# Anderson v. Wexford Health Services

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 21, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646254

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 21, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LAMAR ANDERSON,
#M32519,

Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-00221-SPM

v.

MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, et al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion filed by Defendants Siddiqui, Caldwell, Lang, and Crain. (Doc. 34, 37). Plaintiff has
filed a response in opposition to the motions, and Defendants Siddqui and Caldwell filed a reply
brief. (Doc. 42, 43). For the following reasons, the motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lamar Anderson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated a Western Illinois Correctional Center, initiated this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights that occurred at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that over seven years ago he developed
eczema while at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). (Doc. 1). The condition causes his
skin to crack, bleed, and itch. After trying various treatments, the medical providers at Stateville
began to successfully treat Plaintiff’s eczema with Benadryl and an ointment. At some point,
Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”), where the providers
prescribed different medication for the eczema. These new medications did not work, and
eventually, Plaintiff resumed taking Benadryl and using the ointment prescribed at Stateville. The
medical staff wrote the details concerning the unsuccessful and successful treatments in Plaintiff’s
medical files.
On December 4, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to Menard. Once Plaintiff finished his

eczema medication, Benadryl and the ointment, that had previously been prescribed and successful
at both Stateville and Pontiac, medical staff at Menard refused to renew his prescriptions. Rather,
they prescribed medicines that they knew did not effectively treat his condition. Plaintiff wrote a
grievance, and Defendants renewed the Benadryl prescription. However, when this prescription
was completed, Nurse Lang refused to provide Plaintiff with a refill and stated they were going to
try another medication. Plaintiff spoke to Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, and Nurse Practitioner
Moldenhauer about how the new treatment for his eczema was not working. Despite these
conversations, Defendants continued to not renew the Benadryl and ointment prescription.
Eventually, after filing a grievance, Plaintiff received a prescription for Benadryl and his ointment
cream, but he repeatedly would not receive timely refills or follow-up appointments.

Following review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding
with an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, Nurse
Practitioner Moldenhauer, Health Care Unit Administrator Crain, and Nurse Lang for failing to
provide him adequate treatment for his eczema. (Doc. 8).
On November 13, 2023, Defendants Siddiqui, Caldwell, Crain, and Lang filed motions for
summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
initiating this lawsuit, and therefore, his claims against them should be dismissed. (Doc. 34, 35,
37).1 Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Doc. 42).

1 Defendant Moldenhauer did not file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion by the deadline of
November 13, 2023, so the defense is DEEMED WAIVED by this Defendant. (See Doc. 31).
LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Any doubt about the
existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Lawrence v.
Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and admissions, along
with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, when the
motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested
issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th
Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F. 3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 2014). Where there is no disputed issue
of fact, a hearing is not necessary.
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
“[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion of available
administrative remedies must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398

(7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in
the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d
1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance
process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim
can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The statutory purpose of the PLRA is to
“afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing
the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). This allows the prison
administration an opportunity to fix the problem or to reduce the damages and perhaps shed light
on factual disputes that may arise in litigation even if the prison administration’s solution does not
fully satisfy the prisoner. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-24. To allow otherwise would frustrate the

purpose of the grievance process. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 526 (2002).
III. Grievance Procedure
As an inmate in the custody of IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance
procedures laid out in the Illinois Administrative Code (“grievance procedures”). 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures direct an inmate is to file a grievance first with
the Counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §
504.810(a). The grievance form must:
[C]ontain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the
subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not
preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not
known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the
individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through routine
channels are then sent to a Grievance Officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.820(a). The
Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the inmate. See 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). The Grievance Officer must submit his findings to the Chief
Administrative Officer (“CAO”) within two months after receiving the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then reviews the findings and recommendation of the Grievance
Officer and issues a written decision to the inmate. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the
response, he can file an appeal with the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). See 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days after the date of the
decision by the CAO. Id. Only after a grievance is reviewed by the ARB is it deemed exhausted.
See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023–24.
ANALYSIS
There is one grievance that Defendants do not dispute was filed properly according to
grievance procedures by Plaintiff, Grievance #236-10-21. In this grievance, which was filed as an
emergency, Plaintiff recites the difficulties of receiving effective and consistent treatment for his
eczema over the past six years at Stateville, Pontiac, and now at Menard. (Doc. 42, p. 41-42). He
states that after his transfer to Menard in 2016, he had to file grievances in order to receive proper

care for his eczema. He was eventually seen by a dermatologist who prescribed a cream and
Benadryl. Despite being given a prescription by a specialist, he continues to not receive timely
refills, and he routinely is not scheduled for follow-up exams with a nurse or a doctor when he
completes his prescriptions, even after submitting medical care requests. As of filing the grievance,
the last doctor he saw was Defendant Moldenhauer, who wrongly reduced his Benadryl
prescription to one pill a day. Moldenhauer told Plaintiff that he would again refer Plaintiff to see
a dermatologist, but Plaintiff complains that he has not had an appointment. Plaintiff also grieves
that he has been in segregation for a week and been denied Benadryl and his ointment since his
cell transfer. He states that he has stopped nurses and submitted sick call slips requesting his

