# McHugh, III v. St. Tammany Parish

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · June 25, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648228

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 25, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648228

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that parish council members in their official capacities did not enjoy absolute legislative immunity
- declining to dismiss official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief asserted against members of a county board of education as redundant of the claims asserted against the board itself
- concluding that the “permissive, not mandatory,” language used in “cases discussing dismissal of redundant defendants” “suggest[s] that dismissal of official capacity suits is not required” (citations omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIAM R. MCHUGH, III, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-1300
ST. TAMMANY PARISH, ET AL. SECTION “O”
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion1 of
Defendant David Cougle, in his official capacity as a member of the St. Tammany
Parish Council, to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief that Plaintiffs William R. McHugh, III, Anthony Parr, and Rebecca
Taylor assert against him. Cougle contends that Plaintiffs fail to state Section 1983

claims against him because he enjoys absolute legislative immunity. But personal
immunities—including absolute legislative immunity—are defenses to individual-
capacity claims for damages; they are not defenses to Plaintiffs’ official-capacity
claims for prospective equitable relief. Cougle also contends that Plaintiffs’ official-
capacity claims are redundant of the official-capacity claims against Defendant St.
Tammany Parish. But deciding to dismiss redundant claims is discretionary, and

Cougle has not persuaded the Court that it should exercise its discretion to dismiss
the official-capacity claims against him as redundant at this early stage. Accordingly,
for these reasons and for those that follow, Cougle’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

1 ECF No. 21
I. BACKGROUND
This civil-rights case arises from Plaintiffs’ claim that the St. Tammany Parish
Council violated the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the

Louisiana Constitution by issuing a May 2, 2024 resolution (the “Resolution”)
terminating Plaintiffs’ five-year, fixed-term appointments to the St. Tammany Parish
Library Board of Control (the “Library Board”) and appointing five2 new Library
Board members.3 Plaintiffs generally claim that the St. Tammany Parish Council
issued the Resolution in retaliation for protected speech Plaintiffs made during
Library Board meetings on the topic of minors’ access to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, and Queer (“LGBTQ”) literature at St. Tammany Parish libraries.4

Plaintiffs William R. McHugh, III, Anthony Parr, and Rebecca Taylor allege
that they are appointed members of the Library Board5 serving five-year, fixed terms
that ended on June 1, 2024. According to the complaint, six of the Library Board’s
seven members are appointed by the St. Tammany Parish Council, the legislative
arm of St. Tammany Parish government.6 Plaintiffs allege that the St. Tammany
Parish Council appointed Plaintiff McHugh to the Library Board on June 1, 2023 for

a five-year term expiring on August 4, 2027;7 that the Parish Council appointed
Plaintiff Parr on June 1, 2023 for a five-year term expiring on July 12, 2027;8 and

2 One of the Library Board’s six Parish Council-appointed members, Ann Shaw, was
reappointed via the May 2 Resolution. See ECF No. 13-1 at 1. Thus, the Resolution resulted in the
appointment of five new Library Board members.
3 See generally ECF No. 1.
4 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 88.
5 Id. at ¶¶ 1–3.
6 Id. at ¶ 5.
7 Id. at ¶ 1.
8 Id. at ¶ 2.
that the Parish Council appointed Plaintiff Taylor on July 7, 2022 for a five-year term
expiring on July 12, 2027.9 According to the complaint, Parr is the Library Board’s
“secretary/treasurer,”10 and Taylor is the Library Board’s president.11

Plaintiffs allege that the May 2024 termination of their appointments to the
Library Board represents the culmination of “a firestorm of controversy” that began
in June 2022.12 Then, three of St. Tammany Parish’s twelve library branches—the
Slidell, Madisonville, and Mandeville branches—featured displays announcing
“Pride Month,” “an annual commemoration of primarily [LGBTQ] pride.”13 According
to Plaintiffs’ complaint, “one display in the children’s section at the Mandeville
branch library prompted complaints from patrons concerned about their children’s

exposure to the materials.”14 Per Plaintiffs, “a near-capacity crowd offered widespread
support for the Pride displays” at a Library Board meeting in July 2022.15
After that July 2022 meeting, according to Plaintiffs, “[t]he controversy
shifted” from Pride displays to books “featuring LGBTQ themes.”16 Plaintiffs allege
that St. Tammany Parish residents formed the St. Tammany Library Accountability
Project, “an advocacy organization” with a “purported mission to prevent the sexual

exploitation of children.”17 Defendant David Cougle is a co-founder of the St.

