# Knight v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642717

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ANTONIO WADE KNIGHT,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-566-MMH-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
___________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Antonio Wade Knight, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action on June 1, 2021, by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).1 Knight is proceeding on a
Second Amended Petition (Second Amended Petition; Doc. 14). He challenges
a 2015 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for felony
domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. Knight raises three grounds for relief. See id. at 5−11.
Respondents have submitted a memorandum opposing the Petition. See

1 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the
document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.
Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 17). They also
submitted exhibits. See Response Exs. 1−28. Knight filed a Reply. See

Petitioner’s Traverse to Response to Order to Show Cause (Reply; Doc. 22).
This action is ripe for review.
II. Relevant Procedural History
On March 22, 2011, the state charged Knight by Information with

aggravated assault (domestic) (Count One), aggravated battery (domestic)
(Count Two), felony battery (domestic) (Count Three), and possession of a
firearm or ammunition by violent career criminal (Count Four). Response Ex.
2 at 64−65. After several amendments, the state filed a Fourth Amended

Information on July 20, 2015, charging Knight with felony battery (domestic)
(Count One), sexual battery (Count Two), aggravated battery (domestic)
(Count Three), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count Four).
Response Ex. 5 at 167−68. Knight proceeded to trial and a jury found him

guilty of Counts One, Three, and Four as charged in the Fourth Amended
Information. Id. at 178, 181−84. The jury returned a not guilty verdict as to
Count Two. Id. at 179−80.
On September 9, 2015, the trial court adjudicated Knight as a Habitual

Felony Offender on Counts One and Four and a Violent Career Criminal as to
Count Three. Response Ex. 6 at 51−53. The trial court sentenced Knight to a
ten-year term of imprisonment as to Count One, a thirty-year term of
imprisonment with a ten-year minimum mandatory for a firearm as to Count
Three, and a three-year term of imprisonment with a three-year minimum

mandatory for a firearm as to Count Four. Id. at 43−54. The trial court further
ordered that the sentence imposed for Count One run concurrent to the
sentence in Count Three, and that the sentence imposed for Count Four run
consecutively to the sentence imposed in Count Three. Id. at 49−50. Knight

appealed his judgment and sentences to the First District Court of Appeal
(“First DCA”). Id. at 78−79. On October 28, 2016, the First DCA per curiam
affirmed without a written opinion Knight’s convictions and sentences, and on
November 28, 2016, it issued the mandate. Response Ex. 15 at 2−3.

Knight filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850 on July 6, 2017, raising twelve grounds of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one claim of cumulative error.
Response Ex. 22 at 85−129. Specifically, Knight alleged counsel was ineffective

for failing to: (1) sever Count Four; (2) object to Count One; (3) object to the
state’s four amendments to the information; (4) raise a statute of limitations
challenge to Count One; (5) object to the trial court enhancing Knight’s
sentence and running the sentences consecutively; (6) object to a sentence

imposed on Count Two that exceeded the statutory maximum; (7) challenge his
adjudication as a violent career criminal; (8) object to prosecutorial misconduct;
(9) depose and call as a witness Jevon Scott; (10) object to the information; (11)
object to the jury verdict form; and (12) challenge or suppress the firearm
seized. Id. at 85−125.

On May 1, 2018, the trial court ordered the state to file a response to
grounds two and seven of Knight’s Rule 3.850 motion. Id. at 149−52. The state,
in its response, conceded to ground seven, stating Knight was entitled to
resentencing because he did not qualify as a Violent Career Criminal. Id. at

156−57. The trial court later directed the state to respond again, this time to
grounds four, five, and nine of Knights Rule 3.850 motion. Response Ex. 23 at
10−11. Before an evidentiary hearing could be held on the Rule 3.850 motion,
Knight, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion to correct illegal sentence

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Id. at 83−86. In the
Rule 3.800(a) motion Knight raised the same claim as he had raised in ground
7 of his Rule 3.850 motion. Id. The trial court granted the Rule 3.800(a) motion
and resentenced Knight on June 21, 2019. Id. at 82, 133−43.

