# Demps v. Jones

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 22, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642773

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 22, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM JAMAL DEMPS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 3:22-cv-044-MMH-SJH

CLARA SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff William Jamal Demps, an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on January 12, 2022, by filing a pro se
Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1)1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Demps
alleges that Defendants, employees of the FDOC, violated his Eighth
Amendment right. Id. at 4. Demps also asserts state law claims of assault and
battery. Id. at 4–5. As relief, Demps seeks compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 13. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 77), Demps’s Response in opposition to the
Motion (Response; Doc. 79), Defendants’ Reply (Reply; Doc. 81), and Demps’s

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.
Motion to Set a Date for Trial (Doc. 83). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for
review.

II. Demps’s Allegations
On August 23, 2017, Demps arrived at Suwannee Correctional
Institutional Annex (Suwannee). Complaint at 5. Shortly after his arrival,
Sergeant Jeremy Thomas touched Demps in an inappropriate manner. Id. On

August 29, 2017, Demps filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) claim
against Thomas and was placed in administrative confinement “for a long
period of time.” Id. When Demps was released from administrative
confinement, he was returned to open population and placed in Thomas’s

dormitory. Id. On September 29, 2017, Thomas saw Demps in the dormitory
and threatened him in front of “all the inmates.” Id.
On April 15, 2018, at around 1 a.m. Demps “grasp[ed]” Thomas by the
arm in an attempt to seek help because he could not breathe.2 Id. at 6–7.

Sometime after Demps grasped Thomas, prison guards—Defendants Hanson,
Kirby, Thomas, Russel, Ramsey, Rivas, and Archie—beat Demps and broke
eight of his ribs.3 Id. It is unclear where this encounter occurred. The first time

2 Demps alleges that his inability to breathe was a side effect of the
psychotropic medication that he takes every day. Id.
3 Throughout the Complaint Demps discusses the actions committed by
Thomas, Russell, and “other officers,” but he does not name the “other officers” until
a single sentence on page twenty-one. Complaint at 6, 8–10, 21. Liberally construing
Demps’s pro se Complaint, the Court will assume that the guards mentioned in
Demps’s factual allegations are those named on page twenty-one: Defendants
that Demps addresses these allegations in the Complaint, he states that the
prison guards were escorting him from L-Dormitory to the medical department

when the beating happened. Id. In another part of the Complaint, Demps
alleges that the guards were escorting him to P-Dormitory and administrative
confinement when the use of force occurred. Id. at 16. In yet another part of
the Complaint, Demps states that the use of force occurred in the TV room and

then outside when Thomas and other guards were escorting Demps to lock-up
confinement. Id. at 21. During Demps’s deposition, he testified that he stood
up to tell Thomas he could not breathe and Thomas began beating him, and
the other guards dragged him outside to continue beating him. Doc. 77-17 at

24–25. In Demps’s response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
Demps stated that the beating occurred outside while Thomas and other
guards were taking him to confinement, not the medical department. Doc. 19
at 11. However, in his Response to the Motion, Demps contends that the guards

beat him in the TV room, where the surveillance cameras were not working.
Response at 6, 11.
In the Complaint, Demps also alleges that Captain Clara Smith stood by
and watched as the guards beat him but failed to intervene, and that Wardens

Hanson, Kirby, Thomas, Russel, Ramsey, Rivas, and Archie. Id. at 21. Demps also
mentions Austin McLendon on page twenty-one, but the Court dismissed McLendon
at the motion to dismiss phase because McLendon did not work at Suwanee on April
15, 2018. Doc. 42 at 9–10.
C.E. Lane and Frank Freihofer “were contacted[] and gave [the] command to
use [p]hysical [f]orce on” Demps. Complaint at 6, 10, 21. After the use of force

the guards “left [Demps] for dead,” did not give him any medical attention and
no medical post use of force examination was performed. Id. at 9. On May 7,
2018, Demps initiated a sick call at Suwannee’s medical department during
which doctors examined him and discovered that he had eight broken ribs. Id.

