# Fuller v. The City of Miami

> District Court, S.D. Florida · September 5, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10643831

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 5, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case Number: 23-24251-CIV-MORENO
WILLIAM O. FULLER,
MARTIN PINILLA, II,
BARLINGTON GROUP, LLC, .
CALLE OCHO MARKETPLACE, LLC, .
YO AMO CALLE SIETE, LLC,
LITTLE HAVANA ARTS BUILDING, LLC,
LITTLE HAVANA ARTS BUILDING TOO,
LLC,
TOWER HOTEL, LLC,
BRICKELL STATION PARTNERS, LLC,
PIEDRA VILLAS, LLC,
FUTURAMA, LLC,
EL SHOPPING, LLC,
BEATSTIK, LLC,
VIERNES CULTURALES/CULTURAL
FRIDAYS, INC.,
LITTLE HAVANA BUNGALOWS, LLC,
LHAB TRES, LLC,
LA GRAN FIESTA, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
YVONNE BAYONA,
Defendant.
/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BAYONA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs are numerous business owners who allege that Defendant Yvonne Bayona, as a
member of the City of Miami Code Enforcement Board, violated the Plaintiffs’ civil rights by
unlawfully enforcing the City’s code at the request of City Commissioner Carollo for political
retaliation. Specifically, Board member Bayona sought to instruct other Board members to vote

.

against Carollo’s political enemies, and when it came time to vote, Bayona voted against Plaintiffs
to impose a fine “in excess of $400,000 for a property that was worth half that amount.”

Defendant Bayona argues that dismissal is required because: (1) her conduct was in her
official capacity and such lawsuit is a lawsuit against the City of Miami under Florida law; (2) she
is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for her conduct during a Code Enforcement Board
hearing; and (3) that she is entitled to qualified immunity because the allegations in the Second
Amended Complaint failed to show that she violated a protected constitutional right. The Court
agrees and accordingly dismisses counts 15, 52, 68, 79, 110, 119, 130, and 142.

LEGAL STANDARD: RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
considers only the four corners of the complaint. A court must accept as true the facts as set forth
in the complaint.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal
conclusions,” instead plaintiffs must “allege some specific factual basis for those conclusions or
face dismissal of their claims.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir.
2004). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept the plaintiffs well-pleaded facts as true. See St. Joseph's Hosp.,
Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). This tenet, however, does not
apply to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009). Moreover, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Jd. at 1950. Those “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the
complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). In short, the complaint must not merely allege misconduct, but must
demonstrate that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Defendant Bayona notes for the Court that “[a] suit against a defendant
in [her] official capacity is, in actuality, a suit against the government entity which employs [her].”
Hazleton v. City of Orlando, No. 6:10-cv-342-Orl-35-DAB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157243 (M.D.
Fla. June 10, 2010) (citing Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So. 2d 517, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)).
Here, Plaintiffs have brought suit against Defendant Bayona in her individual capacity. However,
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint show that Defendant was acting in her official
capacity as a member of the Code Enforcement Board. Plaintiffs do not address this argument in
the response in opposition. While the Court could stop here, for purposes of completeness, the
Court will also address the arguments on absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

1. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Defendant Bayona argues that she is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. “Judges are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in
their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Sibley v. Lando,
437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000)). The “touchstone” for the doctrine’s applicability has been “performance of the function

of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Burns □□□
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Defendant Bayona is not a judge. However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that judicial immunity _
also encompasses non-judicial officials—persons whose “official duties have an integral
relationship with the judicial process.” Roland v, Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). Like
judges, these officials must be acting within the scope of their authority. See Property
Management & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 603 (11th Cir.1985) (corporate receiver
protected by judicial immunity in executing orders of appointing judge because complaint did not
allege that he acted outside his authority). In determining absolute quasi-judicial immunity of a
nonjudicial official, the Eleventh Circuit looks to a functional analysis of the action taken by the
official in relation to the judicial process. See Roland, 19 F.3d at 555. At the heart of functional
analysis is the exercise of discretionary judgment. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508
U.S. 429, 436 (1993).

During the relevant times, Defendant Bayona was a member of the City of Miami Code
Enforcement Board. Defendant argues that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that Code
Enforcement Board proceedings under local and state law in Florida involved the exercise of
discretionary judgment like members of a judiciary. The Court agrees. In Lindbloom v. Manatee
County, 808 Fed. Appx. 745, 751 (11th Cir. 2020), the panel noted that “t]he special magistrate
[or Code Enforcement Board] must issue findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
affording the proper relief.” The Code Enforcement Board here provides violators with the same
rights outlined by the Lindbloom panel and Florida’s Local Government Code Enforcement Boards
Act. The Board is empowered to adjudicate code violations for the Department of Code
Compliance. Further, the Board hears cases as a public hearing, and all testimony is under oath

4 .

and recorded by video or audio recording device. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board
exercises discretionary judgment to decide on the matter before the Board. It is clear to the Court
that absolute quasi-judicial immunity exists for Defendant Bayona, a member of the Code
Enforcement Board.

For absolute judicial (or quasi-judicial) immunity to apply, the following factors must exist:
(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the
judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge;
and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565
(11th Cir. 1983)). “This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or
were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000).

Here, Defendant Bayona’s actions fit squarely within absolute quasi-judicial immunity.
While the allegations of Bayona urging other board members to vote against “Carollo’s enemy”
may be inappropriate, the acts complained of happened within Bayona’s normal judicial function.
Further, the act of voting is clearly within the discretion of the Board. Second, the events occurred
within “open court.”! Lastly, the controversy involved judgment by the Board, and the
confrontation arose immediately out of a visit in front of the Code Enforcement Board. Plaintiffs
are entirely silent on issue of absolute quasi-judicial immunity, as they do not mention it once in
their response in opposition. Instead of substantively responding to the arguments in the Motion
to Dismiss, Plaintiffs write that “[e]ven if any of Bayona’s individual acts are subject to any form
of immunity, she fails to recognize the instrumental role that she played as a member of the Code

Another relevant event was the Board’s unanimous vote to reduce the code violation fines by 90%. Plaintiffs are
silent on this front.

Enforcement Board.” Plaintiffs miss the point. Recognizing the “instrumentality” of a Code
Enforcement Board member’s role is irrelevant to whether the events happened in open court or
chambers, or whether there was an exercise of discretionary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court need not reach the third argument of whether Defendant Bayona is
also entitled to qualified immunity. Counts 15, 52, 68, 79, 110, 119, 130, and 142 against
Defendant Bayona are dismissed.

CONCLUSION iA □□□□
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 5 of Avwgust-
2024.

epee MORENO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10643831. Public record. Not legal advice.