# Elkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · August 5, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646717

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** August 5, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646717

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that an ALJ is required to “build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result”
- stating activities such as washing dishes, helping children prepare for school, doing laundry, and preparing dinner are not incompatible with allegations of pain

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

AUSTIN P. ELKINS,
)

)
Plaintiff,
)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00141-SLC
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY, sued as Martin O’Malley, )
Commissioner of the Social Security )
Administration, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Austin P. Elkins appeals to the district court from a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application under the
Social Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF 1).1 For the following reasons, the
Commissioner’s decision will be REVERSED, and the case REMANDED to the
Commissioner.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Elkins applied for DIB and SSI in March 2021, alleging disability as of August 1,
2018. (ECF 12 Administrative Record (“AR”) 16, 235-42).2 Elkins’s claim was denied
initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 88-90, 109, 119). On April 27, 2022, an

1 The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge. (ECF 10).

2 The AR page numbers cited herein correspond to the ECF-generated page numbers displayed at the top
center of the screen when the AR is open in ECF, rather than the page numbers printed in the lower right
corner of each page.
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing, taking testimony from Elkins, who was
represented by a qualified representative from his counsel’s law firm, and a vocational
expert. (AR 44-76; see AR 89-90). On August 25, 2022, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable
decision to Elkins, concluding that he was not disabled because, despite the limitations
caused by his impairments, he could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy. (AR 13-31). The Appeals Council denied Elkins’s request for review
(AR 6-12), at which point the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
On April 4, 2023, Elkins filed a complaint in this Court appealing the
Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF 1). Elkins’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ
erred by failing to consider greater crouching restrictions in Elkins’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) assessment. (ECF 14 at 4).
As of the ALJ’s August 25, 2022, decision, Elkins was twenty-eight years old
(AR 235, 237); had a high school education (AR 29, 256); and had past relevant work as

a general RV or camper assembler and as an inspector (AR 29, 256). In his application,
Elkins alleged disability due to a “shattered leg.” (AR 255).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court the “power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner . . . , with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court’s task is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The decision
will be reversed “only if [it is] not supported by substantial evidence or if the
Commissioner applied an erroneous legal standard.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869
(7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court “review[s] the entire
administrative record, but do[es] not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner . . . are supported by
substantial evidence, they are conclusive.” Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). “In other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence,
reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled, we must
affirm the ALJ’s decision denying benefits.” Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir.
1996).

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Law
Under the Act, a claimant seeking DIB or SSI must establish that she is “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also
id. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id.
§§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a five-step evaluation
process, requiring consideration of the following issues, in sequence: (1) whether the
claimant is currently unemployed in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether he has a

severe impairment, (3) whether his impairment is one that the Commissioner considers
conclusively disabling, (4) whether he is incapable of performing his past relevant work,
and (5) whether he is incapable of performing any work in the national economy. Dixon
v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920.3 “[A]n affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a
finding that the claimant is disabled.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). “A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the
inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Id. (citation
omitted). The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, where

it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
B. The Commissioner’s Final Decision
In the ALJ’s August 25, 2022, decision, which became the final decision of the
Commissioner, the ALJ observed at the outset that Elkins was insured for DIB through
December 31, 2023. (AR 18). At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ noted that

3 Before performing steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC or what tasks he can
do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a), 416.920(e), 416.945(a). The RFC is then
used during steps four and five to help determine what, if any, employment the claimant is capable of. Id.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
Elkins did not engage in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of August
1, 2018. (Id.). At step two, the ALJ found that Elkins had the following severe
impairments: obesity, asthma, residual pain from a gunshot wound to the left lower
extremity, status post open reduction internal fixation to the tibia and fibula, lumbar
spondylosis, chronic pain syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar

disorder, major depressive disorder, personality disorder, and generalized anxiety
disorder. (AR 18-19). At step three, the ALJ concluded that Elkins did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 20).
The ALJ assigned Elkins the following RFC:
[T]he claimant [has] the [RFC] to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant should never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, kneel, or crawl. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
balance, stoop, and crouch. He should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation. He should avoid concentrated exposure to
very loud noises, extreme heat, extreme cold, wetness, and humidity. He should
avoid exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous machinery with moving
mechanical parts. He can perform work involving simple instructions and routine,
repetitive tasks. He cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate,
such as assembly-line work. He is able to meet production requirements that
allow a flexible and goal-oriented pace and can maintain the focus, persistence,
concentration, pace, and attention to engage in such tasks for two-hour
increments, for eight-hour workdays, within the confines of normal work breaks
and lunch periods. The claimant can make simple, work-related decisions and can
respond appropriately to predictable, routine changes in the workplace. He is able
to tolerate brief and superficial interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the
general public, which is defined as occasional and casual contact with no
prolonged conversations. Contact with supervisors still includes what is necessary
for general instruction, task completion, or training. He should not be required to
perform tandem tasks. The claimant may need a cane to ambulate.

