# Art Rojas v. City of Ocala, Florida

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642231

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642231

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding sheriff’s invitation to religious group to speak at mandatory employee meetings gave appearance of state endorsement of religion in violation of Establishment Clause

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

ART ROJAS and LUCINDA HALE,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 5:14-cv-651-TJC-PRL
v.

CITY OF OCALA,

Defendant.

ORDER
I. PROLOGUE
This is a case about whether the City of Ocala violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment in the way it conducted a prayer vigil in the
town square. In 2018, the Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, who are atheists.
Rojas v. City of Ocala, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2018). The Court’s
opinion and the parties’ briefs all relied on the Lemon test (adopted in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)) which was abrogated by Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507 (2022), while the appeal of the Court’s
decision was pending. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded
with instructions to apply the “historical practices and understandings”
standard articulated in Kennedy. Rojas v. City of Ocala, 40 F.4th 1347, 1352
(11th Cir. 2022). In the meantime, the Chief of Police, Greg Graham, passed
away; the Mayor of Ocala at the time left office; and the Prayer Vigil (which
occurred in 2014) has not been repeated. Thus, the Court inquired whether it
would make sense to call it a day on this timeworn litigation. But the parties,

both represented by lawyers who specialize in First Amendment religion cases,
insist on going forward. And, as the Court previously awarded nominal
damages, the case is not moot. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796
(2021).1 So on we go.

The parties have now filed new briefs on cross-motions for summary
judgment, Docs. 145–48, and the Court held oral argument on February 9, 2024,
Doc. 154, the record of which is incorporated by reference.
This opinion is the Court’s effort to address the impact of Kennedy on this

case. Parts of this opinion repeat or resemble portions of the Court’s prior
opinion, but there are also revisions reflecting further briefing, argument, and
legal developments.2

1 There is also no indication in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that it
viewed the case as moot.
2 The only remaining defendant is the City of Ocala. Rojas v. City of
Ocala, 40 F.4th 1347, 1349 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022). In earlier briefings, the City
contended summary judgment was proper because there was no basis to find
municipal liability. Doc. 52 at 24–27. This argument was addressed in the
Court’s prior opinion, has not been raised again, and is therefore not addressed
here. Similarly, there is no discussion here about punitive damages because
those claims have been dropped/abandoned.
2
II. INTRODUCTION
When the City of Ocala experienced a violent crime-spree in the late

summer and early fall of 2014, its police department sought to curtail the
violence using all available means. As part of those efforts, Chief of Police
Kenneth Gregory “Greg” Graham met with members of Ocala’s faith-based
community to seek their assistance. What resulted was an invitation from Chief

Graham to the community, promoted on the Ocala Police Department Facebook
page and elsewhere, encouraging everyone’s attendance at a “Community
Prayer Vigil” on September 24, 2014, in the Downtown Square. Several
atheists, including Plaintiff Lucinda Hale, contacted Chief Graham and Ocala’s

then-mayor, Reuben “Kent” Guinn, in advance of the Prayer Vigil, advising
them of their concern that the City’s promotion and sponsorship of a prayer vigil
would violate the First Amendment. They were rebuffed, the Prayer Vigil took
place, and this lawsuit followed.

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS
In September 2014, the Ocala Police Department pursued various means
to try to apprehend individuals responsible for a shooting spree that left several
children injured. Graham Dec. I3 ¶¶ 5–6 (Doc. 52-1). The police knew who the

3 As used herein, “Dec.” is a citation to a declaration (Graham prepared
two declarations, denoted here as “Dec. I” and “Dec. II”), “Depo.” is a citation to
a deposition, with citation to a page in a deposition transcript (using the Page
3
shooters were but could not persuade witnesses to come forward to testify.
Graham Depo. at 21 (Doc. 54-10). These efforts included meeting with local

NAACP leaders, who suggested to Chief Graham that the police reach out to
the local faith-based community for help in convincing witnesses to cooperate.
Graham Dec. I ¶ 7 (Doc. 52-1). Heeding that suggestion, Chief Graham held a
meeting at the Ocala Police Department on September 17, 2014, and invited:

Captain Richard Edwards, the District Commander of the area where most of
the trouble was occurring; Officer Mary Williams, who assisted Captain
Edwards with community events in the area; Captain Carmen Sirolli, who was
in charge of the division investigating the shootings; Major Dennis Yonce, to

whom Sirolli reported; Hugh Brockington, an Ocala Police Department
Chaplain; Edwin Quintana, another Ocala Police Department Chaplain; and
Narvella Haynes, a community activist who lived in the area where the crimes
occurred and who had previously assisted the police with community outreach.

Graham Depo. at 19−21 (Doc. 54-10). Chaplains Brockington and Quintana
were invited because they were police chaplains. See id. at 20.

ID from the CM/ECF header; some of the transcripts are missing pages so the
court reporter’s page number and the CM/ECF header page are not always
aligned); “Aff.” is a citation to an affidavit; “Int. Resp.” is a citation to an
Interrogatory Response.
4
The purpose of the meeting was to develop ideas about how “to get the
ministers in that area to lean on, talk to, encourage witnesses to come forward”

so the police could hold the perpetrators accountable. Graham Depo. at 21 (Doc.
54-10). Chaplain Quintana suggested that a prayer vigil or similar event on
Ocala’s public Downtown Square might bring the faith-based community
together to get the word out and encourage people to cooperate. Graham Dec. I

¶¶ 10–11 (Doc. 52-1); Graham Depo. at 23 (Doc. 54-10). Chief Graham “thought
it was a great idea” and said, “Let’s do it.” Graham Depo. at 23 (Doc. 54-10).
Chief Graham then left the meeting, and Chaplain Quintana and Ms. Haynes
(with some assistance from Captain Edwards) began planning the vigil,

creating a letter for Chief Graham’s and Ms. Haynes’ signatures that invited
the community to participate in the Prayer Vigil.4 Graham Dec. I ¶¶ 10–11

4 On September 18 (the day after the meeting), Chief Graham sent an
email to Captain Edwards and Quintana (but not Haynes) saying that due to
feedback from ministers, Wednesday was not the best night for the Vigil, “[w]e
are going to have the vigil on Thursday night instead of Wednesday.” Doc. 54-
21 (marked Ex. 5). By September 19, the Police Department was preparing for
the vigil to occur on Wednesday, September 24. See Doc. 54-24 (marked Ex. 8)
(9/19/2014 email from Ocala Police Department employee announcing the
Prayer Vigil for September 24). Although Chief Graham and Chaplain
Quintana signed declarations stating the Prayer Vigil occurred on September
25 (see Graham Dec. I ¶ 22 (Doc. 52-1); Quintana Dec. ¶ 9 (Doc. 52-3)), it appears
they were simply mistaken. Contemporaneous news stories, emails, and social
media postings in the record confirm the Prayer Vigil took place on Wednesday,
September 24, 2014. See, e.g., Doc. 54-19 at Page ID 1389 (marked Ex. 3)
(9/24/2014 social media posting with photos of the vigil); Doc. 54-72 at Page ID
1613, 1617 (marked Ex. 56) (9/24/2014 emails from reporters to the Ocala Police
5
(Doc. 52-1); Haynes Dec. ¶¶ 7, 9 (Doc. 52-2); Quintana Dec. ¶¶ 5−6 (Doc. 52-3).
Chief Graham read the letter and directed an Ocala Police Department

Sergeant to post it on the Ocala Police Department’s Facebook page; Ms.
Haynes and the Chaplains encouraged members of the community to attend the
Prayer Vigil. Graham Dec. I ¶ 11 (Doc. 52-1); Graham Depo. at 31, 58 (Doc. 54-
10); Graham’s Int. Resp. Nos. 1−2 (Doc. 54-6); Haynes Dec. ¶ 8 (Doc. 52-2),

Quintana Dec. ¶ 7 (Doc. 52-3). Chief Graham agreed that by posting the letter
on the Ocala Police Department Facebook page, he was “promoting” the Prayer
Vigil. Graham Depo. at 50 (Doc. 54-10).
Printed on Ocala Police Department letterhead (with the image of the

Ocala Police Department badge, OCALA POLICE DEPARTMENT at top, and
Department address and phone number at bottom), the text of the letter read:
Blessings to all our citizens, specifically Pastors, Community
Leaders, Parents and our precious youth.

