# Ford v. Sanchez-Galvan

> District Court, S.D. California · September 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640718

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** September 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640718

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 14 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 BENNY FORD, Case No.: 24-CV-1025 JLS (KSC)
CDCR #C-04844,
12
ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA
vs. PAUPERIS; AND (2) DISMISSING
14
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
E. SANCHEZ-GALVIN, E. YANEZ,
15 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)
O. VALDEZ and K. SAUNDERS,
16 Defendants.
17
18
19
20 Plaintiff Benny Ford is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights
21 Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has also filed a
22 motion (“Mot.,” ECF No. 2) to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
23 MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
24 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
25 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
26 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55,
27 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP.
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee
1 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to
2 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner
4 seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account
5 statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding
6 the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,
7 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an
8 initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six
9 months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months,
10 whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has insufficient assets. See 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1915(b)(1) & (4); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Prisoners who proceed IFP
12 must pay any remaining balance in “increments” or “installments,” regardless of whether
13 their action is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
14 In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his California
15 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Statement Report and
16 Prison Certificate attested to by a CDCR trust account official. ECF No. 4 at 1. The
17 document shows he had an average monthly balance of $11.87 and average monthly
18 deposits of $12.40, with an available balance of $0.34. Id.
19 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and declines to
20 assesses the initial partial filing fee of $2.48 because it appears Plaintiff has insufficient
21 funds to pay it. See Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP
23 case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when
24 payment is ordered”). The Secretary of the CDCR or his designee will collect and forward
25 to the Clerk of Court the $350 balance of the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914
26 pursuant to the installment payment provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)
2 I. Standard of Review
3 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-Answer
4 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte
5 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails
6 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith,
7 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes
8 v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
9 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
11 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
12 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
13 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the
14 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
15 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
16 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
17 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining
18 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
19 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
20 556 U.S. at 679.
21 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who,
22 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.”
23 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a
24 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
25 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation
26 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation
27 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the
28 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
1 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 II. Allegations in the Complaint
3 Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2023, while housed at Calipatria State Prison in
4 Imperial, California, Defendant Counselor Galvan called Plaintiff into her office to prepare
5 for a December 14, 2023, parole hearing, and handed him five CDCR-810 forms with 52
6 separate items of confidential information ranging from 1979 to 2021. Compl. at 12–13.
7 However, only the dates the information was logged were recorded on those forms, and
8 there was no information regarding the incidents or identification of the correctional
9 officers who reported or confirmed the incidents. Id. at 12. Plaintiff informed Galvan that
10 not knowing that information would prevent him from removing it from his record and
11 defending himself at the parole hearing. Id. at 13. Galvan then gave him a memorandum
12 dated November 8, 2023, which stated Plaintiff “was in the position of supreme counsel of
13 the Bloodlines gang,” but which did not reflect any verification or investigation to
14 determine if that was true. Id. at 13–14.
15 On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff attended a Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”)
16 with Defendants chairperson captain Valdez, counselor Yanez, and supervising counselor
17 Saunders. Id. at 14. Plaintiff informed these Defendants of the “illegal material” prepared
18 by Galvan for the parole hearing, but Saunders refused to listen and falsely stated that the
19 confidential information had been signed off on or verified by a captain or above, while
20 Valdez and Yanez remained silent. Id. at 14, 17–18. Plaintiff alleges there is no
21 documentation showing that the confidential information was signed off on or verified, and
22 states that it was used to deny him parole for seven years. Id. at 14–15. He claims the
23 Defendants have lied and falsified documents in violation of due process, and that their
24 deliberate indifference has caused him physical and emotional injuries amounting to cruel
25 and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 14–20.
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 III. Discussion
2 A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
3 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing]
4 any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
5 XIV, § 1. Liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause “will be generally limited
6 to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected
7 manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless
8 imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
9 of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). To the extent Plaintiff can
10 identify a protected liberty interest with respect to his parole proceedings, federal law
11 requires only that he be provided fair procedures for its vindication. See Swarthout v.
12 Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (“Whatever liberty interest [in parole that] exists is, of
13 course, a state interest created by California law.”). “In the context of parole, we have held
14 that the procedures required are minimal.” Id.
15 Due Process requires that the State furnish a parole applicant with an opportunity to
16 be heard and a statement of reasons for a denial of parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
17 Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). “The Constitution does not require
18 more.” Id.; see also Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (2011) (“[T]here is no
19 substantive due process right created by the California parole scheme. If the state affords
20 the procedural protections required by Greenholtz and Cooke, that is the end of the matter
21 for purposes of the Due Process Clause.”). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants refused
22 to allow him to challenge the evidentiary basis for the evidence used to deny him parole
23 fails to state a due process claim because the United States Supreme Court has rejected the
24 contention that federal due process contains a guarantee of evidentiary sufficiency with
25 respect to a parole determination. See Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220 (“No opinion of ours
26 supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal
27 requirement.”); see also Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642
28 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 2011) ([I]ssue is not whether Board’s parole denial was
1 “substantively reasonable,” or whether the Board correctly applied state parole standards,
2 but simply was “whether the state provided Miller with the minimum procedural due
3 process outlined in [Swarthout v.] Cooke.”).
4 Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the parole board denied him an opportunity to
5 be heard and a statement of reasons for denial of parole, he has failed to state a due process
6 claim. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is dismissed sua sponte
7 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim.
8 B. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
9 “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met.
10 First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v.
11 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
12 Second, Plaintiff must allege the prison official he seeks to hold liable had a “sufficiently
13 culpable state of mind,” that is, “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to” his constitutional
14 rights. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03).
15 Plaintiff alleges he experienced severe physical pain from the stress caused by
16 Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his need to challenge the information used at his
17 parole hearing in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Compl. at 20. Plaintiff has not
18 plausibly alleged an objectively serious deprivation amounting to a denial of “the minimal
19 civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.
20 1996) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
21 (“[O]nly those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’
22 are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” (quoting
23 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347)); see also Morrison v. Madden, No. 22cv0925-MWF (MAA),
24 2023 WL 9601240, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2023) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never
25 recognized an Eighth Amendment claim in the parole denial context.” (first citing
26 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7; and then citing Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220)).
27 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
28 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim.
1 C. State Law Claims
2 Plaintiff indicates in a conclusory manner that he is bringing claims pursuant to state
3 and federal law. Compl. at 2. To the extent Plaintiff brings state law claims, the Court
4 may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any supplemental state law claim
5 if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c);
6 Sanford v. Member Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the usual case in
7 which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
8 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to
9 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). Because all federal claims
10 have been dismissed from this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
11 jurisdiction over any state law claims at this time.
12 IV. Leave to Amend
13 In light of his pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint
14 in order to attempt to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order. See Rosati
15 v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro
16 se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of
17 the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 CONCLUSION
19 Accordingly, good cause appearing, the Court:
20 1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).
21 2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from
22 Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee by collecting monthly payments from
23 Plaintiff’s account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s
24 income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in
25 the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
26 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail
27 on Jeff Macomber, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
28 P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.
1 4) DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which
2 ||relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) & 1915A(b)(1) and
3 || GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file
4 |}an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff's
5 || Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading.
6 ||Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be
7 ||considered waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546
8 ||(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d
9 11896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not
10 |/re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”).
11 If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court
12 || will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff's failure to state
13 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)ai) &
14 |} 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring
15 ||amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does
16 || not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the
17 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 || Dated: September 26, 2024 . tt f te
20 on. Janis L. Sammartino
7] United States District Judge
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640718. Public record. Not legal advice.