(AR 22).
The ALJ determined at step four that, given the foregoing RFC, Elkins could not
perform his past relevant work. (AR 29). However, at step-five, the ALJ concluded that
Elkins could perform a significant number of unskilled, sedentary jobs in the national
economy, including document preparer, tube operator, and polisher. (AR 30). Therefore,
Elkins’s applications for DIB and SSI were denied. (Id.).

C. Physical RFC
Elkins’s only argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred when she failed to include
crouching limitations in the RFC. The RFC is “the individual’s maximum remaining
ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and
continuing basis,” meaning eight hours a day, for five days a week. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (bold emphasis omitted). That is, the “RFC does not
represent the least an individual can do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but
the most.” Id.; see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2004); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).

The [RFC] assessment is based upon consideration of all relevant
evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and relevant
nonmedical evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an
individual’s apparent symptomatology, an individual’s own statement of
what he or she is able or unable to do, and many other factors that could
help the adjudicator determine the most reasonable findings in light of all
the evidence.

SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),
416.945(a)(3). When determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically
determinable impairments, mental and physical, even those that are non-severe. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); see also Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir.
2008).
1. The ALJ’s Analysis
In crafting the RFC, the ALJ first considered Elkins’s hearing testimony, during
which he represented he could not work due to his back and left leg pain, that “his main

problem is bending over,” and that he uses a cane since he accidentally shot himself in
the left knee on September 4, 2018. (AR 23; see AR 24). The ALJ also relayed Elkins’s
ability to perform certain activities of daily living. (AR 23). She then discounted Elkins’s
allegations, concluding that his statements were “not entirely consistent with the
evidence” because he had “not generally received the type of medical treatment one
would expect for a totally disabled individual,” and because his testimony was
undermined by his activities of daily living. (AR 23-24).
As to the activities of daily living, the ALJ considered that Elkins could take care
of himself and his children, handle household tasks, shop in stores for food and clothes,

manage a checking and savings account, watch TV, and work on cars (AR 24). She stated
that in performing those activities, Elkins was “not limited to the extent one would
expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (Id.).
Turning to the medical evidence, the ALJ remarked that surgical procedures,
including a left knee arthrodesis performed in September 2018, and prescriptions for
medications suggested his symptoms were genuine, but the success of his surgery and
effectiveness of the medication indicated relief of his symptoms. (AR 24; see AR 354).
She opined that while physical examinations showed that Elkins was “unable to flex his
left knee,” “had reduced range of motion due to pain in the spine,” and had “positive and
negative straight leg raise tests,” he experienced 50-90% improvement in pain and 40-
50% improvement in function with medication, thereby “demonstrating greater
functioning than [Elkins] allege[d].” (AR 24).
She explained that after his surgery, Elkins began using an assistive device,

underwent physical therapy, and received home care. (Id.). However, the ALJ pointed to
Elkins’s improvement, notably that his fracture was healing well with no significant
abnormalities, that by December 2018 he was released to go back to work, and that a CT
scan revealed his knee joints were well-fused with no significant abnormalities. (AR 25).
The ALJ highlighted that from December 2018 to January 2021, Elkins had not
received treatment for his leg pain, but that beginning January 2021 he reported sharp
pain in his left knee, which was worsening, and that the pain was impairing his ability to
walk. (Id.). She also considered Elkins’s February 7, 2022, diagnosis with chronic pain
syndrome but that he had begun pain management treatments in March 2021 and that he

subsequently reported 50-90% improvement in pain after being prescribed gabapentin,
oxycodone, and Tramadol and 50-70% relief in pain after receiving medial branch block
injections. (Id.).
The ALJ parsed through the record which she represented revealed “mildly
abnormal results,” noting that Elkins was unable to flex his left knee and had no joint
effusion, that he showed restricted range of motion due to pain and negative straight leg
raise, but that he was able to ambulate without an assistive device and that his gait was
normal. (Id.).
The ALJ then evaluated the opinions of consultative examiners R. Gupta, M.D.,
and Vijay Kamineni, M.D., who performed their evaluation of Elkins on April 25, 2019,
and August 20, 2021, respectively. (AR 26). She noted that during both evaluations,
Elkins had decreased range of motion with his left knee, with Dr. Kamineni reporting that
the reduced range of motion was caused by the fusion surgery. (Id.). The ALJ noted that

