# Hollingsworth v. Menella

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · July 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645426

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645426

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the pro se plaintiff’s “pleadings deserve liberal construction.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LASHAWN HOLLINGSWORTH,

Plaintiff,
No. 1:23-cv-2021
v. Judge Franklin U. Valderrama

CONNIE MENNELLA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER
For nearly five years, Plaintiff LaShawn Hollingsworth (Hollingsworth), was a
detainee at the Cook County Jail. R.1 1, Compl. Upon his release, Hollingsworth,
proceeding pro se, brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for deliberate indifference
to his medical needs and living conditions. Id. Apparently, Hollingsworth also alleges
a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Id. He
names as defendants several staff members who worked at Cermak Health Services
(the healthcare provider at the Cook County Jail) during the time of his incarceration:
Connie Mennella, the former Director; Susan Shebel, the nurse tasked with reviewing
detainee grievances; and Anna Jimenez, a former employee (together, the Cermak
Defendants). Id. He also names as a defendant the ADA Compliance Officer working
on behalf of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office at the time of his alleged deprivations,

1Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number or filing name,
and, where necessary, a page or paragraph citation.
Sabrina Rivera (Defendant Rivera) (together with the Cermak Defendants, the
Defendants). Id.
Defendant Rivera and the Cermak Defendants separately moved to dismiss

Hollingsworth’s claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 38, Cermak
Mot. Dismiss; R. 39, Rivera Mot. Dismiss. Given the claims against the Defendants
derive from the same factual background and the substantial overlap between the
arguments raised by the Defendants, the Court will address these parallel motions
to dismiss in this Order. For the following reasons, the Court the grants the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to both Hollingsworth’s Section 1983 claim and his

ADA claim. The Court grants Hollingsworth leave to amend his Complaint consistent
with this Order.
Background2
Hollingsworth was incarcerated at the Cook County Jail between June 2017
and February 2022. Compl. at 4. Hollingsworth alleges that during his incarceration,
the Defendants denied him proper bedding, adequate medical care, and the use of his
cane beginning in June 2017. Id. Although he does not provide dates for additional

alleged violations, Hollingsworth also claims he was forced to participate in
recreation despite experiencing pain, was contaminated with body lice from a
mattress provided by Cermak Health Services, and was denied treatment for a
broken finger, boils, and carbuncles. Id. at 5. Additionally, Hollingsworth asserts

2The Court accepts as true all facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of Hollingsworth. See St. John v. Cach, LLC, 822 F.3d 388, 389 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal
citations omitted).
that, despite being diagnosed with degenerative disc disease in his back and having
had surgeries on his back and right arm, the Defendants deliberately gave him
bedding known to be inadequate for his conditions and denied the accommodation of

cuffing his hands in front of his body to avoid further harm to his shoulder and arm.
Id. at 5-6. As a result, he claims to experience chronic pain, a remedy of which
requires surgical intervention. Id.
Before commencing this action, Hollingsworth filed another lawsuit pursuant
to Section 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against Thomas J. Dart, the Cook County Sheriff, in which he claimed inadequate

prison conditions as described here. Compl. at 3. That suit, however, was settled
around March 2020. Id.
On March 30, 2023, Hollingsworth filed this action against the Defendants,
alleging violations of his rights under Section 1983 and, it appears, the ADA, for
failure to accommodate his disabilities and provide adequate medical care. Compl.
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are now before the Court.
Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811,
820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual
allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly at 555. The allegations
that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than
mere legal conclusions. Iqbal at 678–79.
Analysis
The Defendants move the Court to dismiss this suit because it was filed beyond

the applicable statute of limitations, or, alternatively, because the Complaint does
not allege that the Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations.
Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 2; Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 1. Additionally, the Cermak
Defendants argue that Hollingsworth is not entitled to specific medical treatment
and that Defendant Shebel cannot be held liable for simply reviewing and responding
to grievances. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 2, 6–9. Defendant Rivera also asserts that the
suit should be dismissed because she is entitled to qualified immunity against the

claims alleged, and that ADA claims cannot be brought against individuals. Rivera
Mot. Dismiss at 1–2, 4–5, 7–8. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
I. Section 1983 Claim
A. Statute of Limitations
The Defendants argue that Hollingworth’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations for Section 1983 cases. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 2; Rivera Mot. Dismiss at
1. More specifically, arguing that federal courts must adopt the forum state’s statute
of limitations for personal injury claims because Section 1983 does not have an
express statute of limitations, the Defendants insist that Illinois’ two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury claims applies to this case. Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 2
(citing Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001)); Cermak Mot. Dismiss
at 5–6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133). And thus, each of Hollingsworth’s allegations is
time-barred because the statute of limitations begins to run when Hollingsworth
could have filed a suit and obtained relief. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 5 (citing Walden
v. City of Chicago, 755 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2010)); Rivera Mot. Dismiss at

