# Cloutier v. Pesata

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642936

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JUSTIN CLOUTIER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-744-MMH-PDB

SERGEANT PESATA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Justin Cloutier, a former detainee1 at Flagler County Inmate
Facility, initiated this action by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1).2 He
proceeds on an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5). In the Amended Complaint,
Cloutier asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against seven Defendants:
Sergeant Pesata and Officers Masood, Sullivan, S. Stokes, J. Bocian, D.
Carmona, and Z. Mcminn.3 See Amended Complaint at 2-3; Doc. 20. Cloutier

1 At the time he filed this lawsuit on June 26, 2023, Cloutier was detained at
Flagler County Inmate Facility. Cloutier subsequently advised the Court that he was
released from custody on September 10, 2023. See Doc. 14.
2 For all documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the document and page
numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.
3 On July 22, 2024, the Court dismissed Cloutier’s claims against Defendants
Bocian, Carmona, Mcminn and Stokes without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See
Order (Doc. 46); Judgment (Doc. 47).
asserts Defendants violated “Florida State Statute Article 1 § 17 & 2, [his]
PREA rights, 8th Amendment rights, and [his right to] religous [sic] freedom”

when they “[b]rutalized . . . and sexually assaulted” him while he was detained
in a self-harm unit, and further when they subsequently denied him medical
treatment. See Amended Complaint at 3-4. As relief, Cloutier seeks monetary
damages. Id. at 5.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Pesata, Masood, and
Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22; Motion). Cloutier filed a response in
opposition to the Motion. See “Justin Cloutier’s Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 39; Response). The Motion is ripe for

review.
II. Cloutier’s Allegations4

In the Amended Complaint, Cloutier identifies Defendants Pesata,
Masood, and Sullivan as corrections officers employed by the Jacksonville
Sheriff’s Office (JSO) during the relevant time period.5 See Amended

4 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in
the Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable
to Cloutier, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
allegations. Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022). As such,
the facts recited here are drawn from the Amended Complaint, and may well differ
from those that ultimately can be proved.
5 Cloutier sues Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan in their individual
and official capacities. See Amended Complaint at 2-3.
Complaint at 2-3. As to the specific facts underlying his claims, Cloutier
alleges:

On October[] 9th, 2023[6] between 8 am and 4 pm
I . . . arrived at Jacksonville County Jail. [A]fter being
booked I was brought to the second floor for
processing. I began to pace the [h]allway and was told
to sit by a corrections officer. I told the officer my
medication was causing me to become restless. [T]he
officer then told me to cuff up and go [t]o a Self-Harm
pod; I complied. I was then brought to 6w2b by the
officer.

[A]fter arriving to 6w2b I witnessed a naked
[A]frican [A]merican man being restrained by the
doorway with a restraint chair[.] He had no clothes or
cover. I was brought to the second level and was placed
in a cell with another inmate. While several unknown
named corrections officers were in the cell they told me
to take my uniform off. I believed this was against
policy and refused since I [h]ad witnessed several
other [i]nmates with uniforms on. The unknown
officers than [sic] brought me out of the cell [and] told
me to lay down and [p]ut my [h]ands behind my back.
[A]s I was compl[y]ing an officer began to knee me and
punch me [i]n the face while I was on the ground being
cuffed. I was given a black eye and brought to the first
level. I was placed in a restraint chair and placed next
to the naked [A]frican [A]merican man who still
remained uncovered. We remained there for several
hours. The naked [A]frican [A]merican man requested
assistance and was denied.

After several [h]ours had passed I was brought
to another cell to be released by the officers from the