medicine but was told that “getting Benadryl was a onetime thing.” Plaintiff requests to see a “skin
doctor or a medical judge,” and to have all his “rights to file a 2-1401 about this on-going situation
[he has] been having for the past 6 years.” Plaintiff writes, “This is a[n] emergency. [I’m] in pain.”
(Id.).
Defendants argue that Grievance #236-10-21 cannot serve to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims
because it does not meet the grievance content requirements laid out in the grievance procedures
and fails to properly put Menard on notice of the alleged problems involving them. The grievance
procedures specifically direct inmates to provide the “name of each person who is the subject of
or who is otherwise involved in the complaint” or “include as much descriptive information about
the individual as possible.” (Doc. 35, p. 13; Doc. 37, p. 7) (citing 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 504.810(c)).

In Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff does not name the Defendants or describe their individual
conduct or their participation in his care. Defendants state that Plaintiff’s failure to identify them
and include sufficient factual details regarding his allegations against them means that this
grievance cannot exhaust his claims.
Plaintiff argues that he wrote Grievance #236-10-21 to grieve the overall poor medical care
he had received for his skin condition at Menard. (Doc. 42, p. 11-12). He points out that in the
grievance he provides details about his treatment since 2015 and how he has had to continuously
file grievances and sick call requests in order to be seen by a dermatologist and receive medication
refills. Plaintiff argues that Grievance #236-10-21 sufficiently informs Menard that he has been
denied adequate medical care and an effective course of treatment by all the doctors and nurses
who have treated him since his transfer. (Id.).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Grievance #236-10-21 meets the content requirements
of the grievance procedures and sufficiently put prison officials on notice regarding his issues with

receiving adequate medical care while at Menard. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Grievance
#236-10-21 is not limited to Plaintiff’s discontentment with his treatment by Moldenhauer. He
clearly grieves with sufficient particularity the ongoing issues he has had with his treatment since
his transfer. Although, Plaintiff does not name the individual defendants in his grievance, this
omission is not “fatal to the issue of exhaustion.” See Arce v. Wexford Health Services, No. 18-cv-
1348-SMY-GCS, 2019 WL 6702692, at *5 (Oct. 9, 2019). The grievance process is not intended
to provide individual notice to each defendant who might be sued later, and a grievance is not “per
se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). In cases such as this, “where Plaintiff is claiming a broad denial
of treatment by the health care unit as a whole, he will not be found at fault for failing to name

each, individual health care provider.” Morgan v. Carter, No. 12 C 6445, 2012 WL 5877481, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2012). In Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff clearly states that he is continually
is being denied effective treatment and needed medication. He also claims he is not being
scheduled for necessary appointments with medical providers, inside and outside the facility. The
grievance serves its function of providing Menard officials with (1) notice of Plaintiff’s constant
issues receiving adequate medical care for his eczema, which involves all members of his
healthcare team, and (2) enough information for officials to investigate and attempt to alleviate the
problem. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 219;
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013)). Thus, the grievance successfully serves to
exhaust Plaintiff’s claims against medical providers Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, and Nurse Lang.
As for Health Care Administrator Crain, Plaintiff claims that she was deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs and contributed to the denial of adequate medical care by
reviewing his grievance and providing false information in her response. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Because

Crain was a part of the grievance process and provided a detailed response to the Counselor after
reviewing Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff did not need to file a separate, additional grievance
against Crain. See Barrow v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 14-CV-800-NJR-DGW, 2015 WL
5010104, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24,2014) (“Relevant case law demonstrates that a previously
submitted grievance will suffice to exhaust for future events so long as the prisoner remained in
the same situation.”). “[C]ourts have found that prison officials who are named in grievance
responses, or who directly participate in fielding grievances have ample notice for exhaustion
purposes.” Tacket v. Mitchell, No. 22-cv-1260-DWD, 2024 WL 1483988, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 5,
2024) (citations omitted). Grievance #236-10-21 provided Crain with notice of his dissatisfaction
with the care he was receiving, and she had an opportunity to investigate and intervene if necessary,

and therefore, he exhausted his claims against her.
Because the Court finds that Grievance #236-10-21 served to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants, the Court will not address the other three grievance also submitted by
Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.2
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, the motion for summary judgment filed by Caldwell and
Siddiqui is DENIED, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Crain and Lang is DENIED.
(Doc. 34, 37).

2 Grievance dated February 1, 2017, Grievance #434-3-18, and Grievance #191-11-19.
The stay on merits discovery is LIFTED, and the parties can proceed with discovery on
the merits. A new scheduling order will be entered by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2024

s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10646254. Public record. Not legal advice.