at 22. Demps submitted multiple grievances regarding the use of force. Id. at
6; see Doc. 1-6. Thomas wrote a disciplinary report against Demps for battery
or attempted battery for the April 15th incident. Id. at 6–7. Demps was found
guilty of the charge at a disciplinary hearing and put on close management for

two years. Id. at 8.
III. Defendants’ Evidence
After the April 15th incident, Thomas filed a disciplinary report and a
use of force report. Docs. 77-1 at 1; 77-7 at 1. In the report, Thomas stated that

at 1 a.m. on April 15, 2018, he was doing a verbal count of L-dormitory when
Demps ran up to him, grabbed him by the arm, and pushed him forward. Doc.
77-7 at 1. When Demps did not respond to verbal commands to relinquish
Thomas’s arm, Thomas used reactionary physical force to push Demps to the

floor and, in doing so, caused Demps’s face to hit the floor. Id. In the report
Thomas does not list any other guard as participating. Id. Medical conducted
a post use of force examination twenty-three minutes after the use of force
during which Demps complained about a bruised nose and a lump to his
temple. Id. at 3. Based on the disciplinary report, Demps was found guilty of

battery or attempted battery for this interaction. Doc. 77-1 at 1.
Defendants provide two surveillance videos in support of their Motion.
The first shows L-dormitory at 1 a.m. on April 15, 2018. Exhibit 6; Doc. 77-6.
The video does not show the entire incident because it mostly occurs out of the

camera’s view, but when the video starts, Thomas can be seen walking around
the room from the upper part of the screen to the upper left part of the screen.
Id. Seventeen seconds into the video, right after Thomas disappears from view,
someone can be seen running from the top left corner of the screen towards

where Thomas was last seen. Id. There is no sound, but within fifteen seconds,
other inmates stand up and look towards where Thomas would be standing,
and then settle down shortly after that. Id. By one minute and fifteen seconds,
the other inmates are no longer looking at anything and are back to their own

routines. Id. No other guards are seen in the video. Id. Defendants assert that
Demps was the person running at Thomas in the video and Demps seems to
admit in his Response that the video depicts him running towards Thomas, or
at least does not contest that it is him. Response at 5–6, 11.

The second video begins minutes after the first video ends, at 1:13 a.m.
on April 15, 2018, and ends at 1:38 a.m. Exhibit 8; Doc. 77-8. Defendant
Ramsey recorded the video on a handheld camera to document other guards
escorting Demps to confinement where a member of the medical staff
conducted a post use of force physical after Thomas’s reactionary use of force.

Id. Demps is hunched over for most of the walk, although it is not clear whether
this is due to his restraints or injury, and begins walking upright four minutes
and thirty-seven seconds into the video. Id. Once the guards and Demps reach
confinement, the video depicts a nurse conducting a post use of force

examination on Demps. Id. Through a door with a glass window, the nurse can
be seen examining Demps’s nose and face followed by his chest and stomach.
Id. The video does not depict any force used against Demps. Id. In the
Response, Demps does not contest that the video depicts him being taken to

receive medical attention.4 See Response; Doc. 79-2 at 2.
IV. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary
judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

4 Demps attached a “witness statement” to the Response by a correctional
officer who states they watched the video of Demps receiving medical attention.
Doc. 79-2 at 2. The witness also states that they saw in the video that the nurse wiped
something off Demps that appeared to be blood. Id.
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). An issue is genuine when the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant.
See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.
1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s

position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex
rel. Est. of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, [to] designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64
F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333
F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The mere existence of some factual dispute

will not defeat summary judgment unless the factual dispute is material to an
issue affecting the outcome of the case.”). In determining whether summary
judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.”

Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros.
Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).
“[T]he proper inquiry on summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Stitzel v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 361 F. App’x 20, 22 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 251–52).5 Put another way, a motion for summary judgment should be
denied only “[i]f reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from

[the] undisputed [material] facts.” Pioch v. IBEX Eng’g Servs., 825 F.3d 1264,
1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646
(11th Cir. 1997)). Notably “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories,

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes

of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d
1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
V. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citations omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit requires “‘an affirmative
causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation’ in § 1983 cases.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986)). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or
violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against
the defendant. Kornagay v. Diedeman, No. 3:17-CV-795-J-34MCR, 2019 WL

5802531, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2019).6

6 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. “[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” qualifies

as “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). “[T]he core judicial inquiry” in an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)). Under this standard, a plaintiff must
establish both an objective and subjective element. Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1265.
The objective element requires a showing that the conduct was

“objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation[,]” and
“offends ‘contemporary standards of decency[.]’” Id. (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at
8; Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37). Although “the extent of injury may shed light on
the amount of force applied[,]” the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive force

“regardless of whether ‘significant injury is evident,’ or ‘whether the use of
force could plausibly have been thought necessary.’” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1266
(“[A] lack of serious injury, while not dispositive, is relevant to the inquiry.”).
The subjective element requires a showing that the official “acted with a

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
sufficiently culpable state of mind” by applying force sadistically, maliciously,
and for the purpose of causing harm. Id. (citing Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d

1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304
(11th Cir. 2010)).
VI. Summary of the Arguments
Demps asserts four claims.7 First, a claim of excessive force against

Defendants Hanson, Kirby, Thomas, Russel, Ramsey, Rivas, and Archie for
beating Demps and breaking eight of his ribs. Complaint at 4, 21. Second, a
claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Smith for failing to
intervene when the guards used excessive force against Demps. Id. at 4, 6, 10.

Third, a claim of excessive force against Defendants Lane and Freihofer for
directing the other guards to use excessive force against Demps. Id. at 20.
Fourth, a claim of assault and battery against Defendants Hanson, Kirby,
Thomas, Russel, Ramsey, Rivas, and Archie for beating Demps and breaking

eight of his ribs. Id. at 4, 21.
In the Motion, Defendants argue that Demps’s claims should be dismissed
for three reasons. First, Demps failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
as to Hanson, Kirby, Ramsey, Rivas, Archie, Smith, Lane, and Freihofer.

Motion at 5–10. Second, Demps cannot show a constitutional violation by any

7 These are Demps’s remaining claims after the Court partially granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Doc. 42.
Defendant because his inconsistent allegations are refuted by the evidence in
the record. Id. at 10–23. Third, Demps’s request for punitive damages is

barred. Id. at 23–30.
VII. Analysis and Conclusions
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust his administrative

remedies before pursuing a civil rights action under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). Section 1997e requires “proper exhaustion,” such that “a prisoner
must exhaust all prescribed administrative remedies available to him . . .
before filing a lawsuit to seek judicial redress.” Garcia v. Glover, 197 F. App’x

866, 868 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)).
“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that
unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
211 (2007) (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)). Generally, to

properly exhaust administrative remedies, a Florida prisoner must complete a
three-step process: “(1) file an informal grievance with a designated prison staff
member; (2) file a formal grievance with the institution’s warden; and then (3)
submit an appeal to the Secretary of the FDOC.” Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d

1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the two-step process that the Court
must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies:
After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance procedures, he may
file suit under § 1983. In response to a prisoner suit, defendants
may bring a motion to dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner's
failure to exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner, 541
F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we established a two-step
process for resolving motions to dismiss prisoner lawsuits for
failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to
the factual allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the
prisoner's response and accept the prisoner's view of the facts as
true. The court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the prisoner
show a failure to exhaust. Id. Second, if dismissal is not warranted
on the prisoner's view of the facts, the court makes specific findings
to resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those
findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust. Id. at 1082-
83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining that defendants bear the burden
of showing a failure to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015);
see Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 823–24 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
When a defendant claims that a plaintiff failed to exhaust their claim in a
motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, it is treated as
if it was brought in a motion to dismiss and examined as set out in Whatley.
See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374–75 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Defendants admit that Demps grieved this incident. Motion at 9.
Defendants also admit that Demps exhausted his claims against Thomas and
Russel because he named them in his grievances. Id. However, Defendants
argue that Demps did not exhaust his claims against Defendants Hanson,
Kirby, Ramsey, Rivas, Archie, Smith, Lane, or Freihofer because he did not