Elkins had an antalgic gait without an assistive device, pain and tenderness to the left
knee, and was unable to stoop, squat, and walk heel to toe tandemly during his visit with
Dr. Gupta, but that he was able to sustain gait without an assistive device, though walking
was more painful without it during his visit with Dr. Kamineni. (Id.).
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Kamineni’s opinion was “unpersuasive as it is
inconsistent with the evidence of record showing that the claimant is able to ambulate
without a device, and his gait was normal,” and because it was “inconsistent with
evidence that the claimant had some restricted range of motion in the lumbar spine due to
pain and tenderness to palpation of the spinous process, but he had negative straight leg

raise.” (AR 28). The ALJ further found that “Dr. Kamineni’s opinion appears to be based
primarily on the claimant’s statements of what he can do and not on an examination
identifying the most he could do,” rather than his own examination “which found normal
range of motion throughout, except in the left knee[,] . . . normal muscle strength in the
upper and lower extremities, normal heel/toe walking and tandem walk, and negative
straight leg raise.” (Id. (citations omitted)).
The ALJ also analyzed the opinions of the state agency physicians, J. Sands,
M.D., who reviewed Elkins’s medical record in May 2019, and J.V. Corcoran, M.D., who
reviewed his medical record in August 2021. (Id.). The ALJ contrasted Dr. Sands’s
finding that Elkins was able to occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl with
Dr. Corcoran’s finding that Elkins could occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch, but
could never kneel and crawl. (Id.). The ALJ found those opinions generally persuasive,
stating that “they are mostly consistent with the evidence of record documenting the

claimant’s prior surgery on his left leg following his accident,” and that they “support a
limitation to sedentary work with occasional postural activities, but no crawling or
kneeling.” (Id.). The ALJ also found the state agency physician opinions “consistent with
evidence that the claimant had normal muscle strength, normal heel and toe walking,
normal tandem walk, and negative straight leg raises” and record evidence of “some
restricted range of motion of the spine and left knee.” (Id.).
Lastly, the ALJ discussed the examination of state agency physician M. Brill,
M.D., performed on October 14, 2021, specifically noting Dr. Brill’s conclusion that
Elkins could “occasionally engage in all postural activities” was “not limiting enough

given the claimant’s left knee arthrodesis and use of a cane at times,” and thus, that Dr.
Brill’s opinion was unpersuasive. (AR 29). Ultimately, the ALJ limited Elkins to
occasionally crouch, but never kneel or crawl. (AR 22).
2. The Medical Record
Elkins first argues that the medical record supports greater limitations in his
ability to crouch than assigned by the ALJ. He explains that after his September 7, 2018,
and September 11, 2018, arthrodesis surgeries, he was restricted to no weight bearing on
his left leg and 50% weight bearing on his left leg, respectively. (ECF 14 at 11 (citing AR
391, 884)). On September 27, 2018, it was noted that he would “attain optimal activity
level by [November 20, 2018],” but Elkins argues it is unclear when the weight-bearing
restriction was lifted. (Id.; see AR 968). He also points to his examination with Dr. Gupta
on April 25, 2019, during which he exhibited a decreased range of motion in the left knee
with a 30/150-degree flexion (which he characterizes as an 80% reduction from normal

function) and was “unable to squat.” (ECF 14 at 11 (citing AR 1203-04); see AR 1203
(“He is unable to stoop and squat.”)). Elkins avers such findings were consistent with the
August 20, 2021, opinion issued by Dr. Kamineni (which the ALJ found to be
unpersuasive), at which point Elkins displayed limited range of motion in his left leg and
0-degree of flexion in his left knee. (Id. at 11-12 (citing AR 1455, 1461)).4 He also lists a
series of pain management medical notes starting March 2021 until March 2022
reflecting that he could not “flex” his left knee despite “good healing” following the
arthrodesis surgeries. (ECF 14 at 11 (citing AR 1256, 1263, 1269, 1276, 1496, 1503,
1509, 1517, 1527, 1594, 1601, 1616, 1624, 1632)).

