# Haligas v. City Of Chicago

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · September 3, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645628

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 3, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645628

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that even going limp can be a form of resistance

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Melissa Haligas, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 22 C 313
)
)
City of Chicago, Richard )
McCallum, and Juan Delgado, )
)
Defendants. )

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Chicago Police Officers Richard McCallum and Juan Delgado
(the “Officers”) were called to Melissa Haligas’ apartment
building by her ex-boyfriend, who claimed she was violating a court
order by failing to hand over their son. After speaking with the
ex-boyfriend and cursorily reviewing a copy of the order on his
phone, the Officers proceeded to Haligas’ apartment, where they
ultimately arrested her. Haligas was not charged with any crime
and was released the same day. She sued the Officers under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, excessive force, and failure to
intervene, and sued the City of Chicago under state law for
indemnification and under § 1983 for failure to train and for its
alleged policy of escalating police encounters with non-
threatening suspects. Defendants now move for summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
I.

The following facts are described as favorably to Haligas as
the record and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permit. On
January 31, 2020, the Officers responded to a call from Haligas’
ex-boyfriend Kevin Howard at Haligas’ apartment building. Pl.’s
Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. to
DSMF”), ECF 109 ¶ 7. Both Officers were wearing body-worn cameras
(“BWCs”). Id. ¶ 9. Howard told the Officers that Haligas was
violating a court order by failing to bring down their son to go
with Howard for the weekend. Id. ¶ 8. Howard showed the Officers
a copy of the court order on his phone. Id. ¶ 10.
Officer McCallum briefly scrolled through the document and,
based on his review, understood that multiple orders governed
Haligas’ and Howard’s co-parenting relationship. Id. ¶ 11; Defs.’

Resp. to Pl.’s Add’l Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. to
PSAMF”), ECF 118 ¶ 4. He noted the order contemplated Friday
pickups “no earlier than 3 p.m.” McCallum BWC, ECF 96-8 at 2:30–
2:38. He further stated, while reviewing the document, “This is a
confusing . . .,” before trailing off. Id. at 3:08–3:10; Defs.’
Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 8 (Officer McCallum testified at his deposition
that he found aspects of the court order he reviewed confusing).
Officer McCallum also reviewed messages between Haligas and Howard
before giving Howard his phone and going up to Haligas’ apartment
with Officer Delgado. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶¶ 13–14. Officer Delgado
did not review the court order. Defs.’ Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 5.

The Officers knocked on Haligas’ door, and she invited them
into her apartment. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 16. Shortly after walking
in, Officer McCallum demanded, “Why aren’t you handing over your
son?” Id. ¶ 19. Haligas explained that her son was sick and asleep,
and she was waiting for him to wake up. Id. She showed the Officers
that her son’s things were packed and ready to go as soon as he
woke up. Defs.’ Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 20.
Haligas explained the court order simply said that Howard was
not allowed to pick up their son before 3:00 p.m., the implication
being that it does not necessarily say that Howard is entitled to
pick him up at any point starting at 3:00 p.m. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF
¶ 21. She told them they did not understand the court order and

offered to pull it up for them. McCallum BWC at 8:28–8:31; Defs.’
Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 14. But Officer McCallum declined her offer,
saying he had just looked at it. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 24; Defs.’
Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 15. Haligas reiterated: “The court order says he
cannot get him before 3 p.m.,” McCallum BWC at 8:32–8:36, again
apparently trying to emphasize the distinction between a
prohibition on picking their son up before 3:00 p.m. and a
requirement that as soon as the clock strikes three, Haligas was
required to hand him over. The disagreement continued:
Officer McCallum: You violate the order.

Haligas: I didn’t violate anything.

. . .

Officer McCallum: Listen, you’re not going to change my
opinion of this. You’re violating the order. You either-

Haligas: I’m not violating anything.

Officer McCallum: If you refuse to give over your son
. . . .

