# Johnson v. Doe 1

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646345

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TOMMY L. JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-178-DWD
)
DOUGLAS R. SCHLUTER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Tommy L. Johnson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) currently detained at Hill Correctional Center, brings this action related to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations by reason of his transport to Shawnee Correctional
Center (“Shawnee”) from a court writ in Champaign, Illinois. Plaintiff claims Defendants
violated his rights by drinking red wine vinegar to the point of intoxication, failing to
secure his seatbelt, driving recklessly, and refusing him medical care after hitting a deer.
(Doc. 36). He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.
Defendants filed a timely Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support.
(Docs. 85, 86). Plaintiff responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 95, 100).
The matter is now ripe for review.
Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on January 28, 2022.1 (Doc. 1). Upon initial review, the
Court identified five valid claims:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference by Defendants Douglas
R. Schluter and Andrew S. Causey for failing to buckle Plaintiff and
for driving recklessly;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene by Defendants Douglas R.
Schluter and Andrew S. Causey;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a medical need against
Defendants Douglas R. Schluter and Andrew S. Causey for refusing
medical care;

Claim 4: Eighth Amendment failure to supervise, intervene, or protect,
against Defendant John S. Hobbs for his handling of the situation;

Claim 5: Negligence against Defendant Andrew S. Causey for his driving on
the return trip to the prison.

After review, all claims were allowed to proceed. (Doc. 8). Defendants timely
waived service of process and filed their Answer (Doc. 47). The case then proceeded to
merits discovery.
Facts
The following relevant facts are recounted primarily from Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Doc. 36), with disputes between the parties noted where applicable.

1 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 10, 2022 (Doc. 36). The factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint are the same as those in the original complaint, but the Amended Complaint
substituted named parties Douglas R. Schluter, Andrew S. Causey, and John S. Hobbs for John Does 1-3,
respectively, and contained demands for relief specific to the newly identified defendants. The Amended
Complaint also named the Illinois Department of Corrections and Dawn Rightnowar as defendants, but
failed to include any factual allegations against them, so they were terminated from the case (Doc. 44).
On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff was driven by Defendants Schluter and Causey to
Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, for a court writ. (Doc. 36, p. 23). Defendant Schluter had a

bottle of “Pomera Vinegar Red Wine,” which Plaintiff claims was “not clear plain vinegar
for salad.” (Id. at 23-24). Plaintiff alleges Defendants Schluter and Causey poured the
liquid into Styrofoam cups to drink. (Id. at 23).
After the court proceeding, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Schluter and Causey
placed him back into the van without fastening his seatbelt. (Id. at 23). Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Causey drove recklessly at 90 miles per hour. (Id. at 24). The van had a head-

on collision with a deer. (Id.). The collision caused Plaintiff to hit his head on the roof and
side window of the van, and his back slammed into the seat. (Id. at 25). Defendants allege
that Defendant Causey exited the vehicle and checked on Plaintiff after the collision,
finding him seat-belted in the vehicle. (Doc. 86, p. 2). Plaintiff indicated he was fine
following the collision. (Id.). Defendant Causey reported the collision to Defendant Hobbs

and informed him that the right headlight went out, and Defendant Hobbs advised that
they continue to drive back to the prison. (Id. at 24). When the left headlight began to
flicker or went out, Defendant Causey called Defendant Hobbs, and he again advised
that they continue driving. (Id. at 26). Plaintiff alleges that the officers stopped at a liquor
store and arranged for a back-up transport vehicle from Shawnee. (Id.). However,

Defendants allege that they drove the remainder of the way to Shawnee in the transport
van. (Doc. 86, p. 3).
Because of the collision, Plaintiff claims he sustained injuries to his right shoulder,
head, neck, and back. (Id. at 27). Plaintiff also claims he has PTSD, and the collision caused
him to experience increased anxiety. (Id. at. 24-25). Plaintiff did not receive medical care
at the time of the collision, but he saw a nurse upon returning to Shawnee, several hours

later. (Id. at. 29).
As a result of the above events, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schluter and
Causey’s conduct violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 27). He claims they
should have known about his medical and mental health history and should have
prevented one another from drinking and driving in a reckless manner. (Id.). He alleges
that Defendant Causey’s driving conduct was negligent. (Id.). He also alleges that all three