6 This date appears to be an error as Cloutier filed this lawsuit in June 2023
and was released from custody in September 2023. The Court notes that Cloutier
states elsewhere in the Amended Complaint that the incident at issue occurred in
October 2022. See Amended Complaint at 4-5.
restraint chair. Sergeant Pesata, Officer Masood,
Officer Sullivan, and an unknown officer were present
while I was being released from a restraint chair. I was
released and brought into a cell by the officers named.
[T]he officers told me to remove my uniform again once
inside the cell. I complied and removed my uniform
standing with my back to the door at the back of my
cell. [A]fter I removed my uniform I was pushed down
by one of the officers and was punched repeatedly in
the face until I was knocked out. Once waking up I was
then punched by another officer repeatedly until I
kicked his leg to attempt to stop the beating. [T]he 3rd
officer then picked me up and slammed my [h]ead on
a bed frame causing me to begin to bleed from my
[h]ead. I was then brought out of the cell complet[e]ly
naked, bleeding from my [h]ead, with my face
deformed and placed back into the restraint chair this
time with no uniform on. I requested a covering and
was denied. I requested emergency medical care and
was denied. I remained in the chair for several hours
until being brought to another cell. I requested a
shower and was denied. [T]hat night I slept covered in
blood. Se[r]geant [P]esata witnessed the beating, and
[r]efused my requests for covering, and for medical
care.

Doc. 5-1 at 1-2. Cloutier also alleges that “several officers and a superior . . .
sexually assaulted [him] while [he] was naked” in self-harm unit 6w2b. See
Amended Complaint at 4. Cloutier asserts that he sustained physical and
mental injuries in the incident. Id. at 5.
III. Summary of the Arguments
In the Motion, Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan argue that the
Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint because (1) it is a shotgun
pleading, (2) Cloutier fails to state a claim for violation of religious freedom, (3)
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the individual capacity
claims against them, and (4) Cloutier fails to state a claim for relief against

Defendants in their official capacities. See Motion at 4-12. In response, Cloutier
does not address the specific arguments raised in the Motion; however,
Cloutier provides an alleged video recording of the underlying incident. See
Response at 1.

IV. Analysis
Defendants initially argue that the Court should dismiss the Amended
Complaint because it is an impermissible shotgun pleading. See Motion at 4-
7. Defendants specifically contend that Cloutier improperly asserts “multiple

causes of action against multiple defendants in multiple capacities without
distinct counts.” Id. at 5. As a result, Defendants maintain the Amended
Complaint fails to provide them with adequate notice of the claims against
each Defendant and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. at 6.

At the outset, the Court notes that pro se complaints are held to a less
stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Wright v. Newsome,
795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is still
required to “‘conform to procedural rules.’” Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,

222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296,
1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) require
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “‘A complaint
need not specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is
required is that the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted
against him and the grounds on which it rests.’” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc.,

131 F.3d 957, 964 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Despite Rule 8(a)’s
liberal pleading requirement, “a complaint must still contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all material elements of a cause of action.”
Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis

omitted).
Additionally, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s
prohibition against shotgun pleadings. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach
County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland,

the Eleventh Circuit “identified four rough types or categories of shotgun
pleadings.” See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321). As the Barmapov court explained,

7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
The first [category] is “a complaint containing multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts, causing each successive count to
carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint.” The second is a
complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
particular cause of action.” The third is a complaint
that does not separate “each cause of action or claim
for relief” into a different count. And the final type of
shotgun pleading is a complaint that “assert[s]
multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the
claim is brought against.”

Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324-25 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23).
Notably, “[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that
they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon
which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (footnote omitted). Thus, a
shotgun pleading is one where “it is virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief” and the
defendant therefore cannot be “expected to frame a responsive pleading.”
Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366
(11th Cir. 1996)). For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally
instructed that shotgun pleadings of this sort are “altogether unacceptable.”
Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v.
Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much
to say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.”) (collecting cases).
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism

aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1321 n.9 (collecting cases). This is so because “[s]hotgun pleadings,
whether filed by plaintiff or defendant, exact an intolerable toll on the trial
court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, and impose

unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial
personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263.
Here, upon review of the Amended Complaint, the Court agrees with
Defendants that the Amended Complaint constitutes an impermissible

shotgun pleading. For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds that the
Amended Complaint falls within the second, third, and fourth categories of
impermissible shotgun pleadings, and, ultimately, fails to give Defendants
adequate notice as to the claims being brought against each of them.