9 Id. at ¶ 3.
10 Id. at ¶ 2.
11 Id. at ¶ 3.
12 Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
13 Id. at ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
14 Id. at ¶ 10.
15 Id. at ¶ 13.
16 Id. at ¶ 14.
17 Id. at ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Tammany Library Accountability Project.18 Plaintiffs allege that Cougle leveraged
“the issue of library materials” to win election to the St. Tammany Parish Council.19
According to the complaint, between summer 2022 and his election to the St.

Tammany Parish Council in October 2023, Cougle repeatedly denounced the Library
Board and its handling of the issue of minors’ access to LGBTQ literature that Cougle
and the St. Tammany Library Accountability Project deemed “sexually explicit” or
“pedophilic.”20 Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that Cougle launched an online
petition titled “Stop the Saint Tammany Parish Library System’s Sexual Exploitation
of Children!”;21 that Cougle later updated the online petition to announce his
candidacy for Parish Council and to promise that, if elected, he would “do everything

in [his] power to solve the library crisis[]”;22 that Cougle called the St. Tammany
Parish Library System’s administration “predatory”23; that Cougle vowed to “remove
[L]ibrary [B]oard members that refused to accept community standards” if Cougle
were elected to the Parish Council;24 and that Cougle criticized what Cougle perceived
to be the “liberal” and “far-left” political affiliation of the Library Board.25
According to the complaint, the current members of the St. Tammany Parish

Council—including Cougle—won election in October 2023.26 Plaintiffs allege that the
October 2023 Parish Council “election swept nine new members into power,” and that

18 Id. at ¶ 16.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 18, 21, 23, 31, 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. at ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. at ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 Id. at ¶ 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id. at ¶ 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 42, 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 Id. at ¶ 46.
“only four of the current 14 Council members were previous incumbents.”27 The
current Parish Council took office in January 2024.28
After Cougle and the other current members of the Parish Council took office,

in late January 2024, Cougle allegedly wrote a position paper claiming that the
Library Board appointments were “not in compliance with state law.”29 According to
the complaint, Cougle contended that Section 25:214 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes requires staggered terms for Library Board appointments, and that because
the appointees were not serving staggered terms, the appointments were “invalid.”30
Cougle allegedly claimed that the existing seats on the Library Board “were deemed
vacant,” and “urged the Parish Council to declare existing [Library Board] members’

terms expired, and to nominate candidates for appointment to a staggered term[.]”31
According to the complaint, in February 2024, the St. Tammany Parish Library
Accountability Project urged the St. Tammany Parish Council to “refrain[] from
supporting” Plaintiffs, who the Project “perceived to be responsible for the current
crisis.”32 A few days later, according to Plaintiffs’ complaint, the St. Tammany Parish
Library Accountability Project urged the St. Tammany Parish Council to “replac[e]

the people who caused the problem,” i.e., Plaintiffs.33
In March 2024, according to Plaintiffs, Cougle introduced a Parish Council
resolution calling for nominations to fill the Library Board positions that Cougle’s

27 Id.
28 Id. at ¶ 49.
29 Id. at ¶ 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Id.
31 Id. at ¶ 52.
32 Id. at ¶ 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 Id. at ¶ 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
position paper had declared “vacant.”34 Plaintiffs allege that the Parish Council voted
to postpone action on Cougle’s resolution;35 however, at a Parish Council meeting the
next month, in April 2024, another Parish Council member introduced a