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by endangering him. (Id. at 29).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ conduct violated prison policies, as well as state and
federal law. (Id. at 28).
Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A
genuine dispute is present if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party, and a fact is material if it might bear on the outcome of the case.” Wayland v. OSF
Healthcare Sys., 94 F.4th 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). In determining a
summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to, and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In general, the
Court cannot resolve factual disputes on summary judgment. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

On summary judgment, the moving party is responsible for informing the Court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record that it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden may be discharged if the moving party shows an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325. If the nonmoving party
argues that a fact is in genuine dispute, then the party must cite “to particular parts of

materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The nonmoving party must allege
specific facts, more than “mere conclusions and allegations.” Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse
Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 22, 2003)

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-34).
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255 (emphasis in original).
Deliberate Indifference

The Court first addresses Claims 1 and 3: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference allegations against Defendants Causey and Schluter.
A. Claim 1
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments requires
prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.
2020). A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s substantial risk of serious
harm violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. Liability for deliberate
indifference requires recklessness, “something more than negligence” but “less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will

result.” Id. at 826. Deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective component.
Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 654.
First, the objective component requires an inmate to have been exposed to an
objectively serious harm resulting in injury. Id. Second, the subjective prong requires a
prisoner to show that a prison official had subjective knowledge of—and then

disregarded—an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837-38; LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2020)). “The official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference” for subjective knowledge to exist.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “The subjective element requires more than negligence[,] and it

approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Causey and Schluter were deliberately indifferent
to his health and safety by failing to secure his seatbelt in the transport van and by driving

recklessly (Doc. 36, p. 8). Defendants dispute these allegations (Doc. 86, p. 8).
“Neither the Supreme Court nor [the Seventh Circuit] has ruled that transporting
an inmate without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm.” Dale v. Agresta, 771 F.
App'x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Williams v. Wis. Lock & Load Prisoner Transport, LLC,
No. 15-cv-8090, 2016 WL 4124292, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2016) (“In general, failure to
secure a seatbelt, although unwise, is not a substantial risk of harm that rises to the level

of a constitutional violation.” (citation omitted)). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “other
circuits have concluded that, without reckless driving or other exacerbating
circumstances, failing to seatbelt a shackled inmate does not pose a substantial risk of
serious harm. Dale, 771 F. App'x at 661 (collecting cases). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot
establish a genuine dispute surrounding Defendants’ deliberate indifference unless he

shows that Defendants, in addition to failing to seatbelt him, drove recklessly.
Plaintiff alleges several examples of Defendant Causey’s reckless driving. First,
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Causey was “drinking red wine mix with vinegar, before
the accident and seem to be under the Influence of Alcohol.” (Doc. 100, p. 9).2 Defendant
Causey does not dispute that he used red wine vinegar on his sandwich for lunch that

day, but states in his sworn declaration that he did not mix the red wine vinegar with
alcohol, nor did he have any alcohol in the vehicle or ingest any that day. (Doc. 86-2, p.

2 Notably, Plaintiff exclusively refers to the liquid in question inside quotation marks—i.e., Plaintiff
does not allege Defendants consumed wine, but that they consumed “wine.” This distinction implies
Plaintiff’s awareness that Defendants were not consuming alcoholic beverages.
3). Similarly, Defendants Schluter and Hobbs aver that they neither saw Defendant
Causey drink any alcohol nor believe he was under the influence of any substance at the

time (Docs. 86-4, p. 2; 86-6, p. 2). Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant Causey was
under the influence of alcohol beyond stating that “there is evidence that the Defendants
admit he had a bottle of red wine vinegar.” (Doc. 100, p. 13). Defendant Causey admits
he did consume red wine vinegar that day, but Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant
Causey’s consumption of red wine vinegar rendered him intoxicated is plainly absurd.
The Court is “not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record [in favor

of the non-movant]—only those inferences that are reasonable.” Chmiel v. JC Penney Life
Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Bank Leumi Le–Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d
232, 236 (7th Cir.1991)); see also Hruska v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., Ill., No. 10-cv-
7433, 2013 WL 1195699, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2013) (“These implausible inferences
and unsupported speculation are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” (collecting

cases)). Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants drove under the influence of alcohol from
consuming red wine vinegar is a factual impossibility, one that no reasonable jury could
find. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that Defendants drove recklessly under
the influence of alcohol.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Causey was driving over the speed limit at

