# Bald Guy C-Store, Inc. v. United States

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 16, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642376

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 16, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642376

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[t]his burden remains with the aggrieved store throughout the trial de novo in the district court.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
BALD GUY C-STORE, INC. and
HUSSEIN ABDALLAH,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No: 6:22-cv-977-PGB-DCI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant United States of
America’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31 (the
“Motion”)). Plaintiffs Bald Guy C-Store, Inc., and Hussein Abdallah (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) have responded in opposition (Doc. 35 (the “Response”)), and
Defendant has replied to the Response (Doc. 36). Upon consideration, the
Motion is due to be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Bald Guy C-Store, Inc. (“BGCS”) is a convenience store that

carries both food and nonfood items. (Doc. 30, ¶¶ 9, 14). Plaintiff Hussein
Abdallah (“Mr. Abdallah”) is BGCS’ corporate officer. (Id. ¶ 9). In this action,
Plaintiffs seek judicial review of an administrative decision to permanently
disqualify BGCS from participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036, formerly known as the Food Stamp
Program.1 (Doc. 30, ¶ 1; see generally Doc. 1).
SNAP is operated by the United States Department of Agriculture

(“USDA”), through the Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”), for the purpose of
“raising the level of nutrition among low-income households.” (Doc. 30, ¶¶ 1–2
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2011)). SNAP benefits are often transferred to qualifying
households using plastic Electronic Benefit Transfer (“EBT”) cards, which
function like debit cards. (Id. ¶ 5 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 271.2)). Such households can

use SNAP benefits to purchase specified food items at stores that are approved to
participate in SNAP. (Id. ¶ 3 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2011)). However, SNAP benefits
cannot be used to purchase ineligible items, such as alcohol, soap, or spoons. (See
id. ¶ 14). Further, SNAP benefits cannot be exchanged for cash. (Id. ¶ 8 (citing 7
C.F.R. § 271.2)). The exchange of SNAP benefits for cash is known as
“trafficking.” 7 C.F.R. § 271.2.

The SNAP regulations state that FNS “shall” permanently disqualify a store
from participation in the program if it determines that an employee of the store
has engaged in trafficking. 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(e). However, FNS may impose a civil
money penalty (“CMP”) in lieu of permanent disqualification under certain
circumstances. See § 278.6(i). Before making its final determination that a store

has engaged in trafficking, FNS must send a “charge letter” to the store
“specify[ing] the violations or actions which FNS believes constitute a basis” for

1 The implementing regulations for SNAP, as found in the Code of Federal Regulations, are
cited infra where relevant.
permanent disqualification or the imposition of a CMP. § 278.6(b)(1). The store
has ten (10) days from the date that it receives the charge letter to:
(1) respond to the charges by “set[ting] forth a statement of evidence,

information, or explanation” for the alleged violations; and
(2) request consideration for a CMP in lieu of permanent
disqualification and submit “documentation and evidence of its
eligibility” in support of this request.
§ 278.6(b). Importantly, the SNAP regulations state that a store that does not

timely request consideration for a CMP “shall not be eligible” for a CMP. §
278.6(b)(2)(iii).
Shortly after opening its doors in 2014, BGCS was approved to participate
in SNAP. (Doc. 30, ¶ 10). When applying to participate in SNAP, Plaintiffs agreed
(1) to ensure BGCS’ employees were trained using SNAP’s training materials, (2)
to ensure BGCS’ employees followed SNAP’s regulations, and (3) to accept

responsibility for violations of SNAP’s regulations by any of BGCS’ employees.
(Id. ¶¶ 11, 13). In applying for participation in SNAP, Plaintiffs also acknowledged
that violations of the SNAP regulations could result in administrative actions,
including disqualification from SNAP. (Id. ¶ 12).
In November and December of 2018, FNS conducted an undercover

investigation of BGCS to assess its compliance with SNAP regulations (the
“investigation”). (See id. ¶ 14). During the investigation, undercover
investigators (“UI”) for FNS visited BGCS seven (7) times. (Id.). According to the
UI, on three (3) of these visits, BGCS did not violate any SNAP regulations. (Id.).
However, on three (3) of these visits, BGCS exchanged SNAP benefits for
ineligible, nonfood items and on one (1) of these visits, BGCS exchanged twenty

dollars ($20.00) in SNAP benefits for ten dollars ($10.00) cash. (Id.; Doc. 30-1,
p. 90).
These findings were memorialized in a sworn report regarding the
investigation (Doc. 30-1, pp. 90–104 (the “Sworn Investigation Report”)).
(Doc. 30, ¶ 14). The Sworn Investigation Report included details such as: the

dates of the transactions at issue; physical descriptions of the BGCS clerks who
completed the transactions; the amount of the EBT benefits issued, used, and
returned to the UI; an itemized list of each item the UI attempted to purchase
along with an indication of whether it was eligible for SNAP and whether the
clerk refused to exchange SNAP benefits for the item; and, finally, a brief
synopsis summarizing each of the individual transactions. (Doc. 30-1, pp. 90–