“substantially similar” substitute resolution.36 The substitute resolution called for (1)
the appointment of six Library Board members to staggered terms that would start
on June 1, 2024, and (2) Library Board nominations who would be voted on at the
May 2, 2024 meeting and whose staggered terms would be assigned by randomly
drawn lots.37 Consistent with the substitute resolution, Plaintiffs allege, the Parish
Council nominated 22 candidates to the Library Board, including Plaintiffs and the
other then-sitting members of the Library Board, Carmen Butler and Ann Shaw.38

According to the complaint, on May 2, 2024, the Parish Council issued the
Resolution reflecting the Council’s vote not to appoint Plaintiffs to the Library
Board.39 Rather than reappointing Plaintiffs, the Parish Council voted to appoint five
candidates that had been endorsed as “approved conservative candidates” who “would
protect our children” in an ad that ran in the Slidell Independent the week before the
Parish Council meeting.40 Besides those five candidates, one sitting Library Board

member, Ann Shaw, was reappointed to the Library Board.41 The Resolution
described these staggered appointments as “necessary” “[i]n order to comply with

34 Id. at ¶ 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Id. at ¶ 59.
36 Id. at ¶ 63.
37 Id. at ¶ 64.
38 Id. at ¶ 65.
39 Id. at ¶ 69; see also ECF No. 13-1 at 1–2.
40 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 67, 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 ECF No. 13-1 at 1.
state law,” specifically “La. R.S. 25:214(B).”42
Eighteen days after the St. Tammany Parish Council issued the Resolution
appointing Plaintiffs’ replacements, on May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs brought this 42

U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit in this Court.43 Plaintiffs sued St. Tammany Parish and Cougle,
in his official capacity as a member of the St. Tammany Parish Council.44 In their
complaint, Plaintiffs allege four causes of action (1) First Amendment retaliation;45
(2) viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment;46 (3) substantive-due-
process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment;47 and (4) violations of the free-
speech rights enshrined in Article I, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution.48 Plaintiffs
seek attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and “declaratory relief and an

injunction barring enforcement” of the Resolution.49 Plaintiffs do not seek damages.50
As for the First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiffs allege that they
“engaged in protected First Amendment activities” when they “discuss[ed] Library
Board actions and agenda items; discuss[ed] and vot[ed] on book challenges;
discuss[ed] censorship; [and] discuss[ed] accessibility and display of items at parish
libraries.”51 Plaintiffs allege that St. Tammany Parish and Cougle “engaged in

adverse action [against Plaintiffs] in suggesting, discussing, and passing [the

42 Id.
43 See generally ECF No. 1.
44 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7.
45 Id. at ¶¶ 83–94.
46 Id. at ¶¶ 95–109.
47 Id. at ¶¶ 110–117.
48 Id. at ¶¶ 118–123.
49 Id. at 1 (unnumbered opening paragraph).
50 Id. at 24 (unnumbered “wherefore” clause).
51 Id. at ¶ 85.
Resolution] to appoint six new Library Board members, replacing Plaintiffs and
effectively terminating their duly made appointments to the Library Board.”52 And
Plaintiffs allege that those “adverse actions were motivated by and taken in

retaliation for Plaintiffs’ speech, not for another legitimate government reason.”53
As for the viewpoint-discrimination claim, Plaintiffs allege that they “exercised
their fundamental constitutional right to speak at Library Board meetings[] [by]
expressing their views about Library Board actions and agenda items; by voting on
book challenges; by discussing censorship; [and] by discussing accessibility and
display of items at parish libraries.”54 Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants discriminated
against the content and viewpoint of Plaintiffs’ speech by terminating their

appointments to the Library Board.”55 And Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ motive
in removing Plaintiffs from the Library Board was to silence a particular viewpoint.”56
As for the substantive-due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Plaintiffs allege that they “have a liberty interest” in their unpaid, voluntary
appointments to the Library Board that “was implicated in the Parish Council’s
actions to remove them.”57 Plaintiffs allege that the Parish Council terminated their

appointments “based on various false charges that were publicized, i.e., that they are
liberal, activist, members of a political conspiracy to sexualize children.”58 According
to Plaintiffs, “Defendants failed to refute these untrue allegations, failed to protect

