responded that Gorham should
have already received the message that such attacks wouldn’t be tolerated:
THE COURT: I think I have spoken to what I – I mean, I've said
something to Counsel that I don't know that I've ever said
before, which is re-read what you're going to file and tone it
down so that it's respectful and not inflammatory. We don't
need any more of that.
MR. BEEBE: That's right. And, Judge, I only point this out
because this was not the first time. Again, it becomes a repeat
behavior.
. . . .
MR. BEEBE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm attempting to avoid
that we have any more vitriol.
THE COURT: I've just spent 15-20 minutes doing the same thing.
Id. MR. BEEBE: Very good.
THE COURT: I feel like Ms. Gorham is hearing what I'm saying.
( at 19).
C. TheI tS suepepmles mtheant tGaolr Bhraimef winags not hearing me at all.

Rather than contain herself to traversing Defense counsel’s fee submission (as I had
directed), Gorham used the opportunity to double down on her already-dismissed
complaints that Defense counsel engaged in unethical and unprofessional conduct, locked
her and her client in his office for 15 minutes during a break in a deposition, and created a
“disturbing surveillance environment” in and around that same deposition. (Rec. doc. 108).
She then went next-level, attaching declarations under penalty of perjury from herself and
hIedr. client stating that her allegations of nefarious conduct by Defense counsel were all true.
( ). This was all in the face of the Court explaining that (1) the motion would not be
revisited, (2) her opportunity to present such evidence had long since passed, and (3) her
attacks on counsel were both unsupported and inflammatory.
Gorham has clearly not heard the Court. This is frustrating to say the least. It is also
a serious problem for someone before the Court for possible sanctions for serially missing
and/or ignoring deadlines across multiple cases. Both the underlying conduct (those missed
engagements) and her responses to being ordered to explain that conduct make it clear to
the Court that further sanctions are not only warranted, but necessary.
D. Sanctions

There are numerous mechanisms by which district courts exercise sanction powers,
including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (through Rules 11, 16, 26, 30 and/or 37); 28

U.S.C. §1927; and the inherent power of the courts to manage their own proceedings and to
control the conduct of those who appear before them. Regardless of the source, it is well-
established that the primaryS epeu, rep.go.se of sanctions is to deter frivolous litigation and ongoing
and future abusive tactics. , Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(S2e)e. , Sea.gn.c, tPioanvesl sice e&k LtoeF dloerteer v b. oMthar tvheel
cEunltpma’bt lGe raotutoprney and members of the bar in general.
, 493 U.S. 120, 126-F2r7e d( 1A9. 8S9m)i t(hfi nLduimngb etrh aCto t. hve. Epdriidminary purpose of Rule 11 is
deterrence, not compensation); , 845 F.2d 750, 752 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“the most important purpose of Rule 11 sanctionsS iasn tcot idoentse:r T fhriev oFleoduesr alilt iLgaawti oonf

aLnitdig tahteio nab Aubsiuvsee practices of attorneys”); Gregory P. Joseph,
§ 47(A) (2d ed.) (noting that the purpose of Rule 37 is four-fold: “(1)
penalizing the culpable party or attorney; (2) deterring others from engaging in similar
conduct; (3) compensating the court and oItdh.er parties for the expense caused by the abusive
conduct; and (4) compelling discovery”); at § 20 (noting that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. §
1927 is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation).
Whether a district court exercises its sanctions authority under the Federal Rules of
CTiovpial lPiaronc ve.d Euhrrem, 2a8n U.S.C. § 1927, or its inherent power, it does so at its “broad discretion.”

, 3 F.3d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1993). “The discretion vested in the trial court
is granted so Jietsn nthinogusg vh.t Jfouslh euxae rIc.Si.sDe. will carry out the educational and deterrent functions of
the rule[s].” , 948 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1991).
Gorham’s failures to appear are a Rule 16 problem. The sanctions provision of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides:
In General.
(f) Sanctions.
(1) On motion or on its own, the court may
issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(vii), if a party or its attorney:

(A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial
conference; or
. . . .
(C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial
Impoorsdinegr. Fees and Costs

(2) . Instead of or in addition to
any other sanction, the court must order the party, its
attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses –
including attorney's fees – incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule, unless the noncompliance
was substantially justified or other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16 (emphasis added). It is pursuant to this framework that the Court
considers the appropriate sanction for Gorham for what appears to be her habitual faliures
to appear.
Beyond counsel’s conduct in this case, the Court’s analysis must also be informed by
her history in this Court pre-dating this case. As previously catalogued in its Order setting
all of this for hearing, this is hardly counsel’s first transgression when it comes to simply
showing up.
To recap what has happened in the present case, Gorham’s no-show at the hearing on
her Motion for Sanctions was her third. She failed to appear at the Court-ordered scheduling
conference on August 16, 2023, prompting the District Judge to reset that hearing. (Rec. doc.
34). After the District Judge granted Plaintiff’s motion to continue due to incomplete
Id.
set by the Court to select new dates. ( at 1-2). That caused theId C.ourt to issue an Order to
Show Cause why the Plaintiff’s case should not be dismissed. ( at 2). Plaintiff’s counsel
responded, citing numerous personal issues and scheduling mishaps as reasons for missing