104).
FNS subsequently sent BGCS a charge letter dated February 25, 2019
describing its findings from the investigation (Id., pp. 105–07 (the “BGCS
Charge Letter”)). (Doc. 30, ¶ 15). The BGCS Charge Letter enclosed a copy of
the Sworn Investigation Report. (Id.). Therein, the identities of the UI who

engaged in the subject transactions were redacted. (Id.; see Doc. 30-1, pp. 90–
104). The BGCS Charge Letter noted that the sanction for trafficking is
permanent disqualification and provided information about how BGCS could
request a CMP in lieu of this penalty. (Doc. 30, ¶¶ 16–18). The BGCS Charge
Letter also invited Plaintiffs to respond to the charges and, if applicable, to
provide information demonstrating BGCS’ eligibility for a CMP within ten (10)

calendar days of receiving the letter. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs received the BGCS
Charge Letter on February 26, 2019. (Id. ¶ 15). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ response
to the charges and request for consideration for a CMP were due on or before
March 8, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19).
On March 7, 2019, Mr. Abdallah called FNS2, who advised him that

Plaintiffs’ response to the BGCS Charge Letter was due the following day. (Id. ¶
19). An attorney who represented Plaintiffs at that time also sent a letter dated
March 7, 2019 to FNS. (Id.; Doc. 35, p. 3). In this letter, Plaintiffs’ former counsel
requested an extension of time for responding to the charges, expressly
conceding, “[w]e are aware that doing so will forfeit our right to request the
issuance of a civil money penalty in lieu of other sanctions.” (Doc. 30, ¶ 19). FNS

responded in a letter dated March 8, 2019 (“FNS’ Response Letter”). (Id.).
Therein, FNS granted Plaintiffs an extension for responding to the charges but
reiterated that the time for requesting a CMP “could not be extended[.]” (Id.).
Plaintiffs received FNS’ Response Letter on March 12, 2019. (Id.). That
same day, Plaintiffs filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request as to

this matter, which placed the administrative review in abeyance until the FOIA
process was completed nearly two (2) years later, in February 2021. (Id.).

2 A person identified by the parties as Mr. Abdallah’s “insurance agent/accountant” was also
on this call. (Doc. 30, ¶ 19).
On February 22, 2021, Plaintiffs replied to the BGCS Charge Letter (Doc.
30-1, pp. 172–76 (the “Reply to the Charges”)) and denied the allegations,
arguing that FNS lacked sufficient evidence to support the charges. (Doc. 30, ¶

20). Therein, Plaintiffs argued the evidence consisted of “he-said, she-said”
allegations that could not satisfy “the [USDA]’s burden of proof at this stage of
the proceedings.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 175). In the same vein, Plaintiffs argued that the
statements in the Sworn Investigation Report were “hearsay” and stated that the
redactions in the Sworn Investigation Report meant there was “no reasonable

opportunity for Mr. Abdallah to subpoena or otherwise depose the witness[.]”
(Id. at pp. 175–76).
On July 26, 2021, FNS sent Plaintiffs a letter stating that FNS had
considered Plaintiffs’ Reply to the Charges, but that it had determined that the
alleged violations occurred. (Doc. 30, ¶ 21; Doc. 30-1, pp. 203–04). Accordingly,
FNS informed Plaintiffs that BGCS would be permanently disqualified from

participating in SNAP upon receiving the letter (the “Disqualification
Decision”). (Doc. 30, ¶ 21).
Plaintiffs requested an administrative review of the Disqualification
Decision and submitted a legal brief in support of their argument that the
Disqualification Decision should be overturned. (Id. ¶ 22). Therein, Plaintiffs

raised the same general arguments they had presented in their Reply to the
Charges. (See Doc. 30-1, pp. 216–23). On May 2, 2022, the Administrative
Review Board issued its decision affirming FNS’ Disqualification Decision,
finding there was sufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs’ disqualification from
SNAP (the “Final Agency Decision”). (Doc. 30, ¶ 23). Plaintiffs’ appeal of the
Final Agency Decision to this Court followed. (Doc. 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Review of Final Agency Decision
Under 7 U.S.C. § 2023, an aggrieved food store may appeal a final agency
decision disqualifying it from SNAP by filing a complaint in the appropriate
district court. § 2023(a)(13). Further, the suit in the district court “shall be a trial