52 Id. at ¶ 88.
53 Id. at ¶ 90.
54 Id. at ¶ 99.
55 Id. at ¶101.
56 Id. at ¶ 102.
57 Id. at ¶ 111.
58 Id. at ¶ 112.
Plaintiffs’ professional standing and reputation, and failed to redress the damages
caused to them by the false charges of Cougle and others.”59 Plaintiffs ultimately
allege that “Defendants terminated Plaintiffs’ positions . . . without providing them

due process of law to refute and redress these unfounded and untrue charges.”60
Finally, as for the fourth and final claim—a free-speech claim under Article I,
§ 7 of the Louisiana Constitution—Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants intentionally
and willfully retaliated against Plaintiffs for exercising their freedom of speech and
association by acting to terminate their appointments to the Library Board.”61
On the same day Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing

the Resolution.62 In that May 20 motion, Plaintiffs asked the Court to issue injunctive
relief before June 1, when the terms of the Library Board members appointed through
the St. Tammany Parish Council’s May 2 Resolution would begin.63 Plaintiffs did not
submit any evidence supporting the motion for a temporary restraining order.64
On May 31, two days after oral argument,65 the Court denied the motion for a
temporary restraining order.66 The Court concluded that “Plaintiffs ha[d] not carried

their heavy burden to prove an unequivocal need for issuance of a temporary
restraining order by June 1, 2024.”67 “Specifically,” the Court concluded that

59 Id. at ¶ 115.
60 Id. at ¶117.
61 Id. at ¶ 121.
62 ECF No. 3.
63 ECF No. 3-1 at 20.
64 ECF Nos. 3 (motion); 3-1 (supporting memorandum); 3-2 (proposed order).
65 See ECF No. 16 (minute entry).
66 ECF No. 17.
67 Id. at 1.
“Plaintiffs ha[d] not shown a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the new
Library Board members appointed on May 2 begin their terms on June 1, considering
the first meeting of the new Library Board purportedly will not occur until July 22.”68

Importantly, however, the Court “emphasize[d] that its conclusion and analysis
[were] based on the limited briefing and the lack of evidence before it, and that the
Court’s preliminary-injunction analysis could depart sharply from the necessarily
abbreviated analysis offered” in the opinion denying a temporary restraining order.69
Five days later, on June 5, the Court consolidated the hearing on Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction with a bench trial on the merits of the action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).70 The Court’s minute entry and order

provided the parties “clear and unambiguous notice of the [C]ourt’s intent to
consolidate the trial and the hearing . . . at a time which still afford[ed] the parties a
full opportunity to present their respective cases.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). No
party objected to consolidation. The bench trial is scheduled to start on July 8.71
Now, Cougle moves to dismiss the claims against him for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6).72 Plaintiffs oppose.73 Cougle elected not to file a reply.74

68 Id.
69 Id. at 12.
70 ECF No. 18 at 2.
71 Id.
72 ECF No. 21.
73 ECF No. 28.
74 See generally Docket, E.D. La. No. 24-CV-1300 (last visited June 24, 2024).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not

satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Although ‘[courts] accept all well-pled facts as
true, construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions are not accepted as true.’” Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir.
2024) (quoting Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)).
III. ANALYSIS
Cougle moves to dismiss the official-capacity Section 1983 claims against him
for failure to state a claim.75 He makes two principal arguments.76 First, Cougle

contends that Plaintiffs fail to state any official-capacity claims against him because
he enjoys absolute legislative immunity.77 Second, Cougle contends that Plaintiffs’
official-capacity claims against him are redundant of Plaintiffs’ official-capacity
claims against St. Tammany Parish.78 The Court takes each argument in turn.
A. Absolute Legislative Immunity
Cougle contends that Plaintiffs fail to state Section 1983 claims against him
because he enjoys absolute legislative immunity.79 The Supreme Court has “held that