As a result of the resentencing, the trial court found grounds five and
seven of the Rule 3.850 motion moot. Response Ex. 19 at 171. At the
evidentiary hearing, during which Knight was represented by postconviction
counsel, the parties agreed that Knight was entitled to relief on ground four.

Id. The trial court heard argument on ground nine of Knight’s motion. Id. On
September 16, 2019, the trial court denied relief on the remaining grounds of
Knight’s Rule 3.850 motion. Id. at 169−85. On November 23, 2020, the First
DCA per curiam affirmed without opinion the trial court’s order, and on
December 14, 2020, it issued the mandate. Response Ex. 28 at 2−3.

III. One-Year Limitations Period
This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to
establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318−19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.
The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the
Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without

further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir.
2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions
as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,
and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S.
34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of
final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’”

Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need
not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted
by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely relied on
different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such as
persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court
or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97−98.

The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to
§ 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),
§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”
clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only
“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of
law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523
(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”
clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v.
Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --
-, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,

571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a
state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter,

562 U.S. at 102−03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were
adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §
2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,
either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”
the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[2] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[3] supra, at 84–85, 97 S.
Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural
rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal
review of the claims if, among other requisites, the
state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–
1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558
U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted
claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S.,
at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9−10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that prevented
[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be
fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.
Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[4]
Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show

2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
3 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
that “the errors at trial actually and substantially
disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,

allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per
curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”
Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of
any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a
court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the
prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is
a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S.
Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state court’s
application of Strickland was unreasonable under §
2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created
by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review
is doubly so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable — a substantially
higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not
disturb a state-court decision denying the claim.
Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One

As Ground One, Knight contends the trial court reversibly erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Second Amended Petition at 6. Knight alleges his probation
officer found a firearm during a warrantless search of Knight’s residence in an
area of the residence outside of his control. Id. Knight maintains his probation
officer did not obtain consent from the owner of the area where he searched
and found the firearm. Id. Knight also raises a series of new arguments for the
first time in his Reply that are not properly before the Court.5 The Court does

not consider those arguments here. Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d
1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (“As we repeatedly have admonished, ‘[a]rguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before a reviewing
court.’”) (citation omitted).

Knight filed his pro se motion to suppress on July 28, 2011, arguing that
the probation officer’s search of his living residence exceeded the scope of
Knight’s living space. Response Ex. 2 at 175−85. Knight alleged that his father,
Peter Knight, owned the home, and that the probation officer’s search that

yielded the firearm occurred outside of Knight’s “living space.” Id. Knight also
argued the probation officer conducted the search without a search warrant or
the consent of Peter Knight. Id. at 179−80. The trial court held a hearing on
the pro se motion on August 10, 2011. Response Ex. 6 at 182−204. In denying

the motion, the trial court found the testimony of the probation officer to be
more credible than Knight’s testimony. Response Ex. 2 at 174. Knight filed a
second motion to suppress on June 27, 2012, again arguing that the probation
officer retrieved the firearm from an area that was not in Knight’s living

5 These arguments include his inability to take depositions before the motion
to suppress hearing, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and his decision to proceed
pro se because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance during a critical stage of his
proceedings.
quarters and over which he had no control. Response Ex. 4 at 6−14. He also
argued there was no physical evidence−fingerprint or DNA−on the firearm to

show his possession of it. Id. The trial court heard argument on the second
motion to suppress on July 26, 2012, see Response Ex. 7 at 10−15, and
ultimately denied the second motion, see Response Ex. 4 at 5.
The law is well settled that a federal court cannot entertain a claim of a

violation of a habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights if the petitioner
had an opportunity for full and fair consideration of his claim in the state
courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d
559, 564 (11th Cir. 2000). “[F]ull and fair consideration requires consideration

by the fact-finding court, and at least the availability of meaningful appellate
review by higher state court.” Mincev v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1126 (11th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). The Florida state court’s consideration of Knight’s
claims in Ground One triggers the Stone bar, precluding federal review of his

Fourth Amendment claim, because the state court provided Knight with
processes for full and adequate consideration of this Ground.
A review of the procedural history of this matter establishes the state
provided Knight ample opportunity for “full and fair consideration” of his

claims. The trial court held a hearing on Knight’s motion to suppress, receiving
testimony and argument on the issues presented in the motion. Response Ex.
6 at 182−204. After Knight raised a second, nearly identical claim in another
motion to suppress, the trial court heard additional argument from Knight.
Knight failed to appeal either ruling on direct appeal. Response Ex. 13 at 2−39.