90 miles per hour, and if he had not been speeding, he would have been able to avoid the
collision with the deer by slowing down or changing lanes. (Doc. 100, p. 9). Defendants
Causey and Schluter, on the other hand, dispute that Defendant Causey was speeding.
Defendants point to sworn affidavits and incident reports stating the collision was caused
by the deer running into the path of the van, and that although Defendant Causey may
have swerved to avoid the deer, there were no incidents of reckless driving. (Docs. 86-2,

p. 1; 86-3, p. 3; 86-4, p. 1-2; 86-5, p. 2). In his Response, Plaintiff states that “[t]here is
evidence of speeding” because “all accidents on the highway & Interstate is cause from
drivers speeding, not being cautious, paying Attention, Following the rules of the road.”
(Doc. 100, p. 13). Once again, Plaintiff’s speculative statements, without specific citation
to support from the record, are not enough to establish a genuine dispute of material fact.
Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324, 331 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well-settled that ‘conjecture alone

cannot defeat a summary judgment motion.’” (quoting Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d
895, 901 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Even when construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, any
speeding by Defendants would amount to, at most, negligence, not deliberate
indifference.3 “Allegations of a public official driving too fast for the road conditions are

grounded in negligence, not . . . recklessness.” Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 1996);
see also Jones v. Collins, No. 05-cv-663, 2006 WL 1528882, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 1, 2006) (“As
for [Defendant]’s reckless driving or the failure to fasten seatbelt, these allegations
present, at best, claims of negligence, but a defendant can never be held liable under §

3 The Court notes that much of the case law for § 1983 claims of deliberate indifference due to
reckless driving are brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such Fourteenth Amendment cases are
applicable here, even though Plaintiff bring his claims under the Eighth Amendment, because the Seventh
Circuit has held “that § 1983 claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment are to be analyzed under
the Eighth Amendment test.” Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 844 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Medford v.
Bonjack, No. 17-CV-1014, 2018 WL 1071716, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2018) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has ‘found
it convenient and entirely appropriate to apply the same standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment (detainees) and Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) ‘without differentiation.’” (citing
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)).
1983 for negligence.” (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Zarnes v.
Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995)). The Seventh Circuit has held that "motor vehicle

accidents caused by public officials or employees do not rise to the threshold of a
constitutional violation actionable under § 1983, absent a showing that the official knew
an accident was imminent but consciously and culpably refused to prevent it.” Hill, 93
F.3d at 421. Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants could have avoided colliding with the deer
had they not been speeding, even if true, does not rise to the level of culpability required
for deliberate indifference. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2023), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 560, 217 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2024) (plaintiff failed to allege a constitutional
violation under § 1983 where “[a]llegations of Officer Henderson’s highway speeding
and illegal lane change, when coupled with the allegation that he never saw [a
pedestrian] before the fatal collision, d[id] not suggest that he disregarded extreme or
obvious risks and was ‘willing to let a fatal collision occur.’” (citing Flores v. City of South

Bend, 997 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2021)). The type of collision that occurred here, one involving
a wild animal on the highway at night, is the kind of unpredictable event that is often
unavoidable, even when observing all the rules of the road. Given these circumstances,
no reasonable jury could find that Defendants Causey and Schluter were deliberately
indifferent in their transportation of Plaintiff to Shawnee from the court writ or in the

collision with the deer.
Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Causey and Schluter
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
B. Claim 3
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a medical
condition, a plaintiff must show (1) that his condition was objectively, sufficiently serious

and (2) that the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Lee v.
Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008). A serious medical need, for purposes of the first
prong, is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention. Foulker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2005). It is not necessary

for such a medical condition to “be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a
condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Next, prevailing on the subjective prong requires
a prisoner to show that a prison official has subjective knowledge of—and then

disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th
Cir. 2005).
It is undisputed that Defendants did not arrange for Plaintiff to receive medical
treatment until they reached Shawnee, several hours after the collision occurred. (Doc.
100, p. 7). Because of this delay, Plaintiff claims Defendants Causey and Schluter were