state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under
§ 1983 for their legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998)
(citations omitted). “Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken ‘in
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’” Id. at 54 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). Cougle’s legislative-immunity argument proceeds in three
steps. First, Cougle reasons that “[t]he act which allegedly resulted in the Plaintiffs’

injuries” is the St. Tammany Parish Council’s passage of the Resolution.80 Second,
Cougle reasons that passing the Resolution is a legislative act.81 And third, because
passing the Resolution is a legislative act, Cougle reasons that he “cannot be found

75 ECF No. 21.
76 ECF No. 21-1 at 1–10.
77 Id. at 5–8.
78 Id. at 8–10.
79 Id. at 5–8.
80 Id. at 4.
81 Id. at 5–8.
liable under [Section] 1983 for acts done in connection with the” Resolution.82
But Cougle’s argument overlooks both the capacity in which he has been sued
and the form of relief Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs sued Cougle in his official capacity as

a member of the St. Tammany Parish Council,83 and Plaintiffs seek injunctive and
declaratory relief—not money damages—against him.84 “Official capacity suits
generally represent another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.” Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). “Unlike government officials sued in their individual capacities,
municipal entities and local governing bodies,” like St. Tammany Parish, “do not
enjoy immunity from suit, either absolute or qualified, under § 1983.” Id. (citation

omitted). “Consequently,” courts may not properly dismiss a claim against someone
acting in an official capacity based on absolute immunity “because that form of
personal or individual immunity is not available in an official capacity suit.” Id. at
467 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[a]bsolute and qualified immunity protect only
individuals from claims for damages; they do not bar official-capacity claims or claims
for injunctive relief.” Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 956 F.3d 773, 778 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020)

(italics in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Chrissy F.
by Medley v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Neither
absolute nor qualified personal immunity extends to suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief under § 1983.”).

82 Id. at 5 (capitalization removed)
83 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.
84 Id. at 24 (unnumbered “wherefore” clause).
Cougle is not entitled to absolute legislative immunity for two independent
reasons. First, Plaintiffs sued Cougle in his official capacity.85 See Burge, 187 F.3d at
466–67; Singleton, 956 F.3d at 778 n.3. And second, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and

injunctive relief against him.86 See Chrissy F. by Medley, 925 F.2d at 849. So, absolute
legislative immunity poses no bar to the official-capacity claims against Cougle for
injunctive and declaratory relief. See Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v.
Jefferson Par. Gov’t, 849 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that parish council
members in their official capacities did not enjoy absolute legislative immunity). The
Court denies Cougle’s motion to dismiss based on absolute legislative immunity.87
B. Redundancy

Cougle next contends that the Court should dismiss the official-capacity claims
against him because they are redundant of the claims against St. Tammany Parish.
It is true that the official-capacity claims against Cougle are, “in all respects other
than name, to be treated as [claims] against” St. Tammany Parish. Jefferson Cmty.
Health Care Ctrs., Inc., 849 F.3d at 624 (citations and quotation marks omitted). And
it is true that the Court has discretion to dismiss official-capacity claims as redundant

if they “seek identical relief as claims against a governmental entity.” Notariano v.
Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 266 F. Supp. 3d 919, 928 (E.D. La. 2017) (citation omitted).

