# Brown v. Cook County Auditor's Office

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · July 16, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645392

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 16, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645392

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that health concerns presented as religious beliefs are not afforded protection under Title VII

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD BROWN, )
) Case No. 23-cv-10452
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
v. )
)
COOK COUNTY AUDITOR’S OFFICE, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ronald Brown brings this action against his former employer, the Cook County
Auditor’s Office,1 claiming that his termination was the result of religious and racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Before the Court is the County’s motion to dismiss both counts under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants the County’s motion [14] in full.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true. Brown is an African American and a Baptist
pastor. Brown began working as an Administrative Assistant at the Cook County Auditor’s Office
in 2008. In August 2021, after vaccines became widely available, the Cook County Bureau of
Human Resources imposed a Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination for Personnel Policy (the
“Policy”). Under the Policy, an employee could seek a medical or religious exemption from the
vaccination requirements. If an employee did so, the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)

1 Defendant notes that the “Auditor’s Office” of Cook County is incorrectly named in the complaint and
responds as “Cook County” as a whole. Defendant does not dispute service or the propriety of it responding
to this lawsuit as “Cook County.” The Court will therefore refer to Defendant as “Cook County” or “the
County” in this Opinion.
Office would evaluate the request and engage in an interactive dialogue to determine whether an
accommodation was appropriate and could be granted without imposing an undue hardship.
In September 2021, Brown requested a religious accommodation from compliance with the
Policy (the “Request”). In the Request, Brown stated that the “new law conflicts with [his] personal
health care philosophy, religious beliefs, and cultural practices.” When prompted to describe the
conflict, he explained:

My strong religious convictions have guided me to believe that the development of
the vaccine, like many commercial drugs is made with poisons, carcinogenic
substances and aborted fetus tissue. My cultural and religious belief aligns with a
holistic health care system that focuses on herbalism and the use of nature to heal the
body.

During a subsequent email correspondence with the EEO Office about the Request, Brown
was asked to “provide a brief overview of [his] religious practice or belief.” Brown responded, in
part:
It is a violation of my beliefs to desecrate my body, my temple to God, with foreign
objects against my will… I will not be encouraged or forced to contaminate my body
with manufactured drugs, poisons, black magic, or sorcery.
Forcing me to take the Covid Vaccine and threaten my livelihood is an evil and vile
act… This is also a violation of my constitutional rights and moral beliefs against
having certain chemicals in my body. The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit and
should not be used for medical treatments that are unnecessary and vile. Substances
in the vaccine are possible harmful to the human body, and we are called to protect
the body and not to participate in experimental chemical testing.
He also included various quotations from religious scripture in addition to his asserted beliefs.
On October 19, 2021, the EEO Office denied Brown’s request for religious accommodation
and advised him that he would be disciplined and/or discharged if he failed to get vaccinated.
Brown did not comply. In April 2022, Brown participated in a disciplinary proceeding regarding his
non-compliance with the Policy. On June 27, 2022, he was terminated. Brown did not specify his
race or religion at any point in either the Request or email correspondence. But he alleges that the
EEO Office would have been aware of both characteristics from in-person interactions he had with
various EEO Office employees in the past, among other things.
Around the same time as Brown’s accommodation request process, Brown’s supervisor
Mary Modelski, who is Catholic and white, also requested a religious accommodation to the Policy.
In an email exchange with the EEO Office regarding her accommodation request, Modelski stated:
My religious belief calls for free will and conscious. Yes you are correct, the
inoculations are derived from fetal (kidney) tissues cells obtained from the 1970’s. But
no matter how remote the fetus tissue is from me, on my last day when I must account
for my actions. To be asked did I take the inoculation for my God, my family or my
well-being, I would have to answer no, but for a paycheck. Then I could be asked was
I not adequately clothed, sheltered or fed, for which, I must say abundantly so.
Therefore, in my right conscience I cannot nor will not put a paycheck over my God.
Modelski’s accommodation request was eventually granted by the EEO Office.
Brown subsequently filed this case, alleging religious discrimination (Count I) and racial
discrimination (Count II) in violation of Title VII.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency
of the complaint, not its merits. See Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.
2014). When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts well pleaded factual allegations
as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); Trujillo v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 926
F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2019). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint is facially plausible when the plaintiff alleges “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
DISCUSSION
1. Religious Discrimination
Invoking the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Brown alleges that the rejection of
his Request and his subsequent termination under the Policy constitutes religious discrimination
under Title VII. Brown’s complaint also makes passing reference to the Health Care Right of
Conscience Act, 745 ILCS 70/5 (the “Act”). Even if Brown intends to assert an additional claim,

