# Jamison v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · August 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10644998

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10644998

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the “substantial evidence” standard demands more than a scintilla of evidentiary support but is less demanding than the preponderance of the evidence standard
- stating that an ALJ “must adequately articulate her analysis so that [a reviewing court] can follow her reasoning”

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

DUSTY J.,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:23-cv-01189-JEH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Order

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Brief (Doc. 9) and the Defendant’s
Brief (Doc. 11).1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s
request to reverse and remand the unfavorable decision of the Defendant, Martin
O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security.2
I
Dusty J. filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on June
9, 2019, alleging disability beginning on August 15, 2010. She claimed a back injury
with degenerative disc disease and arthritis limited her ability to work, and she
stated she stopped working on April 15, 2019 due to her conditions. AR 224. Her
DIB claim was denied initially on October 25, 2019 and upon reconsideration on
March 27, 2020. Dusty filed a request for hearing concerning her DIB application,
which was held on August 25, 2022 before the Honorable David W. Thompson

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7, 8).
2 References to the pages within the Administrative Record will be identified by AR [page number]. The Administrative Record
appears at (Doc. 5, 6) on the docket.
(ALJ). At the hearing, Dusty was represented by an attorney, and Dusty and a
vocational expert (VE) testified. Following the hearing, Dusty’s claim was denied
on September 19, 2022. Her request for review by the Appeals Council was denied
on February 1, 2023, making the ALJ’s Decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. Dusty, after obtaining an extension of time to do so, timely filed
the instant civil action seeking review of the ALJ’s Decision on May 15, 2023.
II
Dusty argues: 1) the ALJ committed reversible error when he failed to
consider the impact of Dusty’s chronic pain in assessing her work limitations, in
violation of Social Security Ruling 96-8p and Social Security Ruling 16-3p; and 2)
the ALJ’s finding that fibromyalgia is not a medically determinable impairment
(MDI) within the meaning of Social Security Ruling 12-2p is not supported by
substantial evidence.
III
The Court’s function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant
the ALJ’s findings with the Court’s own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt
v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.
1989). Indeed, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the
Court does not “merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297
F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court’s function is to determine whether the
ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper
legal standards were applied. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).
Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390 (1971); Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999).
In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, an individual must show
that his inability to work is medical in nature and that he is totally disabled.
Economic conditions, personal factors, financial considerations, and attitudes of
the employer are irrelevant in determining whether a plaintiff is eligible for
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. The establishment of disability under the Act
is a two-step process.
First, the plaintiff must be suffering from a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, there must be
a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage
in any substantial gainful employment. McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142, 143 (7th
Cir. 1980). The factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. In the following order, the ALJ must evaluate whether the
claimant:
1) is performing substantial gainful activity;

2) suffers from an impairment that is severe and meets a
durational requirement, or suffers from a combination of
impairments that is severe and meets the durational
requirement;

3) suffers from an impairment which meets or equals any
impairment listed in the appendix and which meets the
duration requirement;

4) is unable to perform her past relevant work which includes an
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity; and

5) is unable to perform any other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.
Id. An affirmative answer at Steps Three or Five leads to a finding that the plaintiff
is disabled. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005).
The plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion on Steps One
through Four. Id. However, once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past
work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show ability to engage in some
other type of substantial gainful employment. Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565,
569 (7th Cir. 2011).
In the instant case, Dusty claims error on the ALJ’s part at Steps Two and
Four.
A
At Step One, the ALJ determined Dusty did not engage in substantial
gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date, August 15, 2010,
through her date last insured, March 31, 2016. AR 30. At Step Two, the ALJ
determined Dusty had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative
disc disease and obesity. Id. At Step Three, the ALJ determined through the date
last insured, Dusty did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. AR
34. At Step Four, the ALJ made the following residual functional capacity (RFC)
finding:
[T]hrough the date last insured, the claimant had the [RFC] to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she is
limited to occasional climbing of ramps, stairs and ladders; limited to
no climbing of ropes and scaffolds; limited to occasional stooping,
kneeling, crouching and crawling; and limited to occasional exposure
to extreme cold, unprotected heights, and unprotected moving
machinery.