85 Id. at ¶ 7.
86 Id. at 24 (unnumbered “wherefore” clause).
87 Because the Court concludes that Cougle does not enjoy absolute legislative immunity given
(1) the official capacity in which he has been sued and (2) the equitable and declaratory relief that
Plaintiffs seek against him, the Court need not—and so the Court does not—reach the merits of
Cougle’s absolute-legislative-immunity argument. See ECF No. 21-1 at 4–8.
But dismissing official-capacity claims as redundant is discretionary; it is not
required. See, e.g., Owens v. District of Columbia, 631 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2009)
(observing that “there is no requirement” that an official-capacity claim against a

government official be dismissed as redundant of the claim against the government
entity); Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(concluding that the “permissive, not mandatory,” language used in “cases discussing
dismissal of redundant defendants” “suggest[s] that dismissal of official capacity suits
is not required” (citations omitted)). After all, Rule 12(b)(6) motions ask whether a
complaint contains well-pleaded factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief; a claim that is redundant does not necessarily fail Rule 8(a)(2)’s

pleading standard. See generally, e.g., Crighton v. Schuylkill Cnty., 882 F. Supp. 411,
415 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (distinguishing a redundant claim from a claim that should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)). And Cougle, for his part, cites no binding precedent
supporting the proposition that the Court must dismiss the official-capacity claims
against him if the Court determines that those claims are indeed redundant.88
What is more, courts often decline to exercise their discretion to dismiss as

redundant official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against

88 See ECF No. 21-1 at 1–10. Cougle cites three district-court opinions, see id. at 9, but none of
them addresses a situation like this one: a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as redundant official-
capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against an independently elected official who is alleged
to have engaged in specific misconduct culminating in the alleged constitutional violations that form
the basis of Section 1983 claims. See, e.g., Rogers v. Smith, 603 F. Supp. 3d 295, 303 (E.D. La. 2022)
(dismissing official-capacity claims asserted against sheriff’s office employees as redundant of claims
asserted against sheriff); Baqer v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, No. 20-CV-980, 2021 WL 1090866, at *8
(E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2021) (dismissing official-capacity claims asserted against a former sheriff and a
former warden as redundant of the claims asserted against the government entity); Muslow v. Bd. of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., No. 19-CV-11793, 2020 WL 1864876, at *12 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2020)
(dismissing official-capacity claims asserted against state officials as barred by sovereign immunity).
government officials. See, e.g., Barnett v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 60 F. Supp. 3d
1216, 1235–36 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (declining to dismiss official-capacity claims for
prospective injunctive relief asserted against members of a county board of education

as redundant of the claims asserted against the board itself). That is particularly true
where, as here, the official-capacity request for injunctive relief is asserted against
an elected official who is alleged to have played a “central role” in the case. See, e.g.,
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. Cnty. Of Mille Lacs, Minn., 650 F. Supp. 3d 690, 708–
11 (D. Minn. 2023) (declining to dismiss official-capacity claims for injunctive relief
asserted against county officials as redundant of the claims asserted against the
county where the officials were “the primary actors” who played a “central role” in

the case, and it was “not entirely clear” whether the officials were county employees).
Ultimately, Cougle has not carried his burden to persuade the Court that it
should exercise its discretion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against him as
redundant of the claims against St. Tammany Parish at this Rule 12 stage. As noted,
Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief against Cougle,89 and Plaintiffs have
alleged specific wrongdoing by Cougle culminating in the passage of the Resolution

and thus the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.90 Moreover, Cougle
is not a St. Tammany Parish employee; he is an independently elected member of the
St. Tammany Parish Council. To that end, neither Cougle nor St. Tammany Parish
has represented that Cougle, in his official capacity, would be bound by an injunction
issued against St. Tammany Parish only. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2) (providing

89 ECF No. 1 at 24 (unnumbered “wherefore” clause).
90 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 42–46, 50–53, 58–59, 62–63, 70, 72–74, 88, 115.
that an injunction binds (A) the parties; (B) officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys of the parties; and (C) others “in active concert or participation with” the
parties or their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys). And given
Defendants’ silence on that point, it is unclear whether St. Tammany Parish has the
power to compel Cougle to comply with an injunction against St. Tammany Parish.
So, the Court denies Cougle’s motion to dismiss the claims against him as redundant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Cougle’s motion?! to dismiss is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of June, 2024.
AS bs Soh
BRANDON 8. LONG ~?)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

91 ECF No. 21.
17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10648228. Public record. Not legal advice.