# Tricoci v. Blackman

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · August 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645617

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VINCENZO TRICOCI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 22 C 5445
)
DANIEL BLACKMAN, MICHAEL )
MARTINEZ, JOHNNY SANTIAGO, )
JAMES RASSO, NAVEEN FRANCIS, )
TOMASZ SIKORSKI, CYRUS )
MARTINEZ, and CITY OF CHICAGO, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Vincenzo Tricoci has sued the City of Chicago and Chicago police officers Daniel
Blackman, Michael Martinez, Johnny Santiago, James Rasso, Naveen Francis, Tomasz
Sikorski, and Cyrus Martinez for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Illinois state law. Tricoci's claims arise from events, including his arrest, that
occurred on the evening of October 5, 2020. Tricoci asserts claims for (1) illegal seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment (count one); (2) use of excessive force when he
was initially arrested and when he was at Swedish Covenant Hospital in violation of the
Fourth Amendment (count two); (3) failure to intervene during his illegal seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment (count three); (4) failure to intervene during the
excessive uses of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (count four); (5)
respondeat superior under Illinois common law (count five); and (6) indemnification
under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (count six).
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Tricoci's claims.
They argue as to count one that Blackman and Martinez had reasonable suspicion to
seize Tricoci1; as to count two that the use of force during Tricoci's arrest was

reasonable and that no excessive force was used at Swedish Covenant Hospital; as to
counts three and four that there is no underlying constitutional violation to support a
failure to intervene claim, and as to count three that only Blackman and Martinez were
involved in the seizure of Tricoci. Defendants argue as to counts five and six that the
City of Chicago may not be liable under a theory of respondeat superior or
indemnification for misdeeds of employees or agents of the municipality when there is
no underlying constitutional violation. In the alternative, defendants argue that the
officers are entitled to qualified immunity regarding counts one, two, three, and four. For
the reasons described below, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
defendants on all of Tricoci's claims except for his claims arising from the alleged use of

force at Swedish Covenant Hospital.
Background
The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted, and when
disputed they are taken in the light most favorable to Tricoci as the nonmoving party.
On the evening of October 5, 2020, Tricoci was driving a moped through the
intersection of Bryn Mawr Avenue and Broadway Street in Chicago, heading toward
Ridge Avenue. Officers Blackman and Martinez were on patrol in the area in an

1 Defendants have withdrawn their arguments for dismissal arising from application of
issue preclusion and from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
unmarked police vehicle. They observed Tricoci drive through the intersection on a
moped. Blackman and Martinez, believing that Tricoci was illegally operating the
moped without a headlight at night and making illegal righthand turns through no-turn-
on-red intersections, initiated a traffic stop. At some point during the officers' pursuit of

him, Tricoci crashed his moped. After crashing, Tricoci ran away from the moped,
heading northbound on Broadway. Blackman pursued Tricoci on foot while Martinez
remained with the police car. As Tricoci ran toward the intersection of Bryn Mawr and
Broadway, Blackman believed he observed Tricoci carrying a large, shiny metal object.
Tricoci states he was not carrying anything.
Cars were stopped at a red light when Tricoci entered the intersection on foot.
As Tricoci ran near one of the cars, Blackman caught up to Tricoci. Blackman says he
believed that Tricoci was reaching toward a car stopped in the intersection; Tricoci
asserts that he was merely running away and that the car happened to be in his path.
Blackman, operating under the belief that Tricoci was carrying a metal object and

reaching toward a car, administered an emergency takedown—he basically tackled
Tricoci. As a result, Tricoci says, his face was slammed into the ground. Blackman then
placed Tricoci in handcuffs. No other officer helped Blackman handcuff Tricoci, and no
other officer besides Martinez was on the scene at the time Tricoci was arrested.
At this point, Tricoci was lying in the middle of the street and was unable to move
due to an injured leg. A short time later, officers Santiago, Rasso, Francis, Sikorski, and
Cyrus Martinez arrived at the scene. Though traffic could flow around Tricoci, a truck
had been directed to the side of the road and was unable to leave with Tricoci in his
current position. To permit the truck to leave, Blackman moved Tricoci toward the curb
by dragging him on the ground, as Tricoci could not stand. Blackman states that he
moved Tricoci by grabbing underneath his arm and by his jacket. Tricoci says that
Blackman dragged him by the handcuffs, resulting in his arms being wrenched above
his head.