Knight does not demonstrate that the trial court failed to afford him a full and
fair opportunity to develop the factual issues of his Fourth Amendment claim.
And Knight could have, but did not, raise the issue to the First DCA. Any
allegation of state court error in denying his motions to suppress does not

suffice to avoid the Stone bar given the record here. See Swicegood v. Alabama,
577 F.2d 1322, 1324−25 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Stone bar applies
despite an error by the state court in deciding the merits of a Fourth
Amendment claim.). Accordingly, under Stone, relief on the claim in Ground

One is due to be denied.
Even assuming Stone did not bar the Court’s consideration of this issue,
Knight’s Fourth Amendment claim is barred because he did not exhaust the
federal nature of this claim in state court. To exhaust state remedies, the

petitioner must “fairly present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to
the state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.
Castille, 489 U.S. at 351 (emphasis omitted). This means state prisoners must
invoke one complete round of the State’s “established appellate review

process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (1999). While Knight did file a direct
appeal, he did not seek review of the trial court’s decisions denying the motions
to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Because Knight never raised the claim in the trial court or direct appeal,
he cannot return to state court to properly exhaust this claim through a second

direct appeal. See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 763 (Fla. 2002) (stating issue
not raised in an initial brief is procedurally barred) abrogation on other
grounds by State v. Johnson, 122 So. 3d 856, 862 (Fla. 2013). Thus, the claim
is unexhausted and procedurally barred in federal court. Snowden v.

Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen it is obvious that the
unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-
law procedural default, we can forego the needless ‘judicial ping-pong’ and just
treat those claims now barred by state law as no basis for federal habeas

relief.”). Knight has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of
justice to overcome his failure to exhaust. Therefore, the claim in Ground One
is due to be denied.
B. Ground Two

As Ground Two, Knight contends the trial court reversibly erred in
denying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel’s failure
to call rebuttal witness Javon Scott.6 Second Amended Petition at 9. Knight

6 Knight lists every ground as “Ground One” in his Second Amended Petition.
In this Order, the Court relabels the grounds in numerical order based on their
appearance in the Petition.
alleges the trial court’s ruling deprived him of his rights under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. Id.

Knight raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing
to call this witness in his Rule 3.850 motion. Response Ex. 22 at 110−12. The
trial court denied the claim, stating:
At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brewer, Defendant’s trial counsel,
testified as follows. She represented Defendant in the instant case,
and when she was appointed to the case, she knew Mr. Scott had
been listed as a defense witness. During her first conversation
with Defendant, they discussed whether there was a conflict
because of the firm that represented Mr. Scott, but it was
determined there was no conflict. Ms. Brewer participated in a
deposition of Mr. Scott on September 26, 2014, but only the State
questioned Mr. Scott since he was listed as a defense witness and
Ms. Brewer does not typically question her witnesses under oath.
During her pre deposition conversation with Mr. Scott, Mr. Scott
told Ms. Brewer that Defendant and Mr. Scott’s aunt, who was the
victim, got into an argument about a letter, his aunt pulled a gun
on Defendant, and Defendant took it from her. Mr. Scott was not
present when the incident occurred. In fact, Mr. Scott had not seen
Defendant for years before seeing him in the jail yard after
Defendant’s arrest. Mr. Scott’s aunt told him everything he knew
about the incident, and he could not provide a point-by-point
recitation of the events that occurred. Ms. Brewer could not say
with any certainty whether Mr. Scott was talking about the
incident he was arrested for in this case or another incident. Ms.
Brewer’s notes did not indicate that Mr. Scott said the victim was
fabricating the events that occurred, and she does not think Mr.
Scott would have ever said his aunt was fabricating because of how
much he was saying he would stand by his family and loved his
aunt.