We are facing a crisis in the City of Ocala and Marion County that
requires fervent prayer and your presence to show unity and help
in this senseless crime spree that is affecting our communities.

Within the last 30 days we have had numerous shootings that have
resulted in two children and an infant being hit by bullets.

Stray bullets do not have respect for addresses, social status,
economic status, educational background, political status and the

Department referencing “tonight’s” Prayer Vigil); Doc. 54-73 at Page ID 1624
(9/24/2014 9:08 p.m. story on Ocala.com about that evening’s Prayer Vigil).
6
list goes on. But my point is none of us are exempt from stray
bullets.

I am urging you all to please support a very important “Community
Prayer Vigil” that will be held this coming Wednesday, September
24, 2014 at 6:30 pm to be held at our Downtown Square located in
the heart of the City.

Please support peace and this appeal for unity on this very
important “Community Prayer Vigil” coming this next Wednesday.
We need you.

The letter was signed with “Blessings and Highest Regards” by Greg
Graham, as Chief of Police, and Ms. Haynes. See Doc. 1, Ex. A. Here is an image
of the letter:

7
□□□
3 J
OCALA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Blessings to all our citizens, specifically Pastors, Community Leaders, Parents and
our precious youth.
We are facing a crisis in the City of Ocala and Marion County that requires fervent
prayer and your presence to show unity and help in this senseless crime spree that is
affecting our communitics.
Within the last 30 days we have had numerous shootings that have resulted in two
children and an infant being hit by bullets.
Stray bullets do not have respect for addresses, social status, economic status,
educational background, political status and the list goes cn. But my point is none of
us are exempt from stray bullets.
I am urging you all to please support a very important “Community Prayer Vigil” that
will be held this coming Wednesday, September 24, 2014 at 6:30 pm to be held at our
Downtown Square located in the heart of the City.
Please support peace and this appeal for unity on this very important “Community
Prayer Vigil” coming this next Wednesday. We need you.
i Highest Regards,
rhe *
Teche ia
of Police

402 S. PINE AVENUE + OCALA, FL 34471-1174 » (352) 369-7000

Ocala Police Department personnel created a separate flyer about the
vigil which depicted a photo of the gazebo covered stage in the Downtown
Square with an image of praying hands in one corner and the Ocala Police
Department logo in the opposite corner, and the words “Community Prayer
Vigil Wednesday, September 24, 2014 6:30 p.m. Ocala/Marion County is in

crisis! Help Stop The Violence! Join us downtown on the square.” Doc. 54-22 at
7 (marked Ex. 6). Chief Graham’s letter and an earlier version of the flyer
(created before the Ocala Police Department logo was added) were sent to Ms.
Haynes by Officer Williams on September 19. Doc. 54-23 (marked Ex. 7).5 Chief
Graham stated he was unaware of the existence of the flyer. Graham Dec. II J
4 (Doc. 68-1).
Here is an image of the flyer:

re oe ys SS
sa Bore a ae we YS

ee A □□ ae, eee ae be Fe = 80 iti
i oe □□ Sm ile
‘ee YA ao” Wednesday, Septemb )! ae ee □
Bae is. a2 Eg? a Wy f been a oo a A
ieee esd ae a ai 7 ee □□
re, ei Te ee ee Ne

a 7 “Ton lo 1 thei Ware
Ps Te oe | ia” 4)
>| ll am a TIM ae Ie
□□ ea mn mT TTT a ‘ Fa fre (cs □

5 It is unclear how the flyer was distributed to the public. See Rojas, 315
F. Supp. 2d at 1266, n.3.

Chaplain Quintana invited several local clergymen to participate in the
vigil and sent an email to the Ocala Police Chaplains (copying Chief Graham)6

telling them Chief Graham had asked Chaplain Quintana to ask all the
Chaplains to be present at the vigil and to come wearing their Police Chaplain
uniforms.7 Quintana Dec. ¶¶ 7, 8 (Doc. 52-3); Doc. 54-26 (marked Ex. 10)
(9/22/2014 email to Chaplains from Chaplain Quintana, copying Graham).

Soon after the vigil was advertised, several citizens, including some of the
original plaintiffs, contacted Chief Graham and Mayor Guinn, expressing
concern that a prayer vigil organized by a police department would violate the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Doc. 52-9 at 3–4 (9/20/2014 6:03 p.m. email); Doc.

54-51 at 2 (marked Ex. 35) (9/22/2014 5:14 p.m. email). Initially, Chief Graham’s
responses tended to take ownership of the Prayer Vigil, saying, for example, “I
have no intention of canceling the event,” Doc. 54-40 at 4 (marked Ex. 24)

6 At his deposition, Chief Graham, appearing on his own behalf and as
the City’s 30(b)(6) representative, testified that he did not recall directing
Quintana to have the Chaplains attend and to do so in uniform and thought it
more likely that he simply agreed to Quintana’s recommendation to do so.
Graham Depo. at 13, 37–38 (Doc. 54-10). The City’s Interrogatory Responses
say the Ocala Police Department did not ask the Ocala Police Chaplains to have
any involvement in the vigil but they did so of their own initiative. City Int.
Resp. No. 8. (Doc. 54-5).
7 Quintana’s declaration states he “asked other police chaplains to attend
the vigil and to wear their uniforms. I let Chief Graham know this was my
intention, but he did not instruct that we be there or that wear our uniforms.”
Doc. 52-3, ¶ 8.
10
(9/22/2014 4:05 p.m. email), and “[t]his ‘vigil’ is not the only strategy that we
[the Police Department] are employing to fight crime in Ocala” and explaining

that the purpose of the vigil was for the Police Department to engage the faith-
based community to help make the community safer. Doc. 52-9 at 3 (9/21/2014
2:43 p.m. email). As Chief Graham responded to one supporter who wrote to
him with the subject line “Stand tall on prayer!”:

Thanks for the encouraging words. I have been getting quite a few
responses from people, mostly from out of our area, who oppose this.
I have no intention on calling this gathering off nor changing my
personal belief on the power of prayer.

Take care and I hope to see you on Wednesday.

Doc. 54-55 (marked Ex. 39) (9/22/2014 3:55 p.m. email).
Soon thereafter, however, Chief Graham began to distance himself and
his Department from the vigil, responding that the vigil was a community event
he could not stop and over which he had no control. For example, on September
23, 2014, he wrote to one citizen with whom he had been corresponding about
the meaning of the Establishment Clause, “I think you are misunderstanding
my role in this event. I am not leading the event, I am not speaking at the event,
I will be in attendance at the event.” Doc. 54-49 at 5 (marked Ex. 33-B)
(9/23/2014 4:07 p.m. email). He further wrote that he knew the minister who
was organizing it and could put the citizen in touch in case he wanted to attend
“and say a few words.” Id. To another citizen, he wrote:
11
I am not sure if I have been clear in any of my prior emails to you
that this event tonight is a “Community Prayer Vigil” not an Ocala
Police Department or City of Ocala Prayer Vigil and as such I have
no say in whether it gets canceled or not. I have indicated to several
others that I have no intent on canceling the event and should have
expanded my thoughts. If I were to try and cancel this event I would
be violating the Constitution by preventing people from gathering
and exercising their right to free speech.