mention them in his grievances. Id. at 5–10. In his deposition, Demps admits
that he did not name any Defendant other than Thomas and Russell in his
grievances. Doc. 77-17 at 33.
“The PLRA requires exhaustion of ‘such administrative remedies as are

available,’ but nothing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defendants’
requirement[.]” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). Whether a
plaintiff must name all defendants in a grievance is determined by the prison
grievance procedure because “[c]ompliance with prison grievance procedures[]

[] is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Id. at 218. Under
the FDOC grievance procedures “a prisoner need not name any particular
defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust his claim.” Parzyck v.
Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Nothing

in the FDOC’s grievance procedures requires inmates to file new grievances
addressing every subsequent act by a prison official that contributes to the
continuation of a problem already raised in an earlier grievance. The only
FDOC requirements regarding the contents of grievances are that they must

accurately state the facts and ‘address only one issue or complaint.’”) (citing
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 219; Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir.
2000); Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006(2)(e), (2)(f)).
Because Defendants admit that Demps grieved the April 15th incident,
and Demps was not required to name each Defendant in the grievances to

exhaust his claims, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment in their
favor on this basis.
B. Defendants Hanson and Kirby
Defendants Jonathan Hanson and Amanda Kirby contend that they

never worked at Suwanee in any capacity. Motion at 3, 13. In support of their
contention, Defendants provided a declaration by FDOC human resource
analyst Marcha Beane attesting to the fact that no one by either of these names
ever worked at Suwannee on the date in question. Docs. 77-4, 77-5. In response

to interrogatories sent to them by Demps, Hanson and Kirby attest to the fact
that they never worked at Suwanee. Doc. 79-7 at 1, 3. Neither Hanson nor
Kirby appears in the surveillance videos, Demps did not name them in his
grievances, their names do not appear on the daily security roster, and their

names do not appear in any documents regarding the April 15th incident such
as the disciplinary report findings or comments. See Exhibits 6, 8; Docs. 1-6,
77-1, 77-2, 77-3, 77-7 at 1.
Demps does not provide any evidence in support of his contention that

either Hanson or Kirby was employed at, or present at, Suwannee on the date
in question or that either used any force against him other than the fact that
he can recite two badge numbers that he alleges belong to Hanson and Kirby.
Response at 4. On this record the Court concludes that Demps presents no
more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his claims. Indeed, he provides

no evidence to contradict Defendants’ evidence that they were not present for
the alleged attack. As such, Demps fails to demonstrate that there is a genuine
issue for trial. See Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593–94. Consequently, as to the claims
against Hanson and Kirby, the Motion is due to granted.

C. Excessive Force
Before proceeding to the merits of Demps’s excessive force claim, it is
important to note that there are two uses of force at issue in this case.8 The
first use of force occurred when Demps ran toward Thomas in L-dormitory, and

Thomas used reactionary force to bring Demps to the ground. Docs. 77-1 at 1;
77-7 at 1. This is the use of force that is documented in the disciplinary report,
use of force report, and incident report, and is partially documented on video
in Exhibit 6. Exhibit 6; Docs. 77-1; 77-7 at 1, 5. There is no dispute that this

use of force occurred, or that Exhibit 6 partially documents it. This use of force
is no longer at issue because it was the subject of disciplinary proceedings in
which Demps was found guilty of battery or attempted battery against Thomas

8 The Court already made this finding in its order on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, but it is worth reiterating the point here for clarity’s sake because Demps
often conflates these two uses of force in his filings. See Doc. 42 at 21–22.
and consequently—as this Court already found at the motion to dismiss
phase—is Heck-barred.9 Doc. 42 at 16–20.