3. Hollingsworth, in response, resubmitted his original complaint in which he alleges
his rights were violated from 2017 to 2022 and that he continues to experience pain
and require medical treatment as a result. R. 41, Resp. He did not, however, address
the arguments raised by the Defendants other than to say that he indeed stated a
detailed claim in his original Complaint. Id.
“While expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may
be pled in an answer pursuant to Rule 8(c), it can be used as a basis for granting a

12(b)(6) motion where the case is ‘obviously time-barred.’” Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d
894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005). A case is obviously time-barred if the factual allegations in
the complaint include dates that establish the claim was filed after the applicable
statute of limitations expired. Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 969, 974 (7th
Cir. 2016). When this happens, a plaintiff can “plead himself out of court.” Lekas v.
Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2005).
Because Section 1983 does not include its own statute of limitations, the forum
state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury torts is the appropriate statute
of limitations for a Section 1983 claim. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). In

Illinois, the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two-years. Therefore,
Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Kalimara v.
Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 879 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1989). While state law
determines the statute of limitations, federal law determines the date of accrual of
the cause of action. Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council,
406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff “knows or should know that his or
her constitutional rights have been violated.” Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 698
(7th Cir. 2004). It is “the standard rule” that accrual in a Section 1983 claim occurs
when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action," meaning when the
plaintiff can “file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)
(cleaned up)3. The Court’s “task, therefore, is to identify the constitutional violation
and locate it in time.” Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1478 (7th Cir. 1994). Put

another way, courts should focus on the “time of the discriminatory act, not the point
at which the consequences of the act become painful.” Hileman at 698.
Here, Hollingsworth’s alleged violations span from June 27, 2017, to February
17, 2022. Compl. Hollingsworth alleges he was denied the use of his cane from June

3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
27, 2017, to August 2019; denied proper bedding from June 27, 2017, until February
17, 2022; and provided inadequate medical care from 2017 to 2022. Id. at 4. He does
not specify dates for his alleged forced participation in recreation, denial of the

accommodation of cuffing his hands in front of his body, contamination with body lice,
or denial of treatment for his broken finger, boils, and carbuncles. Id. at 4–5.
At first blush, it appears that Hollingsworth’s claims are time-barred. That is,
he knew or should have known as of June 2017 of the violation of his constitutional
rights. Thus, he needed to file suit before June 2019. Compl. at 4. See McMasters v.
U.S., 260 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2001) (pro se litigants must determine and comply

with the appropriate statute of limitations). That is, unless Hollingsworth’s claims
are subject to the continuing violation doctrine, in which case the two-year period
starts to run from the date of the last incidence of the violation, not the first. Turley
v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013).
The continuing violation doctrine is an equitable doctrine “aimed at ensuring
that illegal conduct is punished by preventing a defendant from invoking the earliest
manifestation of its wrongful conduct as a means of running out the limitations clock

on a course of misconduct that persisted over time...” United States v. Spectrum
Brands, Inc., 924 F.3d 337, 350 (7th Cir. 2019). As the Seventh Circuit has explained,
“the doctrine serves that end by treating the defendant’s misconduct as a continuing
wrong and deeming the action timely so long as the last act evidencing a defendant’s
violation falls within the limitations period.” Id. That is, “where the violation at issue
can be characterized as a continuing wrong, the limitations period begins to run not
when an action on the violation could first be brought, but when the course of the
conduct is complete.” Id.
As noted, Hollingsworth is proceeding pro se. Pleadings drafted by pro

se litigants are not held to the stringent standards expected of those prepared by
lawyers, so the allegations in the complaint must be liberally construed. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (cleaned up); Wynn v.
Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the pro se plaintiff’s