Given the foregoing evidence, the Court agrees that the ALJ’s opinion does not
sufficiently support her RFC conclusion. The ALJ generally considered Elkins’s inability
to flex his left knee and Dr. Kamineni’s and Dr. Gupta’s opinions (AR 25), but
nevertheless concluded that Elkins was able to crouch occasionally.5 “There is no

4 Dr. Kamineni also found that Elkins “walk[ed] [with] a limp as his [left] knee is fixed [and] fused.” (AR
1456).

5 The ALJ concluded Dr. Kamineni’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical record, but the portion of
his opinion which noted Elkins had 0-degree flexion in his left knee is well supported in the record.
Additionally, while the ALJ evaluated Dr. Gupta’s consultative examination, she never discussed the
persuasiveness of his medical opinion. Hebein v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-880-TLS-MGG, 2023 WL
2583267, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2023) (“In reviewing a disability claim, an ALJ has an obligation to
requirement of . . . tidy packaging, however; [the Court] read[s] the ALJ’s decision as a
whole and with common sense.” Buckhanon ex rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674,
678-79 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)). But here, while “[t]he ALJ was entitled to
make reasonable inferences from the evidence before [her],” Stevenson v. Chater, 105
F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997), inferring that Elkins could crouch despite

acknowledging his documented inability to flex his knee and objective medical evidence
showing 0-to-30-degree flexion in his left knee was not reasonable. “The court has to be
able to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning from evidence to conclusion.” Thelmarae W.
v. Saul, 476 F. Supp. 3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). In acknowledging
this evidence, yet concluding otherwise, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge from the
medical record to her decision. See Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that an ALJ is required to “build an accurate and logical bridge between the
evidence and the result”).
This oversight was not harmless error as the medical evidence, in turn, puts into

question whether Elkins could crouch. Crouching is defined as “[b]ending the body
downward and forward by bending the legs and spine.” Matthew M. v. Kijakazi, No.
1:22cv479, 2023 WL 5526631, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2023) (emphasis added) (citing
Program Operations Manual System (POMS) § 25001.001). Although the ALJ
acknowledged Elkins was unable to “flex” his knee, which is an inherent requirement for
crouching, there is no explanation why the ALJ found he could occasionally crouch.

evaluate every medical opinion and explain the persuasiveness of the opinion.” (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
416.920c(a), (b))).
Elkins also argues that the ALJ committed error when she equated his
improvement with respect to his pain to an improvement in his functional ability. The
Court agrees. The ALJ cited Kara Firas, M.D.’s pain management notes for the
proposition that Elkins improved in his functional abilities, but a review of the cited
evidence does not command such a conclusion. (AR 25 (citing AR 1256, 1607-08, 1615-

16, 1622-23, 1630-31)). Taking a closer look, it appears the pain management notes cited
by the ALJ are related to his knee pain, rather than his ability to flex his knee. Most
glaringly, the same reports cited by the ALJ state that Elkins is unable to flex his left
knee. (Compare AR 1607-08, with AR 1609; compare AR 1615, with AR 1616; compare
AR 1622-23, with AR 1624; compare AR 1630-31, with AR 1632). It, therefore, seems
the ALJ missed the forest by placing too much focus on the trees.
Even assuming Elkins had improved 40-50% from a 0% ability to flex his knee,
it is still unclear that such progress would be sufficient for Elkins to work full-time. “The
key is not whether one has improved (although that is important), but whether they have

improved enough to meet the legal criteria of not being classified as disabled.” Murphy v.
Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 819 (7th Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 20, 2014); Matthew M,
2023 WL 5526631, at *3 (“Rather than discussing any of these facts showing limitations
in . . . crouching, the ALJ instead focused on signs of improvement and progress during a
time Plaintiff was recovering from surgery and clearly unable to actually engage in . . .
crouching.”). Given the countervailing medical record, the ALJ failed to support her
opinion with substantial evidence, thereby justifying a remand of this case. See Schmidt,
395 F.3d at 744.
3. Elkins’s Activities of Daily Living
Elkins also takes issues with the ALJ’s conclusion that his activities of daily
living support a conclusion that he is able to occasionally crouch. This argument, too, is
persuasive. At the hearing, Elkins testified that he can “get up and pick up what’s ever
left up in [his children’s] room, and [wash] dishes, and laundry, and minimal things

around the yard.” (AR 56). He further testified that when mowing the grass, he has to
stop and take a break. (Id.). He stated he is able to sweep, has no problems taking a
shower or getting dressed, and reads to his children at night. (Id.). He also explained that
he “dabbled[s] in tinkering [with] lawnmowers, and cars,” but it was hard for him to
stayed hunched over for very long. (AR 57). In her opinion, the ALJ relayed that Elkins’s
daily activities included, among others, picking up after his kids, preparing meals for
them and himself, doing laundry, washing dishes, helping his kids with their homework
and taking them to their games, mowing the grass with breaks, sweeping and vacuuming,
and working on cars. (AR 23). As stated above, the ALJ found that Elkins was “not