The second use of force is the subject of this dispute and is less clear cut
because Demps asserts inconsistent and competing allegations.10 Demps’s
allegations seem to fit into one of two versions of events. In one version of
events, Demps asserts that when Thomas used reactionary force against him

in the TV room—which seemingly adjoins L-Dormitory—the other guards
joined in and then dragged him outside to continue beating him. Complaint at
21; Response at 6, 11; Doc. 77-17 at 24–25. In this version of events, Demps
seems to assert that the second use of force was an extension of the first, rather

than a separate incident. Presumably the claim that Demps never received
medical attention and “was left for dead” exists in this version of events
because in the second version he was taken to the medical department.
Complaint at 9. In the second version of events, Demps seems to contend that

the first use of force occurred, ended, and resulted in Demps being escorted to
P-Dormitory—either to confinement or to the medical department—during

9 Under Heck, claims that would challenge the validity of a judgment are not
cognizable under § 1983. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645, 648 (1997) (citing
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
10 Demps’s allegations may not be as inconsistent as they appear. For example,
Demps states that he was beaten on the way to P-Dormitory, but then goes on to state
that he was beaten on the way to the medical department. Although these seem
inconsistent, they are not because the medical department appears to be in P-
Dormitory, based the evidence provided by both parties. Nevertheless, Demps still
asserts other inconsistent and competing allegations.
which the named Defendant prison guards began beating him a second time.
Complaint at 6–7, 16, 21; Doc. 19 at 11.

The essence of both versions of events is that Defendants Hanson, Kirby,
Thomas, Russell, Ramsey, Rivas, and Archie used excessive force against
Demps during which they beat him bloody, broke his ribs, and gave him a black
eye. Complaint at 6–7, 21. Demps also alleges that Smith watched as this

happened but failed to intervene, and Lane and Freihofer authorized the use
of force. Complaint at 6, 10, 21. Demps’s own inconsistent allegations—
regarding where and when the second use of force occurred and who
participated in it—in the Complaint, his response to the motion to dismiss, his

Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, his deposition, and his
grievances undermine his claim. In addition, Demps’s account of the facts is
not supported by the evidence.
Demps’s medical records do not support either of his versions of the

events. After the alleged use of force, medical conducted a post use of force
examination. Doc. 77-7 at 3. Defendants provided a medical record of the post
use of force examination in which the nurse states that Demps complained only
of nose pain. Id. The nurse notated that she observed a bruise on Demps’s nose

and a lump on his forehead that was caused by the first use of force when
Demps’s face hit the ground. Id. Notably, the record makes no mention of
Demps having a black eye or complaining of rib pain. Id.
Notably, Demps asserts he was “in so much pain from his eight broken
ribs” following the use of force on April 15th and was refused medical attention.

Complaint at 10. However, Demps provided no sick call request forms from
April in support of this contention.11 See Doc. 1-6. On April 21, 2018, Demps
submitted an inmate request with the mental health department alleging that
he was “abused and beaten” by Thomas and Russell, but he did not request

medical attention and instead stated: “I just wanted to bring this to your
attention, [] so you can document this and send me a copy back with your
response.”12 Docs. 1-6 at 20; 77-10 at 73. Demps did not initiate a sick call with
the medical department until May 7, 2018, three weeks after the alleged use

of force. Docs. 19-4 at 2; 77-7 at 11.
Demps provided medical records demonstrating that on May 15, 2018,
an X-ray revealed rib fractures. Doc. 1-2; see also Doc. 77-7 at 18. Demps also
provided medical records showing he was prescribed pain medication on May

16, 2018. Doc. 1-3. Demps did not provide any records that demonstrate what
caused the rib fractures. These medical records show Demps was injured, but,
in light of the post use of force examination record and the fact that Demps

11 Demps provided multiple sick call request forms from subsequent months,
just not from April when he was apparently suffering without diagnosis or treatment
for his recently broken ribs. See Doc. 1-6.
12 This request seems to refer only to the first use of force, not the second,
because Demps only refers to Thomas and Russell who were involved in the first use
of force rather than naming the Defendants who allegedly participated in the second
use of force.
waited almost three weeks before seeking treatment, they do not associate his
injury with the second use of force—or the first use of force for that matter.