de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity of the
questioned administrative action.” § 2023(a)(15).
Importantly, in the trial, the administrative agency’s decision below carries
a “presumption of validity.” Redmond v. United States, 507 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975).3 Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the burden shifts to the
aggrieved store to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

disqualification decision was invalid. Id. at 1011–12 (“[T]he Act casts the burden
of being the plaintiff on the aggrieved store with all of the usual responsibilities of
a plaintiff in obtaining relief from a court, including the burden of proving facts
to show that he is entitled to relief. In other words, the agency action stands,
unless the plaintiff proves that it should be set aside.”); Goodman v. United

3 The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
States, 518 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “[t]his burden remains
with the aggrieved store throughout the trial de novo in the district court.”).
Accordingly, in the trial, “[t]he burden is placed upon the store owner to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the violations did not occur.” Kim
v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1997); accord Odeh v. Conrad, No.
96-1156-CIV-T-17C, 1996 WL 378931, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 1996) (“At trial,
the plaintiff/aggrieved food store bears the burden of proof to show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the alleged ‘trafficking’ did not occur.”) (citing

Holmes v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (M.D. Ala. 1994), aff’d, 67 F.3d
314 (11th Cir. 1995) (Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions)). In
attempting to meet this burden, the aggrieved store is permitted to present new
evidence that is not contained within the administrative record. Redmond, 507
F.2d at 1012 (“By according the administrative action in question a presumption
of validity, the statute recognizes the initial investigation and determination of

the agency. By providing the aggrieved food store with a new trial where the store
may introduce evidence outside the administrative record, the statute also
protects the rights and interests of the store against final adverse action without
the opportunity for an adversary hearing.”).
If the Court determines that a store has engaged in “trafficking,” it then

reviews the sanction that was applied by the agency under an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard. Odeh, 1996 WL 378931, at *2; Yousef v. United States, 647
F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Fla. 1986). The agency’s decision to permanently
disqualify a store from participation in SNAP is arbitrary and capricious “only ‘if
it is unwarranted in law or without justification in fact.’” Odeh, 1996 WL 378931,
at *2 (quoting Yousef, 647 F. Supp. at 131).

Finally, “[d]espite the trial de novo provision, it is clear that summary
judgment is a proper means for disposing of requests for review under section
2022 [now § 2023] where there are presented no genuine issues of material fact.”
Yousef, 647 F. Supp. at 131 (quoting Modica v. United States, 518 F.2d 374, 376
(5th Cir. 1975) (additional internal citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).
B. Summary Judgment
A court may only “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
initial burden of “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” to support its position that it is entitled to summary judgment. FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must
go beyond the pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
“The court need consider only the cited materials” when resolving a motion for
summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3); see also HRCC, LTD v. Hard Rock
Café Int’l (USA), Inc., 703 F. App’x 814, 816–17 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(holding that a district court does not err by limiting its review to the evidence
cited by the parties in their summary judgment briefs).4

An issue of fact is “genuine” only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the
Court must read the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve any reasonable

doubts in the non-movant’s favor. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136
(11th Cir. 2007). But, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing
party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury
could reasonably find for that party.” Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty.,
446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573,
1577 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden
under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
III. DISCUSSION
In the Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden

of establishing that trafficking did not occur. (Doc. 31, p. 2). More particularly,

4 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their
legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th
Cir. 2007).
Defendant contends that the investigative findings regarding BGCS’ SNAP
violations are undisputed, as “Plaintiffs cannot and have not provided any
evidence to contradict the information contained within the investigative report.”

(Id. at pp. 12–13). Defendant further asserts that “Plaintiffs’ evidence consists
entirely of conclusory allegations and denials.” (Id. at p. 13). Because Plaintiffs
have failed to provide facts contradicting Defendant’s evidence of trafficking,
Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.
(Id. at pp. 11–14).