deliberately indifferent to his injuries from the collision. (Doc. 36, pp. 30-32).
A non-trivial delay in treating serious pain may support a claim of deliberate
indifference. Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019). To demonstrate that
delay caused a cognizable injury, an inmate must show that the delay either exacerbated
his injury or that it unnecessarily prolonged the pain. Thomas v. Martija, 991 F.3d 763, 771
(7th Cir. 2021). In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied treatment, the
plaintiff must offer verifying medical evidence that the delay—rather than the underlying
condition—caused some degree of harm. Id. at 749 (citing Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786,
790 (7th Cir. 2013).
As to the objective prong, Plaintiff alleges that, because of the collision, he
sustained injuries to his head, neck, right shoulder, and back, and his anxiety rose to a
“Level 10.” (Doc. 36, pp. 24-25). He describes the pain as a level 9 or 10. (Docs. 100, p. 4).
Severe pain can indicate a serious medical condition requiring treatment. Walker v.
Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). Yet, it is undisputed that,
in the moments after the collision, Defendant Causey asked Plaintiff if he was “OK,” and
Plaintiff indicated he was fine. (Docs. 86, pp. 2-3; 100, pp. 4-5). When Plaintiff received
treatment by a nurse at Shawnee, he complained of head and neck pain, but he was able
to perform full range of motion with his head and neck, had no swelling, bumps, or
discoloration, and his neuro checks were within normal limits. (Doc. 86-7, p. 1). The nurse
prescribed him with 325 mg of acetaminophen to take as needed, but did not proceed
with any other emergency treatment, suggesting that the nurse did not believe his
condition was severe. (Id.).
However, assuming for the purposes of this analysis that Plaintiff's condition was
objectively serious, he must still show that Defendants had a culpable state of mind. Lee,
533 F.3d at 509. This standard “requires more than negligence and it approaches
intentional wrongdoing.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir.
12

2012). The question here is whether the brief delay from when the collision occurred to
when Plaintiff received treatment demonstrates that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent. The Court concludes it does not.
Defendants’ decision to not seek immediate emergency medical care for Plaintiff
does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. “Anyone who has ever visited a
doctor’s office knows that some delays in treatment are inevitable, particularly absent a
life-threatening emergency. Such delays are even more likely in the prison environment.”
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 442 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s condition, painful though it

may have been, was not life-threatening. Prison officials are required to “‘act responsibly
under the circumstances that confront them’ but are not required to act flawlessly.” Id. at
511 (quoting Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Court cannot say
that Defendants acted irresponsibly here. Although it took several hours to reach
Shawnee, Defendants arranged for Plaintiff to receive medical treatment within

approximately twenty minutes of arrival. (Doc. 86-7, p. 1).4 Other courts have declined
to find deliberate indifference in similar circumstances. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458,
466 (7th Cir. 2009) (a two-and-a-half hour delay in treatment of plaintiff’s shoulder injury
“was minimal and had no adverse consequences”); Burton, 805 F.3d at 785 (two-day delay
in administering pain medication was not enough to show a culpable medical state for

deliberate indifference); Goods v. Navarro, No. 09-cv-7406, 2012 WL 1021807, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 26, 2012) (“The choice to return to the jail, where Defendants knew medical

4 Defendants claim that Parties arrived at Shawnee at approximately 10:13 p.m. (Doc. 86, p. 3). The
Shawnee nurse’s report states that Plaintiff was treated at 10:34 p.m. (Doc. 86-7, p. 1).
attention was available, without first providing Plaintiff with immediate medical
assistance was not so egregious as to be deliberately indifferent.”). Considering the

above, Defendants’ decision to wait for Plaintiff to receive treatment at Shawnee for his
non-life-threatening injuries, where they knew immediate medical attention would be
available to him, was not deliberately indifferent.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants Causey and
Schluter for Plaintiff on both deliberate indifference claims. Claims 1 and 3 are
DISMISSED, with prejudice.

Failure to Intervene
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claims.
A. Claim 2
Plaintiff claims that, as both Defendants Causey and Schluter took turns driving
the transport van, each is liable for failure to intervene in the other’s reckless driving and

driving while consuming red wine vinegar.
A bystander to a constitutional violation can be held liable under § 1983 for failure
to intervene if a plaintiff can show that the officer (1) had reason to know that a fellow
officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a
realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring. See Harper v. Albert,
400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005); accord Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 864-65 (7th Cir.

