# State of Tennessee v. Terrance Williams

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · October 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10643430

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** October 31, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge J. Ross Dyer
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

10/31/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
September 4, 2024 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRANCE WILLIAMS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
Nos. C21-03737, 21-02261 Lee V. Coffee, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2023-01447-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Terrance Williams, of conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and employing a firearm
during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence
of fifty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record
and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER, and
KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Gerald S. Green (on appeal) and John Dolan (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the
appellant, Terrance Williams.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Kevin McAlpin and J.D.
Hamblen, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on August 20, 2020, Tiffany Jones, a medical assistant
at the Shelby County Jail, witnessed a verbal altercation between the defendant, who was
incarcerated at the time, and Derrius Davis, the victim and a correctional officer at the jail.1
The altercation lasted three to five minutes and did not become physical at any point.

Stephanie Williams and Tyrone Williams, also indicted in this case, testified as
State’s witnesses at trial. Ms. Williams, the defendant’s sister, testified that she received a
phone call from the defendant at 12:10 p.m. on August 20, 2020. During the recorded
phone call, the defendant told Ms. Williams that “he need[ed] this handled.” Ms. Williams,
who was aware of the ongoing dispute between the defendant and the victim, understood
the defendant to mean that he wanted Ms. Williams’ son, Tyrone Williams, “[t]o scare [the
victim]. Put some fear in [the victim].” The defendant stated that Mr. Williams should
“let the motherf****r know, you know what I’m saying.” The defendant told Ms. Williams
that “if [Mr. Williams] handle[d] this, it’s his.” Ms. Williams testified that “it’s his” meant
the defendant would give Mr. Williams the defendant’s car.

At 1:39 p.m., an unknown inmate called Ms. Williams and asked if she had spoken
to her son. Ms. Williams had thus far been unable to reach Mr. Williams and told the
inmate that she had not spoken to him yet. The inmate told Ms. Williams to “tell [Mr.
Williams] to go federal” and “give him the keys.” Mr. Williams called Ms. Williams a
short time later, and Ms. Williams told him that “his uncle called and he said to handle that
for him.” On cross-examination, Ms. Williams denied lying to police about the meaning
of “go federal,” testifying that she told officers that it meant to beat someone up. Ms.
Williams admitted that she initially told detectives that the victim’s house number, which
she verified during her call with the defendant, was the price of a cake she was going to
purchase for the defendant’s son. She denied having an agreement with the defendant or
Mr. Williams regarding the victim.

Tyrone Williams testified that Ms. Williams told him “[t]hat [the defendant] wanted
[Mr. Williams] to take care of something for him.” Although Ms. Williams did not specify
what the defendant wanted, Mr. Williams “just knew what it was” because the defendant
had repeatedly told his family about his dispute with the victim. As Mr. Williams drove to
the victim’s house, he saw the victim’s car at a nearby Ace Hardware and waited for the
victim to pull out of the parking lot. While the victim was stopped at the light at South
Parkway and Bellevue, Mr. Williams pulled up next to the victim’s driver’s side, leaned
over, and shot into the victim’s car four times. Mr. Williams testified that he had never
had an issue with the victim and did not know him personally.

On cross-examination, Mr. Williams agreed that he never spoke with the defendant
about the victim and that all his discussions regarding the defendant and the victim were
with Ms. Williams. However, Mr. Williams testified that the instructions on the day of the

1
The victim died prior to trial from causes unrelated to the events of this case.
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shooting were “from [the defendant] but no[t] direct.” Mr. Williams testified that he
intended to kill the victim and did not think about what he was doing before shooting into
the victim’s car. Although Mr. Williams testified that he did not have an agreement with
the defendant, he “knew what [the defendant] wanted.” On redirect examination, Mr.
Williams testified that he anticipated receiving the defendant’s car after killing the victim.

Detective Gregory Buchanan with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”)
learned that the victim had driven to their building following a shooting incident. Detective
Buchanan went outside and observed the victim, who appeared “distraught [and] shaken,”
standing next to his vehicle. The victim told Detective Buchanan that someone shot at him,
and Detective Buchanan discovered four bullet holes in the driver’s side of the victim’s
vehicle. When the victim went inside to give a statement, he began rubbing his leg, and
Detective Buchanan noticed the victim’s pant leg was torn. The victim, who denied being
shot, took his keys out of his pocket, and “it appeared that a bullet . . . went through [the
victim’s] pant leg and impacted [his] keys.”