Doc. 54-40 at 6 (marked Ex. 24-C) (9/24/2014 2:48 p.m. email from
Graham); see also Doc. 54-50 (marked Ex. 34) (9/24/2014 1:27 p.m. email from
Graham) (“I am not attacking your rights as an American to freedom of religion,
I am upholding others[’] rights to express themselves . . . this is not a City of
Ocala or Ocala Police Department Prayer Vigil, it is a Community Prayer Vigil
and as such I have no say in canceling the event”).
Although there is no evidence that Mayor Guinn was part of planning the
Prayer Vigil, once he learned about it, he readily embraced it as a government-
sponsored event, responding to a citizen’s complaint about what the citizen
perceived to be the Police Chief’s endorsement of religion: “I think this is great.
I’ll be sure to praise him [Chief Graham] for it.” Doc. 54-49 at 3 (marked Ex. 33)
(9/19/2014 10:55 p.m. email from Mayor Guinn to citizen, copying Chief
Graham). Mayor Guinn wrote to Chief Graham about the Prayer Vigil two days
later, stating: “As I told you I think this is a great idea and have been
responding to the atheist groups that are writing me about it. I put it on my

calendar to be there,” but telling Chief Graham that next time he does “things
12
like that” to let the Mayor know so he doesn’t find out from his “church and . . .
random emails.” Doc. 54-25 at 2 (marked Ex. 9) (9/21/2014 12:33 p.m. email

from Mayor Guinn to Chief Graham). The next day, Mayor Guinn wrote to a
protesting citizen who had urged the Mayor to show leadership in addressing
Chief Graham’s violation of the First Amendment, saying,
I’m proud to stand by my Chief and support him. Times like this do
test leadership and that’s why we’re leading the community in this
Prayer Vigil. Yes we have heard from folks like you who don’t
understand the constitution. We are doing absolutely nothing
wrong.

Doc. 54-51 (marked Ex. 35) (9/22/2014 6:43 p.m. email from Mayor Guinn to
citizen, copying Chief Graham) (emphasis added). Mayor Guinn responded to
another citizen’s concern about the Prayer Vigil:
Thanks for your interest in our community. There is nothing in the
constitution to prohibit us from having this vigil. Not only are we
not canceling it we are trying to promote it and have as many people
as possible to [sic] join us. We open every council meeting with a
prayer. And we end the prayer in Jesus name we pray. Our city seal
says “God be with us” and we pray that he is and us with him.

Doc. 54-44 at 2 (marked Ex. 28-A) (9/22/2014 10:24 a.m. email from Mayor
Guinn to citizen, copying Chief Graham and a pastor and employee of Mayor
Guinn’s church ) (emphasis added); see Guinn Int. Resp. No. 19. (Doc. 54-7).
Even after the vigil, the Mayor continued to applaud the effort, appearing
in media outlets to discuss this lawsuit and the vigil. See Doc. 61-1 (marked Ex.
64) (Fox News Insider article, “It’s Happening to Me in My Community”:
13
Atheists Sue Mayor Over Prayer Vigil, Nov. 29, 2014). And at his June 2016
deposition the Mayor maintained his position, as reflected in the following

testimony:
Q: Can the police chief be allowed to make the public
announcement on [Ocala Police Department] letterhead, stating
that people should believe in God?
A: Yes.

Guinn Depo. at 87 (Doc. 54-11).

Q: [A]s far as you’re concerned, if the police chief wants to
put out something on letterhead saying that you should believe in
God or that you should believe in Jesus, that’s fine?
A: He can do that.

Id. at 90.

Q: So as far as you’re concerned, they [the Ocala Police
Department] could have another vigil such as that one next week if
they wanted to?
A: Sure.
Q: And the chief could post another letter saying that
there is something that requires fervent prayer in the city?
A: Yes.

Id. at 134.8

8 The City has also maintained this position in this case. In response to a
hypothetical of very similar facts at the hearing, including that the Chief of
Police put together a prayer vigil asking the community to come together as one
effort to combat crime, and the Chief’s staff plans the prayer vigil, which
includes uniformed chaplains on stage speaking and/or praying, the City said
this would be permissible and not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Doc.
155 at 31–33.
14
The Prayer Vigil became a matter of public debate in Ocala, with citizenry
voicing opinions both for and against it on social media, in communications to

Chief Graham and Mayor Guinn, and in local news outlets. For example, one
person wrote on the Ocala Police Department’s Facebook page: “why are the
police asking us to pray? will they arrest us if we don’t pray?” Doc. 54-18 at 4
(marked Ex. 2). Plaintiffs contacted counsel for The American Humanist

Association (now representing plaintiffs here) who urged Chief Graham to
remove the Prayer Vigil letter from the Ocala Police Department Facebook page
on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional government endorsement of
religion. Doc. 54-46 at 2 (marked Ex. 30-A) (9/21/2014 10:47 a.m. email from

David Niose to Graham). Chief Graham responded that his efforts were
upholding the rights of others to assemble and that taxpayer funds were used
only to the minimal extent that Chief Graham wrote the letter and printed it
on Department letterhead. Doc. 54-46 at 3 (marked Ex. 30-B) (9/21/2014 10:57

a.m. email from Chief Graham to Niose).
The day before the Prayer Vigil, Captain Edwards sent an email to Chief
Graham, Chaplain Quintana and Ms. Haynes, copying an Ocala Police
Department officer, asking whether they should secure an indoor location as an

alternative in case of rain. Doc. 54-28 at 2 (marked Ex. 12). Chaplain Quintana’s
suggestion was that the vigil should take place on the Square regardless of the
15
weather: “Nothing should stop, hinder or prevent from [sic] fervent prayer,”
proposing they “[k]eep it to 15-20 minutes of PRAYER only.” Id. at 3

(capitalization in original). In response, Captain Edwards stated “[w]e are a few
making a decision for many . . . .” Id.9 Captain Edwards sent an email to an
Ocala Police Department Major on September 23, saying he would be
“mentioning” the Prayer Vigil at an upcoming staff meeting, Doc. 54-29 (marked

Ex. 13), and the following day he emailed an Ocala Police Department Captain
to say he might not make it to a meeting because he was “working on getting
this Prayer Vigil set up.” Doc. 54-30 (marked Ex. 14).

9 The City states
[i]t remains unclear how much of Edwards’ activities, i.e., emailing
with Haynes and Quintana regarding a date for the vigil and
helping coordinate details regarding the vigil were conducted in his
official capacity or individual capacity. Nonetheless, these activities
would have not been out of the ordinary pursuant to Ocala Police
Department’s custom and practice relating to public events held in
the downtown square. It is undisputed that the OPD followed a
nationally recognized method for fighting crime known as
community policing . . . .
Doc. 146 at 2–3, n.2. Captain Edwards’ declaration states he attended meetings
as an Ocala Police Department Captain to address the shooting spree. Doc. 52-
4 ¶4. He understood the Prayer Vigil to be a community event which he
attended as a private citizen. Id. Captain Edwards agreed to help with the
Prayer Vigil by making meeting space available to the organizers. Id. ¶5. He
does not claim this assistance was as a private citizen. See id.
16
The Prayer Vigil took place on September 24, 2014, in the Ocala
Downtown Square, a public space where meetings, rallies, assemblies and other

public and privately sponsored events occur. Graham Dec. I ¶ 22 (Doc. 52-1);
see supra note 4. Chief Graham and Mayor Guinn both attended the Prayer
Vigil, but neither addressed the crowd.10 Graham Int. Resp. No. 1 (Doc. 54-6);
Guinn Int. Resp. No. 15 (Doc. 54-7). Approximately ten people were on the stage

during the Prayer Vigil, including four uniformed Ocala Police Chaplains,
Quintana, Brockington, Gans, and Lenon; one off-duty Ocala Police Department
employee not in uniform, Captain Edwards; and five faith and/or community
leaders. Graham’s Int. Resp. No. 3 (Doc. 54-6). Chief Graham said he did not

know in advance what any speaker planned to say, but his recollection is that
those who did speak either prayed or sang. Graham Dec. I ¶ 16 (Doc. 52-1);
Graham Dec. II ¶ 5 (Doc. 68-1); Graham Depo. at 139–40 (Doc. 54-10). He did
not hear any non-Christians speak at the Prayer Vigil and the crowd appeared

to be predominately Christian. Graham Depo. at 96–99, 144–45 (Doc. 54-10).
Mayor Guinn knew most of the Ocala Police Department Chaplains by name,
but he had no recollection as to who spoke. Guinn Depo. at 27–28 (Doc. 54-11).

10 In addition to Chief Graham, other uniformed police officers attended
the Prayer Vigil to engage with the crowd and provide security, consistent with
the Department’s regular practice of having officers present at public downtown
gatherings. Graham Dec. I ¶ 26 (Doc. 52-1).
17
Mayor Guinn estimated that 500−600 people attended the Prayer Vigil.
Id. at 108. Chief Graham said the vigil lasted for about an hour and “[t]here

were a lot of people there,” “definitely more than 100.” Graham Depo. at 139,
149 (Doc. 54-10).11 Chief Graham spent his time “engaging people in the crowd,
talking to them” and “attempt[ing] to enlist their help with the crime spree.” Id.
at 140; Graham Dec. I ¶ 21 (Doc. 52-1).