however, this Court has already ruled that section 13.5 of the Act explicitly bars claims arising from
measures intended to prevent the contraction or transmission of COVID-19. See Carrero v. City of
Chicago, No. 23-CV-00650, 2024 WL 22099, *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2024) (Coleman, J.). Brown
provides no reason to depart from that ruling. The Court therefore dismisses any claim under the
Act and focuses this analysis on Brown’s Title VII claim.
To state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff “need only aver that the
employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of” a
protected characteristic. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008). However, a party
may plead himself out of court by alleging facts that establish an impenetrable defense to his claims.
Id. at 1086. To successfully plead a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII, an employee
must demonstrate that “(1) an observance or practice that is religious in nature, and (2) that is based
on a sincerely held religious belief, (3) conflicted with an employment requirement, and (4) the

religious observance or practice was the basis or a motivating factor for the employee’s discharge or
other discriminatory treatment.” Kosenka-Pistell v. Cook Cnty., No. 1:23-CV-1462, 2023 WL 6936800,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2023) (Bucklo, J.) (citing Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 64 F.4th 861, 883
(7th Cir. 2023), vacated on other grounds, No. 21-2475, 2023 WL 4842324 (7th Cir. July 28, 2023)).
The County does not dispute that elements (3) and (4) are satisfied here. Instead, the Court
finds that Brown’s pleadings fail to satisfy elements (1) and (2). The Seventh Circuit test for whether
a sincerely held belief qualifies as religious for Title VII purposes is whether the belief “occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” Adeyeye v.
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 165 -66, 85 S. Ct. 850 (1965)). Such beliefs “deal[ ] with issues of ultimate concern,” such as
“matters of the afterlife, spirituality, or the soul, among other possibilities.” Id. Religious beliefs do
not need to be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others,” Thomas v. Review Bd. of

Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), and “the court does
not concern itself with the truth or validity of religious belief.” Snyder v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 22
CV 6086, 2023 WL 7298943, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2023) (Shah, J.) (citing Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at
451).
Still, the Court must determine whether the belief at issue is “religious” and not a mere
personal conviction, as only the former “warrant[s] the heightened protection of Title VII.” Id., at
*7. The EEOC has issued guidance consistent with these principles, explaining that “objections to a
COVID-19 vaccination requirement that are purely based on … nonreligious concerns (including
about the possible effects of the vaccine), do not qualify as religious beliefs.” What You Should Know
About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S. EEOC,
https://perma.cc/6NR9-L6YK (archived November 1, 2023).
Between his initial application and subsequent email correspondence with the EEO Office,

Brown puts forth two ostensibly religious objections to the Policy: (1) That the vaccine is made with
aborted fetus tissue, and (2) that his body is a temple to God and receiving the vaccine would
constitute a desecration of that temple. As described in more detail below, however, the context of
these allegations shows that Brown’s beliefs are based not in religion but in his more broadly defined
personal preferences, such as his “cultural beliefs” and adherence to “holistic healing.” Broadly
stated worldviews, made up of “cultural beliefs,” personal health preferences, and so on, may in
some sense be informed by religion, but that is not enough to raise them to the level of religious
beliefs: “[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Even if Brown’s personal beliefs
are “sincere and strongly held, [they are] not religious in nature, and, therefore, not protected by
Title VII.” Guthrie-Wilson v. Cook Cnty., No. 91:23-CV-362, 2023 WL 8372043, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec.