Detective William Greever with the SCSO assisted in processing the scene of the
shooting, photographing and collecting all evidence. In particular, Detective Greever
collected four 9 mm shell casings. Later, Detective Greever participated in searches of the
victim’s and Mr. Williams’ vehicles. Upon inspecting the victim’s vehicle, Detective
Greever located four projectile strikes on the driver’s side, three in the driver’s side door
and one in the back door. Inside Mr. Williams’ vehicle, Detective Greever recovered a
9mm pistol on the driver’s side floorboard and a loaded magazine in the driver’s side door
compartment.

Detective Chase Craven with the SCSO canvassed businesses near the crime scene
and obtained video surveillance footage from the time of the shooting. Upon reviewing
the surveillance video, Detective Craven observed the victim’s black Infiniti SUV pull up
to the stop light. A few seconds later, a silver Nissan Murano pulled up on the victim’s
driver’s side and fired several shots. As the stop light turned green, the victim drove north
at a high rate of speed, and the silver Murano turned left onto South Parkway. During the
course of the investigation, the defendant was developed as a suspect, and Detective Craven
began reviewing the defendant’s recorded jail calls. After reviewing the calls, Detective
Craven located Mr. Williams driving a vehicle that matched the one in the surveillance
video.

The defendant declined to present evidence. Following deliberations, the jury
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-
degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-six years in confinement. The

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defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. This timely appeal
followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support his convictions. The State contends the evidence is sufficient. Upon our review,
we agree with the State.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the
reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.
R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury
shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.
1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions
involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and
all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,
accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of
the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme
Court has stated the following rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the
jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their
demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary
instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given
to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
atmosphere, and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523
(Tenn. 1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a
defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v.
Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

At trial, the State relied on a theory of criminal responsibility. “A person is
criminally responsible as a party to an offense, if the offense is committed by the person’s
own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the person is criminally responsible, or
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both.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-401(a). Criminal responsibility for the actions of another
arises when the defendant, “[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, . . . solicits, directs, aids, or
attempts to aid another person to commit the offense[.]” Id. § 39-11-402(2). Criminal
responsibility is not a separate crime but “is solely a theory by which the State may prove
the defendant’s guilt of the alleged offense . . . based upon the conduct of another person.”
State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999).

The defendant need not physically participate in the crime in order to be criminally
responsible. Phillips v. State, 76 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “Presence and
companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the
offense are circumstances from which one’s participation in the crime may be inferred.”
State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “No particular act need be
shown. It is not necessary for one to take physical part in the crime[;] [m]ere
encouragement of the principal is sufficient.” Id. The defendant must “knowingly,
voluntarily and with common intent unite with the principal offenders in the commission
of the crime.” State v. Foster, 755 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

Moreover, under the doctrine of criminal responsibility, a person is liable not only
for the target offense, but also for offenses committed by a confederate that were the natural
and probable consequences of the target offense. State v. Stokes, No. E2023-00667-CCA-
R3-CD, 2024 WL 2032847, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2024), perm. app. denied
(Aug. 13, 2024) (citing State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000)). Whether an
offense was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense is a question for the
jury as the finder of fact. Id. The principle behind the rule is “based on the recognition
that aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally,
probably[,] and foreseeably put into motion.” Id. To demonstrate liability, the State must
prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) the elements of the crime or crimes
that accompanied the target crime; (2) that the defendant was criminally responsible
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402; and (3) that the other crimes
that were committed were natural and probable consequences of the target crime.” Id.

A. Attempted First-Degree Murder2

The defendant was convicted of one count of attempted first-degree murder. First-
degree murder is “a premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-202(a)(1). In this context, premeditation is “an act done after the exercise of

2
For the sake of clarity, we have reordered the issues from the order they appear in the defendant’s
brief.
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reflection and judgment.” Id. § 39-13-202(d). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-
202(d) further states:

“Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed
prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in
the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of
the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully
considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free
from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Id. “The element of premeditation is a question for the jury which may be established by
proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108
(Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)). The Tennessee
Supreme Court has identified certain factors which tend to support a finding of
premeditation, including: “the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the
particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; evidence
of procurement of a weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime,
and calmness immediately after the killing.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660 (citing State v.
Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541-42 (Tenn. 1992); State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn.
1992)). Bland does not include an exhaustive list of factors for consideration when finding
premeditation. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 663 (Tenn. 2013). A conclusion that the
killing was premeditated may also be supported by the nature of the killing or evidence
establishing a motive. Id. Likewise, lack of provocation by the victim, failure to render
aid, and destruction or secretion of evidence may also support an inference of
premeditation. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 815-16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).