Plaintiff Lucinda Hale and Daniel Hale,12 who lived in Marion County,
had visited the Downtown Square on a number of previous occasions, such as
to visit the farmer’s market. L. Hale Depo. at 31 (Doc. 54-15). The Hales heard
about the Prayer Vigil when someone told them about the Ocala Police

Department Facebook posting, which they then viewed. D. Hale Depo. at 7 (Doc.
54-14); L. Hale Depo. at 9 (Doc. 54-15). The Facebook posting discussed the
crisis of crime affecting citizens of Ocala and Marion County, and Ms. Hale
agreed that crime creates a negative environment for all citizens, but she felt

that the message inviting everyone to the Prayer Vigil did not include her or

11 Plaintiffs’ original brief suggested that if this was not a city-sponsored
event, the organizer would have been required to seek a permit (which was not
issued here), but the record is murky as to the permit requirements. See
Graham Depo. at 70–74 (Doc. 54-10).
12 Mr. Hale and Ms. Porgal, identified infra, were plaintiffs in this case
before they died. Docs. 69, 72, 120, 121. Their uncontested sworn observations
are relevant evidence about material facts which the Court may consider as part
of the summary judgment record.
18
others who do not pray. L. Hale Depo. at 17−19 (Doc. 54-15). Mr. Hale engaged
in email correspondence with the Mayor in advance of the vigil, expressing

regret for the crime spree and applauding Chief Graham for his attempts to
curb crime, but explaining that the vigil invitation violated the Establishment
Clause and suggesting that the City promote a different rally encouraging
people to come forward with ideas about how to stop crime. D. Hale Dep. at 17-

18, 53 (Doc. 54-14, emails are Doc. 54-45).
The Hales attended the Prayer Vigil and described it as similar to a
Christian tent revival. D. Hale Depo. at 29, 47−48 (Doc. 54-14); L. Hale Depo.
at 22–23 (Doc. 54-15). Ms. Hale stated she was concerned about alleviating

crime, which was the purported purpose of the Prayer Vigil, but felt unable to
participate in any part of what actually transpired. L. Hale Int. Resp. No. 8
(Doc. 54-3). Mr. Hale did not observe any speaker encourage people to come
forward with ideas about how to stop crime. D. Hale Depo. at 53 (Doc. 54-14).

Mr. Hale recalled at least one speaker was introduced from the stage as an
Ocala Police Department Chaplain. Id. at 43–44. He said he observed uniformed
police officers participating in the Prayer Vigil by being part of a circle of people
praying, bowing heads, and holding hands. Id. at 29–30. Mr. Hale spoke with

Chief Graham at the vigil, and they discussed the possibility of Hale doing

19
volunteer work with the Ocala Police Department. Id. at 35, 54. Mr. Hale feels
it is everyone’s responsibility to better the community. Id. at 54.

Plaintiff Art Rojas, who lived and worked in Ocala, attended the Prayer
Vigil, which he described as being “essentially a Christian revival” that was “not
a comfortable place for non-believers” and caused anyone present to feel “some
pressure to participate and show approval,” lest they be seen as “publicly

opposing the police.” Rojas Int. Resp. Nos. 14, 15 (Doc. 54-1). Rojas said he
attended the vigil to see if there was going to be a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Rojas Depo. at 31 (Doc. 54-12). Rojas wished for his community to be
more inclusive and hoped future events involving his government would include

all of Ocala’s citizens, not only Christians. Id. at 37. Rojas thought the Police
Department should represent everyone, but by involving itself in the Prayer
Vigil, it did not represent him. Id. at 25−26.
Frances Jean Porgal attended the vigil and, like Mr. Hale, recalled at

least one speaker was introduced from the stage as an Ocala Police Department
Chaplain. Porgal Depo. at 32 (Doc. 54-13). Ms. Porgal observed “[p]olice
representatives spent no time discussing the crimes that had recently
occurred,” or “requesting assistance” from the community, or urging people to

20
come forward with information; instead, speakers prayed, preached, and sang.13
Porgal Int. Resp. No. 8 (Doc. 54-2).

The day after the Prayer Vigil, congratulatory emails circulated within
the Ocala Police Department, thanking Chief Graham, Captains, Officers,
Chaplains, and Ms. Haynes for their efforts regarding the Prayer Vigil. See Doc.
54-32 (marked Ex. 16). Captain Edwards sent an email to Ms. Haynes, Chaplain

Quintana, copying Chief Graham and Officer Williams, thanking everyone for
helping and “allow[ing] the PRAYER VIGIL to take place[,]” remarking that
“[t]here was opposition but Isaiah 54:17 says ‘No weapon that is formed
against thee shall prosper; and every tongue that shall rise against thee in

judgment thou shalt condemn.’” Id. at 2 (capitalization and emphais in original).
Captain Edwards suggested a meeting to discuss the next steps including
another possible vigil, and closed with, “‘Romans 8:28 ‘And we know that all
things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the

called according to his purpose.’” Id. at 2. Chaplain Quintana replied to Captain
Edwards, saying “God bless you Captain for organizing” the Prayer Vigil, and

13 Sometime after the vigil, Chief Graham told Ms. Porgal about an anti-
bullying rally scheduled for the Downtown Square where the Prayer Vigil had
occurred. Ms. Porgal and the Hales attended and participated. See D. Hale
Depo. at 55 (Doc. 54-14); L. Hale Depo. at 31–32 (Doc. 54-15).
21
saying he (Chaplain Quintana) was honored that Captain Edwards invited him.
Id. at 4.

Chief Graham testified when the Chaplains are in their police uniforms,14
the public would perceive them as being connected with the Ocala Police
Department. Graham Depo. at 165–66 (Doc. 54-10). “Ocala Police Department
Chaplains are official members of the Ocala Police Department[,]” who are

“appointed by the Chief of Police,” and are “considered members of the staff of
the Chief of Police in a support capacity and report directly to the Chief of
Police.”15 Doc. 52-6 at 2 (marked Ex. 2). Chief Graham agreed that although it
would be inappropriate for Ocala Police Chaplains to try to “convert” people in

the course of their work for the Ocala Police Department, “participating in a
Prayer Vigil” would be part of the official function of an Ocala Police Chaplain.
Graham Depo. at 78–79 (Doc. 54-10).16

14 The Ocala Police Chaplain uniform differs from the uniform of a sworn
officer–the Chaplains wear white shirts instead of blue, the sleeves bear patches
that say “CHAPLAIN” above the Ocala Police Department patch, and the
Chaplains do not carry weapons. Quintana Dec. ¶ 9 (Doc. 52-3); Doc. 54-19 at
Page ID 1386, 1389, 1394, 1396, 1401, 1402 (marked Ex. 3) (photos of uniformed
sworn Ocala Police Officers and uniformed Ocala Police Chaplains).
15 Chief Graham has the authority to terminate the Ocala Police
Chaplains. Graham Depo. at 168 (Doc. 54-10). At the time of Prayer Vigil, all of
the Ocala Police Department Chaplains were of the Christian faith. Id. at 157
(Doc. 54-10).
16 In a later declaration, Chief Graham seems to clarify a portion of this
22
Although the Ocala Police Chaplains are volunteers, they are covered by
worker’s compensation when performing official Department duties. Doc. 52-6

at 2 (marked Ex. 2). The Ocala Police Department supplies and pays for the
Chaplains’ uniforms. City Int. Resp. No. 7 (Doc. 54-5). “[Chaplains] are issued
Police Identifications in the form of an identification card with holder and
badge[,]” id., are issued cell phones, and are authorized to drive Department

vehicles.17 Ocala Police Department Police Chaplain Section Manual, 2010, and
as reviewed 2015 (Doc. 54-74 at 23–24, 36–37 (marked Ex. 58)). The Chaplains
have office space in the Ocala Police Department’s building. Graham Depo. at
169 (Doc. 54-10).