McCallum BWC 9:18–9:36.
Haligas said she was not going to wake up her son, to which
Officer McCallum responded that she would go to jail for “unlawful
violation of visitation.” Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 28. Haligas
repeated that Officer McCallum did not know what was in the court
order and offered to call their child advocate. Id. ¶ 29. Officer
McCallum again insisted that he had already looked at the order.
McCallum BWC 9:48–9:50. Haligas walked toward the kitchen area of
her apartment to get her phone, presumably to call the child
advocate. Id. at 9:50–9:55. As she did, Officer McCallum said,
“You’re gonna be going to jail.” Id.
Haligas then asked the Officers to leave her apartment, but
they refused. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶¶ 31–32. Haligas said she was
going to call 9-1-1, at which point Officer McCallum said, “That’s
it,” attempted to snatch the phone out of her hand, and told her
she would be arrested if she did not calm down. Defs.’ Resp. to
PSAMF ¶ 33; McCallum BWC at 10:08–10:17. He advanced on Haligas as
she backed up into her kitchen. Id. at 10:18–10:24. In a panicked
voice, Haligas said, “Excuse me,” and tried to get past Officer
McCallum, but he physically rebuffed her. Id. at 10:25–10:30.

Officer McCallum told her to turn around and put her hands
behind her back. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 47. Haligas, who was backed
up against the wall, screamed, brought her arms in toward her body,
and fell to the floor. McCallum BWC at 10:30–10:44. She claims the
Officers pulled her to the floor and then pulled her up again.
Defs.’ Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 23. She continued to scream as the Officers
physically restrained her, including exclamations about her
wrists. McCallum BWC at 10:30–11:05; Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 55. In
the minutes that followed, Haligas continued to express that she
was in pain. See McCallum BWC at 11:27–13:10 (repeatedly drawing
attention to her wrist and saying “ow” as she whimpered). In
response to some of these complaints, the Officers said things
like “stop it” and “we know.” Id.

While the Officers waited for other law enforcement to arrive,
Haligas sat handcuffed on the floor of her kitchen, offering once
more to call the child advocate and to pull the order up; McCallum
replied, again, that he had already read the order. Id. at 14:35–
14:40, 16:58–17:03. Haligas was eventually escorted to a police
vehicle in handcuffs. Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF ¶ 66. That evening, she
was taken to Northwestern Memorial Hospital, but did not receive
treatment there at that time. Id. ¶¶ 71–72. The next day, she went
to Northwestern Immediate Care for examination of her right wrist;
her records show she presented with pain, swelling, and a
contusion. Id. ¶ 73; Defs.’ Resp. to PSAMF ¶ 40.

II.
If the Officers had probable cause to arrest Haligas, her
false arrest claim is barred. Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City
of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “An
officer has probable cause to arrest if ‘at the time of the arrest,
the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . .
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’”
Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012)).
It is an objective inquiry that turns on how a reasonable officer

under the circumstances would assess the situation, without regard
to the officer’s subjective state of mind. Abbott v. Sangamon
County, 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013).
Defendants offer up two possible crimes for which there was
probable cause to arrest Haligas. The first is unlawful visitation
interference under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-5.5(b). That statute
provides:
Every person who, in violation of the visitation,
parenting time, or custody time provisions of a court
order relating to child custody, detains or conceals a
child with the intent to deprive another person of his
or her rights to visitation, parenting time, or custody
time commits the offense of unlawful visitation or
parenting time interference.
Id.
Defendants maintain that Howard’s allegation that Haligas was
unlawfully withholding their son, plus Officer McCallum’s review
of the child custody order on Howard’s phone, gave them probable
cause to arrest Haligas for this crime. It is true that “[o]nce a
reasonably credible witness informs an officer that a suspect has
committed a crime, the police have probable cause to arrest the
suspect.” Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.
2006) (citations omitted). But Howard’s credibility is
questionable, given the adverse relationship one might expect
between separated parents in general and which Howard’s resort to
police intervention suggests was present here in particular. Nor
is it clear that the document on Howard’s phone was enough to
overcome concerns about Howard’s reliability. The BWC footage
shows Officer McCallum quickly scrolling through the child custody
order and expressing he found the document “confusing.” He also
understood that it was not the only order that spoke to the
conditions of custody between Haligas and Howard. Yet any
uncertainty on Officer McCallum’s part apparently dissolved when