Criminal attempt occurs when a person “acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the offense . . . [a]cts with intent to complete a course of action or
cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the
conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of the offense.” Id. § 39-12-101(a)(3). To qualify as a “substantial
step,” the person’s “entire course of action” must be “corroborative of the intent to commit
the offense.” Id. § 39-12-101(b).

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that the defendant
intended for Mr. Williams to kill the victim when the defendant told Ms. Williams that he
wanted the victim “handled.” Following a verbal altercation with the victim, the defendant
contacted Ms. Williams and instructed her to have Mr. Williams “handle” the victim. The
defendant promised Mr. Williams a car in exchange for “tak[ing] care” of the victim.
Although Mr. Williams was not given specific instructions, he “knew” the defendant
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wanted him to kill the victim. As the victim was at a stop light, Mr. Williams pulled up
next to him and fired four bullets into the driver’s side of the victim’s vehicle, striking a
set of keys in the victim’s pocket. Mr. Williams testified that he intended to kill the victim
when he shot into the victim’s vehicle. This is sufficient evidence upon which a rational
jury could find the defendant criminally responsible for the attempted first-degree murder
of the victim. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder

The defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder. Conspiracy is committed when “two (2) or more people, each having the culpable
mental state required for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and each acting
for the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of an offense, agree that one (1)
or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-12-103(a). “No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense, unless
an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by the
person or by another with whom the person conspired.” Id. at § 39-12-103(d).

Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct that terminates when the
objectives of the conspiracy are completed or the agreement that they be
completed is abandoned by the person and by those with whom the person
conspired. The objectives of the conspiracy include, but are not limited to,
escape from the crime, distribution of the proceeds of the crime, and
measures, other than silence, for concealing the crime or obstructing justice
in relation to it.

Id. at § 39-12-103(e)(1). The underlying offense of the conspiracy in the present case was
first-degree murder, which is “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Id. at
§ 39-13-202(a)(1). Even though the defendant and his accomplices did not complete the
first-degree murder of the victim, it is not a defense “that the offense that was the object of
the conspiracy was not committed.” Id. at § 39-12-103(f).

“While the essence of the offense is an agreement to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful act, . . . the agreement need not be formal or expressed, and it may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 915 (Tenn. 1998) (internal
citation omitted). “[A] mutual implied understanding is sufficient, although not manifested
by any formal words, or a written agreement.” State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992); see Randolph v. State, 570 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

The defendant contends the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate
the testimonies of Ms. Williams and Mr. Williams as accomplices. At the time of the
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offense, it was well-established that “evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction when
the conviction is solely based upon the uncorroborated testimony of one or more
accomplices.” State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tenn. 2024) (citing State v. Collier,
411 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tenn. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (abolishing the
common law accomplice-corroboration rule on a prospective basis). “An accomplice is
one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent participates with the principal
offender in the commission of a crime.” State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 464 (Tenn.
2004). The test for whether a witness qualifies as an accomplice is “whether the alleged
accomplice could be indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant.” State
v. Allen, 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). It is not in dispute that Ms.
Williams and Mr. Williams qualified as accomplices.

Our supreme court recently described the accomplice-corroboration rule as follows:

[T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the
accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not
only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is
implicated in it; and this independent corroborative testimony must also
include some fact establishing the defendant’s identity. This corroborative
evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate,
in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime charged. It is not necessary that
the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence. The
corroboration need not be conclusive, but it is sufficient if this evidence, of
itself, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense,
although the evidence is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but little
consideration.

Thomas, 687 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994)).
The corroborating evidence need only be “slight.” State v. Griffs, 964 S.W.2d 577, 589
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Whether sufficient corroboration exists is for the jury to
determine. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001).