deposition testimony, saying:
As I previously testified, I do not consider uniformed
[Ocala Police Department] chaplains proselytizing to
the general public to be part of their official
departmental function. Nor is it part of chaplains’
departmental function to lead general community
religious events or activities, such as the Community
Prayer Vigil at issue in this case, while in uniform.
Graham Dec. II ¶ 6 (Doc. 68-1).
17 In Chaplain Quintana’s declaration, he stated Chaplains do not wear
“police badges,” Doc. 52-3 ¶ 9, but the department directive and section manual
both state that Chaplains are issued badges. See Doc. 52-6 at 2, Doc. 54-74 at
23, 36. In some Prayer Vigil photos, some Police Chaplains appear to be wearing
badges. See Doc. 54-19 at Page ID 1386, 1389, 1390, 1394, 1396 (marked Ex. 3).
According to the City’s Interrogatory Responses, the Chaplains’ badges identify
the wearer as a Chaplain (as compared to a sworn officer), but that is not
evident from the photos. See City’s Int. Resp. No. 7 (Doc. 54-5).
23
Under the City of Ocala charter, the Mayor is the sole municipal official
in authority over the Ocala Police Department and he recommends a chief of

police nominee to the City Council, who appoints the chief. Guinn Aff. ¶ 3 (Doc.
53-1). Chief Graham testified he would have removed the Facebook posting if
the Mayor had directed he do so. Graham Depo. at 161 (Doc. 54-10). Likewise,
Mayor Guinn testified he had authority to order Chief Graham to remove the

Facebook posting. Guinn Depo. at 54–55 (Doc. 54-11). Mayor Guinn also had
authority to instruct that Ocala Police Department Chaplains not lead prayers
at the Prayer Vigil or attend in Ocala Police Department Chaplain uniforms,
but he did not consider doing that because he believed those actions were

permitted under the Establishment Clause. Id.
Chief Graham testified going forward, he would not permit the Chaplains
to participate in public events while wearing their Ocala Police Department
uniforms if the event involved leading prayers, not because it was necessarily

inappropriate, but to keep from getting sued. Graham Depo. at 164–68 (Doc. 54-
10). Subsequent public prayer events have been held in Ocala, at least one of
which was organized and sponsored by a church. Id. at 74; Doc. 54-76 at 5.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A district court must grant summary judgment ‘if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
24
to judgment as a matter of law.’” Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 713
F.3d 577, 589 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In making this

assessment, the court “view[s] all facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (cleaned up).
Conclusory allegations are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. Carter v.
City of Melbourne, 731 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

“Issues of fact are ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence
presented, could find for the nonmoving party.” Atheists of Fla., 713 F.3d at 589
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “The
principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file

cross-motions for summary judgment.” T-Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville,
564 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
The Eleventh Circuit decided there is standing for Plaintiff Lucinda Hale.

Rojas, 40 F.4th at 1350-51. The City has reiterated arguments about standing
to preserve the issue for appeal, Doc. 146 at 5–7, but standing is not further
discussed.

25
B. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment “requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no

more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.” Everson
v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing TP, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). The Establishment Clause has
been recognized as protection against “sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n

of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). Still, “[i]n every Establishment
Clause case, [the court] must reconcile the inescapable tension between the
objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state
upon the other, and the reality that, as the [Supreme] Court has so often noted,

total separation of the two is not possible.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672
(1984).
“The Establishment Clause . . . is not a precise, detailed provision in a
legal code capable of ready application.” Id. at 678. Thus, “Establishment

Clause challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a case-by-case
basis with the result turning on the specific facts.” Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d
26
1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Selman v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d
1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Knowledge of the particular facts and specific

circumstances is essential to a determination of whether the governmental acts
in question are religiously neutral.”). “The inquiry [as to whether the
Establishment Clause is violated] remains a fact-sensitive one that considers
both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is

directed.” Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014) (plurality
opinion). Under the Establishment Clause, “detail is key.” McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005) (citation omitted).
Incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the First Amendment “applies to state and municipal
governments, state-created entities, and state and municipal employees.”
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).

C. Kennedy v. Bremerton
As directed by the Eleventh Circuit, the Court addresses Kennedy v.
Bremerton. Kennedy’s facts are far different from those here and to date, no
decisions have considered Kennedy under facts more similar to ours. 18

Nevertheless, Kennedy holds lessons for this case.

18 Even though several hundred cases have cited Kennedy, the Court has
27
In Kennedy, the plaintiff was a high school football coach, who routinely
prayed after games at mid-field.19 597 U.S. at 512–15. Kennedy’s prayers had

occurred for years without any issue, but once the school district became aware
of the prayers, it told Kennedy to stop. Id. at 515–18. Kennedy asked to continue
his practice of after game, on-field prayers. Id. at 517. The district was willing
to allow him to pray privately after the game, but not publicly at mid-field. Id.

at 519. The district prohibited the on-field prayer because it thought Kennedy’s
act of praying while on duty20 could be construed by a “reasonable observer” as

not identified any cases with similar facts as to whether government activity,
short of coercion, is improper sponsorship of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Cf. Erie v. Hunter, 675 F. Supp. 3d 647, 650-51, 659
(M.D. La. 2023) (denying summary judgment because there was a fact dispute
about forced church attendance in state psychiatric hospital); Mays v. Cabell
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., NO. 3:22-cv-85, 2022 W.L. 17637616 at *1, 7-8 (S.D. W.Va.
Dec. 13, 2022) (denying school board’s motion to dismiss because amended
complaint alleged favorable treatment of religion based on students being
required to attend religious assembly).
19 Kennedy also routinely conducted locker room prayers before games
and gave after game motivational speeches with religious messages but stopped
these practices when requested by the school district. Kennedy v. Bremerton
Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 516 (2022). References to Kennedy’s prayers in this
opinion refer to the postgame, on-field prayers that resulted in discipline and
not to other activities Kennedy voluntarily stopped.
20 The Supreme Court found even though Kennedy’s prayers took place
within his office environment (the field of play), the prayers were not within the
scope of his employment duties and occurred at a time when he and other
coaches were expressly permitted to engage in personal activity, such as calling
home. Id. at 530−31.
28
a government endorsement of prayer in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 516−18, 520. Kennedy disobeyed the directive, continued to “pray[] quietly

without his players,” and was disciplined. Id. at 512−15, 525−26.
Kennedy filed suit alleging violation of his free exercise and free speech
rights. Id. at 520−21. The Kennedy decision relied on finding: (1) there was no
undue influence, much less coercion, for others to participate in Kennedy’s

prayers, id. at 519−20, 537−39; (2) Kennedy’s prayers occurred when coaches
were permitted to engage in private activities, id. at 513, 530−31; and (3)
Kennedy’s prayers occurred when students were engaged in other activities,
such as singing the school fight song, id. at 519, 530, 538. The Supreme Court

concluded (1) Kennedy’s prayers were private speech, not government speech,
even though they occurred while he was still on duty, id. at 527−30; and (2) the
school district prohibition against Kennedy’s prayers was hostile towards
religion, not neutral, id. at 526, 541. Accordingly, the prohibition against

Kennedy’s on-field prayers violated his rights of free speech and free exercise of
religion and was not necessary to avoid violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 543.
D. Applying the historical practices and understandings test

In abrogating the Lemon test in Kennedy, the Supreme Court directed
that “the Establishment Clause . . . be interpreted by ‘reference to historical
29
practices and understandings.’” Id. at 535 (citations omitted). Despite the
different context of Kennedy, both parties here argue application of this

historical practices and understandings test operates in their respective favor.
The City maintains the Prayer Vigil was permissible because it fits in
with other historical examples dating back to George Washington of
government and prayer being intertwined, including legislative prayer and

proclamations of National Day of Prayer. Doc. 146 at 11−18.21
The City’s examples of government historical involvement with prayer
are distinguishable. In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court emphasized the
context and settings of legislative prayer noting: “legislative prayer lends

gravity to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in
pursuit of a higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and
peaceful society.” 572 U.S. at 575 (plurality opinion). Unlike legislative prayer,
the Prayer Vigil was directed at the public and asked for public participation.

