# (PC) Gaither v. Williams.

> District Court, S.D. California · July 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640340

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** July 12, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640340

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding placement in segregated housing in and 2 of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest
- noting that 26 claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 27 may be “considered waived if not repled”
- stating inmates have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct 22 which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest”

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 Case No.: 3:24-cv-1089-AJB-DDL
BURRELL A. GAITHER,
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CDCR #BF-2813, ORDER:
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Plaintiff,
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
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v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 [ECF No. 2] AND;

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S. WILLIAMS, A. GEORGE, SMITH, (2) DISMISSING AMENDED
17 S. AMADOR, COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO
18 Defendants.
STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28
19 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)

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22 I. INTRODUCTION
23 Plaintiff Burrell Gaither (“Plaintiff” or “Gaither”), a state inmate proceeding pro se,
24 has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in
25 forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1, 2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that while he
26 was confined at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD), Defendants violated his
27 constitutional rights by sending him to administrative segregation based on “falsified
1 documents.” ECF No. 1 at 3. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
2 IFP motion and dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a claim.
3 II. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
4 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
5 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
6 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the
7 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 28 U.S.C.
8 § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
9 To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit
10 regarding their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
11 Cir. 2015). Prisoners seeking to establish an inability to pay must also submit a “certified
12 copy of the [prisoner’s] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . .
13 the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial
15 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months,
16 or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is
17 greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (4). Prisoners
18 who proceed IFP must repay the entire fee in installments regardless of whether their action
19 is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016).
20 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has provided a copy of his trust account
21 statement and prison certificate authorized by an accounting officer. See ECF No. 7. During
22 the six months prior to filing suit, Plaintiff had an average monthly balance of $86.79,
23 average monthly deposits of $167.73, and an available account balance of $3.10 at the time
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1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of
26 $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee
Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to
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persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.
1 he filed suit. Id. at 6. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP motion is GRANTED, and the Court
2 assesses no partial filing fee. Plaintiff remains obligated to pay the $350.00 fee in monthly
3 installments even if this action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (2).
4 III. SCREENING
5 A. Legal Standards
6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), the Court must screen a
7 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous,
8 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See
9 Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining
10 whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
11 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for
12 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule
13 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to
14 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
15 quotation marks omitted). And while detailed factual allegations are not required,
16 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
17 statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or
18 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of the
19 plausibility standard. Id.
20 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who,
21 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux
22 v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of
23 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
24 conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation
25 marks omitted). To establish liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must show both (1)
26 deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)
27 that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v.
1 Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
3 Gaither alleges that on February 28, 2022, Defendants Williams, George, Smith and
4 Amador, all staff at RJD, “lied” and printed a “false document” which indicated Gaither
5 had informed staff he had safety concerns on “all the yards at RJD.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Gaither
6 was told that, as a result, he was going to be moved to “C Yard.” Plaintiff initially refused
7 to go and told Defendants they would have to extract him from his cell. Id. Defendants then
8 tried to “bribe” him into moving voluntarily by offering him non-disciplinary segregation
9 and a special transfer to California State Prison at Los Angeles County (“LAC”), which
10 Plaintiff had previously been denied. Id. Defendants also had inmates Plaintiff knew “talk
11 to [him]” and urge him to go to segregation. Id. Ultimately Gaither complied and was taken
12 to the administrative segregation unit (“ASU”). Once there, Plaintiff read his “lock up
13 order” and realized it was “all lies.” Id. He claims Defendants “falsified” his lock up order
14 and if “anyone” found out what was in it, he would be in danger from other inmates. Id. As
15 a result of being put “in harm’s way,” Gaither states he has lost weight and experienced
16 trauma. Id. He seeks monetary damages and an injunction requiring Defendants be
17 disciplined. Id. at 4.
18 C. Discussion
19 Plaintiff raises only one claim against Defendants. He does not identify the specific
20 constitutional violation and instead alleges his transfer was based on “‘falsified documents’
21 [and]. . . violated [his] constitutional rights and all [his] amendment rights.” Id. at 3.
22 First, Plaintiff has failed to identify the specific legal basis for his § 1983 claim.
23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
24 statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
25 Although the Court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, the plaintiff