he entered Haligas’ apartment, as he steadfastly maintained that
he had reviewed the court order and knew what it required. Even
Haligas’ repeated assertions that she was not violating the order
and her offers to get a copy for him did not shake him from his
position that he had seen all he needed to. In response to one of

these offers by Haligas, Officer McCallum was explicit that it
would not change his opinion.
While the Officers had no “free-standing affirmative duty” to
“pursue all avenues of investigation before arrest,” Jump v. Vill.
of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782, 791 (7th Cir. 2022), further
investigation is sometimes warranted. Whether that is so depends
on factors such as “the information available to the officer, the
gravity of the alleged crime, the danger of its imminent
repetition, and the amount of time that has passed since the
alleged crime.” Stokes, 599 F.3d at 625; see also BeVier v. Hucal,
806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Under Seventh Circuit
precedent, . . . probable cause is a function of information and

exigency.” (footnote omitted)). Here, the circumstances did not
require quick action on the Officers’ part, as no serious crime
was underway. Further investigation, moreover, was well within
reach: Haligas offered to give the Officers a court order--whether
the same order Officer McCallum had already viewed or a different
one, we do not know--she claimed would show she was in compliance.
And there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a reasonable
officer would hesitate to rely too heavily on the information
Officer McCallum had received so far, from a potentially biased
witness and a single, incomplete, court order that he found
confusing. Under these circumstances, the Officers are not
entitled to summary judgment on whether there was probable cause

to arrest Haligas for violation of the unlawful visitation
interference statute. See Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, 743 F. Supp.
2d 887, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[I]f the victim’s or witness’s
information would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, the
officer has a duty to pursue reasonable avenues of investigation
and may not close his or her eyes to facts that would clarify the
situation.” (citing McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.
2009); Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th
Cir. 2003))).
Defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest
Haligas for the separate offense of resisting arrest. See 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/31-1(a). That statute provides:

(a) A person who knowingly:
(1) resists arrest, or
(2) obstructs the performance by one known to the
person to be a peace officer . . . of any authorized
act within his or her official capacity commits a
Class A misdemeanor.
Id. Illinois courts interpret “resisting” or “resistance” to mean
“withstanding the force or effect of or the exertion of oneself to
counteract or defeat.” People v. Agnew-Downs, 936 N.E.2d 166, 173
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, I must “pinpoint the moment” at which
Officer McCallum “arrested or attempted to arrest” Haligas, “which
is necessary to determine whether her actions constituted
resisting arrest.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 719 (citing Agnew-Downs,

936 N.E.2d at 173–74). The relevant moment is “‘when a reasonable
person in the suspect’s position would have understood the
situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree which the law associates with formal arrest.’” Abbott, 705
F.3d at 719 (quoting Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir.
2003)). The first arguable mention of arrest during the encounter
came when Officer McCallum said, “Well then you’re going to jail”
and “You’re gonna be going to jail.” McCallum BWC at 9:37–9:40,
9:52–9:54. When he said these things, however, he does not appear
to have moved toward Haligas or to have otherwise indicated to her
that this was anything other than a possible, but not inevitable,

outcome. Further, immediately after he tried grabbing Haligas’
phone from her hand, he said “Calm down, or you’re gonna be
arrested,” id. at 10:14–10:17, and had drawn his handcuffs, Delgado
BWC, ECF 96-9 at 12:11–12:14.1 One could reasonably infer from this
statement that Haligas was not yet under arrest, but that she might
be if she did not calm down. It was not until Officer McCallum