Cf., id. at 587−88 (“The analysis would be different if town board members
directed the public to participate in the prayers . . . .”). Moreover, the Prayer

21 A challenge to the Presidential proclamations of prayer failed, not
because the proclamation was determined to be permissible, but because the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked injury and
therefore did not have standing. Freedom from Religion Found. v. Obama, 641
F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2011).
30
Vigil was the event, and dissimilar to legislative prayers because it did not
involve prayers that were tangential to or meant to solemnize other public

business.
Apart from legislative prayers, other examples cited by the City include
when a government response to a crisis has involved prayer: President Obama’s
remarks at the Sandy Hook Interfaith Prayer Vigil (2012), a prayer vigil

attended by congressional members on January 6, 2022 (the second anniversary
of the Capitol Hill Riot), instances related to epidemics (in 1793), war (in 1813),
natural disasters (in 1890), and others. Doc. 146 at 15−17. While these
instances show prayer and prayer vigils as part of a response to crisis, none of

them provide evidence of how much the government was involved in the
conception, planning, and execution of the event, and whether there was a legal
challenge to government involvement or participation, much less that the
involvement was deemed permissible after a challenge.

Similarly, the City’s claim about lack of control and lack of employee
involvement falls short. See id. at 2–4; Doc. 148 at 1–3. The City is correct in
claiming that at the Prayer Vigil itself, no uniformed, sworn officer participated.
But this overlooks the attendance and participation of the Ocala Police

Department Chaplains, in uniform and on stage, based on direction from Chief

31
Graham.22 It overlooks the Ocala Police Department’s employees and staff’s
involvement to conceive and plan the vigil. And the City entirely ignores the

explicit leadership and support of Chief Graham and the Mayor concerning the
Prayer Vigil. The involvement of Chief Graham, Mayor Guinn, Captain
Edwards, the Chaplains, and others is further discussed infra.
Plaintiffs argue aspects of the Prayer Vigil were coercive. Doc. 147 at 3.

They point to the letter announcing the Prayer Vigil (using the Ocala Police
Department logo and letterhead, signed by Chief Graham, and posted on the
Ocala Police Department Facebook page) and its language that the situation
“requires fervent prayer and your presence.” Plaintiffs contend the inherent

authority of law enforcement allows the letter to be viewed as coercive.23 Id. at
7. Mr. Rojas testified he felt pressure to participate or indicate approval of the
Prayer Vigil activities. Nonetheless, all plaintiffs voluntarily attended the vigil
and were allowed to protest. There is no evidence of efforts by the Ocala Police

Department to require attendance by the public or to threaten consequences for
failing to attend. Considering the totality of the circumstances and as a matter

22 It is undisputed Chief Graham was aware of the directive for chaplains
to attend in uniform, knew it had been attributed to him, and let the directive
stand, even though he could have intervened, revised, or countermanded it.
23 Several Facebook comments questioned what might happen if people
did not participate or did not pray. See generally Doc. 54-18.
32
of law, the general public was not coerced as defined in First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 537 (noting government may not

require citizens to participate in church attendance or formal religious exercise)
(citations omitted); cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495−96 (1961) (holding
that a required oath of office declaring belief in existence of God violated the
Establishment Clause).

In applying the Kennedy “historical practices and understandings” test,
keep in mind that Kennedy itself was quite different. The underlying dispute
in Kennedy arose from an individual act of prayer, occurring without any
government assistance, and a government directive to not pray. Because

Kennedy’s prayers were private and he did not coerce anyone into praying with
him, the school district’s directive for him to not publicly pray violated his rights
to free speech and free exercise of religion. Similarly, because Kennedy’s
prayers were as a private citizen and not coercive, allowing Kennedy to pray

did not violate the Establishment Clause. Unlike Kennedy, this case does not
involve alleged violations of free speech or free exercise rights of a private
citizen. Rather, plaintiffs contend that the City’s conception and support of the
Prayer Vigil amounted to government sponsorship and violated the

Establishment Clause.

33
To determine this, the Court will “look to the record of evidence showing
the progression leading up to” the Prayer Vigil along with the event itself to

determine if the City’s actions violated the Establishment Clause. McCreary,
545 U.S. at 868. The government should not be a prime participant in religious
debate or expression because “the Framers deemed religious establishment
antithetical to the freedom of all.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).

“When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).

The City argues it had a “limited role in expressing support for the event
[and a] limited role in the event itself.” Doc. 146 at 23. The City says it did not
control the Prayer Vigil and any involvement of Ocala Police Department
personnel at the Prayer Vigil were as private citizens, not City employees.

However, the undisputed evidence says otherwise.24

24 Two years after the Prayer Vigil occurred some participants–Chief
Graham, Captain Edwards, Chaplain Quintana and Ms. Haynes–testified or
provided declarations indicating minimal involvement of themselves or others.
This evidence does not serve to dispute the contemporaneous evidence because
it is conclusory and fails to acknowledge or explain the contemporaneous
evidence about their involvement or why that involvement should be attributed
to a private role even though work titles and work time were used, etc. Cf.,
Haynes Dec. (Doc. 52-2) ¶ 9 (executed on September 15, 2016, claiming Chief
Graham’s only involvement was “signing and posting the letter to Facebook”
34
As information about the Prayer Vigil spread, the Mayor began receiving
comments (both for and against) and readily accepted responsibility for the

City’s involvement and sponsorship of it. The Mayor responded to Ms. Hale
using inclusive terms of “us” and “we,” stating “[n]ot only are we not canceling
it we are trying to promote it . . . .” Doc. 54-44 at 2. In another email, Mayor
Guinn says “I’m proud to stand by my Chief and support him” and “that’s why

we’re leading the community in this prayer vigil.” Doc. 54-51 at 2. The Mayor’s
support was unequivocal and continued when he was deposed. As his testimony
made clear, the Mayor thought it was acceptable for the police chief to use police

without addressing or acknowledging other emails or communication involving
Chief Graham, including the directive for chaplains to attend in their police
uniform). Declarations from Haynes and Quintana both admit Captain
Edwards was involved in planning and organizing the Prayer Vigil and fail to
claim Captain Edwards was only involved as a private citizen. See Haynes Dec.
¶ 9 (Doc. 52-2) (Captain Edwards provided “some assistance” to organize the
vigil); Quintana Dec. (Doc. 52-3) ¶¶ 5 (executed on September 16, 2016, stating
Captain Edwards “also helped” to organize and plan the Prayer Vigil). Chaplain
Quintana’s declaration states “No Ocala Police Department employee (other
than Richard Edwards who participated while off-duty and wearing plain
clothes) determined or directed any aspect of the vigil, including who would lead
or participate in the vigil, or the content of any speech at the vigil.” Quintana
Dec. (Doc. 52-3) ¶10. This statement, however, about the limited involvement
of Captain Edwards, two years after the vigil, does not claim Captain Edwards
did not provide assistance while on duty. Likewise, it does not acknowledge
OPD activities such as approving the Facebook letter, posting the letter on the
OPD Facebook page, use of the police letterhead and logo, or development and
approval of the flyer with both praying hands and the OPD logo.
35
letterhead and communicate a need to believe in God, post a letter about
requiring “fervent prayer,” and for the City to host a prayer vigil.