AR 35. The ALJ found through the date last insured, Dusty was capable of
performing her past relevant work as a collection clerk because the work did not
require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Dusty’s RFC. AR
44. Thus, the ALJ concluded Dusty was not under a disability at any time from
August 15, 2010 through March 31, 2016. AR 45.
B
Dusty argues the ALJ erred where he failed to consider the mental
limitations arising from Dusty’s chronic pain. She says he incorrectly derived a
“clear and convincing evidence of intense and disabling pain” standard, and he
erred by failing to account for the mental impact of Dusty’s chronic pain and
medication side effects. The Commissioner argues substantial evidence supported
the ALJ’s evaluation of Dusty’s symptoms. He says the Social Security Act, the
regulations, agency policy, and case law belie Dusty’s argument that her subjective
testimony about her pain is enough to establish disability.
Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) provides, in relevant part, “An individual’s
statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of
disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and findings . . .
.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 makes an ALJ’s obligation to consider objective medical
evidence explicit: “In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all your
symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). SSR 16-3p provides, in turn, that all the evidence, including
objective medical evidence, is to be considered in evaluating the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms and also the factors
set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) are to be considered including: the claimant’s
daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; medications and their side
effects; non-medication treatments; any other measures used to relieve pain or
other symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain and other symptoms. SSR 16-3p, at *7-8.
1
Here, the ALJ first identified the location of Dusty’s ailments per Dusty’s
own statements: osteoarthritis in both knees and her lower back and rheumatoid
arthritis in her hands, knees, and ankles. AR 36. Before citing any medical records,
the ALJ explained, “The following summary of the medical evidence and
subsequent discussion supports [the assessment that Dusty’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms is not
entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record].” Id. From
there, the ALJ detailed Dusty’s varying complaints between September 2010 and
January 2016 of: low back pain, worsening back pain; pain with lumbar range of
motion; “pain everywhere;” pain in the back, wrist, and hand; back and right
lower extremity pain; pain in the wrists and ankles; pain in her jaw; pain in the
hips and knees, pain in the right foot; and low back pain into both legs. AR 36-41.
For the noted instances of pain complaints, the ALJ also considered
additional complaints of numbness and tingling as well as positive examination
findings, including tenderness in the following locations: the SI joints, the
paraspinal/paravertebral region, Achilles, left foot, the MCP joints, the PIP joints,
the calf area, the medial aspects of Dusty’s knees, the right ankle, and the
paravertebral gluteal region. AR 36, AR 37, AR 38, AR 39, AR 41. However, the
ALJ cited to several medical records which revealed tenderness was absent at times
Dusty complained and which revealed Dusty’s straight leg and other tests were
negative. See, e.g., AR 36, AR 37, AR 38, AR 40, AR 41; see also Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d
597, 601 (7th Cir. 2020) (“To determine the credibility of allegations of disabling
pain, an ALJ may consider several factors, including objective medical evidence
and any inconsistencies between the allegations and the record) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the ALJ further cited examinations that revealed, simultaneous with
Dusty’s pain complaints and tenderness, normal reflexes, intact sensation, no
atrophy, no swelling, no erythema, full range of motion, no deformity, no evidence
of sensory or motor deficits, normal gait, normal mental status, and no
coordination deficits. AR 36, AR 37, AR 38, AR 40, AR 41. The ALJ cited several
instances where examinations revealed tenderness but “were otherwise normal.”
AR 38, AR 39, AR 40. The ALJ also pointed out instances when Dusty objectively
appeared in no distress while she complained of worsening pain. AR 36, AR 37,
AR 41. Further, the ALJ cited: Dusty’s report that an injection worked much better
than the first one she received (AR 37); Dusty’s note in August 2011 that she was
going to start watching a friend’s baby though just two months earlier she reported
“difficulty holding infant long term” (AR 37); Dusty’s back pain was better with a
chiropractor’s treatment (AR 38); and Dusty had been doing well and had
tolerated her medications until a bout with the flu (AR 38). The ALJ cited where:
Dusty had been exercising (AR 39); Dusty’s knee was feeling better after
undergoing physical therapy (AR 39); she said a bath helped when she had muscle
pain (AR 39); her chronic pain was fairly well controlled as of August 2014 through
October 2014 (AR 40); she reported in June 2015 that her pain was controlled with
medication (AR 41); she obtained 40% relief from previous injections (AR 41); and
a neurosurgeon recommended conservative treatment (AR 42).
The ALJ thereafter condensed his discussion of the record evidence into
several conclusions, among others, that a 2014 MRI showed only mild stenosis,
post-date last insured imaging confirmed there had been little to no evidence of
significant stenosis, the medical records did not clearly demonstrate that Dusty
had significantly limited range of motion or difficulty ambulating, no provider
indicated the need for further surgery, and although Dusty said some of her