1 Defendants maintain that Officer McCallum was reaching for
Haligas’ wrist in order to handcuff her. The video evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to Haligas does not support this as
the only reasonable interpretation.
said, “Alright, turn around and put your hands behind your back,”
and reached for her, McCallum BWC at 10:30–32, that I can conclude
as a matter of law a reasonable person would have understood that

her freedom of movement was being restrained.
In determining whether Haligas resisted arrest, her conduct
after that moment is what counts. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 720 (conduct
prior to being under arrest is not resisting).2 She was backed up
against the wall, brought her arms in close to her body, and
eventually landed on the ground. Defendants assert that Haligas
resisted by dropping her body to the ground, but Haligas’ version
of how she ended up on the ground--that the Officers pulled her
down--finds enough support in the video evidence and Haligas’
deposition testimony. Defendants also assert that Haligas’
movements after she was on the ground constituted resistance, but
again a reasonable jury could believe Haligas that these movements

were caused by force applied by the Officers.
Haligas pulling her arms in close to her body after being
told to turn around and put her hands behind her back presents a
closer question. Still, it is not unambiguous from the evidence
that she was resisting. In Brooks v. City of Aurora, 653 F.3d 478,
484 (7th Cir. 2011), though the court ultimately found qualified

2 That means her backing up into her kitchen and trying to get
around Officer McCallum cannot constitute resisting arrest,
despite defendants’ contentions to the contrary.
immunity applied, it observed that there may be a question of fact
as to the existence of probable cause to arrest a suspect for
violation of Illinois’ resistance statute when he “backpedaled

away, escaped [the officer’s] attempt to grab his wrist and raised
his arms to his shoulders.” Here, too, there is a dispute of
material fact as to the nature of Haligas’ movement and, thus,
whether that movement was enough to supply probable cause.
Accordingly, summary judgment on the question of whether there was
probable cause to arrest Haligas for resisting arrest is
unavailable.
Even absent probable cause, however, qualified immunity might
shield the Officers from liability. Qualified immunity “protects
public officials from liability for damages if their actions did
not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 879

(7th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Once raised by defendants, as it has been here, it is the
plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that it does not apply. Wheeler
v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008). Its application
depends on two questions: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a
constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The first
question is resolved above: viewing the facts most favorably to
Haligas, her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful

seizure was violated. The second question “is similar to but
distinct from the first,” and asks in the false arrest context
“‘whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that
probable cause existed.’” Id. at 758 (quoting Fleming, 674 F.3d at
878). In other words, the question is whether the Officers had
“arguable probable cause.” Id.
A reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that
probable cause existed to arrest Haligas for resisting arrest
because when Officer McCallum instructed Haligas to put her hands
behind her back, she shouted “No!” and brought her arms in toward
her body. These actions arguably could have appeared to a
reasonable officer in Officer McCallum’s shoes to “impede[]” or

“hinder[]” his attempt to arrest her, which has been held to run
afoul of section 5/31-1(a). Agnew-Downs, 936 N.E.2d at 173; see
id. (holding that even going limp can be a form of resistance). So
even if the Officers were mistaken about whether Haligas pulling
her arms toward her body supplied probable cause to arrest her for
resisting arrest, or about whether she was resisting arrest based
on her conduct, that mistake was not unreasonable. See Pearson,
555 U.S. at 231 (“The protection of qualified immunity applies
regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake
of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions
of law and fact.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Haligas fails to overcome the Officers’ invocation of

qualified immunity on the issue of probable cause to arrest for
resisting arrest, which she can do “by ‘point[ing] to a clearly
analogous case establishing a right to be free from the specific
conduct at issue’ or by showing that ‘the conduct [at issue] is so
egregious that no reasonable person could have believed that it
would not violate clearly established rights.’” Wheeler, 539 F.3d
at 639 (quoting Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th
Cir. 2001)). Given that Haligas does neither, and that Officer
McCallum was not unreasonable in thinking Haligas was resisting
arrest, the Officers are entitled to summary judgment on her false
arrest claim. That is so even if the Officers were dead wrong to
attempt to arrest her for unlawful visitation interference,