The idea for the Prayer Vigil came from a meeting convened by Chief
Graham, at the Ocala Police Department, with participants selected by Chief
Graham, all of whom were Ocala Police Department employees or staff, except
for a single community member.25 It was conceived in Chief Graham’s office,

advertised, and completed through the actions of the Mayor, the Chief of Police,
and the Ocala Police Department, including its employees and staff.
Once Chief Graham expressed his approval for the Prayer Vigil (“Let’s do
it”), Chaplain Quintana and Ms. Haynes left the meeting to put together a

letter, which Chief Graham approved and signed along with Ms. Haynes. The
letter was to the community from its Chief of Police. It used the Ocala Police
Department logo in the shape of a badge. It was on Ocala Police Department
letterhead, including the address and phone number for the Ocala Police

Department. Chief Graham directed his staff to post the letter on the Ocala

25 The single community member was Ms. Haynes. The other
participants were Captain Edwards, as District Commander of the area where
most of the trouble was occurring; Officer Mary Williams, who assisted Captain
Edwards with community events in the area; Captain Carmen Sirolli, the
Captain in charge of the division investigating the shootings; Major Dennis
Yonce, the Major to whom Sirolli reported; and Chaplains Brockington and
Quintana. Graham Depo. at 19–21 (Doc. 54-10).
36
Police Department Facebook page. Chief Graham admitted posting the letter
was promoting the Prayer Vigil. In addition to the letter, the Ocala Police

Department put together a flyer about the Prayer Vigil. The flyer is a picture of
the town square, with praying hands in one corner and the Ocala Police
Department logo in the opposite corner.
As information about the Prayer Vigil went out, compliments and

criticism came in. The Mayor, chief executive of the City, was a consistent and
enthusiastic supporter of both the Prayer Vigil and Chief Graham. The Mayor
had authority to tell Chief Graham to cancel the Prayer Vigil, but he did not.
Instead, more than once, the Mayor said he thought the Prayer Vigil was “great”

and expressed praise for Chief Graham having the idea and the City’s
leadership of the Prayer Vigil. Even as criticism mounted, the Mayor’s support
did not waver. “Not only are we not canceling [the Prayer Vigil] we are trying
to promote it and have as many people as possible to [sic] join us.” Both before

and after the Prayer Vigil, the Mayor thought the City’s involvement in the
Prayer Vigil itself was not only permissible but commendable.
Like Mayor Guinn, Chief Graham’s early comments took responsibility
and credit for the Prayer Vigil. Chief Graham sent multiple emails to citizens

in reference to the Prayer Vigil using words such as “we” and “I,” indicating his
personal involvement. Chief Graham thanked one person for encouraging words
37
and said he had no intention to call the Prayer Vigil off. In another instance,
Chief Graham flatly stated he had “no intention of canceling the event.” When

Chief Graham thought a date change for the Prayer Vigil was needed, he
emailed other Ocala Police Department employees and staff and did not include
the community activist or anyone not affiliated with the Ocala Police
Department. When Chief Graham received feedback about the Prayer Vigil, he

personally responded. There is no evidence he ever directed the compliments or
complaints to anyone else, and he did not tell the Mayor someone else was
responsible for the Prayer Vigil.
Chief Graham’s later comments tended to minimize his involvement with

or control over with the Prayer Vigil, but even as Chief Graham began to say
his control or involvement was minimal, his employees and staff were actively
planning it. Captain Edwards confirmed he and Chaplain Quintana were
making decisions about the Prayer Vigil, with input from Chief Graham and

Ms. Haynes.
Chief Graham had authority to cancel the Prayer Vigil, but he did not.
Chief Graham had authority to direct the Chaplains to not participate in the
Prayer Vigil in uniform, but he did not. Chief Graham had authority to tell his

employees they could not work on the Prayer Vigil during work hours, but he
did not. The Ocala Police Department took affirmative steps to plan and
38
promote the Prayer Vigil and associate the City with it. The record lacks
evidence that someone not affiliated with the Ocala Police Department was in

control.
Captain Edwards was involved with the Prayer Vigil in his role as an
Ocala police officer. See Doc. 146 at 2−3, n.4. Captain Edwards communicated
his enthusiastic support for the Prayer Vigil on multiple occasions. One of his

emails included scripture verses about withstanding opposition to the vigil. In
his declaration, Captain Edwards said he offered to assist the Prayer Vigil by
making meeting space available to the organizers, but his involvement was not
limited to that. Indeed, Captain Edwards identified himself as one of the

decision makers for the Prayer Vigil. Captain Edwards said he might have to
miss a work meeting because he was planning the vigil. Captain Edwards was
involved in considering an alternate plan in case of rain. After the Prayer Vigil,
Captain Edwards emailed Ms. Haynes and Chaplain Quintana, copying Chief

Graham and Officer Williams, expressing gratitude to “all who helped and
allowed the PRAYER VIGIL to take place” and wanting to discuss next steps
based on the “many request[s] to continue this sort of thing.” Doc. 54-32 at 2.
Chaplain Quintana responds, “God bless you Captain for organizing this event

and I am honored you invited me.” Id. at 4.

39
Even though many emails to plan the Prayer Vigil included Ms. Haynes,
there are also multiple planning emails exclusively among various City

personnel. For example, Chief Graham’s email about needing to change the date
for the Prayer Vigil is only sent to Captain Edwards and Chaplain Quintana.
Doc. 54-21. An email about the flyer with praying hands is from Tina Brito,
Certified Law Enforcement Analyst, and only sent to Captain Edwards. Doc.

54-22. The record does not contain any instruction to Captain Edwards, any
Chaplain, or any other Ocala Police Department personnel to separate their
official duties from any individual and private support of the Prayer Vigil.
While Ms. Haynes was involved in planning the Prayer Vigil, there is no

evidence she controlled it. To the contrary, she responded to Captain Edwards,
including Chief Graham, Chaplain Quintana, and Officer Williams–all Ocala
Police Department personnel–and thanked “the Chief and staff” of the Ocala
Police Department for “launching into action to make sure [the Prayer Vigil]

happened.” Doc. 54-32 at 2. Apart from Ms. Haynes’ involvement, the record
shows that the Ocala Police Department’s employees and staff planned and
implemented the Prayer Vigil as part of their duties ─ regardless of whether
they were paid or not.

Thus, there is no evidence to support the City’s argument that the Ocala
Police Department employees and staff did not plan the vigil. The undisputed
40
evidence chronicles the Mayor’s and Chief’s direct support of and involvement
with the vigil. The City effectively admits Captain Edwards was involved with

the Prayer Vigil but characterizes his participation either as community
policing or as that of a private citizen. This fails to explain the many actions
Captain Edwards performed while on duty that he labeled as decision making.
Similarly, the City does not address the involvement of other Ocala Police

Department employees. Instead, it argues that the planning work by the
Chaplains cannot be attributed to the City because they are volunteers, and
therefore their activities were done as private citizens.
This downplays, even ignores, pertinent portions of the record. Chaplain

Quintana was one of two Ocala Police Department Chaplains invited by Chief
Graham to the meeting that birthed the Prayer Vigil. While Chaplains are
unpaid, they are not typical volunteers. Chaplains are “official members of the
Ocala Police Department” and “considered members of the staff of the Chief of

Police . . . .” Doc 52-6 at 2. Chaplains are covered by worker’s compensation,
have office space at the Police Department, are issued police badges, receive
uniforms (which they wore to the Prayer Vigil), and are subject to the authority
of the Police Chief, who appoints them. Chaplain Quintana sent an email to

other Chaplains, copying Chief Graham, stating “Chief Graham asked me to
contact all our chaplains” asking them to be present at the vigil and “[Chief
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Graham] also asked to please be Dressed Up in the Official Chaplains Uniform
(White Shirt).”

At the Prayer Vigil itself, five of the ten people on stage were affiliated
with the Ocala Police Department. Four were Ocala Police Department
Chaplains in their uniforms,26 in compliance with the direction from Chief
Graham through Chaplain Quintana’s email. The fifth was Captain Edwards,

off duty and not in uniform.27 Even if some of the Chaplains’ or Captain
Edwards’ actions occurred in their roles as private citizens, there is ample
evidence of activity by Ocala Police Department’s paid and unpaid personnel to
sponsor, plan, and support the Prayer Vigil.

The City argues “Quintana and Haynes were responsible for planning and
organizing the vigil,” citing their declarations and the email from Captain
Edwards “thanking them for helping with and allowing the prayer vigil to take
place.” Doc. 146 at 2, n.3. The City does not explain why Chaplain Quintana’s

email thanking Captain Edwards as the organizer or why the email from Ms.