4, 2023) (Bucklo, J.) (citing Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of S.E. Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 488 (3d
Cir. 2017)).
a. Abortion-Related Objection

Although the Seventh Circuit has apparently not yet addressed the precise issue before the
Court, the Eighth Circuit recently decided a similar COVID-vaccine Title VII case. See Ringhofer v.
Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894 (8th Cir. 2024). In Ringhofer, the court considered a motion to
dismiss five separate religious accommodation requests related to an employer’s COVID-19
vaccination mandate, ultimately ruling that all five plaintiffs plausibly connected their respective
refusals to receive the vaccine with sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 901. Two of these requests
were based on abortion-related objections to the vaccine similar to the one raised by Brown. Id.
Nevertheless, the objections are only superficially similar across both cases. That similarity
goes only as far as a shared reference to the term “abortion.” The Ringhofer plaintiffs centered their
objections on abortion, explained their beliefs about abortion (including their religious roots), and
detailed how and why taking the specific COVID-19 vaccine would make them “a participant” or
“complicit” in abortion. Id. In contrast, Brown’s abortion-related objections are secondary to and
indistinguishable from the purely secular notions that make up the bulk of his Request. Brown’s
Request is based on a wide variety of values, including his “personal health care philosophy, religious
beliefs, and cultural practices.” Indeed, even when pressed to be more specific, Brown fails to tie
the COVID-19 vaccine itself to aborted tissue. Instead, he vaguely asserts that “many commercial
drugs [are] made with poisons, carcinogenic substances and aborted fetus tissue.” This broad
mistrust of commercial drugs is based on a “cultural and religious belief” favoring “a holistic health
care system that focuses on herbalism and the use of nature to heal the body.” Brown emphasizes
the bodily effects of the vaccine with various references to “poisons,” “carcinogenic substances,”
and “experimental chemical testing.” Not only does Brown fail to explain how his religious beliefs

would prevent him from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine specifically, but he never even asserts an
explicit opposition to the use of fetal cells or the general practice of abortion.
Courts across circuits have held that beliefs amounting to a “blanket privilege” for an
employee to make unilateral decisions and “exercise bodily autonomy” do not constitute religious
beliefs. Ulrich v. Lancaster Gen. Health, No. CV 22-4945, 2023 WL 2939585, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2023) (citing Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1025 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also, Fallon, 877 F.3d at 487
(holding that health concerns presented as religious beliefs are not afforded protection under Title
VII); Hassett v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 23 C 14592, 2024 WL 1556300, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2024)
(Kennelly, J.)) (finding that an employee’s unadorned allegations that he held vague “‘Christian’
beliefs ‘against getting the COVID-19 vaccine’” were insufficient to support Title VII religious
discrimination claim because one must allege “facts explaining how his beliefs conflict with
vaccination”); Nelson-Godfrey v. Cook Cnty., No. 23 C 16893, 2024 WL 2722668, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May

28, 2024) (Bucklo, J.) (same) (citations omitted). “This is not to say that anti-vaccination beliefs
cannot be part of a broader religious faith; in some circumstances, they can, and in those
circumstances, they are protected.” Fallon, 877 F.3d at 492-493. But in the present case, Brown’s
objections to the COVID-19 vaccine are plainly grounded in his negative views regarding
“commercial drugs.” See Guthrie-Wilson, No. 91:23-CV-362, 2023 WL 8372043, at *3 (finding that
the Plaintiff’s beliefs were not sincerely religious because they were “facially tied” to health concerns
regarding the vaccine’s effects).
b. Body-as-a-Temple Objection