26 nonetheless must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient
27 to give each defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
1 which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); see also Brazil v.
2 U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). If a plaintiff fails to set forth
3 allegations sufficient to provide defendants with such notice, the complaint fails to comply
4 with Rule 8 and must be dismissed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177–79 (9th
5 Cir. 1996). Here, Gaither’s claim of “falsified documents” is insufficient to provide
6 Defendants with notice of the legal basis for his claim. Therefore, the Complaint is
7 dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
8 Moreover, even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s claim that he was
9 confined to ASU based on falsified documents as an alleged due process violation, as
10 currently pleaded, he would not be entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held prisoners
11 have no constitutional right or interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause
12 to be free from discipline or placement in administrative segregation. Hewitt v. Helms, 459
13 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). Allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in
14 connection with a decision to place him in administrative segregation present a
15 constitutionally cognizable claim only if: (1) prison officials are narrowly restricted by
16 state statutes or regulations to impose the specific deprivation at play, and (2) the liberty in
17 question is one of “real substance.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477–87 (1995).
18 A liberty interest of “real substance” generally will be limited to freedom from (1)
19 restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
20 ordinary incidents of prison life,” or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration
21 of [a] sentence.” Id. at 484, 487; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448–49 (9th Cir.
22 2000) (holding plaintiff failed to state a cognizable due process claim, because plaintiff's
23 complaint failed to allege facts showing placement and retention in the secured housing
24 unit were not “‘within the range of confinement to be normally expected’ by prison inmates
25 ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’”).
26 Here, Gaither does not allege that the duration of his sentence was affected. He also
27 fails to specify how long he was held in administrative segregation. See Serrano v. Francis,
1 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding placement in segregated housing in and
2 of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565
3 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating mere placement in administrative segregation not enough to state
4 due process claim after Sandin); see e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485–86 (inmate’s thirty-day
5 placement in disciplinary segregation, where conditions mirrored conditions in
6 administrative segregation, not a deprivation of “real substance”); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59
7 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding now liberty interest under Sandin when inmate was
8 placed in disciplinary segregation for fourteen days); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
9 224 (2005) (finding indefinite placement in a “supermax” facility, where inmates are not
10 eligible for parole consideration, imposes an “atypical and significant hardship within the
11 correctional context”). Without more, Gaither’s placement in administrative segregation,
12 even if based on “falsified documents,” does not establish a deprivation of “real substance”
13 under Sandin.2 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477–87. Therefore, even if Plaintiff had alleged a
14 due process violation, he would fail to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
15 Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to
16 state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
17 D. Leave to Amend
18 Given Plaintiff’s pro se status the Court GRANTS him leave to amend. See Rosati
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2 The Court further notes that inmates do not have a due process right to be free from false
21 disciplinary charges. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating inmates
have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct
22
which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest”); Scally v. Velasquez, No. 22-
23 CV-0140-JLS-MDD, 2022 WL 1608562, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2022) (stating there is no due
process right to be free from false accusations or false reports by prison officials); Johnson v.
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Felker, 2013 WL 6243280, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Prisoners have no constitutionally
25 guaranteed right to be free from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification of a
[rules violation] report does not give rise to a claim under section 1983.”).
26

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1 v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro
2 se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it
3 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
4 amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).
5 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
6 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:
7 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
8 (ECF No. 2).
9 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350
10 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount
11 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to
12 the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with
13 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE NAME
14 AND CASE NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.
15 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff
16 Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, by
17 U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov.
18 4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
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5. GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which
21 to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this
22 Order. Specifically, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be complete by itself
23 without reference to any previous version of his pleading; Defendants not named and any
24 claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal.
25 CivLR 15.1; Hal Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that
26 claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading
27 may be “considered waived if not repled”); Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,
Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989). If Plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will
2 enter a final Order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169
3 ||(9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his
4 ||complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the
5 || entire action.”)
6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
7 Dated: July 12, 2024 | ZS rz □ Ze
8 Hon. Anthony J.@Battaglia
9 United States District Judge
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QR

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10640340. Public record. Not legal advice.