2022). In order to succeed on a failure to intervene claim, a plaintiff must establish an
underlying constitutional violation. Harper, 400 F.3d at 1064 (citing Fillmore v. Page, 358
F.3d 496, 505 (7th Cir. 2004)). As discussed above, the Court found no genuine dispute of
material fact surrounding Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent. Without any underlying constitutional violation, there can be no

failure to intervene claim against Defendants Causey and Schluter.
B. Claim 4
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hobbs failed to intervene, supervise, or protect
Plaintiff by advising via phone call that Defendants Causey and Schluter drive the van
back to Shawnee, despite knowing that the van’s headlights were not working. (Doc. 36,
pp. 32-33). Further, Defendant Hobbs allegedly failed to intervene, supervise, or protect

Plaintiff by not arranging for Plaintiff to receive immediate medical care. (Id.).
Section 1983 “does not allow actions against individuals merely for their
supervisory role of others.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000)). A supervisor may be held liable
for the conduct of their subordinates only if they were “personally involved in that

conduct,” i.e., that they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it,
or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,
992 (7th Cir. 1988); accord Purdue, 928 F.3d at 664. Put another way, a supervisor must act
“either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Jones, 856 F.2d at 992-93
(citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
Defendant Hobbs’ alleged failure to intervene, supervise, or protect. It is undisputed that
Defendant Causey notified Defendant Hobbs twice via phone call following the collision
with the deer. (Docs. 86, p. 3; 100, p. 3). Defendant Hobbs was initially informed that the
van was drivable, though one of the headlights was out, and that Plaintiff was fine and
not in need of medical attention. (Docs. 86, p. 3). When the van was approximately twenty

minutes from Shawnee, Defendant Hobbs was informed that the headlights were either
flickering or out entirely. (Docs. 36, p. 36; 86, p. 3). With this knowledge, Defendant Hobbs
had no reason to suspect Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were being violated (especially
because, as the Court found above, none were violated). As far as Defendant Hobbs
knew, the van was struck by a deer, but remained in drivable condition, and Plaintiff was
fine. The two phone calls did not provide cause for Defendant Hobbs to request Plaintiff

receive emergency medical care at the scene of the collision or to discipline Defendants
Causey and Schluter. As such, no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Hobbs
acted with deliberate, reckless indifference based on his directions to Defendants Causey
and Schluter.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants on the failure to

intervene claims. Claims 2 and 4 are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
Negligence
Now, as Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims have been dismissed, the Court
must decide whether to retain or relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

E. Claim 5
Generally, when all federal claims in a case have been dismissed prior to trial, the
district court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
Id.; Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2007). However, this rule is subject to
three recognized exceptions: (1) when the statute of limitations bars the refiling of the
state law claim; (2) where substantial judicial resources have already been expended on

the state law claim; and (3) when it is clearly apparent how the state law claim is to be
decided. Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1994); Williams
Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007).
Here, there is not a concern regarding the statute of limitations because Illinois law
provides that when a federal district court dismisses a state law claim for lack of
jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the greater of one year or the remainder of the limitations

period to refile the claim in Illinois state court. 735 ILCS 5/13-217; see also Sharp Elecs.
Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 515 (7th Cir. 2009). This includes a dismissal
based on the decision to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Tamburo v. Elite Auto
Credit, Inc., No. 18-CV-03169, 2020 WL 2745984, at *5 n.1 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2020) (citing
Timberlake v. Illini Hosp., 676 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)). Further, although the

parties have completed discovery, and judicial resources have been expended to some
degree, the Court’s reasoning with respect to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims did not
reach issues fully dispositive of Plaintiff’s supplemental negligence claim. Williams v.
Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007). Finally, the Court cannot say that the proper
resolution of the Illinois negligence claim is absolutely clear. Sharp, 578 F.3d at 515.

For these reasons, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state law negligence claim. Claim 5 is DISMISSED, without prejudice.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants further assert they are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds
of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for

civil damages when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense, once a defendant invokes it, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to argue that it
should not apply. Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2020).

On summary judgment, this court must decide (1) whether the facts that plaintiff has
shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue
was “clearly established” at the time. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see
also id. at 236 (holding that courts may conduct these inquiries in either order).
The Court has already concluded that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights in Claims 1 through 4. Accordingly, because there has been no
violation of constitutional rights, the Court need not reach the issue of qualified
immunity. Mucha v. Village of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1057–58 (7th Cir. 2011) (Where
there is no constitutional violation, defendants “do not require the additional protection
of qualified immunity.”); see also Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 559 n.17 (7th Cir. 2008)

(“Because there was no constitutional violation in this case, we do not reach the issue of
qualified immunity.” (citing Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep't of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014,
1036 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Disposition
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
85) is GRANTED IN PART, as to Claims 1-4. Claims 1-4 are DISMISSED, with
prejudice. Claim 5 is DISMISSED, without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to close the case and enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 19, 2024

DAVID W. DUGAN
US. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646345. Public record. Not legal advice.