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence establishes that the defendant
and the victim were engaged in an ongoing dispute, which culminated in a verbal
altercation on the morning of August 20, 2020. An hour after the altercation, the defendant
called Ms. Williams from jail and stated that he “need[ed] this handled” and that Mr.
Williams should “go federal” on the victim and “let [the victim] know, you know what I’m
saying.” He told Ms. Williams that Mr. Williams could have the defendant’s car after he
handled the victim. Although the defendant spoke in code during the phone call with Ms.
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Williams, she understood the defendant’s instructions and verified the victim’s address
during the conversation. She told Mr. Williams that the defendant “wanted [him] to take
care of something for [the defendant].” Mr. Williams testified that, because he was aware
of the defendant’s ongoing dispute with the victim, he “just knew” what the defendant
wanted. Mr. Williams testified that he intended to kill the victim when he fired four bullets
into the victim’s car and that his instructions were “from [the defendant] but no[t] direct.”
The victim was not injured during the shooting, but one of the bullets hit a set of keys in
the victim’s pants.

Moreover, Ms. Williams’ and Mr. Williams’ testimonies were sufficiently
corroborated by Ms. Jones’ description of the altercation between the defendant and the
victim hours before the shooting as well as the recorded jail calls in which the defendant
instructed Ms. Williams to have Mr. Williams “handle” the victim and verified the victim’s
address. This evidence fairly and legitimately tended to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime sufficient to corroborate the testimonies of Ms. Williams and Mr.
Williams. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder conviction, and the defendant is not entitled to
relief on this issue.

C. Employing a Firearm During the Commission of a Dangerous Felony

The jury convicted the defendant of employing a firearm during the commission of
a dangerous felony under a theory of criminal responsibility. As relevant to this case, “[i]t
is an offense to employ a firearm during the . . . [c]ommission of a dangerous felony.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(b)(1). One such “dangerous felony” is attempted first-
degree murder. Id. at § 39-17-1324(b)(2), (i)(1)(A). The term “employ” means “to make
use of.” State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Tenn. 2014). The evidence at trial showed
that, after receiving instructions from the defendant to “handle” the victim, Mr. Williams
pulled up next to the victim as he was at a stop light and fired four bullets into the side of
the victim’s vehicle. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction under a
theory of criminal responsibility. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Alternatively, we conclude that the defendant’s crimes were a natural and probable
consequence of the orders he gave Mr. Williams, and the crimes committed by Mr.
Williams. As noted supra, the natural and probable consequences rule “extends the scope
of criminal liability to the target crime intended by a defendant as well as to other crimes
committed by a confederate that were the natural and probable consequences of the
commission of the original crime.” State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000)
(citing State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (Tenn. 1997)) . Although the natural and
probable consequences rule is not explicitly included in the code, it nevertheless “survived
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the common law into the criminal responsibility statutes[.]” Id. (citing Carson, 950 S.W.2d
at 954-55). This rule “underlies the doctrine of criminal responsibility and is based on the
recognition that aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they have
naturally, probably and foreseeably put into motion.” Id. (citing Carson, 950 S.W.2d at
954-55; Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Grooms, 653 S.W.2d
271, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)). The Tennessee Supreme Court established a three-
part test that must be satisfied before imposing liability under the natural and probable
consequences rule:

[T]o impose criminal liability based on the natural and probable
consequences rule, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the
jury must find the following: (1) the elements of the crime or crimes that
accompanied the target crime; (2) that the defendant was criminally
responsible pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402; and
(3) that the other crimes that were committed were natural and probable
consequences of the target crime.

Id. The natural and probable consequences rule “reinforces the principle that the jury, not
the court, is vested with the power to weigh the sufficiency of evidence and determine
whether collateral crimes, committed by relevant parties in both physical and spatial
proximity of the target crime, are the natural and probable consequences of the intended
criminal behavior.” State v. Richmond, 90 S.W.3d 648, 656-57 (Tenn. 2002). “[T]he
natural and probable consequence rule ‘presupposes an outcome within a reasonably
predictable range.’” Id. at 276 (quoting Carson, 950 S.W.2d at 955).

Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the natural and probable
consequences rule. See T.P.I.—Crim. 3.01 Criminal responsibility for conduct of another
(2021). Relying on our prior analysis, we conclude that the State established the
aforementioned factors beyond a reasonable doubt. We also conclude that a reasonable
jury could have found that based on the orders given by the defendant to Ms. and Mr.
Williams—he needed “this handled”; “let the motherf****r know, you know what I’m
saying”; and “to go federal”—that Mr. Williams arming himself with a gun and that the
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, the attempted first-degree murder, and
employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony were the natural
and probable consequences of those orders. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to sustain
the defendant’s convictions.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.
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____________________________________
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10643430. Public record. Not legal advice.