First, in the Amended Complaint, Cloutier provides conclusory and
vague assertions of civil rights violations without identifying which alleged
facts are applicable to a particular cause of action. For example, Cloutier
asserts a violation of his right to religious freedom, but fails to identify which,

if any, factual allegations support this claim. Similarly, Cloutier asserts a
sexual assault claim, but does not specify which, if any, of his allegations are
applicable to this cause of action. And although Cloutier generally asserts he
was denied medical treatment, he fails to set forth specific allegations
supporting that claim, especially since he alleges elsewhere in the Amended

Complaint that he received medical treatment—including an MRI, a CAT scan,
stitches, and mental health treatment—following the incident. See Amended
Complaint at 5. In the Amended Complaint, Cloutier also includes immaterial
facts that are not obviously connected to any particular cause of action. For

example, Cloutier raises several allegations concerning an African American
inmate in the same self-harm unit, but he does not explain how these
allegations are connected to any of his claims.
Second, Cloutier’s failure to identify which factual allegations relate to a

particular cause of action is compounded by his failure to separate into
different counts each cause of action he seeks to assert. As such, Cloutier has
left the Court with the onerous task of sifting through the Amended Complaint
to determine which factual allegations relate to each cause of action he is

attempting to bring.
Third, and most critical, Cloutier asserts multiple claims against
Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan without specifying which of these
Defendants he is seeking to hold liable for which actions or omissions. Indeed,

nearly all of Cloutier’s factual allegations are attributed to an “officer” or
“officers” without specifying by name the Defendant that he asserts committed
each alleged act.8 The Court previously identified this deficiency in Cloutier’s
initial Complaint and ordered Cloutier to amend, see Order (Doc. 4); however,

Cloutier has failed to correct this deficiency in the Amended Complaint.
As presented, the Court is unable to determine whether Cloutier states
a plausible claim against Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan, much less
which of the various claims he identifies related to which Defendant. And it

would be nearly impossible for these Defendants to file a cogent responsive
pleading. As such, Cloutier’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice with leave to amend.9 If Cloutier chooses to submit a second amended
complaint, he may proceed only on one claim or related claims that properly

may be joined under Rule 20 and that are plausible and cognizable under §
1983. Cloutier may not join multiple, unrelated claims, nor should he include
extraneous or unrelated facts.
In filing his second amended complaint, Cloutier must comply with

federal pleading standards and the instructions in this Order and must present

8 As Cloutier appears to have a video recording of the use-of-force incident, he
may be able to identify the officers involved by name. But the Court cannot review
the video recording and undertake that task for Cloutier. Not only that, at the motion
to dismiss stage, the Court is limited to analyzing the allegations in the Amended
Complaint to determine if Cloutier has properly stated a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
9 Because the Court finds that dismissal on shotgun grounds is appropriate,
the Court declines to consider Defendants’ other arguments in support of dismissal.
Indeed, without a proper pleading, the Court cannot assess whether Cloutier has
stated a claim against Defendants Pesata, Masood, or Sullivan. Nor can the Court
assess whether these Defendants are entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity.
his claims on the Court’s Civil Rights Complaint Form. Specifically, in section
II of the Civil Rights Complaint Form, labeled “Basis for Jurisdiction,” Cloutier

must identify which federal constitutional or statutory right he claims each
Defendant violated, and in the section labeled, “Statement of Claim” (section
IV), he must plainly and clearly describe how each Defendant was involved in
each alleged federal constitutional or statutory violation. In section V, labeled

“Injuries,” Cloutier should clearly state how each Defendant’s action or
omission injured him.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 22) is GRANTED to the extent Defendants assert the Amended
Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. In all other respects, the
Motion is denied without prejudice.

2. Cloutier’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) is hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice to his right to refile a second amended complaint.
3. If Cloutier wishes to file a second amended complaint, he must do
so on or before October 11, 2024. This case number should be affixed to the

Civil Rights Complaint Form, and the words “Second Amended Complaint”
should be written at the top of the form. Cloutier’s failure to timely file a second
amended complaint or to correct the deficiencies noted here may result in the
dismissal of this action without further notice.
4, The Clerk shall send Cloutier a blank Civil Rights Complaint
Form.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 11th day of
September, 2024.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-10 9/4
Justin Charles Cloutier
Counsel of record

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642936. Public record. Not legal advice.