Throughout the incident, Tricoci complained of severe pain in his leg and that he
had smacked his head on the ground during the emergency takedown. Accordingly, an
ambulance was called, and Tricoci was taken to Swedish Covenant Hospital. Officer
Francis rode in the ambulance with Tricoci; Francis's partner, officer Rasso, followed
behind. Francis and Rasso escorted Tricoci into the hospital. While entering the
hospital, Tricoci says, a police officer who was pushing the wheelchair slammed
Tricoci's injured leg into a wall. Tricoci cannot identify this officer because the officer
was behind him. Francis and Rasso deny pushing Tricoci in a wheelchair and also deny
pushing Tricoci into a wall.
Tricoci was charged by the Cook County State's Attorney's Office with the

following offenses: 520 ILCS 5.0/1.22: resisting / obstructing an officer; 625 ILCS 5/11-
503(A)(1): reckless driving; 625 ILCS 5.0/6-303-A: driving on a revoked license;
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-76-050(A): driving without a headlight; Chicago Municipal
Code § 9-16-050(B): failing to properly signal; Chicago Municipal Code § 9-8-
020(C)(1): disobeying traffic lights; Chicago Municipal Code § 9-16-030(C): turn on red
prohibited; and Chicago Municipal Code § 9-16-040(A): improper U-turn. On January
27, 2022, Tricoci pleaded guilty to driving on a revoked license. The factual basis for
Tricoci's guilty plea was that he was driving on a revoked license at 5600 N. Broadway
in Chicago on October 5, 2020. All other charges were dismissed nolle prosequi.
Discussion
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court, when considering a motion for
summary judgment, is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Merely showing the existence of some
factual dispute between parties is not enough to defeat a properly supported motion for
summary judgment—"the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the evidence,
considered as a whole, would not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden to justify the basis for summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (quotation marks
omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists when, in drawing all reasonable
inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a
reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. Not all inferences, however, are reasonable: "When video footage firmly settles a
factual issue, there is no genuine dispute about it, and we will not indulge stories clearly
contradicted by the footage. Of course, videos are sometimes unclear, incomplete, and
fairly open to varying interpretations." Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir.
2018).
A. Illegal seizure claim

Tricoci contends that Blackman and Michael Martinez illegally seized him when
they swerved their police car toward his moped and caused him to crash. Blackman
and Martinez deny swerving their car toward Tricoci and contend they had the requisite
reasonable suspicion at the time to execute a legal traffic stop. Based on the record
before the Court, it is undisputed that the police car did not strike Tricoci—in other
words, Tricoci did not crash as a result of being hit by Blackman's car. It is likewise
undisputed that the first time Tricoci was physically touched was when Blackman
tackled Tricoci in the intersection.
A seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires "a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v. County of Inyo,

489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). "Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to
walk away, he has seized that person." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)
(citation omitted). Taken together, "[a] seizure requires not only that the reasonable
person feel unfree to leave, but also that the subject actually yields to a show of
authority from the police or be physically touched by police. Under this test, a police
officer who chases a fleeing suspect unsuccessfully has not seized the person. . . . [A]
fleeing person who continues to flee has not [been seized]." Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d
952, 957 (7th Cir. 1992).
To effectuate a legal seizure under the Fourth Amendment, an officer must have
probable cause to detain an individual. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996). The Supreme Court has found that this protection applies to automobile stops.
Id. at 809 ("Traffic stops are seizures, so they must be reasonable under the
circumstances."). "Because traffic stops are typically brief detentions, more akin to

Terry stops than formal arrests, they require only reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation—not probable cause." United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021);
see also Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Under this standard,
the reasonableness of a traffic stop is limited by the circumstances justifying the stop in
the first place. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("A seizure for a traffic violation justifies
a police investigation of that violation."). Prolonging the traffic stop beyond what is
necessary to investigate the underlying cause for the stop "violates the Fourth
Amendment unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity to
independently justify prolonging the stop." Cole, 21 F.4th at 428.
Tricoci asserts that he was illegally seized when officer Blackman swerved his

police car toward Tricoci, causing him to lose control of his moped and crash. This
argument, however, does not comport with the legal standard for when a seizure has
occurred. There is no evidence that Tricoci crashed as a result of being physically
struck by the police car. And after crashing on the moped, Tricoci proceeded to run
toward the intersection at Bryn Mawr and Broadway—in other words, he did not yield to
the officers' authority when they initially tried to pull him over. Accordingly, Tricoci was
not seized at that time. Rather, Tricoci was first seized when Blackman pursued him
into the intersection and executed the emergency takedown. At that point, and not
before, Tricoci's freedom of movement was restrained through intentional means.
That aside, the facts are also clear that Blackman and Martinez had reasonable
suspicion for a traffic stop based on their observations of Tricoci's maneuvers. Though
Tricoci emphasizes that he was unaware that it is illegal to make a right turn on a red
light at Bryn Mawr and Broadway, he acknowledges that the intersection is, in fact, a no-