because “Illinois law is clear that a person violates section 5/31-
1(a) if he or she resists or obstructs even an unlawful arrest
made by a known peace officer.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 720 (citations
omitted).
III.
Haligas bases her suit not only on the fact of the arrest
itself, but also on how that arrest was carried out--namely, the
force the Officers used in handcuffing her. Whether a particular
use of force violates the Fourth Amendment depends on “the facts
and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)). As with the probable cause
inquiry, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)).
The first and second Graham factors weigh heavily in Haligas’
favor. The crimes at issue were relatively minor when viewing the
evidence most favorably to her. Haligas had explained to the
Officers that she was going to hand over her son as soon as he
woke up from his nap, and she even showed them that his bags were

packed and ready to go. At the time force was applied, Haligas,
weighing about 125 pounds and wearing nothing other than a
nightgown, was unarmed and cornered in her kitchen. So while the
alleged crime of resisting arrest certainly can be serious, the
circumstances here do not suggest that significant force was
warranted. Haligas posed virtually no threat, serious or
otherwise, to the Officers’ or others’ safety.
The parties’ most substantive dispute centers on the third
Graham factor--whether Haligas was actively resisting arrest. The
Officers characterize her as “flailing about while refusing to be
handcuffed,” “pull[ing] her arms in to avoid being placed into
handcuffs,” and continuing to struggle while the Officers
attempted to handcuff her. Mem., ECF 97 at 21–22.3 A jury could

reasonably conclude, however, that she was not flailing about or
struggling, but that the chaotic movement seen in the video is the
result of the Officers imposing force on her. Her refusal to put
her hands behind her back and instead keeping them in front of
her, moreover, could be viewed as merely passive resistance, which
would justify only “the minimal use of force.” Phillips v. Cmty.
Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2012); see Cyrus v. Town
of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding jury might
find only passive resistance where suspect “refused to release his
arms for handcuffing” and officer “knew that [the suspect] was
unarmed and there was little risk [the suspect] could access a

weapon”).
Further, the record supports Haligas’ contention that the
handcuffing was rough. She screamed that her wrists hurt
immediately upon being handcuffed and continued to express pain
and discomfort afterward. Her cries were loud enough that the

3 Defendants also discuss Haligas’ backing up into her kitchen and
her attempt to get around Officer McCallum. But as explained above,
those actions happened before the Officers had probable cause to
arrest her, so they do not bear on whether she was actively
resisting arrest.
Officers must have heard them, and in fact they verbally responded
to her complaints on at least two occasions, saying “stop it” and
“we know.” Haligas went to a medical provider the following day

for pain, swelling, and a contusion. Taken together, that is enough
to proceed with her claim that the Officers applied the handcuffs
too tightly or too roughly and that they were made aware of the
pain Haligas was in. See Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“A person has the right to be free from an officer’s
knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary
pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight
or threat of injury.” (citations omitted)); Garcia v. City of
Chicago, No. 09 C 5598, 2012 WL 601844, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
2012) (“[A]n excessive force claim based on handcuffing can survive
summary judgment where the plaintiff adduces evidence of
significant pain resulting from handcuffing under circumstances

where the need for restraint was light.” (citations omitted)).
Many of defendants’ cases in support of their argument for
summary judgment on the excessive force claim involved (1) suspects
who were unambiguously actively resisting arrest or (2)
handcuffing-specific cases in which the officers were not
sufficiently made aware that the handcuffs were causing pain. Those
cases are distinguishable from this one for the reasons explained
above: (1) it is not clear Haligas was actively resisting, and (2)
she made the Officers aware of the pain caused by her handcuffs.
I agree with defendants, however, that the excessive force
claim cannot proceed against Officer Delgado. The only evidence
Haligas points to in support of maintaining this claim against him