Likewise, Brown does almost nothing to explain how his belief—that “[his] body is the
domain of the Holy Spirit”—would conflict with him receiving a COVID vaccine, expressing only a
general opposition to bodily contamination with no explanation of why the vaccine would be
contaminative. Courts routinely reject similar claims. See Nelson-Godfrey, No. 23 C 16893, 2024 WL
2722668, at *3 (collecting cases rejecting objections based on vague “body-as-a-temple” beliefs).
Brown’s case is no different. Throughout his Request, Brown clearly demonstrates that his primary
concern about the Policy is the potential harms of the vaccine and his lack of personal autonomy
under the mandate, rather than the religious principles to which he briefly refers. Ultimately, “a
refusal to be vaccinated that is grounded in the belief that vaccines cause harm is essentially rooted
in medical, not religious concerns.” Guthrie-Wilson, 2023 WL 8372043, at *2 (citing Fallon, 877 F.3d
at 492).
To support a claim that his beliefs are religious in nature, Brown must do more than vaguely
assert an unspecified conflict with general religious beliefs. It is not enough for an employee to add
a few references to religion in an otherwise comprehensive enumeration of their secular concerns
regarding vaccination. Simply put, “the use of religious vocabulary does not elevate a personal

medical judgment to a matter of protected religion.” Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., No. 22-CV-287-JDP,
2023 WL 2455681, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2023);2 see also Prida v. Option Care Enters., Inc., No.
5:23-CV-00905, 2023 WL 7003402, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2023) (Title VII’s definition of
religious belief is “capacious, but it does not expand to include every belief, opinion, or ideology one
might embrace.”). An employee is not permitted to redefine a purely personal preference or

2 Passarella is currently on appeal before the Seventh Circuit.
aversion as a religious belief, otherwise he “could announce without warning that white walls or
venetian blinds offended his ‘spirituality,’ and the employer would have to scramble to see whether it
was feasible to accommodate him by repainting the walls or substituting curtains for venetian
blinds.” Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003).
Even liberally construed, Brown’s allegations do not plausibly establish a sincere religious
practice or belief entitled to Title VII protection. The County’s motion to dismiss is granted as to

Count I.
2. Racial Discrimination
Brown also alleges that the rejection of his Request and his subsequent termination
constitute race discrimination under Title VII, citing the fact that Modelski’s accommodation
request was granted where his was denied. Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that it is illegal for
an employer to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
For a Title VII discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff need only
allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference that the adverse action suffered was connected
to her protected characteristics.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing
Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021)). Brown does not need to present a prima

facie case of discrimination. See id. at 777. He must do more, however, than merely plead that he
belongs to a protected group and was wrongfully terminated; “[t]here must be some facts that make
the wrongful [termination] contention plausible.” Id. at 776.
There is nothing in Brown’s complaint that permits the Court to infer his race and
termination were connected. Brown alleges only that he was treated differently than a white
colleague. But “the mere fact that an employee of one race is [treated differently] than an employee
of another race does not, without more, warrant an inference of ractal discrimination.” Reid pv.
Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 12 C 01975, 2014 WL 3375643, at *4 (N.D. IIL July 10, 2014) (Tharp, J.)
(citation omitted). Brown does not go further to suggest that his differential treatment was linked to
his race. Indeed, the dearth of allegations about race must be contrasted with the numerous alleged
distinctions between Modelski and Brown: she was a manager, he was an administrative assistant;
she was a Catholic, he was a Baptist; her request was supposedly based on religious objections alone,
his was based on a combination of “cultural” and “holistic health” factors. Without more to suggest
that Brown’s treatment was connected to his race, rather than any number of these other alleged or
unalleged factors, Brown’s claim fails.
Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count II.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants Cook County’s motion to dismiss [14] in full. Plaintiffs
complaint is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff believes in good faith that he can cure the
deficiencies identified in this Opinion, he may amend his complaint within 30 days.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/16/2024
Entered:
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10645392. Public record. Not legal advice.