In their Response, Plaintiffs assert that they have consistently disputed
that the trafficking occurred, and that Defendant’s representation that this fact is
“undisputed” is thus inaccurate. (Doc. 35, p. 8). Plaintiffs further argue that the
following issues of material fact should prevent the entry of summary judgment
here, and attach the affidavit of Mr. Abdallah as evidentiary support:
(1) It “may very well have been Mr. Abdallah that was present at the

sales counter” during the alleged violations. (Id. at p. 9). “Mr.
Abdallah certainly did not allow any improper purchases to be made
and he certainly would not” exchange cash for SNAP benefits. (Id.).
(2) Once Plaintiffs learned of the results of the investigation, they
incorporated a new system at BGCS to prevent future violations,

showing their commitment to compliance with SNAP’s rules. (Id.).
(3) During the investigation, Mr. Abdallah was “generally at the Store
during most all hours of operation and he does not recall” any SNAP
violations occurring. (Id. at p. 8).

(4) The investigation showed that at least some clerks “refused to engage
in trafficking SNAP benefits.” (Id. at p. 9).
(5) The descriptions of the BGCS clerks who violated SNAP’s regulations
(the “relevant clerks”) that are contained within the Sworn
Investigation Report are “neither descriptive nor clear.” (Id. at p. 8).

Here, Defendant has properly supported its Motion. (See Doc. 31); Porter,
461 F.3d at 1320. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs, who “must go beyond the
pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exists” to prevent the entry of summary judgment against them. See
Porter, 461 F.3d at 1320. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Response does
not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. (See Doc. 35).

First, Plaintiffs’ bald statement that they dispute that the trafficking
occurred is a conclusory assertion that does not move the needle for Plaintiffs.
(Doc. 35, p. 8); see Yousef, 647 F. Supp. at 132. Further, even if true, the facts that
Mr. Abdallah did not personally violate SNAP and that Plaintiffs incorporated a
new system to prevent SNAP violations after the investigation also do not raise

genuine issues of material fact. (See Doc. 35, p. 9). The Eleventh Circuit has
confirmed that innocent storeowners are strictly liable for SNAP violations by
their store clerks. TRM, INC. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 944–48 (11th Cir.
1995). This is true even in cases where, upon learning of the SNAP violations, the
storeowners take subsequent action to prevent future violations. Id.5 Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ actions after the alleged violations occurred are simply not relevant

here. See id.
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Abdallah “does not recall” witnessing any
SNAP violations, despite his general presence at the store for most of its hours of
operation, does not create a “genuine” issue for trial. (See Doc. 35, p. 8). Neither
does the fact that some of BGCS’ clerks—who are not accused of the violations at

issue—declined to violate SNAP. (See id. at p. 9). Despite speculating that Mr.
Abdallah could conceivably have been at the sales counter when the alleged
violations occurred, Plaintiffs do not provide any demonstrable evidence of this
fact. (See id.). Indeed, Plaintiffs fall short of confirming that Mr. Abdallah was
anywhere on the premises at the time of the violations. (See id. at pp. 8–9).
Likewise, the fact that some clerks declined to violate SNAP provides little to no

evidentiary support for the claim that other clerks acted similarly. Thus, in the
absence of additional evidence, these facts do little more than raise a
metaphysical doubt about whether the alleged violations occurred, and they
therefore fail to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.

5 The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in TRM also resolves Plaintiffs’ claim in the Complaint that
the administrative review procedures below deprived Plaintiffs of due process. See 52 F.3d at
943–47; (Doc. 1, ¶ 28). The TRM court held that, even assuming the administrative review
process fails to sufficiently safeguard the aggrieved store’s due process rights, the
opportunity for a trial de novo in the district court where the aggrieved store may introduce
evidence outside of the administrative record adequately protects these rights. 52 F.3d at
944 (collecting sources).
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the descriptions provided in the Sworn
Investigation Report of the relevant clerks are “neither descriptive nor clear,” and
claim, without providing further explanation or argument, that this raises a

genuine issue of material fact. (Doc. 35, p. 8). To begin, the descriptions appear
to the Court to be reasonably specific. The Sworn Investigation Report identifies
two (2) of BGCS’ clerks as having violated SNAP on a total of four (4) occasions.
(Doc. 30-1, pp. 94, 96, 102, 104). Therein, the following descriptive information is
provided:

(1) November 29, 2018 violation: committed by a male clerk
between 40 and 45 years old, between 5’8” and 5’11” tall, weighing
180 to 190 pounds, with black hair and a light beard. (Id. at p. 94).
(2) December 1, 2018 violation: committed by a male clerk between
35 and 40 years old, between 5’8” and 5’11” tall, weighing 140 to 150
pounds, who was bald (the “December 1 violator”). (Id. at p. 96).