is the BWC footage, which she claims leaves a jury question as to
Officer Delgado’s role in the handcuffing. The footage clearly
shows, however, that although Officer Delgado assisted restraining
Haligas while Officer McCallum handcuffed her, he did not do the
handcuffing--and it is the handcuffing that forms the basis of
Haligas’ claim. See McCallum BWC at 10:40–11:05. Insofar as Haligas
seeks to hold Officer Delgado accountable for failing to stop
Officer McCallum from using excessive force, that goes to her
failure to intervene claim.
The Officers again raise the defense of qualified immunity,
which Haligas can defeat by “establish[ing] that it was objectively
unreasonable for the [Officers] to believe that the force was

lawful--i.e., [she] must demonstrate that the right to be free
from the particular use of force under the relevant circumstances
was ‘clearly established.’” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 725 (citing
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). As before, to show
that the right was “clearly established,” she must show that
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
Material factual disputes prevent the Officers from
prevailing on their qualified immunity defense at this point. If
a jury concludes that Haligas’ resistance was merely passive and
that the force imposed via handcuffing was substantial, then the
Officers have run afoul of Haligas’ clearly established right to

be free from excessive force. That is because precedent has settled
that disproportionate force, in the form of unnecessarily rough or
tight handcuffing, cannot be imposed upon a non-resisting or
passively resisting, non-threatening suspect where a reasonable
Officer would have been aware that the handcuffs were too tight.
See Rooni, 742 F.3d at 742; see also Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d
767, 780 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t was unlawful to use excessively
tight handcuffs and violently yank the arms of arrestees who were
not resisting arrest, did not disobey the orders of a police
officer, did not pose a threat to the safety of others, and were
suspected of committing only minor crimes.”).
IV.

Defendants argue that Haligas’ claim against Officer Delgado
for failure to intervene fails because there were no underlying
constitutional violations. But because Haligas’ excessive force
claim may proceed, this argument fails.
Relying on nothing more than a concurring opinion, defendants
also contend that failure to intervene is not a viable claim under
§ 1983 in this circuit. See Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816,
834 (7th Cir. 2022) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“What statute
or constitutional rule requires one employee of the government to
stop another from making a mistake? The Supreme Court has held
many times that § 1983 supports only direct, and not vicarious,
liability.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). To the

contrary, the viability of failure-to-intervene claims under
§ 1983 is firmly grounded in the majority holdings of Seventh
Circuit cases. See, e.g., Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 864–
65 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining the elements of a failure-to-
intervene claim under § 1983); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423
F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
Defendants also seek to strike Haligas’ request for punitive
damages, which she may recover upon a showing of “evil motive or
intent, or . . . reckless or callous indifference to” her federally
protected rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
Defendants’ argument on this point appears in a single sentence:
“For the reasons set forth more fully above, Plaintiff cannot show

that the Officers violated her Constitutional rights, let alone
that they acted with malice.” Mem., ECF 97 at 32. But as discussed
above, Haligas may be able to show a constitutional violation. And
she will not be required to show the Officers acted with malice,
but can recover punitive damages by showing reckless disregard. I
therefore decline to strike her request for punitive damages.
Finally, defendants move for summary judgment on Haligas’
Monell claims and her indemnity claim against the City because
those claims depend on a finding of liability against the Officers.
But because Haligas’ excessive force claim against Officer
McCallum and her failure to intervene claim against Officer Delgado
will proceed, her Monell and indemnification claims against the
City can, too.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as
to the false arrest claim. It is also granted as to the excessive
force claim against Officer Delgado. It is otherwise denied.

ENTER ORDER:
LO A) Lf
( Onedetr—

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: September 3, 2024

21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645628. Public record. Not legal advice.