turn-on-red intersection. Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Stat. of Undisputed Facts ¶ 10. And it is
illegal to make a right turn on a red light at a no-turn-on-red intersection under Illinois
law. Blackman and Martinez thus had reasonable suspicion that Tricoci had committed
a traffic violation, which in turn was sufficient to permit them to stop him. Tricoci's
subsequent flight from the crash site extended reasonable suspicion under the
circumstances to prolong the stop and allow Blackman to pursue and seize Tricoci. No
reasonable jury could find otherwise.
Ultimately, whether Tricoci was seized when he crashed the moped or when he
was tackled in the intersection does not change the analysis. Because Blackman and
Martinez had reasonable suspicion in both circumstances to detain Tricoci, they did not

violate Tricoci's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
Accordingly, this Court grants summary judgment as to count one.
B. Excessive force claim
Tricoci contends that Blackman twice used excessive force: (1) when he
executed the emergency takedown and (2) when he pulled Tricoci while he was on the
street and handcuffed. Tricoci also contends that an officer slammed him into a wall
while the officer was pushing him in a wheelchair at Swedish Covenant Hospital.
Blackman contends that both instances where he used force were reasonable; Francis
and Rasso deny pushing Tricoci into a wall while at Swedish Covenant.
A claim of excessive force is evaluated under an objective reasonableness
standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Courts must pay "careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case"; relevant factors
include "the severity of the crime, whether the arrestee poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he or she is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to flee and evade arrest." Id. at 396. When applying these factors, a court
must consider that "police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments" and
therefore "a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20 / 20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396–97.
1. Blackman's emergency takedown
Tricoci first alleges that Blackman used excessive force when he took Tricoci
down on the street. The depositions and bodycam footage show that no reasonable
jury could find this use of force was unreasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. Though Blackman initiated the traffic stop for a relatively minor

infraction, it is undisputed that, at the time, Tricoci was running away from Blackman
and toward an intersection where several cars were stopped. Blackman says he
observed Tricoci carrying a shiny metal object as he ran toward the intersection.
Though Tricoci disputes this, Blackman's bodycam footage shows an object in Tricoci's
hand. Because video footage clearly settles this factual issue, no reasonable jury could
find otherwise, and there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Horton, 883 F.3d at
944.
Blackman also says he believed Tricoci was reaching toward a car; Tricoci
contends that he was merely reaching forward to break his fall as he was being tackled
by Blackman. The same bodycam footage shows Tricoci was close enough to a car in
the intersection to place his hand on the car's window just prior to the emergency
takedown. Though "videos are sometimes unclear, incomplete, and fairly open to
varying interpretations," Blackman's bodycam footage shows Tricoci running away,

carrying a metal object, and heading toward a crowded intersection, where he came
close enough to a car to make contact with the driver's side window. Id. at 944. Video
evidence shows that there are no material facts that could be genuinely disputed by a
reasonable jury regarding the circumstances immediately prior to the emergency
takedown.
Though there are arguably facts in dispute, none are material. See Howland v.
Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The mere existence of a factual dispute will
not bar summary judgment unless 'the disputed fact is outcome determinative under
governing law.'") (citation omitted). It is undisputed that Tricoci was running away from
the crashed moped, but there are disputes regarding his state of mind at the time.

Tricoci states that he was running because he feared for his life and that he did not
know police officers were in the unmarked SUV that was pursuing him and did not
observe the SUV flash its lights or blare its siren; Blackman asserts that he flashed his
lights and siren when initiating the traffic stop. An individual's subjective reason for
running from police, however, is not a factor appropriately considered when evaluating
the objective reasonableness of the responding officer's actions. See Graham, 490
U.S. at 396 ("The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . . [T]he question is whether the
officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them . . . .") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Under these circumstances, no reasonable jury could find Blackman's use of
force was unreasonable. Defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment for this
instance of force in count two.