(3) December 15, 2018, first violation: committed by a clerk
described in the same manner as the December 1 violator and is
identified as being the same clerk as the December 1 violator. (Id. at
p. 102).
(4) December 15, 2018, second violation: committed by a clerk

described in the same manner as the December 1 violator and is
identified as being the same clerk as the December 1 violator. (Id. at
p. 104).
Accordingly, there are two relevant clerks: an average-sized bearded male with
black hair and a slightly younger and slimmer bald male. (See id. at pp. 94, 96,
102, 104).

The administrative record reveals BGCS to be a modest convenience store,
similar in size and layout to the convenience stores familiarly associated with gas
stations. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 48, 58, 67, 73). Moreover, BGCS looks to contain a
single checkout counter. (Id. at p. 48). Under the circumstances, ascertaining the
identities of the relevant clerks, who were behind the checkout counter on

specified dates, would appear to be a simple task for Plaintiffs.
Notably, in their Response, Plaintiffs do not argue that they were unable to
identify the relevant clerks by the descriptions provided in the Sworn
Investigation Report. (See Doc. 35). Similarly, Plaintiffs do not attempt to
demonstrate that those descriptions provide affirmative evidence that Plaintiffs
are innocent of the charges. (See id.). For example, Plaintiffs do not assert that

they did not employ a bearded or bald clerk during the relevant times or claim
that it was a female clerk behind the counter on the dates at issue. (See id.).
The implied argument, then, is that the purported lack of specificity in the
descriptions demonstrates that Defendant has insufficient evidence to prove that
the violations occurred. (See id.). This argument gestures at the heart of the claim

raised in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, wherein Plaintiffs cite to purported deficiencies in
Defendant’s evidence in support of their appeal. (See generally Doc. 1). However,
this argument ignores that the burden of proof in the district court has shifted to
Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Redmond, 507 F.2d at 1012. Accordingly, to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, Plaintiffs must provide at least a
modicum of evidentiary support for the notion that the alleged trafficking did not

occur. See, e.g., id.; Kim, 121 F.3d at 1272; Holmes, 868 F. Supp. at 1351.
While attacking the agency’s evidence can be one weapon in the plaintiff’s
armamentarium, it must also be paired with affirmative evidence tending to
suggest that the plaintiff’s version of the facts is true. Compare Odeh, 1996 WL
378931, at *3 (finding an aggrieved store had a low likelihood of success in the

appeal where its case was premised upon inconsistencies within the investigative
report, and reasoning that the aggrieved store “could not plausibly convince the
[c]ourt that mere discrepancies in [the agency’s] evidence would satisfy her
burden at trial.”) with Lazaro v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 186 F. Supp. 1216–
17 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding an aggrieved store had a high likelihood of success in
the appeal where it not only raised substantial concerns regarding the agency’s

evidence, but also presented affirmative evidence tending to prove that the
aggrieved store was innocent of the charges).
In their Response, Plaintiffs fail to put forth any evidence to support their
burden of proving that the trafficking did not occur. (See Doc. 35). Plaintiffs’
trade-off for bearing the burden of proof in the district court is their ability to

present evidence that lies outside of the administrative record. See Redmond, 507
F.2d at 1012. Yet, critically, Defendant’s Motion discloses that, “beyond
requesting the administrative record in this litigation, Plaintiffs have engaged in
no other discovery efforts.” (Doc. 31, p. 13 n.1).6 This representation is untouched
by Plaintiffs’ Response. (See Doc. 35). It is also bolstered by the absence of
motions to compel or similar evidence of discovery battles on the Court’s docket,

as well as Plaintiffs’ failure to cite to any evidence outside of the administrative
record in its Response to the Motion. (See id.). Consequently, Plaintiffs have not
only failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the trafficking
occurred, but it appears that they have failed to even attempt to ascertain such a
fact. As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Lastly, it is beyond dispute that permanent disqualification was the
appropriate sanction. The former counsel for Plaintiffs acknowledged, in writing,
Plaintiffs’ waiver of the right to a CMP when he requested an extension of time
for responding to the underlying charges. (Doc. 30, ¶ 19). As a result, Plaintiffs
are not eligible to avoid permanent disqualification as a penalty. See 7 C.F.R. §
278.6(b)(2)(iii). Thus, under the circumstances, the Court cannot find that the

imposition of the required penalty by FNS was arbitrary and capricious. See
Odeh, 1996 WL 378931, at *2; Yousef, 647 F. Supp. at 131.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is

GRANTED.

6 The discovery deadline in this case expired on December 4, 2023. (See Doc. 20, pp. 1–2).
2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant United States of America and against Plaintiffs Bald Guy
C-Store, Inc., and Hussein Abdallah.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on July 16, 2024.

<.
PAUL G.
UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642376. Public record. Not legal advice.