Whether she argued the necessity defense or not, Ms. Brewer could
say that she definitely looked into a necessity defense. Ms. Brewer
spoke with Defendant about what Mr. Scott said, and she thought
he would not be a helpful defense witness. She stated Mr. Scott
could possibly have helped with the necessity defense, but her
overwhelming feeling after the deposition was that he was not
going to be a good defense witness because he was going to stick
with his family. Ms. Brewer stated several times that the victim
was Mr. Scott’s favorite aunt and she had just given him money.
Ms. Brewer testified Mr. Scott could have aided in the necessity
defense, but he also could have made it worse. Mr. Scott also had
several prior felony convictions.

Defendant testified as follows. Mr. Scott told Defendant that his
aunt said she fabricated the story and that she pulled the gun on
Defendant. Mr. Scott told Defendant his aunt did Defendant
wrong and said he would testify on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant
does not recall having a conversation with Ms. Brewer regarding
the substance of Mr. Scott’s deposition, and when he asked Ms.
Brewer if Mr. Scott would be called as a witness she told Defendant
his testimony was hearsay. On cross-examination, Defendant
acknowledged that he has taken a lot of action on his own in this
case, had disputes with his attorneys regarding things being done
or not being done, and did not hesitate to bring issues to the Court’s
attention or ask to represent himself.

Initially, the Court finds Mr. Scott was deposed. Though Ms.
Brewer did not ask Mr. Scott any questions during the deposition,
Ms. Brewer had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Scott prior to
the deposition and to hear Mr. Scott’s answers to the State’s
deposition questions. As such, Defendant is not entitled to relief on
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to depose Mr. Scott.

As to Defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
call Mr. Scott as a witness at trial, the Court also finds Defendant
is not entitled to relief on this claim. Contrary to Defendant’s
assertion, Ms. Brewer had no indication that Mr. Scott would
testify his aunt fabricated the events that occurred. Instead, Ms.
Brewer testified she would have been concerned calling Mr. Scott
as a witness because he was very close to his aunt. Ms. Brewer
testified her overwhelming feeling after the deposition was that
Mr. Scott would not be a good defense witness because he was
going to stick with his family. She did not think Mr. Scott would
ever say his aunt was fabricating because of how much he said he
would stand by his family and loved his aunt. She indicated he
might have aided in a necessity defense, but he also might have
made it worse.

Considering Ms. Brewer’s testimony, the Court finds Ms. Brewer’s
reasons for not calling Mr. Scott constituted sound trial strategy,
and therefore, Ms. Brewer was not ineffective for failing to call Mr.
Scott as a witness. See Souffrant v. State, 994 So. 2d 407, 410−11
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Strategic decisions do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable
under the norms of professional conduct.”).

Even if Ms. Brewer was found deficient for not calling Mr. Scott as
a witness, Defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by such
failure. While Ms. Brewer thinks Mr. Scott was talking about the
same firearm that was the subject of the charges against
Defendant, she could not say with certainty that he was talking
about the same incident. Ms. Brewer testified that the only
information Mr. Scott had was what his aunt told him, and that
was that his aunt and Defendant argued over a letter, his aunt
pulled a gun, and Defendant took the gun from her. There were no
specific facts to show Mr. Scott was talking about the crimes
charged in this case. Additionally, if Defendant wanted to present
Mr. Scott’s testimony to show the victim was lying and Defendant’s
version of events was actually what occurred, Mr. Scott’s testimony
would not have helped Defendant. Defendant’s version of events
differed from Mr. Scott’s aunt’s alleged version of events. At trial,
Defendant testified that he and the victim were arguing about
money and the argument started at the victim’s house; whereas,
Ms. Brewer testified Mr. Scott said Defendant and the victim were
arguing over a letter. (Ex. J at 490−91.) Further, Mr. Scott had no
specific facts regarding when and where the victim allegedly pulled
the gun on Defendant and where Defendant took the gun. Based
on the foregoing, the Court finds there is not a reasonable
probability the outcome of the trial would have been different if
Mr. Scott was called as a witness at trial.