2. Blackman's "dragging" of Tricoci while handcuffed
Tricoci next contends that Blackman dragged him through the street by his
handcuffs. But again, bodycam footage from multiple angles demonstrates that is not
what happened.
As an initial matter, Blackman must justify moving Tricoci at all; Tricoci was
handcuffed and no longer posed a flight risk or threat to safety. See Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396–97 (finding that the reasonableness of a particular use of force is assessed "in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting [a law enforcement officer]" at the time
force is used). It is undisputed that a truck had pulled over to the side of the road when
Tricoci was arrested in the intersection. Over the course of the arrest, the truck became

wedged between parked cars, police cars that had arrived at the scene, and Tricoci,
who was still lying in the middle of the eastbound lane on Bryn Mawr. An ambulance
arrived accompanied by a fire truck; the ambulance had been called due to Tricoci's
claimed injuries. Neither the ambulance nor the fire truck could approach the
intersection given where the truck was positioned. To permit the truck to safely leave,
Blackman had to move Tricoci out of the way. Though Tricoci contends otherwise,
Blackman's bodycam footage clearly shows that Tricoci was in the truck's path and
needed to be moved to safety. No reasonable jury could find otherwise based on the
bodycam footage.
Having justified the need to move Tricoci at all, Blackman's manner in moving
Tricoci still has to be objectively reasonable. In the bodycam footage, Blackman can be
seen grabbing Tricoci from underneath the arm and by the sleeve of his jacket. Though
Blackman did drag Tricoci several feet through the street, this was only after attempting

unsuccessfully to bring Tricoci to his feet. Tricoci's own statements confirm that he was
unable to stand. And the bodycam footage shows a flurry of activity, with numerous
police cars blocking the truck and the ambulance and fire truck approaching the
intersection. Thus Blackman's only option to move Tricoci to safety was to pull him
while on the ground. Because Blackman used only the force necessary to move Tricoci
out of the line of traffic to a safer location—which is supported by video from Blackman's
bodycam—no reasonable jury could find this use of force was unreasonable under the
circumstances. The defendants are entitled to summary judgement regarding this use
of force as well.

3. "Slammed into wall" at Swedish Covenant
Tricoci finally alleges that an unknown officer pushed him into a wall while he was
in a wheelchair at Swedish Covenant Hospital. Tricoci was in a wheelchair as a result
of injuring his leg during the emergency takedown. At the time of the alleged wheelchair
incident, Tricoci was handcuffed, and there is no contention he was resisting the officers
in any way. Once an individual has been secured, there is no longer a concern for flight
or safety, and even "one violent push or poke" is enough to constitute excessive force.
Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 475–76 (7th Cir. 1997). Unlike
with the alleged uses of force when Tricoci was initially arrested, there is no bodycam
footage or hospital footage to support or undermine Tricoci's claim. Rather, there are
competing versions of what transpired while Tricoci was being pushed into Swedish
Covenant Hospital. Thus there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether an officer
did knowingly push Tricoci into a wall while at Swedish Covenant Hospital. It is
undisputed that officers Naveen Francis and James Rasso were present when Tricoci

was escorted into Swedish Covenant.
For these reasons, Francis and Rasso are not entitled to summary judgment on
the third claim of excessive force contained in count two. By contrast, Blackman,
Martinez, Santiago, Sikorski, and Cyrus Martinez are entitled to summary judgment
regarding this alleged use of force.
C. Failure to intervene claims
Tricoci also contends that the officers who arrived on the scene after his initial
encounter with Blackman and Michael Martinez violated his constitutional rights by
failing to intervene despite having an opportunity to do so. Specifically, Tricoci asserts
claims against officers Santiago, Rasso, Francis, Sikorski, and Cyrus Martinez for failing

to intervene during his initial seizure by Blackman and Michael Martinez and for failing
to intervene to prevent Blackman from dragging him in the street. Tricoci also brings a
failure to intervene claim against Blackman, Michael Martinez, Santiago, Rasso,
Francis, Sikorski, and Cyrus Martinez for failing to intervene when he was pushed into a
wall at Swedish Covenant. Defendants assert that only Blackman was present when
Tricoci was initially seized, that Blackman's use of force was reasonable to move Tricoci
through the street, and that Tricoci was not pushed into a wall at the hospital. Under
these circumstances, defendants allege there was no duty to intervene.
An officer may be liable under section 1983 for failing to intervene to prevent a
constitutional violation if he or she is present at the time the violation occurs and fails to
intervene despite having reason to know "that any constitutional violation has been
committed by a law enforcement official[] and the officer has a realistic opportunity to
intervene to protect the harm from occurring." Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.