the two Court-ordered conferences, and the District Judge declined to take further action.
(Rec. doc. 35).
A sixth Scheduling Order was issued by the District Judge, setting a deadline for
Plaintiff to designate experts and issue reports by February 22, 2024. (Rec. doc. 37). The
day before that deadline, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte/Consent motion to extend the expert
deadline a somewhat staggering three months, to May 22, 2024 (at that time, the trial was
scheduled to begin June 10, 2024). Now, against this unusual background of non-compliance
with deadlines and other court orders, the Court must confront another non-appearance by

counsel.
As noted above, in determining the appropriate sanction for these non-appearances,
the Court must Daulsnon c vo. nAspidacehr ecounsel’s history in this District of similar failures to appear.
4
Her conduct in (for which she was sanctioned twice) was strikingly similar
to (but even more egregious than) that displayed here. Mindful of the goal of deterring future
similar misconduct in assessing the appropriate sanction, a brief discussion of the relevant
history of Dthuantn case is appropriate then.
In , Gorham (who represented the plaintiff) failed to attend a telephonic status
conference on March 8, 2019. (No. 17-cv-12777, rec. doc. 62). When the Court could Indo. t
contact her, District Judge Ivan Lemelle issued an order re-setting the conference. ( ).
Gorham failed to appear for that conference, failed to provide the Court with a contact
Dunn v. Apache Indus. Servs.
Id.
number, and was unresponsive to the Court’s attempts to contact her. ( , rec. doc. 63).
OIwd.ing to these failures, Judge Lemelle actually dismissed Plaintiff’s case without prejudice.
( ).

Following the order of dismissal, Gorham filed a motion for relief and/or
reconsideration, suggesting that her failures to coIdm.ply with court orders were due to
inadvertence and a technical issue with her pIhdo. ne. ( , rec. doc. 64). The Court granted that
motion and vacated its order of dismissal. ( , rec. doc. 71). In that order, the Court found
that, while counsel’s “neglectful” conduct did not justify punishing an innocent plaintiff by
dismissing herI dc.ase, a $200 monetary sanction on counsel was appropriate to deter future
misconduct. ( ).
It's become clear that such a sanction was not nearly sufficient to achieve the stated

goal of deterrence.
Following the actual dismissal of her client’s case and a monetary sanction, Gorham
continued to violate and/or ignore Judge Lemelle’s orders. The record indicatides. that she
violated the scheduling order in that case by serving discovery requests late, ( , reIdc.. doc.
94), and failed to attend two more scheduling conferences ordered by the Court. ( , rec.
docs. 134, 137-38). As a result of thIeds.e additional failures, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss, citing lack of prosecution. ( , rec. doc. 137). In a seven-page “Order and Reasons”
citing counsel’s record of “repeated failures to comIpdl.y with court orders,” Judge Lemelle set

the motion to dismiss for an evidentiary hearing. ( , rec. doc. 139).
The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion to
dismiss, finding that a lesser sanction (than dismissal) was “appropriate to guard against
Id.
future failures to comply with Court Orders.” ( , rec. doc. 155). That lesser sanctioIdn. was
$2,000, assessed against Gorham and payable to Defendant by November 29, 2021. ( ).
Against this backdrop, the Court turns again to Gorham’s record in this case. The first

court-ordered conference Gorham missed in this case was August 16, 2023 – almost two
years after being sanctioned $2,000 by Judge Lemelle in an effort to deter such future
violations. As was the case with Judge Lemelle’s initial $200 sanction, his subsequent $2,000
sanction clearly did not have had the desired or intended effect, as counsel has now missed
tDhurnene more court-ordered conferences or hearings in this case (to go along with the four from
).
Compounding these failures, Gorham continues to ignore the Court’s orders and
directions concerning her ill-advised motion for sanctions and insists on continuing to

aggressively litigate that motion and the issues raised therein, despite the Court very
pointedly denying that motion and explaining at the June 20, 2024 hearing that her motion
to reconsider would also be denied. (Rec. doc. 113).
Notably, the Court-ordered briefing in which Gorham was directed to address her
non-appearances in this case was long on grievance and complaints about opposing
counsel’s conduct and the Court’s treatment of her and very short on acceptance of
5
responsibility, remorse, or anything approaching a mea culpa for routinely failing to appear.
She persists in re-litigating a losing cause (which consists entirely of attacks on opposing

5
Finally, at the show-cause hearing, Gorham informed the Court that she was “deeply remorseful” for her non-
appearances. (Rec. doc. 113 at 12). And in her post-hearing supplemental brief she wrote that she “has
counsel’s professionalism), which requires opposing counsel to respond and, of course,
requires the Court to continue to grapple with a denied motion.
Based upon all this, the Court finds that Gorham’s third non-appearance in this case

is a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and that a sanction is appropriate for that
violation. Unlike Rule 11, Rule 16 proscribes certain acts regardless of purpose or
motivation. Failure to attend a scheduled hearing falls within this category – no doubt serial
failures qualify. Improper motive, bad-faith, even reckless behavior, is not a prerequisite for
finding a violation of the Rule. So long as the court is convinced counsel or her office received
proper and timely notice, a negligent failure to attend the scheduled conference amounts to
a violation of the Rule.
In addition to this violation, the Court also finds that Gorham’s insistence on re-

litigating the matters raised in her motion for sanction is a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which
provides,
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.