injections were unhelpful, she indicated her back pain was fairly well controlled
with muscle relaxants and opioid pain medications. AR 42. Plainly, the ALJ did
not demand Dusty produce specific objective medical findings to substantiate her
pain level. The ALJ instead did as required of him by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR
16-3p where he considered the bulk of the record evidence bearing upon the
question of whether Dusty was as limited by pain as she claimed. The Court may
not reweigh the evidence, but it certainly may (and does) find that the ALJ
committed no legal error in considering Dusty’s pain complaints. See Gedatus v.
Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (“We will not reweigh the evidence, resolve
debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute our judgment
for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports it”).
Specifically, as the Commissioner argues, there is nothing in the Decision to
suggest that the ALJ deviated from the preponderance of evidence standard of
review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.901 (defining the preponderance of the evidence
standard as “such relevant evidence that as a whole shows that the existence of
the fact to be proven is more likely than not”). This Court, in turn, must of course
determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s Decision. See Wood v.
Thompson, 246 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining the “substantial
evidence” standard demands more than a scintilla of evidentiary support but is
less demanding than the preponderance of the evidence standard). The ALJ
sufficiently explained, with citations to substantial record evidence, why he
determined Dusty was not as limited by pain as she claimed. See Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (“substantial evidence . . . means – and means only – such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion”).
2
Dusty points to her hearing testimony that her medications make her
drowsy, that she has to lie down approximately every 15 to 20 minutes for an hour
when performing basic household chores due to aggravated pain from activity,
and that she would be prevented from doing a “sit-down job” because she would
have to get up and move. AR 66, AR 67, AR 68, AR 72. She also cites to a single
treatment note which indicated that chronic pain interfered with her sleep which
then made it difficult to function and perform daily activities. Plf Brief (Doc. 9 at
pg. 12) (citing AR 1453). She argues the ALJ erred when he made no mention of
how the RFC assessment accounted for mental limitations arising from her chronic
pain and medication side effects in violation of SSR 96-8p. SSR 96-8p requires an
ALJ’s RFC assessment to include “a narrative discussion describing how the
evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory
findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-
8p, at *7. A full reading of the ALJ’s RFC assessment at Step Four contradicts
Dusty’s assertion.
As addressed above, the ALJ made no reversible error in his subjective
symptom evaluation. That alone undermines Dusty’s argument; the ALJ
determined Dusty’s pain was not as limiting as alleged, thus, any mental
limitations allegedly caused by that pain did not warrant inclusion in the RFC. See
Richards v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 26, 30 (7th Cir. 2018) (unpublished opinion)
(stating a claimant bears the burden of showing that she has impairments that
affect her ability to work and pointing to various diagnoses and complaints is
insufficient to establish the existence of a functional limitation) (citing Gentle v.
Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005)). Significantly, the ALJ considered
Dusty’s daily activities and observed they “indicate that the claimant can perform
some work activity.” AR 42.
The ALJ cited Dusty’s testimony that she was able to perform her own
personal care. AR 42. He cited that she was able to drive to watch her children’s
extra-curricular activities, including traveling out of state. Id. He cited Dusty’s
ability to care for not only her own children, “but also took on watching a friend’s
baby.” AR 43. The ALJ noted Dusty’s hearing testimony that her medications
made her drowsy and sometimes made it difficult to stay awake during the day,
but Dusty followed up with the statement that she was “drowsy quite a bit during
the day. Now, it’s more so just at night.” AR 35 (citing AR 66-67). The ALJ also
noted Dusty’s hearing testimony that she alternated between sitting and standing
at her child’s travel hockey games.3 AR 36. The ALJ ultimately concluded at Step
Four, “The claimant’s symptoms have been incorporated into the [RFC] herein.
Although the claimant does have impairments that can be anticipated to produce
a certain amount of limitations, she has not demonstrated limitations in excess of
those accounted for in the [RFC].” AR 44. The Court finds the ALJ built an
accurate and logical bridge from his lengthy summary of the overall record
evidence to his conclusions as reflected in the RFC finding. See Jeske v. Saul, 955
F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2020) (reiterating that an ALJ’s decision will be upheld if it
uses the correct legal standards, is supported by substantial evidence, and builds
an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion). One
conclusion being that the overall record evidence did not warrant the addition of
mental limitations in the RFC finding.
As the Commissioner puts it, the ALJ did not wholly reject Dusty’s
subjective complaints but instead discounted them in light of the overall record
evidence. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 903 (“the presence of contradictory evidence and
arguments does not mean the ALJ’s determination is not supported by substantial
evidence”). The Seventh Circuit has explained strict conformity with SSR 96-8p is
not necessarily fatal because, “Essentially, an ALJ’s RFC analysis must say enough