Although the existence and extent of an injury is not dispositive regarding
whether force was excessive, see Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1266, Demps’s failure to
provide evidence to associate his broken ribs to the alleged use of force, coupled
with the fact that there is no other evidence that the second use of force

occurred, undercuts his contention that it did occur.
Other evidence in the record refutes Demps’s contention that the second
use of force happened. First, the disciplinary report, use of force report, and
incident report did not mention the second use of force or contain any

indication that anyone other than Thomas used force against Demps on April
15th. Docs. 77-1; 77-7 at 1, 5. Second, in response to interrogatories, Thomas
only referred to the first use of force and stated that, to his knowledge, no one
beat Demps or broke his ribs, but rather, other guards took Demps to

confinement where medical personnel examined him. Doc. 79-8 at 3–5. Third,
in response to interrogatories, Defendants Russell, Ramsey, Rivas, and Smith
stated that only Thomas used force on Demps in response to being attacked by
Demps, and there was no excessive force; and Defendant Archie had no

recollection of any uses of force on April 15th at all. Doc. 79-8 at 9–11, 15, 20–
21, 25–26, 29–30, 34–35. Demps does not provide any witness testimony, in the
form of deposition transcripts or affidavits, to support his version of events.13

Demps’s own administrative grievances similarly undercut his claim.
See Doc. 1-6. Although it is not entirely clear because Demps often conflates
the two uses of force, in his grievances Demps indicated only that the first use
of force occurred and that the broken ribs were caused by the first use of force

because he stated that Thomas punched Demps in his eye and nose and broke
his ribs. See id. Although Demps referred to his black eye and broken ribs in
the grievances, he did not reference being dragged outside, being beaten on the
way to P-Dormitory, or other officers joining Thomas. See id. Of the one

hundred and fourteen pages of grievances, medical records, and medical
requests that Demps filed with the Complaint, he mentions “other prison
guards” in only three,14 while in the other grievances and requests Demps
names only Thomas and Russell.15 Id. at 47–48, 71. None of the grievances give

any indication that a second use of force occurred.

13 Exhibit 6 shows inmates in L-Dormitory spectating as the first use of force
occurred. See Exhibit 6. If Defendants did join Thomas in beating Demps and
dragging him outside, as Demps sometimes claims, someone likely would have seen
it and could have served as a witness.
14 Technically there are four of these grievances in Doc. 1-6, but one is a
duplicate. See Doc. 1-6 at 47, 86.
15 In a letter that Demps wrote to the FDOC Inspector General, Demps
provided an entirely different account of the April 15th events. Doc. 1-6 at 29. In this
letter Demps claimed that at 1 a.m. Thomas woke Demps up and told Demps to fold
laundry for him, and once they got to the officer’s station, Thomas closed the door and
began beating Demps along with Russell. Id.
More importantly, Defendants provided two surveillance videos in
support of their Motion that affirmatively contradict Demps’s claim. See

Exhibits 6, 8. Exhibit 6 begins around the time the first use of force occurred,
1 a.m. on April 15, 2018,16 and partially depicts the events leading to the first
use of force. See Exhibit 6. Exhibit 8 begins at 1:13 a.m. and shows two guards,
Rivas and Archie, escorting Demps to the P-Dormitory following the first use

of force. See Exhibit 8. Based on Demps’s allegations that the second use of
force was either an extension of the first use of force or happened before he was
taken to P-Dormitory, and the fact that Exhibit 8 does not depict any use of
force, the second use of force must have occurred before Exhibit 8 began, if at

all.
Demps is hunched over for most of the walk to P-Dormitory but begins
to walk upright four minutes and thirty-seven seconds into Exhibit 8. Id. It is
not clear whether Demps’s posture is due to his restraints or injury. Once

Demps reaches confinement, the video depicts—through a door with a glass
window—a nurse conducting a post use of force examination on Demps. Id.
During the examination, the nurse can be seen examining Demps’s nose and
face and wiping something off his face.17 Id. Demps stands up and takes off his

16 Both Demps and Defendants agree this is when the first use of force
occurred. Complaint at 6; Motion at 3.
17 The Court will assume this was blood as Demps seems to claim. Doc. 79-2
at 2.
white shirt without any difficulty to reveal there is no blood on his body, and
the nurse briefly looks at his chest and stomach. Id.