28 U.S.C. § 1927. Gorham’s Motion for Sanctions was denied due to her own non-appearance
at the hearing on that motion as well as on the merits. (Rec. doc. 100). At the oral argument
on her “Motion for Objections to the Magistrate's Order and Rule to Show Cause,” the Court
made it abundantly clear that the time for trying to support those arguments had paspsaesds iamnd
warned counsel against continuing to lash out at opposing counsel. (Rec. doc. 113, ).
The Court even short-circuited Defense Counsel’s argument with this closing observation:
MR. BEEBE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm attempting to avoid
that we have any more vitriol.
THE COURT: I've just spent 15-20 minutes doing the same thing.
MR. BEEBE: Very good.
Id. THE COURT: I feel like Ms. Gorham is hearing what I'm saying.

( at 19) (emphasis added). The Court was wrong about that last bit, given that Gorham
followed up immediately with yet another pleading doubling down on her attacks on
counsel’s professionalism and taking the additional step of including declarations made
under penalty of perjury repeating those same attacks.
This is all wasteful in the extreme. The Court finds that Gorham’s conduct along this
continuum rises to the level of conduct that has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the
proceedings, in violation of Section 1927.
Finally, the Court turns to an appropriate sanction. Rule 16 authorizes monetary and
non-monetary sanctions, whereas Section 1927 authorizes only monetary sanctions in the
form of excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of the
conduct being sanctioned. Here, Defense counsel has requested $3,500 in reasonable
attorney’s fees. (Rec. doc. 106). As a direct result of the motion for sanctions, Gorham’s non-
appearance, and her continuing efforts to re-litigate a lost cause, the Court notes that Defense
counsel has been required to file three separate memoranda and appear at two different live
hearings. (Rec. docs. 82, 106, 111). This is not to mention the amount of time the Court has
been forced to expend on all this.
Whether a court wields its sanction powers under the TFoepdaelriaaln Rules, 28 U.S.C. §1927,
or its inherent power, it does so at its “broad discretion.” , 3 F.3d at 934. “The
discretion vested in the trial court is granted soJ eitnsn tinhgosughtful exercise will carry out the
educational and deterrent functions of the rule.” , 948 F.2d at 199.
Concerning the fashioning of an appropriate sanction on a case-by-case basis, the
Fifth Circuit has stated,
Under this circuit's pGroenczeadleenz tv, .w Teri hnaitvye M reaqriunier eGdr pth., aInt cth. e district
court use “the least onesreoeu asl ssoa Tnocptiaolnia nwhich will address the
offensive conduct.” , 117 F.3d
894, 899 (5th Cir.1997); , 3 F.3d at 937 (holding
that district courts must show that “sanctions are not vindictive
or overly harsh reactions to objectionable conduct, and that the
amount and type of sanction was necessary to carry out the
Brown v. Oil Stpautersp Soksaeg oift tShmea stacnoctioning provision”) (citation omitted).

, 664 F.3d 71, 78 (5th Cir. 2011).

In conducting this required analysis in this case, the Court cannot ignore Gorham’s
prior conduct and the fact that a $200 sanction followed by a $2,000 sanction for serial non-
6
appearances before another judge in this District did not have the intended effect of
deterring future misconduct.
Based on all of the above, the Court finds that a sanction of $3,500, payable as
attorneys’ fees to Defense Counsel, is appropriate here. As noted, the amount of this sanction
aligns, not only with the cost to Defendant and counsel, but also with the well-established
goal of deterrence. Given the failure of a $2,000 sanction to achieve this goal, the Court must
look beyond that figure.
No lawyer should have to be sanctioned three times. The Court sincerely hopes this
is the last time that Gorham appears before any Court to answer for the type of shortcomings
described herein. It certainly hopes that this sanction has the desired effect and that no court
in the future has to consider more onerous sanctions against counsel.
Dunn
DENIES
Accordingly, the Court hereby Plaintiff’s “Motion for Objections to the
Magistrate's Order and Rule to Show Cause.” (Rec. doc. 102). The Court further orders that
J.P. Gorham is sanctioned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 for repeated failures

to appear at court-ordered hearings and conferences and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for
multiplying the proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously by continuing to litigate and brief
issues that were decided by the Court and no longer ripe for litigation. Gorham is hereby
ordered to pay to Defense Counsel $3,500 in reasonable attorneys’ fees. That payment shall
be made no later than October 1, 2024, and Gorham shall notify the Court once the payment
has been made in satisfaction of this Order.
26th August
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of _________________________, 2024.

MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648430. Public record. Not legal advice.