“pleadings deserve liberal construction.”). Accordingly, taking as true the facts in
Hollingsworth’s Complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the
Court cannot say that Hollingsworth has pled himself out of court for his claims,
except for his allegation that he was denied the use of his cane, as by his own
admission, the last date of that conduct was August 2019, putting his claim outside
the statute of limitations. As for the remainder of his claims, it may be the case that
the evidence will show that Hollingsworth’s claims are time-barred, but today is not

that day. As such, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hollingsworth’s
Section 1983 claim on the basis of statute of limitations.
B. Specific Medical Treatment
The Defendants argue that the deprivations Hollingsworth alleges do not amount
to constitutional violations, but rather disagreements over the type of medical care
provided. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 8; Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 7-8. To support their
argument, they point out that despite his dissatisfaction with the care provided,
Hollingsworth does not allege he was prevented from seeing medical providers
altogether. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 8; Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 5-6. The Cermak

Defendants assert that detainees are not entitled to specific medical care or even the
best medical care, but rather reasonable treatment. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 8. While
the Cermak Defendants acknowledge that the treatment of detainees must be
constitutional, they argue that Hollingsworth did not meet his burden of alleging
facts that satisfy the two-pronged McCann v. Ogle City framework to demonstrate
medical care to be constitutionally inadequate. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 7-8 (citing

McCann v. Ogle City, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018)). In other words, they argue
Hollingsworth’s allegations do not support an inference that the Defendants’ conduct
was (1) “purposeful, knowing, or perhaps reckless” and (2) “objectively unreasonable.”
Id. As with the Defendants’ other arguments, Hollingsworth does not respond to the
Defendants’ argument about entitlement to specific medical treatment in his
response to the motion to dismiss. Resp.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s

condition of confinement claim. Turner v. Paul, 953 F.3d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 2020).
Because pretrial detainees are presumed to be innocent, “the punishment model is
inappropriate for them.” Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018).
As the Cermak Defendants assert, a prison official’s conduct must be purposeful,
knowing, or reckless to satisfy the first prong of the McCann v. Ogle City’s test for
determining whether a detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.
McCann at 886. If the first prong is satisfied, the totality of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the allegations must be evaluated for objective
reasonableness. Id. If a factual inquiry shows that the treatment provided was

objectively unreasonable, the official or officials responsible for the detainee’s
treatment could be found liable for violating the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id. at 887.
Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true and considering the
information currently available to the Court, the Court is unable to determine
whether Hollingsworth was treated objectively unreasonably due to the Defendants’

purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct. This determination would require an
inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations. Additionally, it
is far from clear that Hollingsworth’s allegations constitute a disagreement over
medical care rather than a violation of constitutional rights. Denial of bedding
adequate for his disability, forced participation in recreation, contamination with
body lice, denial of the accommodation of cuffing his hands in front of his body, and
denial of treatment for a broken finger, boils, and carbuncles could very well be found

to constitute objectively unreasonable treatment. Compl. As such, the Court
disagrees with the Defendants that the allegations indicate a disagreement regarding
specific medical treatment and finds that a more rigorous inquiry is required to
determine whether the Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of Hollingsworth’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
C. Defendant Rivera’s Qualified Immunity
Defendant Rivera also asserts qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
against Hollingsworth’s claims. Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 2, 7-8. Qualified immunity

“‘shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)). “The doctrine of qualified
immunity balances dueling interests—allowing officials to perform their duties
reasonably without fear of liability on the one hand and affording members of the

public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations by government officials who
abuse their offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 993 F.3d 981, 987 (7th
Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted). “The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect
‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Humphrey
v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once a defendant properly

raises the defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it. Leiser v. Kloth, 933
F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2722 (2020). Courts, in
determining whether qualified immunity applies, engage in a two-prong
inquiry. Rose ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2018).
Under the first prong, the court inquires whether the facts, taken in the light most
favorable to the injured party, show that the official’s conduct violated a federal
right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Under the second prong, the court
inquires whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct. Id. “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate based on

qualified immunity only when the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, taken as true,
do not ‘state a claim of violation of clearly established law’.” Hanson v. LeVan, 967
F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2020).
As the Seventh Circuit has instructed “dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) are
appropriate based on qualified immunity only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations, taken as true, do not state a claim of violation of clearly established law.”