The Court also finds Defendant’s testimony is not credible. Based
on Defendant’s assertiveness in this case, it is difficult to believe
that if Defendant thought Mr. Scott should be called as a witness
at trial he would have allowed the opportunity to call Mr. Scott to
pass without raising the issue before the Court.

Based on the foregoing, Ground Nine is denied.

Response Ex. 19 at 178−81. On November 23, 2020, the First DCA per curiam
affirmed without opinion the trial court’s order, and on December 14, 2020, it
issued the mandate. Response Ex. 28 at 2−3.
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of
the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the
evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The trial court relied on its
observance of the witnesses during their testimony to weigh their credibility
and found counsel’s testimony to be more credible. The trial court was able to

view the demeanor of the respective witnesses during the evidentiary hearing.
The state court’s credibility determinations are entitled to heightened
deference. Gore v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“A certain amount of deference is always given to a trial court’s credibility

determinations. That the case is before us on habeas review heightens that
deference.”).
Also, trial counsel’s decision on whether to call a witness is the “epitome”
of a strategic decision. Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 956

(11th Cir. 2016) (“Which witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the
epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second
guess.”). Trial counsel testified that she chose not to use Scott as a defense
witness because there was no indication that Scott would testify that the victim

fabricated the allegations against Knight. Indeed, Scott was not present during
the alleged offense and had no first-hand knowledge of what occurred. Scott
was also related to the victim and borrowed money from her, and trial counsel
questioned whether the familial relationship would impact his ability to testify

in Knight’s favor. Scott also had a felony record, which could impact the jury’s
view of his credibility. The Court finds reasonable trial counsel’s strategic
decision to forgo presenting Scott as a witness. Thus, relief on Ground Two is
due to be denied.

C. Ground Three

As Ground Three, Knight contends he was denied effective assistance of
counsel based on the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors. Second Amended
Petition at 11. He maintains the errors raised in his Second Amended Petition,
even if individually harmless, when taken together were so egregious as to
deny his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment. Id.
Knight maintains that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness deprived him of a fair trial. Petition at 11. He raised this claim

in his Rule 3.850 motion. Response Ex. 22 at 126. In addressing this issue, the
trial court ruled as follows:
Defendant claims counsel’s acts and omissions, when considered
cumulatively, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Based
on the reasoning stated for denying the other claims addressed in
this Order, the Court finds Defendant’s claim of cumulative error
must also be denied. See Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla.
2005) (“[W]here the individual claims of error alleged are either
procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative
error also necessarily fails.”). Accordingly, Ground Thirteen is
denied.

Response Ex. 19 at 183−84. On November 23, 2020, the First DCA per curiam
affirmed without opinion the trial court’s order, and on December 14, 2020, it
issued the mandate. Response Ex. 28 at 2−3. To the extent that the First DCA
affirmed the trial court’s denial on the merits, the Court will address the claim
in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of state
court adjudications.
The Eleventh Circuit addresses “claims of cumulative error by first
considering the validity of each claim individually, and then examining any
errors that [it] find[s] in the aggregate and in light of the trial as a whole to
determine whether the appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.”
Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012). Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that where there is no individual merit to
individual claims, the argument that cumulative error requires reversal is
baseless. United States v. Taylor, 417 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005); see

also United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 852 (11th Cir. 1984). Here, because the Court
has determined that none of Knight’s individual claims of error or prejudice
have merit, Knight’s cumulative error claim cannot stand. See Taylor, 417 F.3d

at 1182 (“There being no error in any of the district court’s rulings, the
argument that cumulative trial error requires that this Court reverse [the
defendant’s] convictions is without merit.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly

established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Knight’s claim of cumulative error is due to be denied.

VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

If Knight seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the undersigned
opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The Court should
issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make
this substantial showing, Knight “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 335−36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4
(1983)).

Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on
the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.
See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has rejected a

claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon

consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Second Amended Petition (Doc. 14) is DENIED, and this
action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Second
Amended Petition and dismissing this case with prejudice.
3. If Knight appeals the denial of the Second Amended Petition, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined
that a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate
from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper
that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the
motion.
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of
August 2024.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Antonio Wade Knight # 296322
Counsel of record

28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642717. Public record. Not legal advice.