3 While not mentioned in the Decision, Dusty’s own attorney at her hearing elicited the following from
the VE. As long as the individual performing the identified job of Dusty’s past work as collection clerk
was within the productivity limits of no more than 15% off task, the individual could change position
from seated to standing and standing to seated. AR 81-82.
to enable review of whether the ALJ considered the totality of the claimant’s
limitations.” Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Here, even if the Court were to find the ALJ
could have more closely complied with SSR 96-8p, the ALJ’s RFC analysis certainly
said enough such that the Court answers in the affirmative that he considered all
of Dusty’s limitations.
C
Dusty lastly argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is incomplete because it does
not account for any limitations arising from her impairment of fibromyalgia.
Dusty says that is because the ALJ, at Step Two, failed to correctly apply SSR 12-
2p. SSR 12-2p provides two ways of proving fibromyalgia is a MDI: the 1990
American College of Rheumatology (ACR) Criteria for the Classification of
Fibromyalgia and the 2010 ACR Preliminary Diagnostic Criteria. Both require the
claimant to show a history of widespread pain in all quadrants of the body that
has persisted for at least three months. The first way also requires at least 11
positive tender points on physical examination found bilaterally and both above
and below the waist and evidence that other disorders that could cause the
symptoms or signs were excluded. SSR 12-2p, at *2-3. The second way requires
the claimant to also show: repeated manifestations of six or more fibromyalgia
symptoms, signs, or co-occurring conditions, especially manifestations of fatigue,
cognitive or memory problems, waking unrefreshed, depression, anxiety disorder,
or irritable bowel syndrome; and evidence that other disorders that could cause
those repeated manifestations of symptoms, signs, or co-occurring conditions
were excluded. SSR 12-2p, at *3. SSR 12-2p also provides that an ALJ cannot rely
upon a licensed physician’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia alone. Id. at *2. Here, Dusty
contends the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 12-2p where he considered only the
1990 ACR criteria and did not even properly consider the evidence pursuant to
that set of criteria.
At Step Two, the ALJ explained that he considered and applied the
provisions of SSR 12-2p in assessing possible fibromyalgia, and he identified the
two sets of criteria. AR 33. From there, he focused on trigger point evidence,
stating:
[T]he claimant’s medical record refers to fibromyalgia but treatment
records do not identify any specific trigger points. At times, the
claimant had no diffuse tender points . . . At other times, only diffuse
tender points were noted . . . As such, there is insufficient information
upon which to find fibromyalgia a medically determinable severe
impairment.