Id. This is so, “[b]ecause qualified immunity defense so clearly depends on the facts
of a case, a complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified
immunity grounds.” Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018).
As mentioned above, Defendant Rivera argues that Hollingsworth’s allegations
constitute a disagreement in medical care, not a violation of clearly established
constitutional rights. Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 7-8. Thus, she asserts that he has not
defeated her qualified immunity. Id. Hollingsworth does not address Defendant

Rivera’s argument about qualified immunity in his response to the motion to dismiss.
Resp.
Defendant Rivera is correct that qualified immunity can protect government
officials such as herself from individual liability under Section 1983 for actions taken
performing their discretionary duties unless their actions violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Hernandez at 2007. However, as discussed above, objectively unreasonable
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct can be found to be a violation of clearly
established Fourteenth Amendment rights. McCann at 886. Thus, if Defendant

Rivera is found to have purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly acted objectively
unreasonably in regard to Hollingsworth’s alleged deprivations, her qualified
immunity could be defeated, and she could be held liable under Section 1983 for
violating Hollingsworth’s constitutional rights. Id. Thus, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity is not appropriate here. Hanson at 590.
D. Personal Liability

The Defendants assert that Hollingsworth has not specified how they directly
caused or participated in the alleged constitutional violations as required to establish
liability in a Section 1983 case. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 4; Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 5.
Further, Defendant Rivera argues that because she is a nonmedical defendant and
was not an employee of Cermak at the time of the alleged abuses, she cannot be held
liable for any deprivation alleged. Rivera Mot. Dismiss at 6-7. Similarly, the Cermak
Defendants assert that a “defendant such as Ms. Shebel,” who merely reviews and

responds to grievances, cannot be held liable for the alleged violations under Section
1983. Cermak Mot. Dismiss at 6. As with the Defendants’ other arguments,
Hollingsworth does not respond to the arguments about personal liability in his
response to the motions to dismiss. Resp.
“[E]ven under the liberal construction to be given to pro se complaints” a
plaintiff’s complaint must allege a specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant
to proceed. Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974). Thus, as argued by
the Defendants, to be held liable in a Section 1983 action, an official must have caused
or participated in a constitutional deprivation. Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556

(7th Cir. 2012).
The Court agrees with the Defendants that Hollingsworth has not sufficiently
described any specific actions through which the Defendants personally caused or
participated in the alleged deprivations. While Defendants Rivera’s and Shebel’s
positions may not involve directly providing medical care, they still could be liable for
Hollingsworth’s alleged deprivations if they are found to have known of constitutional

violations and not acted to rectify them. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612,
652 (7th Cir. 2001) (a nonmedical defendant may be deemed personally responsible
“if he directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with
his knowledge or consent.”); Courtney v. Butler, 66 F.4th 1043, 1052 (7th Cir. 2023)
(an official responsible for addressing grievances may be held liable in a Section 1983
action if he or she failed to investigate and respond to the grievance filed). Although
Defendant Rivera argues that she cannot be held liable for Hollingsworth’s treatment

because she is not a Cermak employee, a question of fact remains as to whether her
conduct was purposeful, knowing, or reckless and directly contributed to
Hollingsworth’s allegedly objectively unreasonable medical care.
For these reasons, the Court grants the motions to dismiss Hollingsworth’s
Section 1983 claims without prejudice. The Court grants Hollingsworth leave to
amend his Complaint consistent with this Order.
II. ADA Claim
As far as the Court can discern, Hollingsworth not only asserts a claim under
Section 1983, but also a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42

U.S.C. § 12132. Compl. at 4. Defendant Rivera moves to dismiss his ADA claim on
the basis that he may not bring such a claim against an individual. Rivera Mot.
Dismiss at 1, 4-5. As with the Defendants’ other arguments, Hollingsworth does not
respond to Defendant Rivera’s argument about the ADA in his response to the motion
to dismiss. Resp.
Defendant Rivera is correct that a claim under the ADA cannot be brought against

an individual. The text of the ADA specifies that its protections are against public
entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity is defined as “any State or local
government” and “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” § 12131. Thus, a plaintiff
must pursue an ADA claim against a public entity itself and cannot proceed against
individual defendants in their personal capacities. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of
Northwest Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, the claims Hollingsworth

has brought are against the Defendants in their individual capacities rather than
against a public entity. This means his ADA claim cannot proceed and, as such, the
Court dismisses Hollingsworth’s ADA claim without prejudice. The Court grants
Hollingsworth leave to amend his Complaint consistent with this Order.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court grants the Defendants’ motions to dismiss as
to both Hollingsworth’s Section 1983 claim and his ADA claim. The Court grants
Hollingsworth leave to amend his Complaint consistent with this Order, “[u]nless it
is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or
otherwise unwarranted” and there is “no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago
and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2015); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 46 (1957).

Dated: 7/19/2024

Ad
United States hd Judge
Franklin U. Valderrama

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645426. Public record. Not legal advice.