26 See supra n.2.
27 It is not clear whether Captain Edwards gave remarks stating he was
a sworn officer with the Ocala Police Department. See Doc. 54-31 at 2 (marked
Ex. 15), which appears to be a draft of Captain Edwards’ remarks (sent to
himself), in which he greets the crowd, explains he is there in many capacities,
including as a police officer and a child of God, and, like the audience, is calling
on God through prayer, hoping to end senseless shooting and violence in the
city.
42
Haynes thanking Chief Graham and his staff for making the Prayer Vigil
happen does not evidence official government action. The City does not cite any

evidence that the Chaplains’ planning efforts for the vigil were as private
citizens as opposed to their “staff” and “official” roles. Nor does the City argue
it did not provide support to the Prayer Vigil through use of “our chaplains.”
See e.g. Graham Depo. at 20 (Doc. 54-10); Doc. 54-26 at 2; Doc. 54-35 at 3. The

City fails to address various statements of ownership from Chief Graham (“I
have no intention of calling off this gathering”) and Mayor Guinn (“that’s why
we’re leading the community in this prayer vigil”), even if later statements are
more measured.

Based on the undisputed facts, the City’s involvement in conceiving,
organizing, and implementing the Prayer Vigil is government sponsorship of a
religious event. The content of the Facebook letter on Ocala Police Department
letterhead (describing a community crisis that “requires fervent prayer and

your presence”), and the flyer confirm this. See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1286;
Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 924, 930−31 (3d Cir. 1980)
(finding city’s expenditures to create platform from which the Pope would
celebrate a Mass and deliver a sermon to over 1,000,000 people had religious

effect, notwithstanding that the Pope would be celebrating Mass and delivering
a sermon even if city had not provided the platform); Hewett v. City of King, 29
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F. Supp. 3d 584, 635 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (finding mayor’s delivery in his official
capacity of religious messages at privately sponsored annual public

commemorative events which featured Christian prayer practices had effect of
City endorsement of Christianity); see also Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v.
Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 528−29 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding sheriff’s invitation to
religious group to speak at mandatory employee meetings gave appearance of

state endorsement of religion in violation of Establishment Clause); cf. Am.
Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 243−44 (2d Cir. 2014)
(finding reasonable observer would know that Ground Zero Cross held such
historical significance to the story of the 9/11 recovery that its inclusion with

hundreds of other artifacts at government museum had effect of ensuring
historical completeness and not of promoting religion).
The conclusion that the City’s activities amount to sponsorship in
violation of the Establishment Clause is consistent with other cases. Those

decisions turn on the degree to which a government entity or official initiated,
organized, facilitated, promoted, provided space for, paid for, supervised,
participated in, regulated, censored, led, endorsed, encouraged, or otherwise
controlled the activity.28 See Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1479

28 This list of factors is not intended to be exclusive.
44
(7th Cir. 1990) (government entity or official initiated, promoted, and provided
space for the activity); McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869 (government entity or official

initiated the activity); Marrero-Mendez v. Calixto-Rodriguez, 830 F.3d 38, 45
(1st Cir. 2016) (government entity or official initiated, and participated in the
activity); Newman v. City of East Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1376, 1380 (N.D.
Ga. 2002) (government entity or official organized, promoted, provided space

for, paid for, and endorsed the activity); Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1287−88
(government entity or official facilitated, supervised, participated in, led,
endorsed, and encouraged the activity); Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 308, 310 (2000) (government entity or official supervised and encouraged

the activity); Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1333, 1337, 1341
(11th Cir. 2001) (government entity or official regulated, censored, or otherwise
controlled the activity).
One case concluding there was sponsorship (but not relying on Lemon) is

Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990).29 A city employee

29 A similar case that does rely on Lemon is Newman v. City of East Point,
181 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2002). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city and
mayor from holding the mayor’s annual prayer breakfast. Id. at 1380. The city
argued it was not promoting or endorsing the event, but it was privately paid
for and was not going to be held on city property. Id. at 1376. Plaintiffs
demonstrated that city resources had previously been used to organize,
promote, and pay for the mayor’s prayer breakfast. Id. at 1380. Evidence
included a letter from the mayor on city letterhead promoting the event and
soliciting donations; mayor’s request for reimbursements related to the prayer
45
was also a member of a club involved with an annual village-sponsored Italian
festival in a public park and invited a Roman Catholic priest to deliver a Mass

during the festival. Id. at 1477−78. Reviewing the district court’s injunction to
stop the Mass, the Seventh Circuit noted, “everything turns on who is putting
on this mass.” Id. at 1479. Looking at the slim record available on the emergency
motion for stay, the court considered that a city employee selected and recruited

the priest, and advertisements and other publicity for the event referred to “us”
and “our” (meaning the village) and did not mention that anyone other than the
village was sponsoring the Mass. Id. From this, the Seventh Circuit determined
that the record supported the district court’s finding that the Mass was

sponsored by the government in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
To paraphrase Lee, the good faith intentions of the City are not the issue
here. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588−89. Without the City’s actions—from the Mayor on
down—there would not have been a Prayer Vigil. And the City’s support of the

Prayer Vigil favored a religious viewpoint. While the Prayer Vigil was geared

breakfast; and mention of the event in a city-produced community flyer about
other city-led events. Id. The court determined plaintiffs’ showing was sufficient
to secure an injunction prohibiting the city and the mayor in her official capacity
from organizing, advertising, promoting, or endorsing the breakfast or using
city resources to do so, but the court denied plaintiffs’ requests to enjoin the
mayor’s prayer breakfast from taking place at all and to enjoin the mayor or
city officials from attending. Id. at 1381−82.
46
towards Christianity,30 there is some evidence that it was not limited to any
one faith. See Doc. 146 at 22; see also Docs. 54-41 at 4, 54-42 at 3, 5 (emails

from Chief Graham denying vigil is limited to a particular religion). But that
thin layer of neutrality is not enough to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation. Government cannot prefer religion over non-religion or atheism.
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing TP., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see Sch. Dist. of

Abington Twp., PA v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218−225 (1963) (citing Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 314 (1952)).
Similarly, Chief Graham’s offer to connect an objector, Paul Tjaden, with
organizers if Tjaden wanted to speak at the vigil, Doc. 52-8, is not comparable

to neutrality demonstrated by rotating responsibilities for an opening prayer or
invocation at government events. See Doc. 146 at 22. As previously discussed,
legislative prayer has a different purpose: to solemnize and prepare for the main
event of government business. Trying to achieve neutrality towards religion by

inviting an atheist to speak at an event whose only purpose is prayer fails to
treat the secular viewpoint with the same level of respect being provided to
religious prayer.

30 Attendees included various Christian denominations, including Rabbi
Baruch Greenstein, identified by Jean Porgal as a Messianic Christian. See Doc.
54-13 at 46-47.
47
As Kennedy commands, the Court bases its decision on a “historically
sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause,” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at

537, and comes to this conclusion: where government action amounts to
sponsorship of or favoritism towards a religious belief system, it violates the
Establishment Clause. That is what happened here.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is tempting to simply say this decade-old event was conceived with good
intent by persons of good will and that no real harm was done. But the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment serves as a bulwark against
government sponsorship or endorsement of religion. The Court’s role is to give

effect to its protections. And, there was a ready alternative.
If individuals or religious groups had organized a prayer vigil and
gathered in the Downtown Square in the City of Ocala to pray for an end to
violent crime (even with law enforcement attending), the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution would have protected the “Free Exercise” of
their religion. But because the City conceived, organized, promoted, and
conducted the Prayer Vigil, it violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

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The Court is granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and
denying the City’s cross-motion.31

Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. The City of Ocala’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 146) is
DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145) is
GRANTED.
3. The Court will award each plaintiff one dollar ($1.00) in nominal
damages.

4. As the prevailing parties, the Court will also be considering an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs in plaintiffs’ favor under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. No
later than July 26, 2024, plaintiffs shall file a motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs.32 Assuming it opposes the motion, no later than September 6, 2024, the

City of Ocala shall file its response.

31 Both parties agreed that the record is fully developed and that a trial
of the matter would serve no purpose.
32 Because Plaintiff’s entitlement of attorney’s fees is governed by § 1988,
the Court directs that Plaintiffs’ motion address both entitlement and amount
of fees. Cf. Local Rule 7.01.
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5. The Clerk is directed to withhold entry of judgment until the Court
has resolved plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida the 26th day of June,
2024.

Fe. 2 Cimotheg 9. Corrig □□
: TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
= United States District Judge

ddw
Copies:
Counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10642231. Public record. Not legal advice.