limited to the extent one would expect” in his ability to perform his daily activities. (AR
24).
An ALJ is to consider a claimant’s activities of daily living when she evaluates
his subjective allegations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 2017
WL 5180304, at *7 (Oct. 25, 2017), but in doing so she must explain any inconsistencies
between the claimant’s activities, his complaints, and the medical evidence, Zurawski,
245 F.3d at 887; Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (“The ALJ did not provide any explanation for
his belief that Clifford’s activities were inconsistent with Dr. Combs’s opinion and his
failure to do so constitutes error.”). “[A]lthough it is appropriate for an ALJ to consider a
claimant’s daily activities when evaluating their credibility, this must be done with care.”
Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186,
at *3 (July 2, 1996)). “We have repeatedly cautioned that a person’s ability to perform
daily activities, especially if that can be done only with significant limitations, does not

necessarily translate into an ability to work full-time.” Id.
Here, Elkins’s activities of daily living do not support the conclusion that he can
occasionally crouch. To begin, they are not incompatible with an inability to crouch.
Rather, the daily activities cited by the ALJ—mostly housework, cooking, and personal
care—“are fairly restricted . . . and not of a sort that necessarily undermines or
contradicts” a claim of inability to crouch. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887; see Clifford, 227
F.3d at 872 (“[M]inimal daily activities . . . do not establish that a person is capable of
engaging in substantial physical activity.”); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (stating activities
such as washing dishes, helping children prepare for school, doing laundry, and preparing

dinner are not incompatible with allegations of pain). Most importantly, the ALJ does not
explain how the cited daily activities would undermine greater limitations for crouching
but not for kneeling, as both postural activities involve the same maneuver, that is
bending the knee. Social Security Administration, POMS § 25001.001,
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0425001001 (last visited July 26, 2024)
(defining kneeling as “[b]ending the legs at the knees to come to rest on the knee or
knees,” and crouching as “[b]ending the body downward and forward by bending the legs
and spine”).6 As such, the ALJ’s reference to Elkins’s daily activities does not lend
support to her conclusion that Elkins can occasionally crouch while never kneeling.
Given that the ALJ’s other arguments do not support her RFC assessment, and in
the face of medical evidence suggesting greater limitations in Elkins’s ability to crouch,
the ALJ’s analysis of his daily activities also falls short of being supported by substantial

evidence. See Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 744.7
Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ erred when concluding that Elkins
could occasionally crouch, and thus the case will be remanded on that basis.8 On remand,
the ALJ will be tasked with examining the record evidence pertaining to Elkins’s ability
to crouch, and its impact, if any, on the RFC assessment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and the
case is REMANDED to the Commissioner in accordance with this Opinion and Order.

6 Low Postures, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/ors/factsheet/low-
postures.htm#:~:text=Kneeling%20%E2%80%93%20bending%20the%20legs%20at,on%20or%20near%2
0the%20ground.

7 Beyond considering activities of daily living and an improvement in Elkins’s pain, the inherent logical
deficit in the ALJ’s opinion cannot be cured by her findings regarding Elkins’s “normal neurological
findings, including largely normal muscle strength in Elkins’s legs, mostly normal straight-leg raising tests,
and normal sensation,” nor the fact that Elkins had an “intact surgically-fused left knee” and “mild findings
in Plaintiff’s lower back,” as the Commissioner suggests. (See ECF 19 at 5). This evidence conflicts with
the ALJ’s finding and the plethora of medical evidence showing Elkins is unable to flex his knee. See
Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n internally inconsistent opinion by an ALJ is
likely to fail to build a logical bridge between the evidence and the result.”).

8 As a final note, the Commissioner argues that even if the ALJ erred in considering Ekins’s ability to
crouch, such error would be harmless because the occupations cited by the vocational expert do not require
crouching. (EFC 19 at 9). The Court refuses to conjecture at this juncture. “[T]he fact that the
administrative law judge, had she considered the entire record, might have reached the same result does not
prove that her failure to consider the evidence was harmless.” Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.
2010); Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. 2004)
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a judgment in favor of Elkins and against the
Commissioner.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 5th day of August 2024.
/s/ Susan Collins
Susan Collins
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646717. Public record. Not legal advice.