Id. Quite obviously, the ALJ failed to include any discussion for the Court’s review
as to his consideration of both sets of criteria, and that was error. See Minnick v.
Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that an ALJ “must adequately
articulate her analysis so that [a reviewing court] can follow her reasoning”).
Among other arguments the Commissioner makes in opposition to Dusty’s,
the Commissioner contends the ALJ’s failure to evaluate whether Dusty’s
fibromyalgia met the 2010 ACR criteria was harmless. See Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th
498, 504 (7th Cir. 2021) (“the harmless error standard applies to judicial review of
administrative decisions, and we will not remand a case to the ALJ for further
specification where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result”)
(quoting McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011)). He says that is so
where, as here, the ALJ found other impairments severe with similar symptoms
and proceeded with the sequential evaluation process. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d
923, 927 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[d]eciding whether impairments are severe at Step 2 is a threshold issue only; an
ALJ must continue on to the remaining steps of the evaluation process as long as
there exists even one severe impairment” such that any error of omission by the
ALJ at Step Two was harmless where he categorized two impairments as severe).
Noting the ALJ found Dusty had severe degenerative disc disease and obesity,
both of which generated pain similar to her claimed fibromyalgia, the
Commissioner further argues Dusty cannot establish error because the ALJ
evaluated all of the medical records during the period under consideration when
evaluating what Dusty could and could not do in the workplace.
In fact, at Step Two, the ALJ explicitly recognized: “[T]he claimant’s
diagnosis is unclear, with varying diagnoses by different medical sources
addressing overlapping signs and symptoms, which is not surprising given the
nature of inflammatory/rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, and radiculopathy.”
AR 33. He continued, “Regardless of the diagnostic label applied, the undersigned
considered all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe,
when assessing the claimant’s [RFC].” AR 34. From there, at Step Four, the ALJ
considered the record evidence as detailed in III.B above.
The ALJ’s explicit consideration of that evidence contradicts Dusty’s
assertion that the ALJ failed to consider limitations her fibromyalgia caused. True,
the ALJ considered the complained of limitations as stemming from her lumbar
degenerative disc disease and obesity (rather than fibromyalgia), but the evidence
was one and the same. As detailed above, the ALJ juxtaposed Dusty’s complaints
with normal findings, the ALJ noted examinations simultaneously revealed
normal and positive findings, and the ALJ contemplated Dusty’s reported daily
activities and the efficacy of her medications against other record evidence. He
ultimately detailed how and why the evidence did not support the extent of
limitation alleged.
An “RFC assessment must incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations
supported by the medical record[.]” Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1233 (7th Cir.
2021). Here, it is apparent the ALJ did as was required of him; the relevant
authority speaks of limitations, not a particular diagnosis in and of itself. See, e.g.,
Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1998) (“It is not enough to show that [the
claimant] had received a diagnosis of fibromyalgia with a date of onset prior to the
expiration of the insured period, since fibromyalgia is not always (indeed, not
usually) disabling”).
Though the ALJ erred at Step Two, that error was rendered harmless at Step
Four where he considered Dusty’s alleged symptoms and limitations stemming
from her impairments, albeit without explicitly identifying fibromyalgia as a MDI.
Again, as the Court analyzed above in III.B, the ALJ’s consideration of the record
evidence at Step Four was articulated clearly enough to enable the Court to “assess
the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate findings and afford [Dusty] meaningful judicial
review.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ formulated a
RFC that was responsive to Dusty’s complaints of limitation while also reflective
of substantial medical and other evidence of record. Remand is not warranted.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s request to
reverse and remand the unfavorable decision of the Defendant. The Clerk of Court
is directed to enter judgment as follows: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
the decision of the Defendant, Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security,
denying benefits to the Plaintiff, Dusty J., is AFFIRMED.” This matter is now
terminated.
It is so ordered.
Entered on August 19, 2024.
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10644998. Public record. Not legal advice.