1994). A realistic opportunity to intervene exists whenever an officer could have "called
for backup, called for help, or at least cautioned [the excessive force officer] to stop." Id.
The Court addresses each incident in turn.
1. Illegal seizure
Tricoci concedes that only officers Blackman and Michael Martinez were
personally involved in the initial seizure. Accordingly, the remaining defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on count three for failure to intervene during Tricoci's
seizure. See Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An
individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in
[the] alleged constitutional deprivation.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2. Excessive force
Tricoci claims that other officers failed to intervene to prevent excessive force on
three instances: (1) when Blackman administered the emergency takedown; (2) when
Blackman pulled Tricoci in the street; and (3) when an officer slammed Tricoci into a wall
at Swedish Covenant while he was in a wheelchair.
a. Emergency takedown
It is undisputed that the only officers on the scene when Blackman used the
emergency takedown on Tricoci were Blackman and Michael Martinez. Martinez's
bodycam footage clearly shows he remained with the police car. Thus he had no
opportunity to intervene when Blackman used the takedown. And the Court has
concluded that no reasonable jury could find the takedown was unreasonable. Thus all
of the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim of failure to intervene
regarding this particular use of force.

b. Dragging in the street
By the time Blackman moved Tricoci while he lay handcuffed in the street, other
officers had arrived and did have an opportunity to intervene. The Court has previously
concluded, however, that no reasonable jury could find Blackman's use of force to be
unreasonable. Thus there can be no liability for failure to intervene. All of the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim of failure to intervene
regarding this use of force as well.
c. Slammed into wall at hospital
It is undisputed that only Francis and Rasso were present at Swedish Covenant
when Tricoci alleges he was slammed into a wall while being pushed in his wheelchair.

The remaining defendants thus had no opportunity to intervene, and as a result they are
entitled to summary judgment on this particular claim. Though it is not clear which (if
either) of Francis or Rasso allegedly used force, it is undisputed that both officers were
present at the time. Thus one could have intervened to prevent the other from using
excessive force. Those two defendants are not entitled to summary judgment for failure
to intervene on this particular claimed use of force.
D. Respondeat superior
In count five, Tricoci alleges that the City of Chicago is liable for the actions of its
employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Respondeat superior is not a viable
theory of liability under section 1983. See Hanh v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 638–39 (7th
Cir. 2014) ("Monell permits suits against municipal entities under § 1983, but only when
a governmental policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation; municipal
entities cannot be liable for their employees' actions under a respondeat superior

theory."). Because only section 1983 claims have been asserted in this case, the City of
Chicago is entitled to summary judgment on count five.
E. Indemnification
Tricoci likewise asserts a claim against the City of Chicago under 745 ILCS 10/9-
102 for indemnification of the defendant officers. This claim will remain in the case with
respect to the remaining claims against Francis and Russo.
F. Qualified immunity
Finally, the defendant officers assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
The Court addresses this only with regard to the claims that remain in the case,
regarding the alleged pushing of Tricoci into a wall at the hospital.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity when performing a discretionary
function that is objectively lawful in light of clearly established law and the information
an officer possessed at the time. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
("Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights or which a reasonable person would have
known.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). Once the defense of qualified immunity
is raised, "a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was clearly established at the time so that it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer that her conduct was unlawful in the situation." Ewell v. Toney, 853
F.3d 911, 919 (7th Cir. 2017).
Tricoci alleges that Francis and Rasso used excessive force by pushing him into
a wall while at Swedish Covenant, further injuring his leg. If such force was used, it
would be clearly unlawful, as Tricoci was already restrained and not claimed to pose
any danger. See, e.g., Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 475-76. The dispute over this claim
involves whether the underlying event claimed by Tricoci actually happened. Given this
genuine dispute of material fact, qualified immunity does not provide a basis for
summary judgment. See Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 807 (genuine dispute of
material fact regarding whether police officer used excessive force precludes summary
judgment on issue of qualified immunity). Therefore, Francis and Rasso are not entitled
to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the remaining claims against
them.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of all
defendants on counts one, three, and five of plaintiffs complaint and in favor of all
defendants other than Francis and Russo on counts two and four. The Court otherwise
denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment [57]. The Court sets the case for a
telephonic status hearing on September 6, 2024 at 9:20 a.m. to set a trial date and
discuss the possibility of settlement. The following call-in number will be used: 650-
479-3207, access code 980-394-33.
Date: August 27, 2024

United States District Judge

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645617. Public record. Not legal advice.