This video affirmatively contradicts Demps’s claim in three ways. First,
Demps asserts multiple times that he was either left for dead or did not receive
medical attention. Complaint at 9; Docs. 19 at 11; 77-17 at 35. These
contentions are blatantly refuted by Exhibit 8 and contradicted by Demps’s

own statements that Defendants beat him on his way to receive medical
attention. See Complaint at 6–7. Second, Exhibit 8 refutes Demps’s claim that
Defendants beat him on the way to P-Dormitory because it depicts his journey
from L-Dormitory to P-Dormitory and does not show even an inkling of force.

Third, a reasonable juror could not watch Exhibit 8 and conclude that anyone
beat Demps bloody or broke his ribs minutes before it began because there is
no visible blood on his white shirt or body, and he stands and lifts up his arms
to take off his shirt without any sign of injury or pain.18 Exhibit 8 does not

permit any inference that Demps was suffering from a beating or freshly
broken ribs.
Defendants have a multitude of evidence in their favor and Demps has
only his own inconsistent allegations. Even when viewing all evidence in

18 It should also be noted that, although Demps claims that the beating lasted
fifteen minutes, Exhibit 8 begins less than ten minutes after the first use of force
occurred. Doc. 77-17 at 33.
Demps’s favor, no reasonable jury could believe his side of the story as it is
“blatantly contradicted by the record” and his own inconsistent allegations.

See Morton, 707 F.3d at 1284. Because there is no evidence that the second use
of force occurred, no reasonable jury could find that Defendants Hanson, Kirby,
Thomas, Russel, Ramsey, Rivas, or Archie used excessive force against Demps.
Accordingly, as there was no use of force, Lane, Freihofer, and Smith cannot

be liable for sanctioning or being deliberately indifferent to the alleged use of
force.
Therefore, the excessive force claims against Thomas, Russell, Ramsey,
Rivas, Archie, Lane, and Freihofer are DISMISSED. Further, the failure to

intervene claim against Smith is also DISMISSED.
D. Assault and Battery
The dismissal of Demps's underlying federal question claim does not
deprive the Court of supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction”) (emphasis added). Although
Demps’s federal law claims have been dismissed, the Court will continue to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Demps’s assault and battery claims;
however, Demps fails to demonstrate an issue of material fact regarding his
state law assault or battery claim.
Under Florida law, “[a]n ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by
word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent

ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such
other person that such violence is imminent.” Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1). Demps
does not allege an assault because he does not allege that any Defendant
threatened him, nor does he present any evidence to support such an

allegation. Therefore, there is no issue of material fact requiring submission to
a jury on this issue.
As to the battery claim, under Florida law, “[t]he elements of simple
battery are: (1) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person;

and (2) against the will of the other person.” Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d
359, 361 (Fla. 2008) (citing Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(1) (2002)). Battery can also
occur when someone “[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.”
Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(2). Even when viewing all evidence in Demps’s favor,

he fails to demonstrate that the Defendants touched or struck him and fails to
show his broken ribs were caused by Defendants. See Haves, 52 F.3d at 921
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A., 38 F.3d at 1578). Therefore, Demps fails to put
forth evidence that shows a sufficient disagreement requiring submission to

the jury regarding whether the Defendants battered him.
Consequently, Demps’s assault and battery claims are DISMISSED.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) is
GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff William Jamal Demps’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Demps’s Motion to Set a Date for Trial (Doc. 83) is DENIED as
moot.
4, The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 22nd day of August
2024.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

C: William Jamal Demps
Counsel of record
OCAP-4

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642773. Public record. Not legal advice.